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FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
WELCOMING REMARKS
My assignment this morning is a very brief one. First, I want to
thank the keynote speakers, all the participants in the panels and
the moderators of panels, for your willingness to participate in this
special program.
I want to say to the Urban Law Journal and all the students in-
volved this year and last year what an incredible job you have done
in assembling the tremendous quality of people who will partici-
pate in the program today.
You mentioned the origin of the program as emanating from me,
but it has a much deeper involvement that does not involve me,
and perhaps it might be relevant to very briefly share that.
In the fall of 1999, during the height of the impeachment pro-
ceedings involving President Clinton, I received a call from a stu-
dent attending a graduate school in California in a discipline other
than the law. The student asked me, on behalf of her class, if I
could share some views with the class through the student on the
subject of forgiveness in the law. The question was: did it have a
place in the law, and, if so, what was it?
I was, frankly, dumbfounded by the question. I found myself
hesitant about offering any perspective on the subject because it
was not one that I had given really any thought to. I realized that
the class was a very significant class, indeed, and I should not be
irresponsible enough to offer some "two cents" kind of response.
I said to the student that I would like to think about it and then
respond. I then sought out the views of three or four members of
our faculty here at Fordham Law School, and I was astonished by
some of the responses I received. Somehow, I did not feel from the
responses any better equipped to respond to the question than I
had been when I initially received the telephone call.
One member of the faculty said to me, "Forgiveness has no place
in the law, that you go to the law when everything else breaks
down, and the law is there when nothing else has worked." He
suggested of a writing that I might pursue. I, frankly, threw up my
hands and did not return the call. I knew the student who called
me and I knew that she would understand my not calling.
Two of the editors of the Urban Law Journal must have heard
my lament. I was not aware until this morning that I had written a
little note, one sentence, I was told by Elizabeth Malang, to the
Urban Law Journal, asking the question of "is this something that
students might have an interest in, in developing a program?"
Everything that has taken place since is the work product of our
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students and our Urban Law Journal, co-sponsored by our Stein
Center on Law and Ethics.
I just want to say again to our students thank you for bringing
together such a diverse and talented group. I am not sure at the
end of the day if I will be in any better position to respond than I
would be right now, but I do know I will benefit tremendously, as I
am sure all of you will, from the tremendous variety of back-
grounds and points of view that are obviously present or will be
present today in the room.
A final note would be that we live in a time when social idealism,
in my view, is not as clearly present, certainly among the popula-
tions that I interface with, as it was at an earlier stage in my life and
my early participation in the legal profession. I lament as I see in
our society the constant focus on punishment, the constant focus
on retribution, and on incapacitation. These are, of course, impor-
tant values, important goals. I do not see in American society to-
day - at least the parts that I am familiar with, and that is obviously
a very small part - much discussion on subjects like forgiveness and
the law. I salute you, Elizabeth, and all your colleagues for bring-
ing us together to learn more about this subject.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
FORGIVENESS, RECONCILIATION AND RESPONDING To EVIL:
A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW
Introduction
PROFESSOR MURPHY: I am honored to be a part of what
promises to be a rich and varied symposium on forgiveness. What
I have been asked to do is to present a philosophical overview on
the topic of forgiveness in order to provide a framework for the
day's later discussions. I have also been asked to limit my remarks
to thirty minutes. This time limit will, of course, entail that most of
what I say will be quite general, since I shall not be able to make
the kinds of qualifications and refinements that would be possible
if I had more time. Being general is not the same as being shallow,
however, and I will do my best to avoid this latter pitfall.
Before getting into the details of my discussion, I would like to
make three preliminary points.
First, I should note that most of my thinking and writing on for-
giveness and reconciliation has concerned what might be called in-
terpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation - e.g., forgiveness of an
unfaithful spouse, a betraying friend, a malicious colleague, a gov-
ernment agent by whom one has been tortured, or a criminal by
whom one has been victimized. With respect to law, my focus has
been more on criminal than civil law.
I have only recently started to think and write about what might
be called group forgiveness and reconciliation as possible re-
sponses to such mass violence as genocide and apartheid. My
views on this topic are still in a very early stage, and thus I feel very
fortunate that I shall be able to join you all this afternoon in listen-
ing to the talk by Professor Martha Minow. She is the author of the
truly splendid book, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing
History After Genocide and Mass Violence.'
The second preliminary point I want to make concerns my own
qualifications to speak on the topic in question. I have been think-
ing and writing about this topic for many years, and over the years
I have developed increasingly positive views about the value of for-
giveness. (Indeed, my early views on the topic were perceived as
so negative that a colleague once suggested that my chapters in the
book Forgiveness and Mercy should be subtitled "An Outsider's
1. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HIS-
TORY AFTR GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
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View.") However, I want to make it clear that my current views
are essentially intellectual and theoretical rather than autobio-
graphical in nature. Although I have over the years suffered my
share of petty slights and insults, I have led an astoundingly fortu-
nate life in the realm of victimization. I have experienced some
small scale immorality, but nothing that I would identify as evil. I
have never to my knowledge been betrayed by a loved one or
friend; I have never been tortured; I have never been raped; I have
never been violently assaulted or been the victim of any crime
more serious than auto theft - nor has anyone close to me. Thus,
when I speak of forgiveness as a virtue, I know that I may be open
to the charge "easy for you to say." When those who have been
seriously victimized can emerge from their victimization without
hate, there is nobility and moral grandeur to be found in their ca-
pacity to forgive. Nelson Mandela seems to be such a person. I
have no idea, however, if I could rise to this in similar circum-
stances; and thus I will express my admiration for such people
without ever meaning to suggest that I know that I could act in a
comparable way.
The third and final preliminary point I want to make concerns
the level of precision that one can expect on the topic of forgive-
ness. With Aristotle, I tend to think that it is generally a mistake in
ethics to aim for a level of precision not really allowed by what is in
fact a quite messy and conflicted subject matter. Neat theories in
ethics generally produce not illumination but rather (in Herbert
Hart's fine phrase) uniformity at the price of distortion.z (I am
convinced, indeed, that a really insightful book in ethics would not
have as a title "The Theory of. . . ." but rather something like
"Muddling Through" or "Stumbling Along."'3) Thus all one can
hope to do is to enrich the discussion a bit by exposing some of the
value choices at the heart of forgiveness - a point well made by
Professor Minow in her book when she says that she will resist "ti-
diness" and "temptations of closure" in her own thinking and writ-
ing about forgiveness.4
Preliminaries out of the way, I shall now move to my "philosoph-
ical overview." But what exactly is it that philosophers do? Well,
first they draw a lot of distinctions. (Indeed, I think it was J. L.
Austin who once suggested that the drawing of distinctions might
be the occupation and not just the occupational disease of philoso-
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 38 (2d ed. 1994).
3. The second title was suggested to me in conversation by D.Z. Phillips.
4. See MINOW, supra note 1, at 4, 24.
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phers.) Thus I shall begin by attempting to explain what forgive-
ness is and, in the process, distinguish it from various other things it
is not but with which is has often been confused. After that, I will
explore what can be said against forgiveness and then close with a
discussion of what can be said in its favor.
The Nature of Forgiveness
I think that one of the most insightful discussions of forgiveness
ever penned is to be found in Bishop Joseph Butler's 1726 sermon
"Upon Forgiveness of Injuries."' 5 In that sermon, Bishop Butler
offers a definition of forgiveness that I have adapted in my own
work on the topic.6 According to Butler, forgiveness is a moral
virtue (a virtue of character) that is essentially a matter of the
heart, the inner self, and involves a change in inner feeling more
than a change in external action. The change in feeling is this: the
overcoming, on moral grounds, of the intense negative reactive at-
titudes - the vindictive passions of resentment, anger, hatred, and
the desire for revenge - that are quite naturally occasioned when
one has been wronged by another responsible agent. A person
who has forgiven has overcome those vindictive attitudes and has
overcome them for a morally creditable motive - e.g., being
moved by repentance on the part of the person by whom one has
been wronged. Of course, such a change in feeling often leads to a
change of behavior - reconciliation, for example; but, as our abil-
ity to forgive the dead illustrates, it does not always do so.
On this analysis of forgiveness, it is useful initially to distinguish
forgiveness from other responses to wrongdoing with which for-
giveness is often confused: justification, excuse, mercy, and recon-
ciliation. Although these concepts are to some degree open
textured and can bleed into each other, clarity is - I think -
served if one at least starts by attempting to separate them. I will
discuss each of them briefly.
1. Justification: To regard conduct as justified (as in lawful
self defense, for example) is to claim that the conduct, though nor-
mally wrongful, was - in the given circumstances and all things
considered - the right thing to do. If I have suffered because of
5. See Sermon IX, in SERMONS OF JOSEPH BUTLER 127-41 (W. E. Gladstone ed.,
1897).
6. My adaptation of Butler is free, and I make no pretense that what follows is a
solid piece of Butler scholarship. I have been inspired by Butler's discussion; and
thus, even when I have modified or added to that discussion, I hope that I have always
been loyal to its essential spirit.
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conduct that was right - e.g., had my nose bloodied by someone
defending himself against my wrongful attack - I have not been
wronged, have nothing legitimately to resent, and thus have noth-
ing to forgive.
2. Excuse: To regard conduct as excused (as in the insanity
defense, for example) is to admit that the conduct was wrong but to
claim that the person who engaged in the conduct lacked substan-
tial capacity to conform his conduct to the relevant norms and thus
was not a fully responsible agent. Responsible agency is, of course,
a matter of degree; but to the degree that the person who injures
me is not a responsible agent, resentment of that person would
make no more sense than resenting a sudden storm that soaks me.
Again, there is nothing here to forgive.
3. Mercy: To accord a wrongdoer mercy is to inflict a less
harsh consequence on that person than allowed by institutional
(usually legal) rules. Mercy is less personal than forgiveness, since
the one granting mercy (a sentencing judge, say) typically will not
be a victim of wrongdoing and thus will not have any feelings of
resentment to overcome. (There is a sense in which only victims of
wrongdoing have what might be called standing to forgive.) Mercy
also has a public behavioral dimension not necessarily present in
forgiveness. I can forgive a person simply in my heart of hearts,
but I cannot show mercy simply in my heart of hearts. I can forgive
the dead, but I cannot show mercy to the dead. I can forgive my-
self, but I cannot show mercy to myself.
This distinction between mercy and forgiveness allows us to see
why there is no inconsistency in fully forgiving a person for wrong-
doing (that is, stop resenting or hating the person for it) but still
advocate that the person suffer the legal consequence of criminal
punishment. To the degree that criminal punishment is justified in
order to secure victim satisfaction, then - of course - the fact
that the victim has forgiven will be a relevant argument for reduc-
ing the criminal's sentence and the fact that a victim still resents
and hates will be a relevant argument for increasing that sentence.
It is highly controversial, of course, that criminal punishment
should to any degree be harnessed to victim desires.7 Even if it is,
however, it must surely be admitted that the practice serves other
values as well - particularly crime control and justice; and, with
respect to these goals, victim forgiveness could hardly be disposi-
7. For a survey of the arguments pro and con, on allowing victim desires to influ-
ence criminal sentencing, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
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tive. In short: It would indeed be inconsistent for a person to
claim that he has forgiven the wrongdoer and still advocate punish-
ment for the wrongdoer in order to satisfy his personal vindictive
feelings. (If he still has those feelings, he has not forgiven.) It
would not be inconsistent, however, to advocate punishment for
other legitimate reasons. Of course, the possibilities for self decep-
tion are enormous here.
4. Reconciliation. The vindictive passions (those overcome
in forgiveness) are often a major barrier to reconciliation; and thus,
since forgiveness often leads to reconciliation, it is easy to confuse
the two concepts. I think, however, that it is important also to see
how they may differ - how there can be forgiveness without rec-
onciliation and reconciliation without forgiveness.
First let me give an example of forgiveness without reconcilia-
tion. Imagine a battered woman who has been repeatedly beaten
and raped by her husband or boyfriend. This woman - after a
religious conversion, perhaps - might well come to forgive her
batterer (i.e., stop hating him) without a willingness to resume her
relationship with him. "I forgive you and wish you well" can, in my
view, sit quite consistently with "I never want you in this house
again." In short, the fact that one has forgiven does not mean that
one must also trust or live again with a person.
As an example of reconciliation without forgiveness, consider
the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission.8 In order to negotiate a viable transition from apartheid
to democratic government with full black participation, all parties
had to agree that there would in most cases be no punishment for
evil acts that occurred under the previous government. Wrongdo-
ers, by making a full confession and accepting responsibility, would
typically be granted amnesty. In this process the wrongdoers
would not be required to repent, show remorse, or even apologize.
I can clearly see this process as one of reconciliation - a process
that will allow all to work toward a democratic and just future. I
do not so easily see this process as one of forgiveness, however. No
change of heart was required or even sought from the victims - no
overcoming of such vindictive feelings as resentment and hatred.
All that was required of them was a willingness to accept this pro-
cess as a necessary means to the future good of their society.
In my view, this counts as forgiveness only if one embraces what
is (to me) a less morally rich definition of forgiveness: forgiveness
8. For a survey of the operation of the Commission, see MINOW, supra, note 1, at
52-90.
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merely as the waiving of a right. Examples of this are found in the
private law idea of forgiving a debt or in Bishop Desmond Titu's
definition of forgiveness as "waiving one's right to revenge."9 But
surely one can waive one's rights for purely instrumental reasons;
reasons having nothing to do with the change of heart that consti-
tutes forgiveness as a moral virtue. One can even waive one's
rights for selfish reasons - e.g., the belief that one's future em-
ployment prospects will be better if one simply lets bygones be
bygones. I am not saying that it is wrong to act for instrumental
reasons - indeed, for South Africa, it may have been the only
justified course. Neither am I saying that instrumental justifica-
tions can never be moral justifications. To attempt reconciliation
for the future good of one's society, for example, is surely both
instrumental and moral. I am simply saying that, however justified
acting instrumentally may sometimes be, it is - absent the extinc-
tion of resentment and other vindictive passions - something
other than what I understand as the moral virtue of forgiveness. In
short: If all we know is that two parties have decided to reconcile,
we do not know enough to make a reliable judgment about
whether the moral virtue of forgiveness has been realized in the
reconciliation.
Another point worth making about the relation between recon-
ciliation and forgiveness is this: If one always delayed reconcilia-
tion until forgiveness had taken place, then some vitally important
kinds of reconciliation might not be possible. Thus the realization
that forgiveness is often a helpful step toward reconciliation should
not lead us into the mistaken belief that forgiveness is a necessary
condition for reconciliation. Indeed, it is surely sometimes the case
that reconciliation, coming first and adopted for instrumental rea-
sons, opens the door to future forgiveness. After learning that one
can work with one's victimizer toward a common goal, a sense of
common humanity might emerge and one's vindictive passions to-
ward that person might over time begin to soften.
Let me now discuss the evaluation of forgiveness as I - follow-
ing Bishop Butler - have defined it.
The Dangers of Hasty Forgiveness
In addition to his powerful sermon on forgiveness, Bishop Butler
authored an equally powerful sermon with the title "Upon Resent-
9. Interview by Bill Moyers with Bishop Desmond TItu, PBS (Apr. 27, 1999).
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ment."'10 In that sermon, Butler started to make a case for the le-
gitimacy of resentment and other vindictive passions - arguing
that a just and loving God would not have universally implanted
these passions within his creatures unless the passions served some
valuable purpose. The danger of resentment, he argued, lies not in
having it, but rather in being dominated and consumed by it to
such a degree that one can never overcome it and acts irresponsibly
on the basis of it. As the initial response to being wronged, how-
ever, the passion stands in defense of important values - values
that might be compromised by immediate and uncritical forgive-
ness of wrongs.
What are the values defended by resentment and threatened by
hasty and uncritical forgiveness? I would suggest two: respect for
self and respect for the moral order. A person who never resented
any injuries done to himself might be a saint. It is equally likely,
however, that his lack of resentment reveals a servile personality -
a personality lacking in respect for himself and respect for his
rights and status as a free and equal moral agent. (This is the point
behind the famous quip: "To err is human; to forgive, supine.") 11
Just as indignation or guilt over the mistreatment of others stands
as emotional testimony that we care about them and their rights, so
does resentment stand as emotional testimony that we care about
ourselves and our rights.
Related to this is an instrumental point: Those who have vindic-
tive dispositions toward those who wrong them give potential
wrongdoers an incentive not to wrong them. If I were going to set
out to oppress other people, I would surely prefer to select for my
victims persons whose first response is forgiveness rather than per-
sons whose first response is revenge. As Kant noted in his Doc-
trine of Virtue, "One who makes himself into a worm cannot
complain if people step on him.' 12
Resentment does not simply stand as emotional testimony of
self-respect, however. This passion - and the reluctance to hastily
transcend it in forgiveness - also stands as testimony to our alle-
giance to the moral order itself. This is a point made forcefully by
Aurel Kolnai in his important essay on forgiveness. 3 According to
10. See Sermon VIII, in SERMONS OF JOSEPH BUTLER, supra note 5, at 115-126.
11. I have heard this quip attributed to the comic writer S. J. Perelman (who often
wrote for the Marx Brothers), but I am not certain if the attribution is accurate.
12. IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE, PART II OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 103, (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1964).
13. See AUREL KOLNAI, Forgiveness, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SO-
CIETY 91, 95-98 (1973-74).
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Kolnai, we all have a duty to support - both intellectually and
emotionally - the moral order, an order represented by clear un-
derstandings of what constitutes unacceptable treatment of one
human being by another. If we do not show some resentment to
those who, in victimizing us, flout those understandings, then we
run the risk of being "complicitous in evil."
If I had more time, I could say many more things in defense of
the vindictive passions. (Indeed, I am soon to publish an essay
with the title "TWo Cheers for Vindictiveness."' 4 ) I hope I have
said enough, however, to support Butler's claim that these passions
have some positive value. Having such value, these passions are
unlike, say, malice - pure delight in the misfortunes and sufferings
of others. Malice is by no means universal but is, where present,
intrinsically evil or diseased or both. Butler essentially wants to
apply Aristotle's idea of the mean to the passion of resentment -
developing an account of the circumstances that justify it and the
degree to which it is legitimate to feel and be guided by it.15 But
the doctrine of the mean does not apply to malice; for the proper
amount of this passion is always zero.
Uncritical boosters for quick forgiveness have a tendency to
treat resentment and the other vindictive passions as though, like
malice, they are intrinsically evil - passions that no decent person
would acknowledge.' 6 In this, I think that they are quite mistaken.
In the Oresteia, Athena rightly made an honorable home for the
Furies (representatives of the vindictive passions) - so con-
straining their excess by due process and the rule of law that they
become the Eumenides (the Kindly Ones), protectors of law and
social stability.' 7 There is no honorable home for malice, however.
Let me summarize what I have argued to this point: The prob-
lem with resentment and other vindictive passions is not (as with
malice) their very existence. In their proper place, they have an
important role to play in the defense of self and of the moral and
legal order. The problem with these passions is rather their ten-
14. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Two Cheers for Vindictiveness, in PUNISHMENT AND
SOCIETY (forthcoming).
15. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1107a, reprinted in NICHOMACHEAN
ETHICS 44-46 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
16. I sometimes think I find such uncritical boosterism among certain voices
within what might be called the "forgiveness movement" in clinical psychology. See
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Forgiveness in Counseling: A Philosophical Perspective, in
CHARACTER, LIBERTY AND LAW: KANTIAN ESSAYS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 223-
238 (1998).
17. See AESCHYLUS, ORESTEIA (Robert Fagles trans., 1979).
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dency to get out of control - to so dominate the life of a victim-
ized person that the person's own life is soured and, in his revenge
seeking, he starts to pose a danger to the very moral and legal or-
der that rightly identifies him.as a victim of immorality. It is here
- as a limiting and overcoming virtue - that forgiveness has its
important role to play.
Forgiveness as a Virtue
It is, of course, possible to take one's revenge against others in
measured and proportional and peaceful ways - ways as simple as
a cutting remark before colleagues or a failure to continue issuing
lunch invitations.
Very often, however, a victimized person will allow vindictive-
ness to take over his very self - turning him into a self-righteous
fanatic so involved - even joyous - in his outrage that he will be
satisfied only with the utter annihilation of the person who has
wronged him. Such a person is sometimes even willing to destroy,
as symbolic stand-ins, persons who have done him no wrong or
who may even be totally innocent. 18 Such a person is a danger to
himself - very like, as I think Nietzsche once said, a scorpion
stinging itself with its own tail - and poses a threat to the morality
and decency of the social order. A person under the power of such
vindictiveness can, often unconsciously, even use the language of
justice and crime control as a rationalization for what is really sad-
ism and cruelty. I cannot help thinking, for example, that many of
the unspeakably brutish conditions that we tolerate in our prisons
flow not from the stated legitimate desires for justice and crime
control, but rather from a vindictiveness so out of control that it
actually becomes a kind of malice.
Against such a background, forgiveness can be seen as a healing
virtue that brings with it great blessings - chief among them being
its capacity to free us from being consumed by our angers, its ca-
pacity to check our tendencies toward cruelty, and its capacity to
open the door to the restoration of those relationships in our lives
that are worthy of restoration. This last blessing can be seen in the
fact that, since each one of us will sometimes wrong the people that
mean the most to us, there will be times when we will want to be
18. The von Kleist story Michael Kohlhaas - retold by E. L. Doctorow in his
novel, Ragtime (1974), is a famous illustration of this. A good English translation of
Heinrich von Kleist's 1808 novella Michael Kohlhass may be found in HEINRICH VON
KLEIST, THE MARQUISE OF 0 AND OTHER STORIES 114-213 (David Luke & Nigel
Reeves trans., 1978).
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forgiven by those whom we have wronged. Seeing this, no rational
person would desire to live in a world where forgiveness was not
seen as a healing virtue. This is, I take it, the secular meaning of
the parable of the unforgiving servant.19
We are faced, then, with a complex dilemma: How are we to
reap the blessings of forgiveness without sacrificing our self respect
or our respect for the moral order in the process?
One great help here - and I make no claim that it is the only
help or even a necessary condition for forgiveness - is sincere re-
pentance on the part of the wrongdoer. When I am wronged by
another, a great part of the injury - over and above any physical
harm I may suffer - is the insulting or degrading message that has
been given to me by the wrongdoer; the message is that I am less
worthy than he is, so unworthy that he may use me merely as a
means or object in service to his desires and projects. Thus failing
to resent (or hastily forgiving) the wrongdoer runs the risk that I
am endorsing that very immoral message for which the wrongdoer
stands. If the wrongdoer sincerely repents, however, he now joins
me in repudiating the degrading and insulting message - allowing
me to relate to him (his new self) as an equal without fear that a
failure to resent him will be read as a failure to resent what he has
done. In short: It is much easier to follow St. Augustine's counsel
that we should "hate the sin but not the sinner" when the sinner
(the wrongdoer) repudiates his own wrongdoing through an act of
repentance.20
My point here is that sincere repentance on the part of the
wrongdoer opens the door to forgiveness and often to reconcilia-
tion. This is not to suggest, however, that we should always de-
mand repentance as a condition for forgiveness and reconciliation.
When a person comes to repentance as a result of his own spiritual
growth, we are witness to an inspiring transformation of character.
Any repentance that is simply a response to a demand or external
incentive, however, is very likely to be fake. In what could be read
as a commentary both on certain aspects of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines2' and on remarks made by some of our current crop of
19. See Matthew 18:21-35.
20. St. Augustine's remark, so often rendered as it is here, more literally reads
"with love of mankind and hatred of sins." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTA-
TIONS 37 (Angela Partington ed., rev. 4th ed. 1996) (citing Letter 211, reprinted in 33
PATROLOGIAE LATINAE (J. P. Minge ed., 1845)).
21. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1998) ("If
the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, de-
crease the offense level by 2 levels.").
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elected officials, Montaigne wrote: "These men make us believe
that they feel great regret and remorse within, but of atonement
and correction or interruption they show us no sign .... I know of
no quality so easy to counterfeit as piety. ' 22 Montaigne's observa-
tion also suggests that the South Africans were perhaps wise in not
making repentance a condition for amnesty under their Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
So let us welcome repentance when we find it, and let us do what
we can to create a climate where it can flourish and open the door
to the moral rebirth of the wrongdoer and to forgiveness by the
wronged. But, out of respect for the genuine article, let us not de-
mand or otherwise coerce it. Demanding tends to produce only
lying and may even be degrading to the wrongdoer - inviting his
further corruption rather than his moral rebirth. David Lurie, the
central character in J. M. Coetzee's recent novel Disgrace, could
save his job if he simply expressed the kind of repentance de-
manded of him by the university disciplinary board that has au-
thority over him. I find myself sympathizing with the reasons he
gives for not giving them what they want when he says:
We went through the repentance business yesterday. I told you
what I thought. I won't do it. I appeared before an officially
constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. Before that
secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea
should suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. Repen-
tance belongs to another world, to another universe of dis-
course .... [What you are asking] reminds me too much of
Mao's China. Recantation, self-criticism, public apology. I'm
old fashioned, I would prefer simply to be put against a wall and
shot.23
There has in recent times been much cheap and shallow chatter
about forgiveness and repentance - some of it coming from high
political officials and some coming from the kind of psychobabble
often found in self-help and recovery books. As a result of this,
many people are, I fear, starting to become cynical about both. For
reasons I have developed here, repentance may pave the way for
forgiveness. It is less likely to do so, however, in a world where we
come to believe that too many claims of repentance are insincere
and expedient - talking the talk without (so far as we can tell)
walking the walk.
22. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, ON REPENTANCE (1588), in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS
OF MONTAIGNE 617 (Donald Frame trans., 1958).
23. J.M. COETZEE, DISGRACE 58, 66 (1999).
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I have reached a point where I fear that I have both used up my
time and worn out my welcome. So I will now move to bring my
remarks to a close by touching briefly on one additional issue.
Forgiveness and Christianity
At a symposium on forgiveness sponsored by a distinguished
Catholic university, it would be fitting for me to close my talk with
a few general remarks about the relationship between religion -
particularly Christianity - and forgiveness. As someone who is
neither devout nor trained in theology, I am hardly the best person
to do this - either spiritually or intellectually. However, I will
take a brief stab at it none the less.
There are, I think, at least three ways in which a Christian per-
spective on the world might make the struggle toward forgiveness
- not easy, surely - but at least slightly less difficult than it other-
wise might be. (Similar perspectives might also be present, of
course, in other religions and world views.) 24
First, I think that Christianity tends to introduce a humbling per-
spective on one's self and one's personal concerns - attempting to
counter our natural tendencies of pride and narcissistic self impor-
tance. According to this perspective, we are all fallible and flawed
and all stand in deep need of forgiveness. This perspective does
not seek to trivialize the wrongs that we suffer, but it does seek to
blunt our very human tendency to magnify those wrongs out of all
reasonable sense of proportion - the tendency to see ourselves as
morally pure while seeing those who wrong us as evil incarnate. By
breaking down a sharp us-them dichotomy, such a view should
make it easier to follow Auden's counsel to "love your crooked
neighbor with your crooked heart. '25 This should make us more
open to the possibility of forgiving those who have wronged us and
should also help us to keep our justified resentments from turning
into malicious hatreds and our demands for just punishment from
serving as rationalizations for sadistic cruelty.
24. See, e.g., the discussion of the background world view that underlies the Judaic
conception of forgiveness in Louis E. Newman's The Quality of Mercy: On the Duty
to Forgive in the Judaic Tradition, 15 JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUs ETmics 155 (1987). For
the context provided by Stoicism, see Seneca, On Anger and On Mercy, in 1 MORAL
ESSAYS 106-449 (John W. Basore trans., 1994). For a discussion of forgiveness in capi-
tal murder cases from an Islamic perspective, see Azizah al-Hibri, The Muslim Per-
spective on the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1723, 1728-29 (1996).
25. W.H. AUDEN, As I Walked Out One Evening, in COLLECTED POEMS 135
(1991).
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Related to this is a second Christian teaching that might help
open the door to forgiveness - a teaching that concerns not the
status of the victim, but the status of the wrongdoer. According to
Christianity, we are supposed to see the wrongdoer, as we are sup-
posed to see each person, as a child of God, created in His image,
and thus as ultimately precious. This vision is beautifully expressed
by the writer William Trevor in his novel Felicia's Journey. He
speaks with compassion and forgiveness even of the serial killer
who is a central character of that novel and writes of him: "Lost
within a man who murdered, there was a soul like any other soul,
purity itself it surely once had been."26 Viewing the wrongdoer in
this way - seeing in him the innocent child he once was - should
make it difficult to hate him with the kind of abandon that would
make forgiveness of him utterly impossible.
Third and finally, Christianity teaches that the universe is - for
all its evil and hardship - ultimately benign, created and sustained
by a loving God, and to be met with hope rather than despair. On
this view, the world may be falling, but - as Rilke wrote - "there
is One who holds this falling/with infinite softness in his hands."27
If I could embrace such a view of the universe and our place in it
- a view for which there is surely no proof, requiring a faith that is
properly called religious - then perhaps I would not so easily
think that the struggle against evil - even evil done to me - is my
task alone, all up to me.28 If I think that I alone can and must
make things right - including making sure that the people I have
branded as evil get exactly what is coming to them - then I take
on a kind of self-importance that makes me not only unforgiving
but dangerous - becoming the kind of person Nietzsche probably
had in mind when he warned that we should "mistrust those in
whom the urge to punish is very strong. ' 29 If I were capable of a
26. WILLIAM TREVOR, FELICIA'S JOURNEY 212 (1994).
27. RAINER MARIA RILKE, Autumn, in THE BOOK OF IMAGES (Edward Snow
trans., 1991).
28. I came to see the value of this perspective when it was used by philosopher-
theologian Marilyn Adams in her critique of some of my earlier writing on forgive-
ness. See Marilyn Adams, Forgiveness: A Christian Model, 8 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
277-304 (1991). I have also recently come to see the wisdom in Herbert Morris's use
of the thought of Simone Weil on these matters. See Herbert Morris & Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Exchange on Forgiveness, 7 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 3, 22 (Summer/Fall
1988).
29. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathrustra, Second Part, On the Taran-
tulas, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 212 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1970). I pursue
Nietzsche's thoughts on punishment in somewhat greater detail in my Moral Episte-
mology, the Retributive Emotions, and the "Clumsy Moral Philosophy" of Jesus Christ,
in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 149 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999).
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certain kind of faith, then perhaps I could relax a bit the clinched
fist with which I try to protect myself, sustain my self respect,
avenge myself, and hold my world together all alone.
This brings to a close my brief ruminations on forgiveness -
ruminations that have, I hope, helped a bit to provide a framework
for the discussion to follow today. As much as I love my own disci-
pline of philosophy, however, I believe that it is the poets and
other literary artists who do the best job of providing a vision
around which not just our thinking but our sensibilities can be or-
ganized. And thus I shall give my last word to the poet Seamus
Heaney and simply read to you a brief excerpt from his play, The
Cure at Troy:
Human beings suffer.
They torture one another.
They get hurt and get hard.
No poem or play or song
Can fully right a wrong
Inflicted and endured.
The innocent in goals
Beat on their bars together.
A hunger-striker's father
Stands in the graveyard dumb.
The police widow in veils
Faints at the funeral home.
History says, Don't hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up.
And hope and history rhyme.
So hope for a great sea-change
On the far side of revenge.
Believe that a further shore
Is reachable from here .. 30
30. SEAMUS HEANEY, THE CURE AT TROY 77 (1991). This play is Heaney's per-
forming version of Sophocles's Philoctetes.
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FORGIVENESS AND JUSTICE*
PROFESSOR MURPHY: I was struck by something Linda
Meyer said about the way in which crime undermines basic public
trust.3' I think that is a very important insight. On the other hand,
it seems to me that it can be a matter of degree, in that I think one
of the sad commentaries on our current society is that there is not a
terribly high level of public trust. If we had a more communitarian
society, the idea that a crime undermines public trust would be an
even more powerful argument than in a society as "discom-
munitarian," as ours increasingly is.
The example I think of is how deeply upset I get when I hear a
crime has been committed as the result of appealing to the rare and
precious human quality we think of as generosity. The kind of
crimes I am thinking of are when people pretend to be accident
victims and a generous, Good Samaritan-type person stops and
helps them, and then that person is beaten and robbed. That seems
to me to lend extra horror, over and above what was done, because
it undermines our increasingly fragile sense of community.
PROFESSOR ZIPURSKY: I have a question as well as a com-
ment. The term "forgiveness" is ambiguous and can refer to an
emotion. It can also refer to a disposition to do the opposite of
"standing on one's rights," as Jeff Murphy put it in his book with
regard to mercy.32 It can refer to the equivalent of loan forgive-
ness, refraining from enforcing a right that you have. In this sense,
there is a certain degree of forgiveness in, one could argue, a prose-
cutor who does not go for the maximum sentence.
My question is whether there are connections between the dispo-
sition to forgive in the sense of not enforcing one's rights to their
full power, on the one hand, and the disposition to feel forgiveness
in the way that Jeffrie Murphy and others have described it, on the
other.
* The presentations of the following panelists are presented in detail in their
respective articles or essays written in connection with this Symposium. See Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Keynote Address, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Responding to Evil: A
Philosophical Overview, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353 (2000); Susan Bandes, When
Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000); Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515 (2000); Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Is There a Place for
Forgiveness in the Justice System?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1721 (2000). We reprint
here the discussion and questions that followed the presentations.
31. See Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URn. L.J.
1515 (2000).
32. JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE MURPHY, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988).
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A closely related question is, how do we want to define the vir-
tue of forgiveness: in terms of the disposition to go through the
acts of refraining from enforcing one's rights in a variety of circum-
stances, or in terms of the disposition to feel forgiveness?
PROFESSOR BANDES: I have a number of questions, if that
counts as a response, not just about your comments, Ben, but
about a lot of what Linda said as well.
I certainly agree with Linda, for example, that a lot of these for-
giveness issues are communitarian issues,33 issues of what the com-
munity is willing to forgive and what kind of vengeance the
community needs. I think that raises a host of questions that
trouble me about the individual's standing in the criminal justice
system.
I guess I have the same question about Ben's question, which is,
what do we mean when we say "enforcing one's rights?" If we are
talking about criminal law - I don't know if your question was
confined to that - the sorts of rights the prosecutor is enforcing
are not individual rights, they are community rights.
These are things I am struggling with and I don't have any an-
swers. It seems that the real problem is in the individual's role and
not the community role. For example, when does the victim get to
object to a prosecutor's decision or a sentencing decision? When
Linda talks about a more expansive definition of who gets to for-
give, my question is what is the legal implication of that? What
should be the legal consequences of saying that only certain people
can forgive, when it seems that we are dealing here with a much
more collectivized notion of forgiveness?
PROFESSOR MEYER: Maybe my response will answer, or at
least partially respond to, both of those thoughts. There is a very
deep connection between giving up one's rights, if you will, and the
forgiveness idea. I would extend it even to reconceptualizing our
understanding of punishment. If we take seriously the idea that a
wrong is a breach of trust with the community, and we take seri-
ously the idea that forgiveness is, in a sense, being willing to deal
with that offender again, punishment is no longer about just deserts
because we have acknowledged that just deserts are impossible.
Punishment then becomes a matter of atonement. Here I would
gesture toward Stephen Garvey's recent article, Punishment as
Atonement,34 which provides a wonderful transitional view of pun-
33. See Meyer, supra note 31, at 1519-21.
34. STEPHEN P. GARVEY, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801
(1999).
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ishment that says, "look at what we are doing when we are punish-
ing. We are not getting even, we are not doing vengeance, but we
are giving the opportunity to a defendant to atone for his crime so
that he can then be reconciled."
Atonement avoids the problem that mitigating a punishment
seems unjust. Instead, the offender is doing penance, undertaking
a sacrifice, in order to demonstrate her sincerity and her desire to
move back into the community. Atonement ends up pushing to-
gether forgiveness and punishment in a way with which we are not
familiar. "Just desserts" drops out of the picture.
PROFESSOR MURPHY: In ordinary language we use the
word "forgiveness" to mean two rather different things. It is prob-
ably a good idea to try to keep those separate. The idea of simply
waiving a right does not necessarily imply that anybody has done
any wrong. That is one sense of forgiveness. The other sense of
forgiveness is forgiving a wrong.
There is a perfectly legitimate sense in which we might talk
about the legitimacy, let's say, of forgiving third-world debt. I
would not want it tacitly to be thought that if we talk that way
somehow there is wrongdoing on the part of the third world. That
is a different sense of forgiveness, it seems to me, than forgiving a
wrong. For that reason, it is worth keeping those two concepts sep-
arate sometimes.
PROFESSOR WORTHINGTON: It is important to make a dis-
tinction between forgiveness as an intrapersonal event versus recon-
ciliation, which I define as restoration of trust after a breach in
trust. Reconciliation involves a lot of talking about the transgres-
sion and talking about forgiveness. It is a separate issue than the
experience of forgiveness. Although they are related to each other
and there is a psychological relationship, they are still different
issues.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: I am interested in forgiveness as a personal trans-
formation and the degree to which the legal system can facilitate
that, engender it or encourage it. Professor Murphy talked about
the relationship between religion and forgiveness and named, I
think, three components of how religion and Christianity can en-
courage forgiveness. I want to know if he has any ideas about re-
forms or mechanisms in the law that can encourage or engender
forgiveness on the part of victims, to encourage victims to forgive
their wrongdoers?
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PROFESSOR MURPHY: The one thing I am aware of is the
victim/offender mediation family conference model in juvenile jus-
tice. An Australian philosopher and politician, named David
Moore, has written quite insightfully on this in Criminal Justice
Ethics.35
AUDIENCE: The implicit baseline assumption here is that
there is a category of situations in which it is right to inflict human
suffering in order to achieve certain goals, such as to feel better or
get justice. I am mystified as to the basis for this. Forgiveness is
treated as this weird sort of spigot, and sometimes we turn off that
thing and take for granted that imposing human suffering is a good
thing to do. Why isn't it the other way around, that inflicting
human suffering deliberately is a bad thing to do and that forgive-
ness is the normal thing, and possibly there are situations where,
for consequential reasons you still have to punish?
PROFESSOR MEYER: I think you are right, and I think that
one of the things that I would like to see changed is our view that
justice is what creates community and undergirds our relations with
each other. I think that justice is chancy. If you look at the statis-
tics, very few crimes get reported, very few crimes that are re-
ported get prosecuted, very few of the prosecutions result in trials,
and so forth.36 So the ultimate numbers of cases that actually get
tried and get "justice" are very few. I think it is very important to
recognize that, indeed, forgiveness is the norm and forgiveness is
what really binds us together, rather than justice.
PROFESSOR MURPHY: I guess I would slightly disagree in
that if you look at all of the philosophical writings on punishment,
all the way back to Plato, the underlying assumption has always
been that what we do to people in punishing is a bad and terrible
thing. It is to hurt people. In our system, it is essentially locking
them up in cages or killing them. If you wanted to teach some-
body, a little kid, what it means to do something terrible to some-
body and to hurt them, you could hardly give two better examples.
So it is not quite right to say that our assumption is that hurting
people is okay. I think our assumption is that hurting people is not
okay, which is why everybody has always thought that punishment
35. DAVID B. MOORE, Shame, Forgiveness & Juvenile Justice, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1993, at 3.
36. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14-35 (8th ed.
1994); cf. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NAT'L CRIME VIC-
TIMIZATION SURVEY (1999) (estimating the number of unreported serious crimes);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS (1998) (summarizing reported crimes).
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requires a justification. Why is it that it is sometimes okay to do
something that any decent person would have to admit is normally
not okay to do?
AUDIENCE: What happens when we tout forgiveness as a vir-
tue? I like thinking of forgiveness as a virtue. But what happens to
us as human beings when we get into, as Professor Worthington
said, a place where we want to deny our unforgiveness? What hap-
pens then, for example, when you say to your child, "I am angry
and I forgive you." How do you get into a place to really be forgiv-
ing while you are angry?
To use your example, Professor Worthington, within twenty-four
hours of your mother's murder, you say, "I forgive you, the of-
fender."37 Is the virtue of forgiveness present then, or are we in a
place of denying our unforgiveness and wanting to move too
quickly to the virtue?
PROFESSOR WORTHINGTON: I wish that I were such a for-
giving person that every single thing that I ever had to deal with in
life I could just forgive like I was blessed to be able to do with the
murder. But, unfortunately, I chair the Department of Psychology
at Virginia Commonwealth University, and dealing with the faculty
has demonstrated to me that I am not always a very forgiving per-
son. I hate to admit that, and I struggle with it a lot, because I do
think forgiveness is a virtue and I do want to practice that virtue.
Some people can forgive horrendous things very quickly, and
some people have to struggle for years to forgive the smallest
things. I have become reluctant to over-generalize and to say one
always must take a lot of time to deal with forgiveness or one al-
ways should be able to forgive instantly. It is very individual within
a person as well as across different individuals.
AUDIENCE: I want to go back to Professor Zipursky's com-
ments distinguishing between forgiveness in the sense of ceasing
anger, an emotional sense internally, versus forgiving a debt exter-
nally. Usually, when we think of what the law does, we think of it
in a coercive way; the law is the power to put someone in jail or to
order someone to pay damages, or something like that. The latter
sense of forgiveness, in terms of relinquishing a right and so on, is
something conceivably the law could do. But as to the former
sense, in terms of ceasing anger, I wonder whether there the most
that one could hope for from legal mechanisms is that they might
foster an environment that could promote internal psychological
37. See Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Is There a Place for Forgiveness in the Justice
System, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1721 (2000).
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transformation rather than command it in some sense, because it is
beyond the scope of command.
PROFESSOR ZIPURSKY: I am going to take one other ques-
tion and then let the panel answer.
AUDIENCE: I have a comment about the idea that we are
moving away from a communitarian model. I wonder what every-
one thinks about the idea that, through the mass media, we are
becoming more and more aware of certain crimes and they become
a crime to all of us. So, as much as I hated hearing about the O.J.
Simpson trial, it showed that people were completely enamored
with the idea of learning what was happening, and it still has not
gone away.
PROFESSOR BANDES: One way the law could do that is
through the way the law chooses what stories to tell about people.
A lot of the comments today show that the more we understand, or
try to understand, about people's motives and backgrounds - for
example, Everett's very moving story about his mother - the
more able we are to forgive them.
There are many ways of telling stories in the court room about
defendants, as well as victims, many choices that get made all down
the line. I suppose that greater ability to understand will often lead
to, although certainly not predictably, greater compassion and em-
pathy, but with the caveat that I think Jeff mentioned earlier, that it
is not only impossible to demand, but also impossible to measure,
the sincerity of the resulting feelings.
PROFESSOR MURPHY: Also, if we are going to take account
of victim feelings, it is important to consider the time at which we
take account of them. Professor Worthington, as Susan said, told a
story that I think we all probably found deeply moving. But my
own personal story, from which I learned an enormous amount,
provides a slightly different lesson.
I had my car stereo stolen by teenagers when it was parked at
the airport. My immediate response was, "those little sons of
bitches, I'd like to kill them. If I had them here, I would. ... " My
wife said to me, "Do you hear what you sound like?" Suddenly, I
saw myself in an astoundingly unattractive way. I thought maybe I
had learned something about how the victim perspective occasion-
ally can be a quite nuts perspective. So that is probably worth
keeping in mind, too.
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FORGIVENESS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
MR. LERMAN:38 Can the law make room for forgiveness? The
short answer is yes. And, is that possible from a prosecutor's of-
fice? The answer is yes.
I believe, first, that forgiveness should be seen as flowing from
the victim (or a surrogate victim or a victim's representative) or
from the neighborhood most affected by a particular crime. To the
extent that a prosecutor takes on the mantle of the community to
effect justice, then I as a prosecutor may engage in forgiveness.
Otherwise, I think that what I do when I engage in plea bargain-
ing, or lowering a sentence, is compassion or mercy, or rachmo-
nes,39 as people ask me for in court; I often hear, "Give me a writ
of rachmones in this particular case."
Prosecutors are the hub of the system. We control so much of
what goes on in the criminal justice system; therefore, I think we
play an absolutely vital role in advancing the notion of forgiveness
in criminal justice processes. How should we do that? We should
allow for practices that advance the possibility of forgiveness. This
is what is most helpful to victims, I believe.
There is a natural desire on the part of people to be connected
with one another. We heard from one of the earlier panelists about
the lack of trust among people. Crime contributes to that. The
current system focuses too heavily on punishment, which really
only breeds further distrust. Part of that is fueled by the media.
Willie Horton ads, for example, but there is a lot of blame to pass
around as to why we have a very vindictive and retributive system.
The desire of the people to be connected with one another con-
tinues even after a person has been harmed. Victims desire to have
some solace from the community around them. Prosecutors' of-
fices are becoming better at providing that service to victims
through victims witness units, and there are offices that are engag-
ing social Workers in offices. Des Moines is one of them.
These practices fall into the rubric of restorative justice. For a
very quick thumbnail definition of restorative justice, I would offer
38. For further comments, see David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Jus-
tice System: If It Belongs, Why Is It So Hard to Find?, 27 FORDHAM URnB. L.J. 1663
(2000).
39. "Rachmones" is Yiddish for "compassion." See LEO RoSmN, THE Joys OF
YIDDISH 304 (1968).
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this: it is a general framework for viewing crime and its after-
math.4 ° It is not any particular program.
We can compare restorative justice to the traditional system as
follows: The traditional system asks three questions: Who is the
perpetrator; what law was violated; and how do we punish that per-
son? Restorative justice asks a different set of questions: first and
foremost, what is the harm that has been caused; secondly, how do
we fix that harm; and third, who is responsible for that repair?
When you ask those questions, you end up with a very different
focus for justice seeking. You become future-oriented, which re-
quires, if done properly, turning to the people most affected by the
wrong. These people are the individual victims, or in victimless
crimes, such as prostitution or drug sales, neighborhoods.
There are practices which allow those harmed parties to partici-
pate very readily. Victim/offender conferencing is one of the most
viable practices. It goes by different terms, i.e., victim/offender rec-
onciliation or mediation, but the core idea is to bring a victim, or a
victim's surrogate, or a neighborhood panel, together with an of-
fender in a safe setting, with a facilitator, to engage in a process.
First, you go through the facts of the case. Secondly and most im-
portantly, you discuss what the impacts on the victim and on the
offender are, finally what the restitution is, what is the repair that
can be had here?
I want to talk quickly about this in terms of the life of a prosecu-
tor. There are standards put out by the National D.A.'s Associa-
tion that talk about "doing justice."'" I think in order to arrive at a
system where forgiveness plays a role, we prosecutors have to
change the way we view justice. Justice is not about getting notches
in your belt. That is a hard thing. Young prosecutors go into an
office and want to be tough and to be vigilant, and often there is an
office culture that suggests that you have got to ask for tough
sentences. You do not want to be thought of as being reasonable.
You can see a lot of cultural change has to take place within many
prosecutors' offices.
A great way to do this is for prosecutors to talk with community
members. When you talk with community members, you learn, in-
evitably, that people do not always want the ten-year sentence on a
second burglary. What they want to see is drug treatment. What
40. See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999); Charles W. Colson, Truth, Justice, Peace: The
Foundations of Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REv. 1 (1998).
41. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (National Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1991).
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they want to see is the offender become an active participant in
society, somebody who pays taxes. You do not get that by sending
people to prison.
There is a recent study, August 1999, by the Council of State
Governments Eastern Regional Conference, which has as one of
its questions, "Should the public provide victims the opportunity to
talk to offenders? '42 Seventy-seven percent of the public re-
sponded yes. That is huge.
Before closing, I want to talk briefly about what forgiveness
means by way of example. A couple of years ago, there was a
shooting at a high school in Kentucky. The next day, a group of
students held a big banner outside the high school: "We forgive
you, Michael. '' 43 In my tradition, in the Jewish tradition, that could
not have happened without Michael having done something to ar-
rive at the place where there could be forgiveness. In other words,
the offender has to take some affirmative steps to warrant
forgiveness.
There is diversity in this room, there is diversity in this country,
and therefore, differing ideas on how to arrive at forgiveness. I
think defining what forgiveness must be for every individual victim
is too difficult and should not be done. But providing the opportu-
nities for meaningful discussion, which may help a victim move to-
wards forgiveness, is imperative if we are to humanize our criminal
justice system.
MR. GAY:44 Two weeks ago tonight, I happened to be at a local
Catholic worker house in Des Moines, Iowa. They had asked me
to give a little presentation on restorative justice. Earlier that day,
I had looked at the mission statement for this Symposium which
asked, "Can the law make room for the virtue of forgiveness, and
should it?"
I posed those questions to the people at the Catholic worker
house. They were staff members, people from the faith commu-
nity, homeless individuals, and some other people. They did not
address the "can it, should it?" question. They said, "Why
wouldn't it?" For them, it was unanimous. That is the business
that we ought to be about in our criminal justice community.
42. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS EASTERN REGIONAL CONFERENCE RE-
PORT fig. 36 (Aug. 1999).
43. See Leslie Scanlon, Coping With Grief, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., at A7 (Dec. 6,
1997).
44. For further comments, see Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prose-
cutor, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1651 (2000).
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I was heartened, certainly, by those responses and got to think-
ing about groups I had met with over the years - victim groups,
offender groups, church groups, community groups . They always
respond the same way: "Why wouldn't we do this kind of thing?"
They are not concerned about the legality. They are concerned
about saving human lives. The only time I do not get that kind of
response is when I talk to lawyers.
Our experience was that, back in 1990-1991, we began looking at
these questions as a result of oftentimes experiencing victims dis-
satisfied with the process. Our office, the Polk County Attorney's
Office, represents Des Moines, Iowa, a community much smaller
than Manhattan, about 450,000 people. It is a typical prosecutor's
office in a mid-sized, Midwestern community. Someone is prose-
cuted, found guilty, sentenced, goes to prison. Closure has not
taken place. What do we do about that?
We looked around and found a program out of Elkhart, Indiana,
called the PAC Program; they had a victim/offender reconciliation
("VOR") program based on restorative justice principles. We
thought that it was an isolated program but found out that it was
not, that there were programs around the United States, Canada,
Western Europe, Belgium, England, Germany, et cetera.45
We took what others had done and created a program, called
Victim/Offender Reconciliation, whereby victims of crimes meet
the offender in a very controlled, safe, mediated session. It started
out small, with minor shoplifting crimes. Today we do about 1000
to 1200 cases a year, the minor crimes - harassment, property
damage cases - and some major crimes - sexual assault cases,
burglaries, robberies, and homicides.
It was tough getting started. The judges thought, "Why would
we do this?" Now they accept it. It is part of our process. We do it
as a result of a sentencing, we do it between plea and sentencing,
and we do it post-plea in some cases.
How does the process work? As David outlined a little bit, there
is a discussion of the facts, always questions by the victim as to:
"Why me, why me? Why my house? Why my car? Why my
45. See Mark S. Umbreit & William Bradshaw, Victim Experience of Meeting
Adult vs. Juvenile Offenders: A Cross-National Comparison, 61 FED. PROBATION 33
(1997); see also, e.g., Dieter Rossner, Mediation as a Basic Element of Crime Control:
Theoretical and Empirical Comments, 3 BumF. CRIM. L. REv. 211, 211-12 (1999) (dis-
cussing section 46(a) of the German Penal Code, which contains a provision by which
the judge and prosecutor may, at their discretion, refrain from punishment in cases
where the maximum penalty is one year in prison and Victim/Offender Reconciliation
has taken place).
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daughter? Why my son?" Then we discuss the offender's re-
sponse; finally, we talk about what justice should look like in this
case.
I want to talk to you about one specific case. A couple of years
ago, two young neo-Nazis in Des Moines did considerable damage
to a local synagogue.46 There was considerable public uproar and
support for the Jewish community. After a couple of weeks, the
two perpetrators were apprehended. There was a pseudo-lynch
mob mentality among the community.
The case ended up on my desk. I called the Rabbi, Rabbi Fink,
and asked him about doing a victim/offender reconciliation.
"You've got to be kidding me," he said. "Why would we do some-
thing like that? I'm so mad I could strangle those two." I asked
him to think about it. He called back two days later and said,
"That's what we ought to be doing. It is not what my heart says,
but I think that is what we ought to be doing."
We had a meeting in the basement of the synagogue with seven
members from the synagogue, the two perpetrators, and a trained
mediator. We talked about what had happened. It was fascinating.
The synagogue members found out about the histories of these two
young men and the two young men found out about what this did
to the Jewish community. There were several Holocaust survivors
in Des Moines that actually went into hiding as a result of the
desecration.
Based on the meeting, they reached an agreement. The boys
agreed to do community service at the temple, and also to meet
with the Rabbi over a period of about six months to study Jewish
and Holocaust history. The boys kept their promise. Six months
later, I saw a transformation among the offenders, and also among
the members of the synagogue. The boys had, in fact, become
friends with the people at the synagogue.
At one point in the dialogue, one of the Holocaust survivors
said, "What do you want from us?" The young male said, "We
want to be forgiven." Her response was, "In our tradition we can-
not forgive without atonement." They discussed the Jewish con-
cept of atonement, and what that would look like in this particular
case.
About a year after this meeting, the Drake University Law
School in Des Moines had a day-long symposium on restorative
46. See Tom Alex, D.M. Synagogue Defaced, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar. 4,
1994, at 1.
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justice.4 7 Rabbi Fink spoke about his experience with this and sub-
sequent VOR meetings. At the very end he discussed the Jewish
concept of atonement.
Two weeks ago we observed the holiest day of the Jewish
year, Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement. On this day we fast
for twenty-four hours. It is literally a twenty-four-hour fast from
sunset to sunset, no water, no food of any kind, unless there is
great physical need. We do this because we concentrate on
making reconciliation with God. But in order to reconcile with
God, in order to end the state of alienation that exists between
us and God, we need to first ask those whom we have wronged
for forgiveness. And, unless we can get up the courage to go
and ask these people to forgive us, then God will not forgive us.
There are some crimes that are so heinous that we human be-
ings cannot forgive, and so we leave forgiveness up to God, but
for most acts that are done against us, for most wrongs, we can
forgive.
We saw this process literally fade out in the secular arena
through the VOR proceedings and working with the two perpe-
trators. We were wronged and they came to us. They made sin-
cere repentance. They were examples of what it means to
repent, to make atonement. They really meant it. I don't think
they are going to ever do something like this again. So we
granted atonement. It wasn't easy, but we did it. We worked
through our feelings and, willingly, towards the end, we granted
them atonement and gave them our friendship.
We learned an important lesson as well. We learned that in
order to make reconciliation with God we must reconcile with
God's creation. As we know, we are imperfect human beings,
but the VOR process has given us the opportunity to reconcile
with one another.
A question that that gives rise to is: Why wouldn't we attempt
that all the time?
MR. BARRETT: I am not going to engage in the semantic
parsing of forgiveness versus mercy. I just want to flag, with a con-
fession, that I am perhaps bleeding those into each other as I dis-
cuss this.
But what I do want to move to is a different idea of the victim
role. Much of the previous discussion has focused on cases where
crime is perpetrated on an identified individual. A lot of offenses,
however, particularly in the federal system, are victimless, in the
47. See Drake University Law School Restorative Justice Symposium (Oct. 4,
1996) (unpublished).
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sense that there is no identifiable individual who has suffered this
infraction. Examples in both state and federal law are obviously
drug crimes, the classic possession or intent to distribute offenses.
In addition, the whole realm of white-collar crime is very hard to
connect up with identified individuals. There are obviously excep-
tions in the economic fraud context, but much of it does not con-
nect to somebody who has been injured.
Public corruption and integrity offenses are also a realm of crimi-
nal law and criminal prosecutions that does not have victims with
faces. Think of things like bribery, gratuity, conspiracy, perjury, or
obstruction of justice. The victim is the public order. There is no
localized neighborhood in which the crime occurred. It is simply
public order, as embodied in the law itself, which has been injured.
The person of the victim in those cases, frankly, is the government.
At the first level it is the aggrieved cop or the aggrieved agent; at a
later level in the process - I do not want to say a higher level -
the victim is the prosecutor who gets responsibility for that matter
as an investigation and the decisions that will follow.
I want to focus on victimless criminal conduct, and prosecutors
as actors in that realm. This connects back to some of the themes
discussed at last year's Fordham Urban Law Journal Symposium on
"The Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor." 48 They are really
quite intertwined.
Government, and particularly prosecutorial behavior in those
cases, has two characteristics, as I see it. The first is that there is
extremely little official guidance about how a prosecutor should
behave. There is a realm of enormous discretion on how an of-
fense is viewed, on how an investigation gets conducted, and on
how the perpetrator will be treated as that investigation moves
forward.
There is, many of you may know, a United States Attorneys' Man-
ual, which is a thick publication.49 In all the clinches where the
action actually occurs, however, where decision making counts, the
federal government has refrained from making choices. The Man-
ual explicitly embodies a lot of discretion for federal prosecutors in
48. See Symposium, The Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 645 (1999).
49. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL (1997). A copy of the
Manual is also available online, and is updated regularly. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
U.S. ATroRN, EY's MANUAL (updated Nov. 12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/>.
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deciding "how will I handle this; how will I handle him or her as my
investigative activity and my decisions come forward? '50
Prosecutors do forgive perpetrators in this realm all the time.
They show mercy, or cut slack, or move on. Sometimes they re-
spond to a change of heart. Sometimes they see the prospect of a
change of conduct. They show mercy in making decisions like con-
ferring immunity or not, which is technically judicial but is trig-
gered by a prosecutorial decision and is basically mechanical at the
judicial level.
Prosecutors engage in cooperation agreements with certain peo-
ple, simply decline to prosecute or to push the investigation fur-
ther, make plea offers, write 5(k) letters that allow downward
departures in sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
All of those are ways individual prosecutors, with relatively little
supervision, make mercy/forgiveness decisions.
How does it work? Well, it works the way any interpersonal in-
teraction works. It works at the heart, at the emotion, at the level
of person-to-person affinity: "I like this person enough - or I do
not hate this person enough - to take the hard path; I choose the
easier path." I want to focus more on that realm of unregulated
discretion.
We should officially encourage two processes as we look at for-
giveness by federal prosecutors. The first is direct human contact,
the face-to-face contact between this person who is going to be the
subject of the prosecutorial decision and the prosecutor who will
make it. That happens in some cases. It usually is a function of a
choice by a criminal defense lawyer.
Obviously, no one has to talk - Fifth Amendment, et cetera -
but better lawyers, at least in white-collar or victimless cases of the
type I am describing, make the contact. Often they will bring their
client in to make the contact, to communicate the human reality of
who this person is. Otherwise the person is just the other side of
"United States v." and the next statistic that the Assistant U.S. At-
torney is contemplating in his or her advancement as a prosecutor.
That process is valuable, it is appropriate at the human level, and it
is something that the Manual, or the U.S. Attorney, or the Attor-
ney General, whatever the right official process, should encourage.
50. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-2.001 (granting
U.S. Attorneys authority and discretionary power in criminal matters).
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It also, obviously, connects up to the counsel issue.5' The lawy-
ering on the criminal defense side - quantity and quality of lawy-
ering and the compensation for the lawyering - are important
aspects of this face-to-face meeting and we neglect a key compo-
nent if we skip over the counsel question.
Human contact is vital. Face the situation, look at it, meet the
perpetrator, understand the bigger picture, not just the act, not just
the facts, not just the draft indictment. A second thing, however,
that we should officially encourage is visibility or transparency in
the decision making of forgiveness. Indictments are visible, trials
are visible, pleas are visible, but cutting breaks is often invisible.
We hurt ourselves by making it invisible. To put it affirmatively,
we would benefit by making the process visible and transparent.
On the perpetrator's side we would gain a way of accepting ac-
countability, which is a predicate to forgiveness, has social value,
and is part of what I am talking about here. If you can see the
person come into the U.S. Attorney's Office but not become a de-
fendant - and have some understanding about what transpired
there - you achieve something for that person and for society.
Plus, you build a factual record, knowledge in society itself about
human conduct, about law enforcement, about this kind of decision
making.
You would also help prosecutors in prosecuting. In part, this vis-
ibility would combat, a bit, the trend of prosecutors taking on the
victim role, of believing that they are assigned to feel aggrieved,
that they are assigned to hate the perpetrator. "Because there is
no battered person in this case, I am going to do it. I am going to
make you pay for what you did to the law. The law is me. See you
in court." Some sense of valuing forgiveness and explaining for-
giveness would counteract that a little bit.
In addition, it would be at the government level - at the broad
level - a good way of showing humanity. It would be a good way
of government teaching about, and then perhaps building, the com-
munity bonds that we all agree are implicit in this topic.
It is obviously a question of leadership. Federal law enforcement
has an incredibly top-down command structure, and so part of
what we need is a better, different, fuller audience. This is really
partly a pitch to future Attorneys General, to future FBI directors,
51. Susan Bandes implicitly discusses this in her Essay. See Susan Bandes, When
Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000).
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and to lots of U.S. Attorneys who need to be part of the
conversation.
MS. LOVE:52 I will pitch it one higher and talk about presiden-
tial pardons. Pardon may seem a curious and even vestigial part of
the justice system these days, but it is very important to consider
the gestures of executive clemency that are the real and symbolic
signs of a forgiving or merciful government. In the state system, of
course, gubernatorial pardon powers parallel the President's par-
don power.
My interest in the subject of forgiveness derives from my experi-
ence as Pardon Attorney in the Department of Justice. I was re-
sponsible for reviewing and making recommendations on the
literally hundreds of petitions that came into the Department of
Justice every year. After we had finished looking at them, we sent
them to the White House for action by the President.
These applications came from people who were in prison and
wanted their sentences commuted. They also came from people
who had been convicted many years earlier and were seeking res-
toration of civil rights or the removal of the stigma of conviction.
Sometimes petitioners simply wanted to be forgiven for having
broken the law, and they used that word, although now I under-
stand, having prepared for this conference a little bit, that mercy is
really what they were looking for. They were asking the President,
basically, to dispense a better, or at least a more complete, form of
justice than they had heretofore received.
Very few of them got what they were looking for. The process
was mysterious, it was slow, it was unpredictable and it resulted in
very few grants. This is not always the way it was; until about
twenty years ago, twenty-five to forty percent of those who applied
for presidential pardon or commutation of sentence got what they
wanted.53 That is literally hundreds of grants every year. These
days there are only a handful. I would like to comment on this
phenomenon, the atrophy of this most visible sign of official mercy,
and what it might reflect and what it might signal. It reflects some-
thing very hard about the heart of the government that somehow
parallels a hardening of the law. It also sends a negative signal to
52. For further comments, see Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and
Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President's Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1483 (2000).
53. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY ACTIONS
BY FISCAL YEAR, 1900 TO 1945 (1999); OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, PRESI-
DENTIAL CLEMENCY ACTIONS BY ADMINISTRATION, 1945 TO PRESENT (1999, Supp.
Feb. 2000).
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those who are responsible for administering the law on a day-to-
day basis - line prosecutors - as well as to the public.
The pardon power began to decline about twenty years ago for a
number of reasons, not the least of which was that within the De-
partment of Justice prosecutors became responsible for making the
recommendations to the White House. The war on crime was go-
ing into high gear. One of those prosecutors was your current
Mayor; when he was Associate Attorney General, Rudolph Giu-
liani was responsible for making the decisions as to what cases
would go forward to Ronald Reagan. Not very many went
forward.
By the time I came to be involved in the pardon process, in the
late 1980s, official parsimony had been more or less institutional-
ized. The fact that there were very few grants by President Bush
reflects the fact that there were very few favorable recommenda-
tions made by the Department of Justice.
This did not change with the Clinton Administration, although
there were a number of encouraging early pronouncements from
Attorney General Reno that resulted in an absolute flood of in-
mate petitions into our office. We did not really know what to do
with them.
The FALN cases,54 in which President Clinton offered to com-
mute the sentences of sixteen Puerto Rican terrorists last summer,
therefore came as a pretty big surprise. His decision was greeted,
of course, with considerable suspicious and cynicism. The New
York press took up the cry, virtually on a daily basis, that this had
been done to help Mrs. Clinton's Senate campaign.5 5 The Presi-
dent had to defend his action in a very unusual way and he dis-
avowed the fact that political considerations had played any part in
it at all.56
There is good news and bad news in the FALN cases. The good
news is that he did it at all; the kind of political risk now associated
with any clemency decision is such that it is very discouraging and
is likely to dry up the process entirely. The good news is that he
54. See Charles Babington, Puerto Rican Nationalists Freed From Prison; Most
Are Heading Home; Controversy Over Clemency Remains, WASH. POST, Sept. 11,
1999, at A2. "FALN" stands for Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (Armed
Forces National Liberation).
55. See, e.g., Dick Morris, PostOpinion: Hillary's Self-Inflicted Wounds - Keeping
Secrets Keeps the Home-Loan and FALN Scandals Alive, N.Y. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at
43.
56. See Charles Babington, Carter, Tutu Were Involved On Clemency; Clinton De-
tails His Reasons for Offer, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1999, at Al.
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explained his act in retributivist terms that, if they are listened to
by those who are administering the process, may have real effect
on some of the decisions that are made on a day-to-day basis by
line prosecutors. Clinton cited Bishop Tutu and Coretta Scott King
as having persuaded him to be merciful, because the sixteen FALN
members "had spent over a decade in prison and that they would
not see their children grow up." 57 This was a humanitarian reason
for commuting their sentences.
The bad news, of course, is that very few people believed him.
I hope there will be some effort to follow up on these cases be-
cause I think that there is not only a lot of work to be done at the
grassroots level, but that there has to be some work done to pene-
trate the consciousness of the officials responsible for sending these
vindictive and unforgiving signals about the criminal justice system.
We have received these signals for so many years now that we are
almost inured to any thought that the government could be
merciful in a principled and considered fashion. That is a very sad
situation.
MR. AMMAR: (Comments presented in detail in his Essay writ-
ten in connection with this Symposium.) 58
PROFESSOR WEINSTEIN: At what point in the process
should forgiveness play a role, and does it matter who is doing the
forgiving? If it comes from the victim of the crime, should we
think about that at the time a charging decision is made, should we
think about that only in relationship to sentence, or should we
think about it in relationship to commutation later in the process?
Does it make a difference whether it is the victim, or whether it is a
surrogate victim like a prosecutor? Does their receiving some for-
giveness, or does their feeling some forgiveness, suggest it should
be at a different point in the process?
I also wonder if anybody had any reaction to Doug Ammar's
suggestion that these ideas of forgiveness work better in some com-
munities than in other communities.5 9
MR. LERMAN: I would like to respond to the last point. In
Milwaukee, which is not a homogeneous community, restorative
justice practices work in the African-American community. There
57. Letter from the President to The Honorable Henry Waxman, Ranking Minor-
ity Member, Committee on Government Reform, Sept. 21, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter
FALN letter].
58. See Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law: A Redemptive Opportunity,
27 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1583 (2000).
59. See id. at Part III.
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is very intense support from our NAACP chapter and something
called the Social Development Commission, which runs commu-
nity panels for juvenile offenses in four police districts. They are
not major crimes, they are ticket cases, but nonetheless it is the
practice where you are bringing the community together.
Restorative justice uses the crime as a fuel of sorts with which to
engage in community building. It is not just a matter of forgive-
ness. This goes to the communitarian discussion that we heard ear-
lier. It can take hold. The notion that it cannot take hold in a
minority community is wrong.
Doug is right to point out that there are cultural issues in play
that might affect how it takes place and how it grows. I would sug-
gest turning to the faith community and asking them to get in-
volved because they inevitably preach these concepts at their
services.
MR. GAY: In Des Moines, the capital of Iowa, which is rela-
tively small but not a homogeneous community either, with a large
immigrant population in recent years as well as a large African-
American community, restorative justice works well within those
communities.
In terms of "where in the process," at least in our system, any-
where: post-plea, between plea and sentencing, and post-sentenc-
ing. We have brought prisoners back from prison, for example,
because victims of sexual assault have said, after three or four
years following sentencing, "I have gone through counseling, I
have gone through therapy. It hasn't worked. I need to meet this
person. I need to be able to confront this person. I need to be able
to tell him what this did to me." When that initial dialogue takes
place, oftentimes forgiveness is a result.
There is no crime where this is not hypothetically possible. I
think when it does not occur you either have an offender or a vic-
tim who is not ready. But hypothetically any crime is possible and
anywhere in the process is possible.
We have had great results pre-plea. In our system now, all per-
sons who plead guilty to a felony have to have a pre-sentence in-
vestigation done by the Department of Corrections. It takes about
six to eight weeks. The court, upon accepting a guilty plea, orders
that investigation and orders a victim/offender meeting, so that,
hopefully, the victim and the offender meet following the plea.
The meeting takes place before sentencing so that if they reach
agreement we present the agreement to the court at sentencing.
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On the non-felony level, because we are pushing people through
so quickly, most of the time the victim/offender meeting takes
place post-sentencing and agreements then become addenda to the
court's sentence.
MR. LERMAN: I just want to quickly say that Des Moines is
one of the shining lights in the restorative justice practices, the best
place for restorative justice in the country. Milwaukee is years
behind.
PROFESSOR BARRET'T: Commit your crimes in Des Moines.
PROFESSOR WEINSTEIN: Actually, John, I have a thought
that takes off from your joke. We have talked about forgiveness,
but it is not immediately obvious to me that that means more leni-
ent sentences. What is the relationship between forgiveness and
mercy, if we are to understand mercy as mitigation?
PROFESSOR BARRETT: Particularly in the kind of federal
victim list offense category that I am talking about, the decision-
making process is really a decision about how serious the infraction
is. The decision to forgive, to mitigate, is all the same thing; it is
what you think about this person who has violated the law.
The meeting process, the face-to-face engagement, the order I
am imagining from some bold U.S. Attorney, that "we won't indict
cases where we have not first truly tried to meet and engage the
person and offer Queen for a Day immunity and get some kind of
conversation and see what the fuller picture might be," is a way of
getting to the homogeneous world. It is not a question of locality.
The situation is incredibly heterogeneous at the beginning. The
meetings I am familiar with start with somebody on the govern-
ment side of the table and a law breaker, in their view, on the other
side of the table. Although they may be of similar race, education,
class, whatever, that is all incidental to that fundamental defining
difference between the two: "my world" and "your world." If you
are not even there, and I have just developed facts about your
world, I see you as the "other."
I am trying to advocate something that brings a person into
something like a community with a prosecutor, where the time for
forgiveness is on a rolling basis as the decision making occurs.
There is not one magic moment. Obviously, it can be too late at
every stage. I think the more you emphasize it, and the earlier it
happens, the more balanced, and more frequent, the mitigation/
mercy/forgiveness will be.
MR. GAY: You are exactly right, whether they are victim or
victimless crimes. When you have that kind of dialogue, the prose-
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cutors tend to look at it as "it's us versus them" until you have this
dialogue, the beginning of a relationship. When you do that, it be-
comes more of a problem-solving model than a prosecution model.
MS. LOVE: It is also important to restore forgiveness and
mercy to some respectable status as responses to crime. I am
speaking mostly from my experience in the federal system.
It is also important to bring it out into the open. As it is now, it
pretty much operates under the table, and that is a reflection of the
harsh and inflexible sentencing law that discourages exceptions.
But in order to do justice - and not all prosecutors are hard-
hearted - it is very important to make exceptions. So, in a sense,
the pardon power that the Framers of the Constitution contem-
plated would be placed in the President6° has been effectively dele-
gated on a day-to-day basis to line prosecutors.
But it does not operate in the open; it cannot operate in the open
until it is restored to some sort of respectability. That is the key
thing.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: When does it not work? When does restorative
justice not work, when does the mercy not work, when does the
pardon application not work, when does the community building
not work, and why?
MR. GAY: At least in our system, you have less favorable re-
sults when you have offenders that are not prepared. But you do
not have to have a perfectly prepared offender in order to have a
successful meeting resolution because the process itself is trans-
formative. You are not going to have this angel going into the
meeting. At least in the meetings we have, you may have an hour,
hour-and-a-half, where you have a recalcitrant offender or a very
strident victim.
One of the keys, by the way, is very well-trained mediators/
facilitators who will allow the process to develop fully. If you have
very goal-oriented mediators who want a bottom line and who
push the thing through too quickly, you do not get a good result.
But if you allow the thing to take place with no time limits, then
rarely do you not have a favorable dialogue.
There are certainly offenders who are pathological. There are
people who have no conscience who do not belong in those meet-
ings. We try to screen them out through the preparation process if
60. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
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we see that they have no conscience. But there are some times,
even with the no-conscience offender, where there is value to a vic-
tim still being able to tell the perpetrator what happened to them.
There is a value in that, a very strong value. So it is rare, I think,
that it does not work at some level that is good for the victim and
also for the offender.
MR. AMMAR: I have seen it not work often across racial lines,
across class lines, and that is sort of what fuels my observation.
AUDIENCE: I teach undergraduates at Pace University, mostly
business law, some law topics. My question is, beyond the dialogue
between the parties and the asking for forgiveness and giving the
victim's views, what else can the perpetrator do to enhance forgive-
ness or foster forgiveness? I understand the thing about the dese-
cration of the synagogue, but do other things occur to you?
MR. LERMAN: Yes. We have used victim/offender conferenc-
ing in employee theft cases. We have had several employees, who
have of course been fired, go back to the store to talk to new em-
ployees about the embarrassment and the pain of being arrested
and caught. That provides a real service to the stores.
MR. GAY: We have had major embezzlement cases, hundreds
of thousands of dollars lost, and they will agree to restitution. Oft-
entimes they will confess civil judgment so a civil suit is not neces-
sary. And sometimes, when there is an insurance company that is
providing coverage, there will be a confession of judgment and as-
signment of that judgment to the insurance company. So to satisfy
perhaps your business interest, that takes place.
MR. AMMAR: Restitution, too. We do a lot of restitution in
our office, before it even gets in front of a judge or a D.A.
AUDIENCE: I am from the Center for Court Innovation here
in New York City. I would offer a friendly critique that the courts
are missing from the panel.61 That is a perspective that I want to
try to fill in quickly and then follow with a question.
There is a huge movement going on in the courts and there is a
lot of excitement going on around problem-solving courts. You
have mentioned some of that, in particular drug treatment courts,
where the court is seen less as an engine of punishment and more
as a way to get people who are committing drug offenses treatment
as an alternative to a harsh sentencing regime.
61. For the courts' response to this Symposium, see Derek Denckla, Forgiveness as
a Problem-Solving Tool in the Courts: A Brief Response to the Panel on Forgiveness in
Criminal Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1613 (2000).
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There is also a community court model.6 2 There is one here in
midtown, just a couple of blocks away, which our center started. It
has a victim panel and also a community service component, and
takes these victimless crimes and puts a face on them. The people
whose store was spray painted, let's say, in a graffiti case, would
meet with the wrongdoer, describe how it makes them feel, what it
did to their business, and how much money they had to spend on it.
In some cases the wrongdoer would undo that wrong.
There is a whole movement afoot, and in fact the center is taking
part in a national conversation with the Justice Department, which
has funded a lot of these courts, in a project called the Justice Pro-
ject.63 So the government has done some things. There has been
some talk on the panel about how government can do more and
government has not done much on this issue, but there is the Drug
Court Program Office of the Department of Justice' and the State
Justice Institute.65 They have funded very innovative programs
that have restorative justice elements.
Another thing that touches upon all these issues is the notion of
therapeutic jurisprudence,66 which connects very nicely up with all
this.
My question to the panel is the following: is the whole notion of
forgiveness in the law and these other subsets that I have identified
- holistic lawyering, therapeutic jurisprudence - aren't all these
just new consequentialism, similar to law and economics, new ways
to make law more effective? And, if so, does that change the tone
from purely forgiveness? Are we talking about something quite
different altogether, so that there would not be the conflation be-
tween the emotional notion of forgiveness talked about in the first
panel and the actual more implementational notion of forgiveness
that we are talking about in the criminal justice context? Are we
talking about something else when we talk about forgiveness in the
62. See Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 ALB. L. REV.
1491, 1494 (1999).
63. See Janet Reno, Remarks to the American Association of University Women
(June 19, 1999), available at <http://www.usdoj/gov/ag/speeches/1999/orgwomen-
speech.htm> ("We have funded and encouraged new community strategies - com-
munity policing, innovative crime prevention programs, community courts.").
64. See Office of Justice Programs (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/dcpo>.
65. See State Justice Institute (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http>://www.statejustice.
org>.
66. See Robert F. Schopp, Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 665 (1998).
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criminal justice context because we are looking at it being more
effective, it being more consequentialist?
MR. AMMAR: One quick point. The consequences seem to be
pretty good right now, with 1.8 million people in prison.67 We are
really good at being consequential in the criminal justice system.
There are, however, some fundamental challenges that are happen-
ing a lot of places, like the community courts, et cetera.
One problem with the community court here in Midtown, by the
way, is that it is post-sentence, it is post-conviction, so there is not
as much incentive, I believe, for the offender to have some owner-
ship in wanting to do that. But that is just a small point. Some of
the things we are talking about are before the case is resolved, and
those are pretty innovative and revolutionary.
MR. GAY: Going back to your comments earlier about the his-
torical underpinnings of restorative justice, this is not just a new
fad. It is a return to a previous way of doing business, quite
frankly. If you look at a lot of the indigenous cultures and how
they determine justice - Navajos, aboriginal Australians and New
Zealanders, native Canadians - this is part of the way that their
justice systems have operated for hundreds of years, thousands of
years perhaps.68 So it is not new, it is only new to us.
MR. AMMAR: That's right. In cultures that are much more
homogeneous, like Japan and China, the criminal justice system is
much more about bringing the offender and the victim together.
That is again another challenge to why we do not do it in this coun-
try, is our xenophobia or incredible narcissism.
AUDIENCE: I have been a criminal appellate defense attorney
for the indigent for twenty years in New York, where prosecutorial
decisions are made by twenty-five-year-old prosecutors who do
want notches on their gun belts, unfortunately.
I would like to speak to Margaret Love. Most criminal offenses
are state offenses, with governors wielding the power. At that
level, there are virtually no pardons. For instance, during Gover-
67. See Jason Zeidenberg & Vincent Schiraldi, The Punishing Decade: Prison and
Jail Estimates at the Millennium (Justice Policy Institute 1999), available at <http://
www.cjcj.org/punishingdecade/punishing.htm>.
68. See, e.g., Robert Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlii" - We Are Now In Good Rela-
tions: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117 (1996); Donna Coker
Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons From Navajo Peacemaking, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1, n.6 (1999) (citing Marianne 0. Nielsen, A Comparison of Develop-
mental Ideologies: Navajo Nation Peacemaker Courts and Canadian Native Justice
Committees, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 207 (Burt
Galaxy & Joe Hudson eds., 1996); Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Trans-
formative Journey of Peacemaking, 14 MEDIATION Q. 201 (1997)).
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nor Bush's five and a half year term, Texas executed 121.69 Gover-
nor Bush has never even used his power to grant a thirty-day
stay.7 ° What can be done with state governors?
MS. LOVE: You elect them, that is what you do with them.
That is kind of a tough answer, but I do not know where else the
process of change starts. It has to come from the top. It has to
come from some change of heart in those we elect. On the other
hand, we are electing people to office who are apparently doing
things that they think we want them to do.
The Senate Judiciary Committee is one of the hardest-hearted
bodies. When asked to equalize the sentences for crack and pow-
der cocaine, because the sentences for crack were so draconian
compared to powder,7' its response was to increase the sentences
for powder to the level of crack.72 Do we want this? They think
we do.
So I am really thrilled to hear so much wonderful process talk, it
is so exciting. But at the same time the prison population is still
increasing. It is not 1.8 million, it is an estimated 2 million in Feb-
ruary, 2 million people in this country in prison.73 And there are
now 137,000 in the federal system, compared to 24,000 federal pris-
oners in 1980, a figure that had remained about the same for the
entire preceding half century.74 These are really telling numbers.
Something is happening out there. Hopefully the tide will turn,
but right now I cannot put these two trends together.
69. See Michael Graczyk, Texas Executes Convicted Killer, 2000 WL 14324030
(Feb. 25, 2000).
70. See Margo Athens, A Test for Bush's Compassion?, BALT. SUN, Jan. 21, 2000,
at A2.
71. The differential between crack and powder sentences has been the subject of
much controversy. See U. S. SENTENCING COMMISSION SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY. See also Judy Mann, The
Harm in Mandatory Sentences, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2000, at C15. The debate in the
Senate over the proposal to equalize crack and powder sentences is available at
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?r106:1:./temp/-rlO6RoVI8I:e12083>.
72. See id.
73. See Zeidenburg & Schiraldi, supra note 67.
74. As of March 6, 2000, the inmate population of the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(including contract facilities) stood at 138,842. See OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND
ARCHIVES, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ("FBOP"), COMPILATION OF YEAR-END
POPULATION FIGURES, (Mar. 6, 2000). For annual population figures between 1930
and the present, see FBOP, MONDAY MORNING HIGHLIGHTS NEWSLETrER (1994 to
present); FBOP, STATISTICAL REPORTS (1960 to 1993); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (1930 to 1960).
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MR. GAY: You talk about twenty-five-year-old prosecutors,
and they are the problem a lot of times. What preceded that was
going to law school. That is the problem we have. We put them on
the high-volume dockets and they screw things up because they are
so litigation-minded, which is fine. We want young prosecutors to
have good litigation skills.
But they can be educated. As an example, in July I spoke with a
couple of prosecutors from a particular docket that dealt with
lower-level misdemeanors - assaults, property damage - and
before they could touch a file they had to go through a two-week
restorative justice training course. I was just amazed. Now they
pick up a file and say, "What should justice look like in this case?"
The challenge is not governors, it is law schools. You have got to
bring the curriculum in to law schools and at least offer it on an
elective basis for people who think they want to be defense attor-
neys or prosecutors.
MR. LERMAN: And you engage in the discussion elsewhere,
outside of the legal world. In other words, going back to the faith
communities is one obvious place to have this discussion. Certainly,
many prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, and system person-
nel attend houses of worship. And if this discussion is occurring on
Saturdays and Sundays then there should be some cognitive disso-
nance of some sort that goes on, or should be going on, for prose-
cutors who are simply interested in the notches on the belt.
PROFESSOR WEINSTEIN: Perhaps it should be no surprise
to us - and this bit of the discussion brings it out clearly - that
we see legislators who have no contact with individual cases and
are under strong political pressure who continue to ratchet up
sentences. We have assembled a panel of four prosecutors, and
one defense attorney, who sound like voices for moderation. I
think that is because those who have contact with individuals and
individual cases think about things like forgiveness, which operates
on an individual level.
Margaret's comment was that we elect the governor. Well, it is
true, but unfortunately mass politics is such that, at least now, our
criminal sentences seem to be a one-way ratchet. We need to find
a way to make forgiveness a political issue but it is particularly ill-
suited to that because it operates on the individual level. This is
really quite a problem.
It suggests to me why what John says about bringing some visi-
bility and standards to this process to legitimize it makes so much
sense. Margaret reminds us that forgiveness has fallen into disre-
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pute and, at least from the legislative point of view, the only good
prosecution is a harsh prosecution seeking a maximum sentence.
But people who do the work tell us that that is not what should be
going on.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: FORGIVENESS AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR MINOW: In one of my favorite cartoons, the first
panel shows a letter that says, "Dear Minister: I am sick and tired
of your holier-than-thou attitude. Signed, Fed Up. ' 75 The second
frame shows a minister reading the letter, thinking, and then writ-
ing one back that says, "Dear Fed Up: I forgive you." In the third
frame, the minister says to himself, "Shame on you. '"76
As this cartoon suggests, forgiveness is, in a fundamental way,
about power. I am honored to be at this conference that has
launched an extraordinarily rich and fascinating set of discussions.
I was so intrigued by the fact of the conference, by its existence, by
its name, by its timing. It would not have happened twenty years
ago, I do not think, although we have long had forgiveness in bank-
ruptcy, clemency in criminal law, Rule 60(b) in civil procedure,77
amnesty in settings ranging from public library overdue fines to
international human rights violations. My quick computer Lexis
search for forgiveness "within five of law" turned up over 300 ref-
erences, the bulk of the first twenty of them concerned loan for-
giveness for law students, so I stopped looking.
Each of these and other modes of forgiveness in law have be-
come more salient now, not only because of powerful and valuable
scholarly works, such as Jeffrie Murphy's, 78 and not even solely due
to notable institutional experiments, such as South Africa's Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. I think the depth and breadth of
interest in forgiveness among law-types reflects something more.
As we have heard somewhat this morning, for the last twenty-
five years or more, scholars and practitioners have generated strik-
ingly convergent alternatives to conventional adversarial litigation
in a whole host of areas that otherwise have nothing in common.
These alternatives respond to governmentally sponsored atrocities,
to local misdemeanors, and to family conflicts. The contemporary
infusion of apologies, pardons, amnesties and calls for healing and
forgiveness in the wake of inter-group violence, government-spon-
sored violence, misbehavior by government actors around the
world, and private misbehaviors have striking parallels with restor-
75. Doug Marlette, Kudzu, CHI. TRIB., Nov 28, 1988, at 8.
76. Id.
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (permitting relief from judgment or order due to
"mistakes; inadvertance; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc.").
78. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
(1988).
1394
FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
ative justice community conferences, divorce and child custody me-
diation hearings, and juvenile justice community hearings.
In each instance, the search for alternatives reflects a critique.
Critics find conventional litigious justice isolating, destructive of
human ties, inflexible, impersonal. It offers little or only con-
strained roles for the parties; it permits compromise only in its
shadows; and it requires people to put aside their whole identities
- their needs, their spirituality, their beliefs - in order to trans-
late the conflict into specifically legal terms.
Alternatives draw upon or help to forge interpersonal ties and
social norms, help to reconnect people who have been in conflict,
involve people in designing their own unique solutions so that they
feel invested in them, and abandon a "winner take all/loser suffer
all" approach to human conflict. Alternative methods can invite
people to bring their whole selves, including their emotions and
religious commitments, their tears and their hopes, as they deal
with wrongdoing, conflict, and dereliction of duties.
Crudely put, to critics law is arcane, remote and divisive, even if
it is also principled, formal and professional. Jessamyn West writes
of law, "It seems to be all Greek and turkey tracks. '79 In contrast,
alternatives - such as mediation, restorative justice circles, truth
and reconciliation commissions - depart from precedent, depart
from professional scripts, to seem humane, integrative, and heal-
ing. No small virtue of the alternatives is that they can promote
forgiveness. Forgiveness, writes author Christina Baldwin, "is the
act of admitting that we are like other people."80
Admitting that we are like other people, that those who ao
wrong are like us, that we could be like them - these aspirations
strike the keys of compassion and empathy, connection and inter-
dependence. The Lord's Prayer, variously phrased as "forgiveness
as we forgive our trespassers" or "forgive our debtors, '"81 suggests
that the Almighty, too, is part of this web of reciprocal forgiveness,
although I leave to theologians whether the Supreme Being also
needs or can receive forgiveness.
79. JESSAMYN WEST, THE FRIENDLY PERSUASION (1945).
80. CHRISTINA BALDWIN, LIFE'S COMPANION, JOURNAL WRITING AS A SPIRITUAL
QUESTION (1990).
81. Matthew 6:9-13 (King James). See also Phillip Nonet, Sanction, 25 CUMB. L.
REV. 489, 527 (discussing Hegel's notion of forgiveness as human comprehending of
the necessity that God does God's work: "The judge himself must fall to the ground
and embrace the sinner in confessing to the sin of judging." (internal citation
omitted)).
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The aspirations of forgiveness depart from those conventionally
guiding Western, democratic, secular, legal systems which are much
more at home with the ideals of equal treatment, impartiality, just
desserts, and respect for individual autonomy. This sets the stage
for my central question: Are these distinctive sets of aspirations
compatible? Can compassion join impartiality, interdependence
join just desserts, connection join individual autonomy? Can we
create a legal world adept at judgment and also comfortable with
forgiveness?
I have been struggling with these issues as I examine responses
to the situations in Kosovo and in Rwanda. In Rwanda, the justice
system there is so overwhelmed by the numbers of people incarcer-
ated following the genocide that they will never be able to prose-
cute everybody who is incarcerated. So what should happen?
Should the thousands who are incarcerated just be let out and sent
home? The people I have been consulting with there report that
one option they are considering is trying to revive traditional forms
of communal justice, which were themselves devastated by the ge-
nocide. Traditions of informal, communal justice may provide a
sense of accountability without the economic and political costs of
prosecutions; perhaps they could promote reconciliation as well,
yet the obvious difficulty is finding people steeped in the traditions
who remain alive and willing to guide and conduct the process.
My own thoughts have turned back to this country, and espe-
cially to hate crimes and domestic violence. Can compassion join
impartiality? Can forgiveness join law enforcement and protection
of rights? These are hard questions.
So my eye wandered and found the program for this conference.
Being a teacher of civil procedure, I focused on the vital words, the
conjunctions and prepositions. I noticed that we are here for the
Symposium entitled "The Role of Forgiveness in the Law," but
the first panel this morning addressed "Forgiveness and Justice,"
the second looked at "Forgiveness in the Criminal Law," while this
afternoon we will hear about "Forgiveness in the Civil Law" and
"Forgiveness and International Amnesty."
Forgive me, please, if I make too much of this contrast. But
there is a difference between "in" and "and." We can unearth the
dimensions of forgiveness and mercy already present within the
formal justice systems and rules, forgiveness that may temper rigid-
ities, or that may reflect pragmatic assessments about how to elicit
compliance, or that create settlements with individuals. Yet, for-
1396
FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
giveness also affords something that can only be juxtaposed with
the law, by acknowledging a separation, joined only by an "and."
Forgiveness in this sense signals an outside vantage point ena-
bled by psychological, religious and political perspectives that cri-
tique law's limits. Approaching wrongs with forgiveness in this
sense means sustaining alternatives to lawsuits, to prosecutions and
to convictions, and thereby confining the instances governed en-
tirely by rules, punishment, and predictability. Forgiveness is a
kind of supplement to law's core, whether it is introduced inside
the system or promoted outside the corridors of formal legal insti-
tutions. Forgiveness is "in" law, but also one of the "law and's,"
like law and society, law and literature, law and economics, law and
justice.
The shifts between "in" and "and" highlight potential questions
about what happens to law when forgiveness is available and what
happens to forgiveness when law proceeds.
I will explore these questions by comparing the domains of law
and forgiveness. When are they separate? When do they overlap?
Can forgiveness substitute for law, or law for forgiveness? I will
explore these problems by addressing what I will call the moral
ambitions at work in forgiveness and in the ordinary rule of law.
In the domains of Law and Forgiveness, Forgiveness does not,
and should not, necessarily take the place of a legal process, pun-
ishment, or justice. Indeed, their domains could be viewed as en-
tirely separate and also compatible.82
One observer put it this way: "Human codes of law establish
indispensable rules of life together and standards of relationship.
Any attempt to weaken the supremacy of the law thus entails the
erosion of the humane. Forgiveness is about renouncing unjusti-
fied power, not about weakening the pursuit of justice."83 Accord-
ingly, forgiveness marks a change in how the offended feels about
the person who committed the injury, to a change in the action to
be taken by the legal system. For an individual, forgiveness, many
tell us, essentially means the relinquishment of resentment that is
otherwise warranted based on an offense or a wrong.
82. Elizabeth Kiss pursues a related inquiry about the moral ambition of truth
commissions. See Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Con-
straints: Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert Rothberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
83. GEIKO MULLER-FAHRENHOLZ, ART OF FORGIVENESS: THEOLOGICAL RE-
FLECTIONS ON HEALING AND RECONCILLIATION at viii (1997).
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In this view, wrongdoers should be forgiven if they accept re-
sponsibility and consequences, or wrongdoers may be forgiven in-
dependently of the operation of the formal justice system. Either
way, forgiveness need not substitute for punishment or liability.
That we can advocate punishment for a wrongdoer one has for-
given or will forgive shows how potentially separate are the
domains of law and forgiveness. Forgiveness operates interperson-
ally; the legal system operates impersonally. Through forgiveness I
forgo my anger and hatred towards someone who has harmed me,
but I do not and cannot alter the requirements of just desserts.8
Those requirements reflect the rule of law's commitments to pre-
dictability, neutrality, treating like cases alike, building a factual
predicate for decisions, and restraining the personal views and bi-
ases of decision makers so that we have a government of rules, not
of people. Punishment, in this view, should follow wrongdoing in
order to ensure like treatment for factually similar conduct as well
as neutral and predictable application of the law.
Supporting punishment can be compatible with forgiveness on
an entirely different view that points to rather lofty moral ambi-
tions. Here, forgiveness and legal punishment both partake of the
view that offenders should be treated as full members of a commu-
nity, and that the community demands responsibility by all of its
members for their actions.85 Even the traditional Christian call to
forgive rather than to avenge accompanies faith that vengeance
will come through the Divine.8 6
Yet, the moral ambitions seem to diverge when law and forgive-
ness come to be alternatives to one another and people seek to
substitute one for the other. This happens in one of two contexts.
In the first, a specific victim may wish to forgive an individual
wrongdoer. The second, typically involving large numbers of of-
fenders and victims, substitutes for legal process. I will compare
these by considering competing moral ambitions.
84. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in MURPHY & HAMPTON,
supra note 78, at 33.
85. See Jules Coleman, Adding Institutional Insult to Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 223, 224 (1990).
86. See SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 5 (1983).
Of course, the central Christian concern is the reconciliation with God. See VINCENT
TAYLOR, FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION: A STUDY IN NEW TESTAMENT THE-
OLOGY (1960).
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A. Substituting Forgiveness for Law Due to
High Moral Ambition
When an identifiable victim wants to forgive an individual
wrongdoer to substitute for legal action, usually it is because either
the wrongdoer has changed or the one who wants to forgive wants
to change. These are very ambitious goals. To some, the punish-
ment no longer seems justified if the moral ambition is to change
the person who did wrong, even though our legal system usually
emphasizes acts, not persons, and retrospective evaluations, not
prospective predictions.
Other people hope that the act of forgiving itself may transform
the wrongdoer in a way that impersonal punishment cannot. By
re-inviting the offender into the moral community of humanity, by
demonstrating care and connection, and by offering a relationship
some aspire to change the offender and change themselves.87
For example, the restorative conferences following criminal
charges offer this kind of invitation to the wrongdoer who admits
responsibility, but not to one who does not. The process of forgive-
ness thus transforms a wrongdoer only if the forgiven and the for-
giver share a script. John Reed explains: "The forgiven must act
likewise and be forgiving. Moreover, to be forgiven one must first
acknowledge guilt." 88
Allowing the legal process to proceed simultaneously could in-
terfere with this script, worsen the offender's sense of isolation and
exacerbate his rejection of the norms of decency. If both partici-
pants play their parts, however, the process can heal the offender
and also restore a sense of dignity and self-respect to the offended
person.89
But, of course, not everybody shares this script, as admirable as
it may be. Indeed, some do not embrace this script even as they
promote forgiveness. They do so without expecting a change in the
wrongdoer. Instead, they view a change in the one who was
wronged as crucial. Rabbi Harold Kushner argues that "the victim
should forgive not because the other deserves it, but because the
victim does not want to turn into a bitter, resentful person." 9 Vic-
87. See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in MURPHY & HAMP-
TON, supra note 78, at 35, 80-81.
88. JOHN REED, DICKENS AND THACKERY: PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS 17
(1955).
89. See Aaron Lazare, The Healing Process of Apology 11 (unpublished lecture
on file with author) (describing benefits of apology).
90. HAROLD S. KUSHNER, How GOOD Do WE HAVE TO BE: A NEW UNDER-
STANDING OF GUILT AND FORGIVENESS 107 (1996).
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tims should forgive not because the other has earned it but to per-
mit victims to reshape themselves as people undistorted by the
violation.
Forgiving can afford not only psychological release but also the
chance for moral betterment. Trying not to be like the wrongdoer
for some means breaking cycles of vengeance and resisting the de-
sire to see the wrongdoer suffer. Forgiving is the stance to reach
for precisely when the wrong is incomprehensible. For Doris Les-
sing, "If you understand something, you don't forgive it, you are
the thing itself. Forgiveness is for what you don't understand."'"
The one who forgives, therefore, can stretch herself to deal with
what she cannot comprehend or control. By forgiving, she can ele-
vate herself, avoid bitterness, prevent cycles of revenge, and free
herself from the kind of preoccupation with a felt wrong that can
distort her own life and sensibilities. Forgiving thus involves a
script of self-making, with the opportunity for moral self-
improvement.
These aspirations to change the survivor and to change the
wrongdoer stand in sharp contrast with the more skeptical moral
aspirations of the law.
The state's law proceeds with a different script, one that de-
mands accountability whether or not the wrongdoer has changed
or could change. In a world of flexible criminal sentencing, contri-
tion and personal transformation might be relevant at some point,
but, increasingly, our legislatures mandate flat sentencing. What
matters is the prior acts, not personal change.
Accordingly, the role law scripts for victims is confined to sup-
plying inculpating evidence and testimony about their own suffer-
ing. This helps stiffen the fact finder's resolve to punish. Victim
witness statements are introduced in death penalty proceedings, for
example, in order to provide vivid statements of pain and harm
caused by horrific acts, not to permit forgiveness and reconnection
between victim and offender. Thus, when people choose to substi-
tute forgiveness for law they seek a personal transformation and
interpersonal connection, very different moral ambition than the
what law seeks or fosters.
91. DORRIS LESSING, To ROOM NINETEEN, A MAN AND Two WOMEN (1963).
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B. Substituting "Forgiveness" for Law Due to
Political Necessity
When people want to substitute forgiveness for law out of polit-
ical necessity, they express different moral ambitions Mass vio-
lence strains the will to forgive - if there are survivors who could
forgive - but also strains the power to prosecute. The sheer num-
bers of people murdered in Rwanda, for example - one out of five
members of the community were killed in the genocide.92 It is hard
to imagine how many people committed the crime, since it con-
sisted of hand-to-hand killings with machetes. Can a nation prose-
cute everybody in the society? It is a practical as well as a moral
problem.
In addition, political circumstances may press against legal ac-
tion. The governing political regime may not have changed; the
judiciary and the prosecutors may be the same as the ones who
committed the abuses in the apartheid regime, which is the current
situation in South Africa. The new regime may be relatively pow-
erless, or it may have made a deal to dispense with prosecution in
order to gain power. Violations may have occurred over such a
long period of time, with reprisals and revenge by victims, that dis-
entangling victims from offenders becomes nearly impossible. As-
sessing individual responsibility under a rule of law becomes
unattainable where you have had systematic violence and wrong-
doing. Only a political solution will work.
Amnesty is usually the form it takes. Amnesty for political
figures of criminal regimes is much in the news now, as we watch
General Pinochet slip away even from the legal accountability
outside of Chile. If Chile had not granted him amnesty, we would
not need the extraordinary measures of Spanish prosecution and
English extradition. If Chile had not granted him amnesty, he and
his henchman would still control the country. Amnesty reflects as-
piration to restore peace, order and in some instances, democracy.
But official amnesty is not the same as forgiveness. Forgiveness
is and must remain the exclusive prerogative of the wronged indi-
vidual. Forced or pressured to forgive, a victim undergoes a new
harm and subordination. Survivors can forgive the wrongdoer for
their own suffering but not the suffering of those who did not sur-
vive. Government officials may seek to act in the name of victims,
but they cannot forgive on their behalf; they can forego legal con-
92. See Stephen Buckley, Mass Slaughter was Avoidable, General Says, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 26, 1998, at A17 (reporting that at least 500,000 were killed in 100 days).
20001 1401
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
sequences, not personal, righteous resentment. When amnesties
are granted because of fear of reprisals, political pressure, or inade-
quate resources, these aspirations fall short not only of the loftiest
goals of forgiveness but also the legal objectives of accountability,
visibility, and impartiality. Public apologies and amnesties follow-
ing mass oppression elicit objections in the name of justice, under-
stood as prosecutions, punishment or reparations.
Amnesties can be granted as part of a negotiated transition to
democracy, as happened in several Eastern European countries, or
as part of a process of helping multiple antagonistic parties learn to
coexist. Such amnesties relinquish the moral ambitions of law due
to rgalpolitik and a sense of political impotence rather than any
competing ambitions of reconciliation and personal transfor-
mation.
Where does South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion ("TRC") fit? It is a different, unique effort. Its Chair, Arch-
bishop Desmond Tutu, characterizes it as an institutional enabling
of forgiveness. It occasioned encounters between victims and per-
petrators but was not a command performance of reconciliation.
The TRC did not require individuals to forgive those who tortured
them or murdered their loved ones or otherwise committed gross
human rights violations. Instead, by gathering testimony from indi-
vidual survivors, the TRC modeled a form of respect to help re-
store the dignity of those who were violated.
Its most controversial feature was its provisions permitting am-
nesty from criminal and civil liability for human rights abuses for
perpetrators on all sides of the conflict, including the leaders of the
current ANC-led government. Yet, by resisting blanket and un-
conditional amnesty, the TRC resisted the complete abandonment
of moral accountability that so often accompanies political amnes-
ties. Instead, the TRC elicited individual applications and received
9,000 of them from people on all sides of the conflict. In so doing it
did fulfill a political bargain. It was the chief condition for peaceful
transition to democratic rule. But the amnesty hearings also ad-
hered to the rule-of-law commitments to factual predicates, treat-
ing likes alike and predictable decision making.
The TRC's amnesty application requires full disclosure of the
facts of the individual's violations of human rights - not avoidance
or suppression of those facts. The application requires memory not
repression. Thus, it reflects the weighty moral ambitions of over-
coming communal denial and secrecy, restoring dignity to the vic-
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tims, and acknowledging the wrongs done by individuals on all
sides of the Apartheid-era struggles.
One mother whose son was murdered by the governmental
agents explained her support for the amnesty process precisely be-
cause of the profound moral ambition to humanize victims and
perpetrators alike. Thus, she explained: "This thing called recon-
ciliation, if I am understanding it correctly, if it means that this
perpetrator, this man who has killed my son, if it means he be-
comes human again, this man, so that all of us get our humanity
back, then I agree, then I support it all."93
This ambition could not, in the views of those most directly in-
volved, have been pursued within preexisting legal institutions. The
courts in South Africa themselves were so much a part of the pro-
cess of enforcing apartheid. The police, the judges, the prosecu-
tors, and much of the bar still to this day hold the same roles that
they held while the government notoriously violated the human
rights of a majority of the nation's citizens. In addition, the imper-
sonality of law particularly seemed ill suited to the tasks of the
TRC.
The Amnesty Committee, from the start, gave a special role to
victims and authorized them to engage in cross-examination of
anyone who applied for amnesty. Reversing roles, then, torturers
and murderers faced interrogation by their former victims and fam-
ily members. That face-to-face confrontation and engagement en-
couraged some applicants to seek forgiveness and enabled some
survivors to forgive, but there were at least as many situations
where there was no exchange of apology or forgiveness at all.
The TRC represents a unique effort to forge the preconditions
for the rule of law, not an instance of forgiveness. Itself a legal
institution, the TRC was duly authorized by the Parliament. It was
governed by political appointees. It was not extralegal. Creating
and supporting it, the first democratic Parliament sought to pre-
vent cycles of revenge by giving public acknowledgement to past
wrongs and by investigating the causes of, and the participants in,
the violations of human dignity committed both by the apartheid
regime and those who fought against it. :
The Commission's hearings and public broadcasts offered occa-
sions for people to make apologies and forgive, but depended upon
neither. The amnesty provision, born of political compromise, did
not embody the moral ambition of forgiveness, and did not seek to
93. ANTJI KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL 109 (1998) (quoting TRC participants).
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change the individual offender or the victim, but sought to change
the country. Indeed, the Amnesty Committee tried to adhere to
the features of the rule of law, treating like alike, and treating peo-
ple with impartiality.
In a country like South Africa, where the trappings of the legal
system were so profoundly associated with oppression, institutional
innovation was a courageous step to help the nation turn a new
page. Rather than serve as a substitute for law, it was a kind of
precondition for its reestablishment.
C. Can and Should Law Pursue Higher Moral Ambitions?
Thus, forgiveness can operate when individuals leave law's oper-
ations intact. Forgiveness can lead individuals to forgo or prevent
formal legal action. Something quite short of forgiveness, some
kinds of political and practical assessments, may lead societies or
governments to preempt legal action and substitute what they call
forgiveness but is better known as amnesty. Something different
from forgiveness and the rule of law, but something harmonious
with it occurred with the TRC, as it tried to create a predicate for
establishing the rule of law.
But what this conference raises is the question not just of for-
giveness and the law, but forgiveness in the law. Should legal insti-
tutions, most notably courts, themselves adopt the high moral
ambitions that I have associated with forgiveness? Should legal in-
stitutions seek to foster forgiveness by victims towards wrongdoers,
to seek to encourage contrition by wrongdoers? Should courts try
to frame roles for victims and bystanders that would allow them to
engage wrongdoers in a sense of common fellowship and mutual
recognition?
In this spirit, can legal actors mobilize community? Many prose-
cutors' offices use the language of community in efforts to mediate
or work through violations of rights. The community, not the law,
forgives them. What then can the law contribute?
Perhaps the law can promote a sensibility of repair and restora-
tion. But can it do so co-existing with what has to remain the cru-
cial domain of law, that of enforcement, neutrality, objectivity?
There is often tension inside an office where restorative justice
people vie with other people who seek the notches on their trial
belt. Can both attitudes be sustained in the same prosecutor's of-
fice? Can both attitudes be sustained in the same court room?
Can both attitudes be sustained in the same law school?
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I think the answer I want to give is, "Yes, or it's worth a try."
Nevertheless, I have three cautions.
The first is that we better be honest and not call things what they
are not. Do not call it restorative justice when it is alternative dis-
pute resolution designed as docket cleaning, with timed mediation
sessions - you get a half an hour or you get an hour - conducted
by people who are not trained to mediate. Boy, you clear those
dockets fast. Just do not call it restorative justice.
Second, beware of state power used to try to produce forgiveness
or used to try to produce contrition. When it is the state and not
the community acting, I think we have to be very much on our
guard, not only for people feigning the change, but also for the
abuses of government power. Respecting the choice of an individ-
ual not to forgive has to be as important as respecting an individual
who comes to forgive. Otherwise, respect for individuals does not
mean anything.
Third, we should not underestimate the importance of maintain-
ing a straight, formal, legal system, especially in a divided, divisive
society. A legal system that does not abandon commitment to im-
partiality, neutrality, and treating likes alike is itself a remarkable
accomplishment and not something to be bypassed in the hopes of
human transformation.
I will close with a few comments on this last one. The drive to-
ward the rule of law, launched in the West but spreading around
the globe, itself embodied stirring moral ambitions. By elevating
respect for each individual over the community, over hierarchy,
over inherited status, the rule of law embodied liberalism's com-
mitment to objectivity, to facts, and to a system of governance by
law rather than by people - or, to be historically accurate, I
should say men.
To embrace the rule of law is to embrace rules and rights as re-
straints on relationships and power. The movement for the rule of
law may have tried to squeeze forgiveness and justice in order to
implement equal, objective, and impersonal treatment and to
guard against the whims of the powerful and the abuses of power
relationships. In nations that do not have it, it is easier to see the
moral ambition of the rule of law as the accomplishment that it is.
Consider the situation of the few Serbs remaining in Kosovo to-
day. If they are alive, it is because they have a one-to-one ratio of
British and French police and security officials protecting their
lives. And if they are ill, there is no place to go because no hospital
in Kosovo will treat a Serbian.
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From this kind of vantage point, it would be admirable, indeed,
to implement the rule of law to ensure that likes be treated alike
and that personal biases be restrained in ensuring equal protection.
I grant that the movement to the rule of law, even where it is far
better established, has never completely succeeded. It never lives
up to its reputation. It also remains tricky to know what is a like
that should be treated alike. It leaves inadequate discretion to tai-
lor the results to particular persons. It produces unfairness and
rigidity.
Therefore, within formal legal rules, judges and lawyers always
have invented room for forgiving individual wrongs and wrongdo-
ers. The British King crafted a system of equity, partly as a strug-
gle for gaining political power but also to supplement and override
the common law courts of the local lords. Initially, equity permit-
ted flexibility and justice tailored to the circumstances, until it too
became rule-bound. Executive power and pardons reflect to this
day the conception that stemmed from royal forgiveness overriding
the necessary rigidities of law. And, to do justice, it is also impor-
tant to make exceptions.
Religious authorities, immigrant communities, and, most nota-
bly, native traditions that existed in this country, Canada and
around the world before liberalism came to colonize, have repeat-
edly shaped alternatives to formal legal adjudication. They permit
face-to-face resolution of conflicts that rely on communal ties and
often on chances for forgiveness. Over the past several decades,
lawyers, psychologists and others have crafted similar problem-
solving methods, such as alternative dispute resolution, mediation,
and reintegrative conferences, to bring interpersonal relationships
and community and hopes for personal change back into the pro-
cess of dealing with wrongs and wrongdoers.
Methods to permit apology and forgiveness figure inside and
outside of formal legal institutions - and must - but we have to
be careful whenever we increase the discretion given to formal
legal actors. I will illustrate with another favorite cartoon of mine.
There is a judge with an enormous nose and an enormous mus-
tache, sitting up at the bench, looking down at the defendant, who
- guess what? - has the same enormous nose and enormous
mustache, and the judge says, hammering his gavel, "Obviously not
guilty." 94
94. Charles Barsottie, Untitled, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 1988, at 55.
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Who gets the discretion? In a society that is as marked by divi-
sion and distress as ours, who will be helped by discretion and who
will not be?
Methods to permit apologies and forgiveness supplement the in-
sistence on precedent and treating likes alike, they temper the uni-
versal, they reintroduce the person, and that is valuable; they also
endanger the very predicates of the rule of law. Those committed
to advance individual equality, predictability of coercive power,
and curbing the vagaries of personal preference and feelings seek,
as they should, to shore up the rule of law and formal legal institu-
tions. It is a real accomplishment to establish institutions commit-
ted to law rather than the whims of the governors.
But, of course, no less admirable are the generosity and hope
associated with forgiveness, with community reintegration. Admi-
rable indeed is the recognition by the Jewish community in Iowa
that the two people who had defaced and destroyed parts of the
synagogue Were people too and they had been objectified by the
Jewish community as much as the objectification worked in the
other direction.95 What a story! This is a story about the possibil-
ity of the human heart and the possibility of change, the possibility
of forgiveness, and the possibility of embrace.
The moral ambitions of law and forgiveness, in short, offer wor-
thy challenges one to the other in our desires for impartiality and
compassion, autonomy and connection. Let us just not confuse
one for the other.
We will, no doubt, make mistakes as we grasp the ideals of both
law and forgiveness. I am reminded of the actress, Tallulah Bank-
head. She said late in life, "If I had my past life to live over again, I
would make all the same mistakes, only sooner. ' '96
What a wonderful place to be in, a wonderful stance of self-for-
giveness. I wonder whether the strong retributive feeling in this
country has to do with a failure of self-forgiveness. Maybe if we
started there, we could make some change. In the meantime, may
we admit that we are like other people and forgive where possible.
May we also respect what law, untempered by forgiveness, pro-
vides for the coexistence of imperfect people.
95. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
96. ROSALDE MAGGIO, QUOTATIONS BY WOMEN 241 (1992).
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FORGIVENESS IN THE CIVIL LAW
PROFESSOR NOLAN-HALEY: In this panel we are going to
consider how we advance this project of forgiveness in the civil law:
How do we define forgiveness in the context of civil law? To what
extent, if any, should forgiveness play a role in the civil law? Is
forgiveness really a corrective to a civil justice system that may too
often exclude the human element?
PROFESSOR BLOCK-LIEB: My topic today is the role of for-
giveness in consumer bankruptcy law. To receive a bankruptcy dis-
charge means that debt is forgiven. By virtue of the bankruptcy
discharge, creditors are enjoined against any act to collect, recover,
or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor.97 That
means that, after completion of a bankruptcy proceeding, the
debtor need not repay unsecured creditors any amount which re-
mains unpaid.
So, for example, consider an individual debtor who files a volun-
tary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.98 At the
time of the filing, the debtor owns $100 in non-exempt, unencum-
bered assets and owes $1000 in non-priority, unsecured claims.
These creditors would receive a pro-rata portion of the proceeds
from the sale of the debtor's assets, about ten cents on the dollar.
The remaining ninety cents on the dollar would be discharged in
the bankruptcy context, forgiven.
It should come as no surprise that an important theoretical justi-
fication for the bankruptcy discharge draws on the moral philoso-
phy of forgiveness. And yet, many bankruptcy commentators
reject the notion that the bankruptcy policy favoring the debtor's
fresh start following bankruptcy should be explained in terms of
the philosophy of forgiveness.
I would like to discuss the relevance of forgiveness to consumer
bankruptcy law, for I believe that forgiveness provides a controver-
sial, and yet enormously important, metaphor for the bankruptcy
discharge. I will first discuss the controversy, and then address the
usefulness of this concept of forgiveness to consumer bankruptcy
law.
In her book, Failure and Forgiveness, Professor Karen Gross ar-
gues that the bankruptcy discharge is "how society mandates that
creditors forgive non-paying creditors."99 Drawing on the secular
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1999).
98. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 701 (1999).
99. KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANK-
RUPTCY SYSTEM 93 (1997).
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philosophy of forgiveness, she acknowledges that, "forgiveness is
appropriate where a wrong is committed, where the wrong harms
another, or the wronged party resents what occurred, where the
wrongdoer acknowledges the wrong done and takes steps to rectify
it."'1 She argues that these conditions exist in the bankruptcy
setting:
For debtors, the wrong is the nonpayment of legitimate obliga-
tions. That nonpayment provides a panoply of injuries. Credi-
tors who are not paid are damaged economically, and perhaps
emotionally. And others who pay for the losses indirectly are
also harmed. Many injured creditors are resentful of the debt-
ors' failures because debtors have received a benefit for which
payment has not been made. Creditors may also feel resent-
ment because debtors overstated their abilities to succeed. Fi-
nally, debtors admit to failure and take steps to redress their
wrong by accessing the legal system. The system makes that
wrong a matter of public record and requires debtors to submit
to judicial scrutiny.''
Gross's critics contend that the rhetoric of forgiveness does not sat-
isfactorily explain consumer bankruptcy law. They offer alterna-
tive justifications.
For example, Professor Marjorie Girth rejects forgiveness as a
rationale in this context on the grounds that "the discharge is man-
dated by our bankruptcy law, no matter how creditors may feel
about that result.' 10 2 As a result, she views forgiveness and dis-
charge as "internally contradictory concepts," and argues that this
follows from the notion that a critical aspect of forgiveness is the
wronged person's decision to forgive.' 3 She, instead, suggests that
a more useful concept for the bankruptcy context is one of
sympathyY°4
Philosopher Jukki Kilpi similarly critiques the usefulness of for-
giveness in this context: "An institution discharging . . . debt
against the creditor's will does not represent forgiveness, which can
be a morally meaningful term only in relation to a person's willing-
ness to forgive."' 0 5
100. Id.
101. Id. at 93-94.
102. Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AMER.
BANXR. L.J. 449, 451 (1999).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 450-53.
105. JUKKA KILIPI, THE ETHics OF BANKRUPTCY 68 (1998).
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Kilpi also rejects sympathy on roughly the same grounds, for he
views sympathy as "a subjective attitude of mind, one which cannot
be brought about by decree.' 0 6 He similarly rejects impossibility,
legalism, and utilitarianism as justifications for the bankruptcy dis-
charge.107 Kilpi, instead, argues that principles of distributive jus-
tice, in combination with respect for individual autonomy, provide
a strong ethical explanation for providing debtors a fresh start in
bankruptcy. 8 In so doing, Kilpi takes issue with the notion that
defaulting debtors have acted wrongfully and deserve punish-
ment. l0 9
Should forgiveness have any role in consumer bankruptcy policy
making? Admittedly, the fit between the secular philosophy of for-
giveness and a theory of consumer bankruptcy policy is imperfect.
Creditors do not consent to their debtors' discharge. Some would
argue that a debtor's financial distress does not constitute wrongful
conduct. A discharge in bankruptcy, furthermore, is not today tied
in any way to restitution, repentance, or mandatory repayments
made through the bankruptcy process. Nonetheless, forgiveness
should have an important place in thinking about consumer bank-
ruptcy law and policy. The importance of forgiveness to consumer
bankruptcy policy making is as a metaphor - an analogy. It is the
idea of forgiveness that should permeate any dialogue about con-
sumer bankruptcy law and its goals.
Bankruptcy policy-making is not unique in its reliance upon for-
giveness merely as a metaphor. Indeed, when applied to any litig-
ious or contentious setting, forgiveness can only ever constitute an
analogy. Family law, tort law, criminal law - in each of these con-
texts we talk about forgiveness, knowing full well there may be no
voluntary act of forgiveness by the victim. We refer to the notion
of forgiveness in these contexts largely as an analogy. And still,
forgiveness can be a powerful analogy in this context.
We draw on the metaphor of forgiveness in talking about these
areas of contention in the hopes of formulating legal policies that
direct or encourage the resolution of litigation on merciful and for-
giving grounds. By reference to the metaphor of forgiveness, we
consider whether, under certain circumstances, there exists a moral
obligation to forgive and create legal rules either to create incen-
106. Id.
107. See id. at 68-72.
108. See id. at 73-82.
109. See id. at 93-125.
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tives for forgiveness or, instead, to mandate forgiveness in these
circumstances.
Why is it important to analogize the bankruptcy discharge to for-
giveness rather than rely on other normative explanations for dis-
charge? What role can the metaphor of forgiveness play when we
think about consumer bankruptcy law and policy? There are at
least five reasons that forgiveness can play an important role in this
context.
First, a focus on forgiveness emphasizes the humanity of debtors.
Other normative justifications for the bankruptcy discharge, based
on economic or paternalistic concepts, often miss this human
element.110
Second, the analogy to forgiveness reminds us of the moral di-
lemma created by a debtor's financial distress and the complexity
of the ethical issues involved in the bankruptcy contest.
Third, the concept of forgiveness provides a framework for
thinking about bankruptcy, even if it is conceded, whether for pur-
poses of argument or not, that the debtor has behaved wrongfully.
Concluding that debtors in financial distress have acted wrongfully
need not end the debate about consumer bankruptcy policy. Even
if a debtor's conduct has been wrongful, forgiveness may be appro-
priate - forgiveness through the bankruptcy discharge.
Moreover, an analogy to forgiveness can assist us in focusing our
assessment of what constitutes wrongful conduct in this setting.
Has the debtor acted wrongfully by borrowing, rather than relying
on savings, to purchase goods and services? By borrowing exces-
sively? By becoming over-extended? By defaulting? By failing to
cut back on expenses or take on an extra job in order to repay
defaulted loans? By filing a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code rather than attempting to repay defaulted
obligations either outside of bankruptcy or through a Chapter 13
repayment plan?"' By seeking a discharge from certain hallowed
obligations, such as the obligation to support dependent children?
By hiding assets from creditors? By misrepresenting financial
worth to lenders when obtaining credit?
Thinking more precisely about what counts as a debtor's wrong-
ful conduct is helped by linking forgiveness of the wrongful act to
the wrongdoer's repentance and restitution. For example, if a
debtor has wronged her creditor by engaging in fraud, then it is
110. See Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 471, 477 (1998).
111. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1334 (1999).
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meaningful to talk in terms of forgiving the fraudulent conduct, on
the one hand, but not the obligation to provide restitution for
fraud, on the other. That the Bankruptcy Code excepts from dis-
charged debts incurred as a result of fraud 12 can make sense in this
way. And yet, if instead the debtor is said to have wronged the
creditor by virtue of having borrowed, by virtue of failing to repay,
then it is illogical to talk in terms of forgiving the wrongful debt
and, at the same time, imposing an obligation to provide restitution
for that wrongful act.
Fourth, forgiveness reaffirms the notion that bankruptcy laws
should rehabilitate an individual debtor's personal financial life fol-
lowing bankruptcy. Indeed, Professor Gross incorporates notions
of forgiveness into the dialogue about consumer bankruptcy law
precisely so that she can stress the restorative nature of the bank-
ruptcy process. 113 She refers to bankruptcy in this way as "an
opportunity to regain self-esteem and become once again a produc-
tive member of our capitalistic economy. 1M 4
Fifth and finally, framing the debate about consumer bankruptcy
policy in terms of a creditor's forgiveness of a debtor's debt also
suggests that the conduct of the creditor should be assessed, not
simply the conduct of a debtor. Forgiveness implies a bilateral re-
lationship, a give and take, between victim and wrongdoer. As Pro-
fessor Minow reminded us, the Lord's Prayer refers to forgiving
our debtors as they forgive us.1 5 In a religious context, then, the
focus on forgiveness emphasizes that we are all potentially wrong-
doers in need of forgiveness. In psychological and secular philo-
sophical contexts, forgiveness is often said to be conditioned in
some sense upon the existence of proper grounds for resentment.
But if the victim does not have proper grounds for resentment be-
cause the victim, the creditor in this context, has himself acted
wrongfully or negligently, then there may be nothing to forgive. It
may be inappropriate to talk in terms of forgiveness. Forgiveness
theory suggests to me that empathy may be far more important to
the dialogue about consumer bankruptcy policy than sympathy.
I would like to conclude by remarking on the relationship be-
tween forgiveness theory and pending legislation to rewrite con-
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(11) (1999).
113. See GROSS, supra note 99, at 104 ("[D]ebtors should be forgiven in order to
encourage their rehabilitation - both for their sake and society's.").
114. Id. at 94.
115. See Martha Minow, Keynote Address, Forgiveness and the Law, supra page
1394 [hereinafter Minow Keynote Address].
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sumer bankruptcy law, for Congress stands poised today to rewrite
consumer bankruptcy law.116 Wide-ranging proposals are pending
in Congress. I would like to focus on one of them, means testing.
Means testing would condition eligibility to Chapter 7 liquida-
tion upon a showing that the individual debtor has insufficient dis-
posable income with which to repay creditors over a sixty-month
period." 7 This eligibility requirement would, as a practical matter,
force or encourage debtors to repay their obligations either
through a Chapter 13 repayment plan or outside of bankruptcy.
This disposable income test starts by presuming that debtors with
disposable net current monthly income above the national median
could repay their creditors' claims over a five-year period." 8 In
determining what counts as net current monthly income, the bill
would reduce from a debtor's monthly gross income certain ex-
penses for maintenance of a household - not actual expenses, but
those expenses set forth in regulations promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service, 1 9 regulations which are known for their exces-
sively stingy estimates as to household expenses. The bill also goes
on to permit reductions from gross monthly income for any se-
cured obligations the debtor may have incurred prior to bank-
ruptcy. 20 Matrimonial and other priority obligations are similarly
reduced from gross income. 2'
The debate about means testing involves disagreement, and pos-
sibly even confusion, about the circumstances under which debtors
in bankruptcy have acted wrongfully, and the circumstances under
which restitution and repayment is appropriate. Much of the de-
bate about means testing has circled around whether it is appropri-
ate to even consider the risks which lenders may have assumed by
lending on a negligent basis.'22 These provisions raise important
questions regarding the link between a discharge in bankruptcy
and a debtor's personal financial rehabilitation.
116. See S. 625, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999).
117. See S. 625, § 102; H.R. 833, § 102.
118. See id.
119. See Internal Revenue Service, Collection Financial Standards, Allowable Liv-
ing Expenses for Food, Clothing and Other Items, Total Monthly National Standards
(Except Alaska and Hawaii) (last modified Sept. 28, 1999) <http:www.irs.gov/prod/
ind_info/coll_stds/cfs-other.html>.
120. See S. 625; H.R. 833.
121. See id.
122. Compare Bad Ideas on Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2000, at A22, with
Winners in Bankruptcy, Mar. 4, 2000, at A15 (reporting that Representatives George
W. Gekas, Rick Baucher and Adam Smith co-sponsored the House's Bankruptcy Re-
form Act).
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In sum, the pending legislation, while it draws on important con-
cepts of forgiveness, is largely an unforgiving bill.
PROFESSOR COHEN:12 3 My topic is the role of apology in
civil lawsuits. Jeffrey Murphy started our conference by addressing
the subject of forgiveness.12 4 Apology is, in many respects, the
"flip side" of forgiveness, for an apology can often be the trigger
that leads to forgiveness. The cases I have in mind are not the life-
shattering, criminal events of murder or genocide that some other
panelists have considered. Rather I will focus on the role of apol-
ogy in routine civil cases such as medical malpractice, car accidents,
and divorce.
What prompts me to examine this topic? Three motivations are
as follows. First, if a child makes a mistake and injures someone
while playing, and if the child goes to his or her parent, the parent
may respond, "Go apologize for what you have done. Try to make
amends." If an adult makes a mistake and injures another, and if
the adult visits a lawyer, the lawyer's focus may very well be on
how to deny responsibility. There is a marked gap between these
two responses, and it is a problematic gap.
Morality provides a second reason to examine this topic. Many
people believe that apologizing is the right thing to do when one
has injured another.
A third motivation for examining this topic is what I would label
a "vicious cycle." Suppose that a doctor commits an error while
treating a patient and that the patient suffers harm from it. In such
circumstances, many doctors would like to say, "I'm sorry. I made
a mistake," and, from the viewpoint of medical ethics, surely that is
usually the proper response. 25 However, many doctors do not
apologize out of fear of liability. They are told to remain silent,
sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, by their attorneys
and insurance companies, their hospitals' risk management com-
mittees, and often their peers too. Conversely, if one examines re-
search on why patients sue physicians, though the statistics are by
123. For further comments, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Apology and Organizations].
124. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Keynote Address, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Re-
sponding To Evil: A Philosophical Overview, supra page 1353 [hereinafter Murphy
Keynote Address].
125. See Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in
Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, in Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 12
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770 (1997); Daniel Finkelstein et al., When a Physician
Harms a Patient by Medical Error: Ethical, Legal, and Risk Management Considera-
tions, 8 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 4, 330 (1997).
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no means perfect, perhaps twenty to thirty percent of patients say
words to the effect of, "If I had received an apology, I would not
have sued. ' 126 Hence, there may often be a vicious and wasteful
cycle where a doctor refrains from apologizing out of fear of liabil-
ity, and it is precisely the absence of the apology that triggers the
lawsuit.
With this in mind, let me pose two questions and offer one exam-
ple. The first question is whether, under the existing laws, defense
attorneys ought to talk with their clients about apology more often.
In response, I will argue that they should, i.e., that lawyers should
think of apology as a possible response to injury. The second ques-
tion is whether our laws should be revised to encourage apology.
Again, I will argue in the affirmative. After this, I will discuss one
hospital's special use of apology. I can only treat each of these
matters briefly here, and I direct interested persons elsewhere for
more extensive and precise presentations. 127
Before addressing these questions, let me make clear that I do
not view apology as a substitute for compensation. Suppose that,
God forbid, you are in a car accident in which you hit a stopped car
from behind and the other driver's leg is broken. You should get
out of your car and tell the other driver that you are sorry, and you
should pay for damages to the other driver's leg, car, etc. While
sometimes apology may lead the other party to drop suit, mostly
what I have in mind is what one might call "subtracting insult from
126. TWenty to thirty percent of patients say that if they had received an apology,
they would not have sued. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA
1359, 1361 (1992) (studying families who sued their physicians following perinatal in-
juries, finding that 24% filed medical malpractice claims when they realized that phy-
sicians had failed to be completely honest with them about what happened, had
allowed them to believe things that were not true or had intentionally misled them).
Further, 19% of those filing suit indicated that they did so out of a desire to deter
subsequent malpractice by the physician and/or seek revenge. Such filings also may
have been prevented by an apology. See id.; see also Charles Vincent et al., Why Do
People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LAN-
CET 1609, 1612 (1994) (studying British patients and families and finding that 39%
may not have brought malpractice suits had there been a full explanation and apology
- more significant factors to them than monetary compensation). For other related
references, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009, 1011 n.7 (1999) [hereinafter Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize].
127. See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 126, at 1009 (arguing
that lawyers should consider advising clients to apologize more often and that Ameri-
can society should consider legal reforms to encourage apology); Cohen, Apology and
Organizations, supra note 123 (analyzing apology in the organizational context
through the lens of one hospital's experience where apology was financially viable, if
not beneficial).
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injury." The injurer should apologize, and the injured party may or
may not forgive the injurer in the sense of ceasing anger, but the
injurer should still pay compensatory damages.
Returning to the first question of whether, under the existing
laws, defense attorneys ought to talk with their clients about apol-
ogy more often, my approach is to examine the benefits and risks
to the injurer of apologizing. By so doing, I do not mean to "in-
strumentalize" apology and suggest that the reason a defendant
should apologize is that the plaintiff might drop the case. Apology
should be rooted in remorse rather than in economic strategy.
However, often injurers do not apologize out of fear of liability
without thinking carefully about both the benefits and risks of
apology.
What are some possible benefits to the injurer of apologizing?
* the plaintiff might forgo suit;
* the settlement process could be greatly facilitated, reducing
legal fees;
* in some cases, punitive damages could be avoided;
" some injurers would benefit psychologically and spiritually
(e.g., guilt reduction); or
" an apology could help to repair a damaged relationship.
What are some possible risks to the injurer of apologizing?
Some injurers may fear that apologizing will void their insurance
coverage. One of my friends received a small, wallet-sized card
from his insurance company titled, What To Do When [You Are]
Involved in a Car Accident. The last line of the card reads, "Keep
calm, don't argue, accuse anyone, or admit guilt." If my friend
were in an accident and apologized to the other driver, would he
void his insurance coverage? Could a physician who apologizes to
a patient for a medical error void her malpractice coverage? Insur-
ance law and insurance contracts place upon the insured a duty of
cooperation in the defense of the claim. 128 Could the insured's
apology be taken as a breach of that duty and thereby void the
insurance coverage? The short answer is, "likely not.' 1 29 How-
ever, this risk is worth keeping in mind.
The more substantial risk for many injurers is that the apology
will be taken as an admission of liability. "If I apologize, aren't I
128. See John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, 8 INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE
4771 (1999); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
(1991).
129. See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 126, at 1025-28.
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giving the other side the ability to prove their case?" This is a seri-
ous concern, for evidence law accepts admissions by party oppo-
nents.130 The question thus arises of whether there are ways an
injurer can apologize, including fully admitting his fault, such that
the apology cannot be used against him as proof of fault.
Note that there is an important class of cases in which simply
expressing sympathy for the injury, without admitting fault, would
go a great distance toward resolving the dispute. After many acci-
dents, who was at fault and to precisely what degree is unclear.
Expressing sympathy through a statement such as, "We had an ac-
cident. I don't know who was at fault, but I do want you to know
that I am sorry that you are injured and hospitalized," can be quite
powerful.
Yet what about the legally most-difficult case in which the in-
jurer wants to say, or the injured party will not be satisfied unless
she hears, "I'm sorry. It was my fault." Can the injurer make such
a statement "safely," that is, without incurring the risk that it can
be used against him in court as an admission?
Under existing law, there is some room, but not much room, for
such "safe" apology. One vehicle for "safe" apology is in media-
tion. Many states have laws providing that statements made within
mediation cannot be used as proof in court.131 These laws vary
from state to state, and the confidentiality shielding they provide is
not absolute. 132 However, apologizing within mediation can often
be one avenue for "safe" apology. Another theoretical possibility
is to offer the apology in the course of settlement negotiations.
The Federal Rules of Evidence purport to exclude statements
made in the course of settlement negotiations from admissibility. 33
However, it turns out that this rule is very "porous" and, in prac-
tice, offers little shielding for an apology.13 4 While other theoreti-
cal possibilities exist, the bottom line is that, under our existing
130. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
131. See Pamela Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable
Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidential-
ity and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 724
(observing that nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has different statutes or
local court rules establishing the parameters of the particular mediation programs. As
a result, confidentiality policies differ significantly from one program to another.).
Currently, efforts are underway to draft a uniform act to standardize such mediation
confidentiality protections.
132. See id.; see also Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 126, at 1036-
39.
133. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
134. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 126.
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laws, if the injurer wants to apologize "safely," mediation is usually
the best vehicle. Yet from a functional perspective, mediation is
often inadequate, for mediation typically comes quite late. If
you're in a car accident that you know is your fault, what you want
to be able to do - and what our law should encourage, or at least
not discourage, you to do - is get out of your car and apologize to
the other driver right then.
Could we revise our laws so as to prevent apologies from being
used as proof in court? There are different ways we might do this.
The simplest is to create an independent evidentiary exclusion for
apologies. Other approaches are broadening the concept of subse-
quent remedial measures (which are inadmissible) 135 to include
apologies or plugging some of the holes in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 408 so as to make that rule less porous. Through such steps
our society could encourage apology, and thereby help foster
forgiveness.
A basic goal of excluding apologies from use in court is to
decouple the act of apology from the liability system. While at-
taching liability to the act of apologizing helps ensure, though does
not completely ensure, that apologies that are made are sincere
(for the speaker must "put his money where his mouth is"), such
attachment also risks the "vicious cycle" discussed at the outset in
which the injurer wants to apologize, but refrains from doing so out
of the fear of liability, and it is precisely the absence of the apology
that prompts the lawsuit. Further, an apology made in a "safe"
haven such as mediation can also be, and be seen as, sincere. Like
a conversation with a stranger on an airplane, the fact that there
are few consequences can help people speak candidly. Note too
that if apologies are excluded from admissibility in court, nothing
prevents an injurer from offering compensation with the apology,
and the injured party may certainly note the absence of such an
offer. At root, creating "safe" havens for apology increases, rather
than decreases, the possible modes of communication between the
parties.
I shall conclude with an example that focuses on the economics
of apology. I present it not because I believe economic considera-
tions should motivate apologies - apologies should be rooted in
remorse rather than economics - but because the fear of adverse
135. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
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economic consequences often prevents people from apologizing,
and, in my opinion, that fear is overstated. 136
JUDGE ZUCKERMAN: When I was initially approached
about participating in today's Symposium, I was quite taken aback
by the realization that, in my twenty years on the Family Court
bench, I had given virtually no thought to the question of forgive-
ness and only very occasional thought to the question of apology,
and I was rather stunned by this realization. So I quickly accepted
the invitation. I figured it would be a good thing to, albeit belat-
edly, focus on aspects of forgiveness and apology in the area of
family law and family court and see what I thought might be the
reason why there had been so little discussion of it amongst law-
yers, judges, and, to my knowledge, commentators up to this point.
First, I tried to immerse myself in the literature, and that lasted
about three minutes, because I quickly realized that people had
been devoting decades to these questions and that I could not pos-
sibly do it in a couple of weeks. And so, I propose to share with
you some of the peculiar aspects of family law and family court,
and to try to figure out what the differences are important. I will
look at whether there is room for research and study of some of
these differences in order to maximize what can be done to bring
the benefits that have been described in the earlier part of this pro-
gram to the litigants and the parties in interest in Family Court.
There are two basic categories of cases I will talk about: the pri-
vate cases and the cases that have a public aspect. I am not going
to be talking about juvenile delinquency cases today at all because
those are very like the criminal proceedings that were addressed at
some length this morning. 137 They are essentially criminal cases
without juries, albeit with some differences at the equivalent of the
sentencing stages.
These cases involve public interest or public involvement. By
that I mean public agency involvement through child protective
proceedings, i.e. child abuse, child neglect. Also in that category,
although they are somewhat different, are termination of parental
rights proceedings and proceedings to free children who are in fos-
ter care placement for adoption. This is a very large part of the
family court's jurisdiction.
136. Professor Cohen discusses the example of Lexington, Kentucky's Veteran's
Administration Hospital in his article. See Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra
note 123.
137. For a discussion of the role of forgiveness in the criminal law, see the panel
discussion supra page 1373.
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A petitioner in those cases, by definition, will be a social service
agency. In New York City, it would be either the Department of
Social Services in a child protective proceeding, or the Department
of Social Services or a voluntary child care agency in a termination
of parental rights case. But the most important aspect of this is
that in the child protective cases, it is the child who is the victim of
either some action or inaction by a parent or a parental figure, and
it is not, as was true of all the other cases we have talked about
before, with the exception of some of the criminal cases, cases in-
volving two adults, or an adult and a corporation.
Children figured in some of the criminal cases, but in every Arti-
cle 10 case, in every child protective case, the child is the victim.
The defendants or respondents are in every case either a parent, a
legal guardian, or a person legally responsible for the child's care.
The person, in other words, who in the criminal matters would act
as an advocate for the victim is now accused of mistreating the
victim.
In the termination of parental rights cases, it is somewhat differ-
ent, in that these are less matters of fault as matters of failures to
plan for children's futures.
Even within the child protective cases, you have a huge range of
behavior by the offender. The behaviors range from the most ex-
cruciating cases in which children are tortured, maimed, treated in
an utterly inhuman fashion, to cases in which a child is actually
murdered by a parent and the child protective proceeding only in-
volves the surviving siblings of the child who is deceased. You
have cases of sexual abuse; you have cases in which children are
used for child pornography courtesy of their parents; and then you
have the cases in which the court is involved because of parental
drug abuse, alcohol abuse, or because a parent is incarcerated for
murdering the other parent and now the children have no one; or
because of domestic violence between the parents. The patterns go
on and on. Abuse cases also include those where a parent leaves
the child home alone, unattended for days at a time, in charge of
the younger children, some of whom are in diapers.
I cannot begin to sketch in the range, but you can see that in
some of the cases the children are physically harmed; in others,
they are placed in undue risk of harm, physical or emotional; and
in other cases, there is a kind of overlying or overhanging neglect
which is often a risk of psychological harm.
In a great many of these cases the children are removed, sepa-
rated from their siblings, separated from the parents. In many of
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the cases, the children are not as disaffected with the parents as you
might expect, at least at first, because they are so shocked by the
separation.
I remember quite vividly a case many years ago in which a child
had been kept in a closet for essentially a year and was fed from a
bucket. It was only when the priest in the neighborhood church
realized that he had not seen the child in a very long time and
investigated that this came to light. The child had stopped growing.
He was about ten years old when this occurred.
The child was brought to court for the testimony that he had to
give and they finally got him talking again. He sat there on the
social worker's lap with a court reporter and the attorneys for the
parents. This is a civil case, remember. It was very slow going, but
the child's exact words I have never forgotten. When he finally
could be persuaded to say something, he just looked up and said,
"They treated me like a dog. I never want to see them again," and
then he said nothing more. That is a stunning kind of case because
usually children will not usually be as vehement as that because
they are afraid.
What is the point of emphasizing this? If we are going to talk
about apology and forgiveness, we should recognize that we are
talking now about parents and children who have a unique
relationship.
Depending on the age of the child, the child may very well be
aware of what has gone on. The child may blame himself or herself
in part for what has gone on, either because the child told some-
body or the parent has told the child that it is the child's fault. In
some cases, the child is furious with the parent because the parent
believed a paramour instead of the child who said they were being
sexually abused. By the time the parent wises up, it is too late; the
damage has been done, at least for the moment.
The other thing that is different about these cases is that these
relationships existed before the injury and exist after the injury, so
the issue of reconciliation is crucial. If reconciliation is not going to
happen, either because the parent is incarcerated on a parallel
criminal case for the same activity or, for some other reason, there
may still be a necessity for something to happen for the family,
even if they are never going to live together again and even if the
legal ties are going to be severed, so each person in the family can
move on. In other words, the child has to have some form of reso-
lution of the issue, of the betrayal, and the parent, who may end up
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having other children or who may regain custody of this child or
other children, may need some transformation event.
For example, in the child protective case a child is removed and
placed with relatives or in foster care and the parent is offered ap-
propriate services. That often is not what happens for parents who
are drug addicted and the like because of the dearth of services.
But assume the services are out there and visitation is set up with
the child. The parent does not go to drug treatment, the parent
does not come for the visits half the time, or comes quite drunk.
The child now has a further injury that he has suffered, that the
parent is not trying. And again, there is a further problem that
stands in the way of the child's development.
The question in this area is: How do you evaluate the prospects
and the process of apology and forgiveness when it is a parent and
a child? What is different about it? What is the same about it?
How do you modify the way you approach this? What are the
valid goals that you would articulate?
For this, I think you need to look to psychologists and child de-
velopment specialists, for a variety of answers, depending on the
age of the child and the circumstances that resulted in the injury to
the child. As far as I know, this question has not been explored at
all in a systematic fashion by anybody.
The private cases are custody and visitation cases. Here there
has been some use of mediation, in family court at least. I am not
sure about in supreme court, and it is certainly true in New York
City and New York State, as well as elsewhere in the country.
Mediation can be tricky for a number of reasons. The cases do
not always declare themselves as pure custody or visitation cases,
by which I mean cases in which there is no history of child abuse or
neglect or no history of domestic violence between the parents.
They may appear at first glance to be straightforward cases, but
they can be more complicated.
If they are straightforward cases and there is no injury to the
child, then we have simply the grownups fighting it out, and the
mediation process may help them to reach a rational result without
injuring the children in the process of fighting over custody and
visitation. These cases sometimes, as time goes on, develop into
more problematic cases which have to be taken from mediation
and brought back to court.
Depending on what is at issue, though, the people may be able to
it work out, without getting into the questions of the redress of old
injuries, proper custody and visitation. Certainly, the things that
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led to a marital rift in the first place may or may not involve
"fault," "injury" or mutual fault.
Another and interesting parallel development is as we move to
no-fault divorce, there is a question as to whether an outlet is
needed for the moral indignation factor that used to be part and
parcel of divorce litigation in order for the people to move on.
An area that has been removed entirely, though, from media-
tion, and possibly incorrectly so, involves domestic violence. Do-
mestic violence means lots of different things. Now, in family
court, for example, domestic violence cases are not limited to hus-
bands versus wives, wives versus husbands or paramour versus par-
amour who have a child in common even if they are unmarried, or
former paramours. It includes feuding siblings, aunts and uncles.
The whole family constellation can come into Family Court on a
family offense case alleging domestic violence.
Traditionally, where it is the case of husbands and wives or lov-
ers, who have children in common, the fear has been that using
mediation is inappropriate because the situation is so volatile. The
whole process in a serious domestic violence case involves the esca-
lation of violence, a very violent episode followed by a period of
apology, the seeking of forgiveness, and then the process starts
again, so that, by definition, if you were looking to apology and
forgiveness and so on, you would be feeding into the very syn-
drome that is causing the risk of harm.
That analysis does not necessarily apply to every case. Quite
apart from whether it applies to every husband-wife case or par-
amour case, it almost certainly does not apply to some of the ex-
tended family cases, and those often take on more of the aspect of
a neighborhood feud.
MS. LIVINGSTON: When Dean Feerick contacted me, asking
me to participate in this Symposium and telling me the topic, I con-
fess I thought initially, not only by myself, but in talking to people
with whom I work about the concept of forgiveness in the civil law,
that it is not something we focus on. However, it is not something
we think of often, and it is not part of what we do. And then, after
spending some hours reflecting on it, I decided that my initial im-
pression was wrong.
Forgiveness is really what civil law is all about. We do not talk of
punitive damages in civil cases in New York State. 38 It is the rare
138. The legal standard for maintaining a punitive damages claim is rigorous in
New York State. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dyer, 593 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (App. Div. 1993)
(finding that defendant's conduct must be "morally culpable or actuated by evil and
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case, I think perhaps there are maybe two or three in the State's
history that I know of, that has ever involved punitive damages, so
the idea of punishing anybody is something that we know exists out
there in other worlds but not in our own.
And so what are we compensating for? We are only compensat-
ing to make a person whole. You all remember that, of course,
from your first week in torts. That is all damages are. That is what
the entire lawsuit is about: somebody has been injured, they have
economic losses, they have pain and suffering that must be com-
pensated for, and the wrongdoer, should he or she be judged to be
a wrongdoer, must compensate only to make that person whole.
There is no punishment, there is no revenge, only allow this person
to be compensated, allow them to get back what they had in the
only way, of course, that the law can see and understand and actu-
alize on, money.
If you think about that, then it is indeed a very forgiving system.
The wrongdoer does not pay. We hear about civil verdicts and you
think, "My goodness, look how horrendous that malpractice was,"
for instance. (I will resort to malpractice throughout my comments
because it is the area of the law in which I practice). "Look how
large that verdict was." It shocks us sometimes when we read of it,
but remember when you hear it that it is only to compensate that
person for what they lost. It is only to pay them for what their
needs are.
When you read about large verdicts, they are almost exclusively
verdicts to pay for the costs, for instance, of the child who has brain
damage as the result of an obstetrician's negligence or a hospital's
negligence around the time of his or her birth. She has a lifetime of
health care needs: a lifetime of costs for therapies, costs for their
maintenance, and caregivers because she can never live alone and
can never function alone.
So are they large damages? Of course they are. Why are they
large damages? Because that is the only thing that can compensate
that person to at least give her some semblance of who she would
have been before.
reprehensive [sic] motive"); Karen S. v. Streitferdt, 568 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947 (App. Div.
1991) (stating that punitive damages are "awarded in 'singularly rare cases' such as
cases involving.., malice or... wrongdoing to the public"); Lugo v. LJN Toys, Ltd.,
539 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (App. Div. 1989) ("The recovery of punitive damages depends
upon the defendant acting with evil and wrongful motive or with a willful and inten-
tional misdoing, or with a reckless indifference equivalent thereto.").
1424
FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
People come to me all the time, because we only represent plain-
tiffs who are injured, with tales as horrible as you can imagine
about situations where they only went in expecting wonderful
things. Examples include the birth of a child or a minor medical
procedure where a loved one ended up comatose for the rest of
their days. They only expected wonderful things to happen. In-
stead, in a moment or hours, whichever it might be, from careless-
ness or from negligence, their lives, or the lives of those that they
love, were radically altered forever.
Time and again, I hear this. As I look at them and listen to
them, they say to me, in words or in substance, "And you know
what? He never even said he was sorry." Or, alternatively, we
hear the story and then we get the records; the plaintiffs come back
and we say, "Do you know that 'X' happened," whatever the par-
ticular circumstance might be, and they say, "You know what?
They never even told me." Not surprisingly, they are angry.
I have heard, probably in half the cases that come to us, the fol-
lowing: "If they had come in to me and said 'I'm sorry,' or if the
doctor had come in and told me what happened, I would not be
here." I was not surprised to hear the Lexington, Kentucky
story139 because I have been hearing it for twenty years now.
Forgiveness is one of the most crucial elements of medical mal-
practice and personal injury. Speaking to a group of physicians, as
I have done at times in the past, I say to them: "Do you want to
know how to avoid medical malpractice lawsuits? Sit down with
the patient afterwards and talk to her, and if something happens,
then you tell her. People sue because they are angry at being mis-
treated, however horrendous their injury."
I could tell you of a hundred different cases of horrendous inju-
ries where nobody would have sued except that, "They didn't tell
me. They avoided me. My loved one went for this simple proce-
dure in the emergency room and wound up being in a coma, but for
days I would say to people, 'What happened?,' and they would
avoid me, no one had an answer. All the nurses would say, 'Ask
the doctor,' and all the doctors would say, 'You have to ask some-
body else.' I never got an answer."
They never get an answer, so what do they do? Do they seek
lawyers because they are money-hungry? Do they come to us be-
cause they want revenge? Do they come to us because they hate
doctors and this is their chance? No. They come because they
139. See Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 123.
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want answers; and, if the answers were not sufficient, they also
want apologies. They do not get them.
We would all like to say that if medical care was a lot better, then
there would be fewer lawsuits. I don't know that that will happen.
As many as 98,000 deaths a year in the United States are attributa-
ble to medical malpractice, more than almost all major accidents.' 4
Those are the people suing. The people suing are the ones who
have not gotten answers, who have not been told.
So where does forgiveness come in? Even if the same negligence
occurred, but defendants were schooled to apologize, even once
the lawsuit is started, that would help. But the reality of the system
is that there is an innate conflict because defendants' lawyers in
New York State are hired out on a case-by-case basis by the insur-
ance companies and they are paid on an hourly basis.
Sitting here, I thought of all the cases I have seen in my twenty
years of practice where the defendant admitted liability. I thought
of two, and that is staggering, because in many cases there is no
question of how bad the medical care was. In only two cases pre-
jury selection, one of them only happened days before the jury was
selected, did anybody say, "We admit responsibility, we were
wrong, we are going to try this case only on damages."
Now, that might be a function of people not wanting to admit,
hoping against hope that some expert will come into a courtroom
and testify on their behalf, however unbelievable that might be. Or
it might be a function of the system as it is set up, with lawyers paid
by the hour. I am not sure.
The public thinks people are money-hungry, and they are not, as
I said. The public has the sense that people are suing because they
want to be compensated only, but they are indeed suing for justice.
Juries are rather forgiving, not, I am sorry to say, of plaintiffs,
but rather forgiving of defendants. They are forgiving of those who
make a mistake, perhaps thinking, "Well, it could have been me
doing that" or "It could have been any one of us who ran the red
light."
They have been taught, as most of us have, to look up to the
medical profession and respect them. Juries look up to doctors,
respect them and believe what they say. The public perception is
that it is the plaintiffs who exaggerate and lie, it is the plaintiffs who
are making things up. I can tell you that I see, time and time again,
140. See Rick Weiss, Medical Errors Blamed For Many Deaths, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 1999, at Al (citing a study by the National Academy of Sciences).
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doctors who rewrite their office records, hospitals that make parts
of records disappear. It happens time and time again.
A recent example is the doctor in a failure to diagnose breast
cancer case, with a very believable woman who came in and was
telling me this horrible story about why she is so fiddled with can-
cer because of a misdiagnosis. It was so believable. And then we
got the doctor's office records; her story was totally different than
the records. It just didn't make any sense. We studied and studied
the records because we couldn't put the two together, until, at the
very bottom, we noticed that the records for this medical malprac-
tice that was supposed to have happened in 1994 were on a form
that was first printed in 1996.
A little digression, but juries want to believe that doctors do not
do wrong and that it was somehow the fault of the patients who
were injured. So they will not forgive the victim, as it often be-
lieved, but forgive the wrongdoer when he or she is in that position
of authority that they want to believe. It is very hard to overcome.
It contrasts with the public perception that the court system is a
give-away. The reality is that it is far more likely that those who
deserve to be compensated are turned away.
What does a jury trial do for people? Horrible injuries, lives de-
stroyed. People come to a courtroom for justice. A jury can speak
out for justice for those who are injured. As disfigured as they are,
when they even cannot stand, they walk away taller because some
juror has said they are right. And, should the defendant not have
admitted responsibility all along, when it comes to a jury saying
they were right, then that plaintiff forgives them, and the defendant
as well.
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FORGIVENESS AND INTERNATIONAL AMNESTY
PROFESSOR FLAHERTY: We turn to forgiveness and am-
nesty in the international context. Today we look at that in at least
two regards. The more conventional regard is that as nations come
out of human rights nightmares they are confronted with the prob-
lem of what to do about past human rights transgressors; the solu-
tions run across the spectrum. One end of the spectrum, to hold
transgressors accountable to the fullest extent possible, is moti-
vated largely by concerns of justice. The other end of the spec-
trum, amnesty, is motivated largely by concerns about peace-
making, and, to an extent, forgiveness. As countries emerged from
repressive human rights situations, they fell at different points
along the spectrum; we will investigate that in this panel.
We will also investigate an intriguing regard to this subject: for-
giveness of loans and debt when it comes to international law. Pro-
fessor Chantal Thomas, in particular, will speak about this.1 41
This discussion of forgiveness is a sign of progress because it
shows that nations are moving beyond repressive regimes to deal
with the problem of how to move forward.
MR. CHIPOCO CACEDA:142 Probably one of the most impor-
tant contributions of the 20th century to humanity has been the
notion or conception of human rights. One of the most interesting
things in human rights and public international law is the progres-
sive nature and how the law has developed over time with respect
to protecting the individual.
One of the most recently recognized human rights is the right to
truth. It emerged in the 20th century and really in the last ten
years. Among the first jurisprudence on this was the Inter-Ameri-
can Court's Velasquez Rodriguez case, where the court found that
it was a state responsibility, not only to punish violators, but also to
investigate and to prevent violations. 143 I should mention that Juan
M6ndez tried the Velasquez case.
In a number of reports, the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission has stated that it is necessary to know not only who has
done what, but what has happened, why it happened and the cir-
cumstances in which those events and violations occurred. More
than twenty-five African and Latin American national truth com-
missions, occurring in governments or states that have been in
141. See Thomas, infra note 174.
142. Remarks translated by Andrew Kaufman.
143. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4 (1988), avail-
able at <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b-11-12d.htm>.
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democratic transitions, have stated the need to know the truth of
what occurred, the circumstances in which it occurred, and the con-
ditions that led state institutions to violate human rights. But why
has the right to truth become a human right?
In the first place, there is a moral obligation to the victims, the
family members of the victims, and society, to discover and expose
what happened. Perhaps the best example of the need for the right
to truth is in the case of disappearances. There have been
thousands of cases throughout Latin America, Africa, Asia, and
Central America where people have "disappeared," either through
state institutions, such as the army or police, and the need for the
right to truth is reflected through the families.4 It has often been
said that it is worse to have a relative "disappeared" than to be
murdered, because it is the hope and the lack of hope that drives
you all the time, that inability to actually ever know what has
happened.
A second reason for the right to truth is its preventative nature.
To prevent abuses in the future it is transcendental that people
know what the circumstances and conditions were that led state
institutions to commit abuses, and thereby, with this knowledge,
prevent future similar actions. For example, with truth commis-
sions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, one of the basic
findings is that the lack of accountability is what allowed state insti-
tutions to commit serious human rights violations. This lack of ac-
countability allowed police forces, military forces, and secret
services to act in a way that they would not have been able to if
there were accountability.
With regard to the right to truth, furthermore, truth must have
certain characteristics that enable it to reconstruct the circum-
stances of what happened and, by revealing those circumstances,
have a dissuasive effect in the future. The truth must not be a par-
tial, but a complete, truth. In Latin America, there have been a
couple of cases, such as in Guatemala, where truth commissions
have not individualized responsibility. They just named institu-
tions, such as the army or the guerrillas. For the right to truth to
have its desired effect, it needs to reveal not only the circumstances
but also the names of the actors involved.
144. See, e.g., NUNCA MAS: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE DISAPPEARED (Writers and Scholars Int'l trans. 1986), cited in Terence
S. Coonan, Rescuing History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task of Mak-
ing Former Torturers Accountable, 20 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 512 n.1 (1996).
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The truth must be an official truth, a state-sponsored truth, a
public truth, an impartial truth, and a truth to which all have ac-
cess. Only through access can truth contribute to processes of
transition.
Without the truth there can be no forgiveness. Without knowing
who has done what, and how they did it, there can be no forgive-
ness; without the actors, the victimizers, the perpetrators, admitting
their responsibility for these acts, and thereby verifying this truth,
the conditions for forgiveness will not exist. That said, the right to
truth is a powerful instrument for societies or countries that have
suffered serious human rights violations to use in their transition
processes.
MR. FORTI: I have been requested to talk about the instrument
of what Carlos Chipoco has developed, this concept of the right to
the truth. In Latin America, within the past two decades, several
countries have experienced the emergence and the implementation
of truth commissions. These are basically officially endorsed, ad
hoc, investigative bodies with the power to examine and inquire
into the past. Their findings and conclusions are expected to end
impunity by presenting an authoritative, an official, and a so-called
"final" truth behind the crimes and grave acts of violence that they
investigate.
Truth commissions in Latin America have always been sur-
rounded by the context of transition. Argentina and Chile passed
from military dictatorship to democracy. Haiti rehabilitated and
reinstalled a democratically elected government. El Salvador and
Guatemala reached peace agreements ending internal conflict.
The common element in all of these cases is a strong demand for
justice by victims, their relatives, and by civil society in general. In
broad terms, these truth commissions have three main core pur-
poses or objectives. The first is to investigate, to elucidate the facts
behind the grave acts of violence that remain under impunity, espe-
cially, like Carlos mentioned before, human rights violations that
are considered crimes against humanity, like disappearances, extra-
judicial executions, and massacres. The investigation is expected to
reveal the modus operandi of government structures and state
agents that were involved, sometimes in a clandestine manner, in
these massive violations of human rights. The investigation is also
expected to identify those individuals or institutions responsible for
ordering and implementing those human rights violations.
The second goal is to promote specific measures in order to
avoid the future occurrence of such events and keep society from
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forgetting the past. This, in Latin America, is done through spe-
cific actions and recommendations to honor the memory of the vic-
tims, such as the case recently in Guatemala;a45 national
monuments; the broad dissemination of the commission's reports;
and the incorporation of the commission's findings and conclusions
through the public educational system.
A third goal has also been the promotion of national reconcilia-
tion. The rationale behind this is that it is possible to forgive only
when three elements are present: when the truth is known; when
errors are acknowledged by the perpetrators; and when the gov-
ernment implements actions of reparations.
Having said this, my opinion, after personal experience in some
of these commissions, is that truth commissions are by no means
the ideal solution to bring about truth and justice after human
rights violations. The proper way is through state bodies of admin-
istration of justice charged with the investigation, prosecution, pun-
ishment, and reparation of those crimes. Truth commissions have
appeared in Latin America precisely because the justice systems of
our countries were unable or unwilling to perform their task. The
state's obligation is to find and disclose the truth and bring about
justice. Truth commissions have been in Latin America a "last re-
sort" solution.
A final point about this general overview, which Carlos has men-
tioned, is the issue of controversy surrounding truth commissions.
We can identify two major approaches by truth commissions in the
implementation of their mandate; some focus on determining the
fate of the victims and some emphasize identifying the perpetrators
of human rights violations. In other words, some commissions
name names and some do not.
Some people argue that naming the individuals responsible for
abuses triggers legal processes and produces public debate, which,
in turn, generates instability and polarization in societies that need,
above all, to be reconciled. This school of thought also argues that
truth commissions are not jurisdictional bodies, by definition and
by naming names, they are to some extent violating the due pro-
cess of those persons being named.
On the other hand, abstention from disclosing names of perpe-
trators constitutes a half or incomplete truth. It fails to meet the
expectations of victims, civil society, and the international commu-
nity. Worst of all, it does not eliminate the possibility of repetition,
145. See COMISI6N DE EScLARECIMIENT HIST6RICO, Guatemala: Memoria del
Silencio (Feb. 25, 1999).
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since impunity is maintained for those who commit these crimes.
Moreover, not knowing the identity of responsible individuals im-
pedes the ability of those affected ones to forgive and thus to ad-
vance the national reconciliation, the very objective given to truth
commissions.
I have been asked to develop two case studies on this process of
investigation of past human rights violations. I will try to be very
brief in describing the cases of El Salvador and Honduras. But,
because of the time constraint, I would emphasize that they are
very important cases.
In El Salvador, the truth commission was the result of a peace
agreement in an internal armed conflict. The commission was
made up of three individuals named by the United Nations Secre-
tary-General. a4 6 All of them were foreigners. The two parties at
war established the mandate.'47 In El Salvador's truth commission,
even though the mandate did not explicitly call for naming names,
the commission interpreted the mandate to require them to name
names.
Honduras is very important because it is not necessarily referred
to as a case where a truth commission took place. But the
Hondurans performed a thorough investigation of the disappear-
ances that occurred throughout the 1980s.' 48 A state organ, the
Office of the Human Rights Commissioner (known as the
Ombudsman), did the investigation. 4 9 In Honduras, for the first
time, the state fulfilled its obligation to investigate itself.
In both cases, the recommendations were partially implemented
and accepted by their respective governments. This is evidence
that perhaps the greatest weaknesses of truth commissions has
been the inability, or the lack of strength or instruments, to make
sure that governments implement their recommendations.
In retrospect, the experiences of El Salvador and Honduras were
guided by common objectives of ending impunity, consolidating
the rule of law, and promoting national reconciliation based on the
146. The three members were Belisario Betancur, former President of Colombia,
Reinaldo Figueredo, former Foreign Minister of Venezuela, and Thomas Buergenthal,
former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
147. See San Jose Agreement on Human Rights (July 26, 1990); Mexican Agreement
at app. (Apr. 27, 1991).
148. See Dr. Leo Valladares Lanza, Los Hechos Hablan Por Si Mismos (Nat'l
Comm. Protection of Hum. Rts. Dec. 29, 1993).
149. See Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez-Ayllon, The Impact of Globalization on
the Reform of the State and the Law in Latin America, 19 Hous. J. INr'L L. 785, 798
(1997).
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full knowledge of the truth. Something very important, and that
applies to other cases in Latin America, is that in both Honduras
and El Salvador, not only were the truth commissions independent
and autonomous from the government but they also were per-
ceived as such by the population. That is why their reports were a
very important element, very important documents that still have a
repercussion in those societies.
These two experiences are concrete expressions of the advance-
ment of what was referred to by Carlos and was brilliantly articu-
lated by Juan M6ndez, 5 ° this set of principles known as the right to
the truth, which is a right directly related with an obligation, an
obligation of the state to investigate these crimes against humanity,
to prosecute and punish their perpetrators, to provide reparations
for victims, and to find and disclose the truth about what
happened.
PROFESSOR ANDREWS: I will talk about South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") and essentially
raise the question which Martha Minow touched on in her talk ear-
lier.15' The question is: Was this a grand exercise in forgiveness, to
use her term, a "command performance of reconciliation, 1 52 or
was this justice held hostage to truth? I will attempt in my brief
comments to answer part of this question.
The TRC in South Africa, apart from its substantive provisions,
served a highly symbolic purpose and was central to the rituals of
transformation, reconciliation and forgiveness playing out in South
Africa since 1994 and the first elections there. When the TRC was
established in 1996, it was a bold exercise, and it certainly captured
the imagination of South Africans, and also people abroad. 53
It was an ambitious project. Alfredo Forti commented on some
of the aims of the truth commissions in Central and South
America. Some of those aims are mirrored in the South African
TRC: to find the truth; to compensate the victims; to force the
nation to pay attention to the suffering of others; to reconcile the
victims and the perpetrators; and to close off the past while starting
150. See Mdndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, infra note 163.
151. See Minow Keynote Address, supra note 115.
152. See id.
153. For a thoughtful analysis of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see KA-
DER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILLIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF
APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (1997).
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a future with reconciliation strongly in the minds of South
Africans.1 54
Of course, the TRC was ultimately a political compromise. It
was part of the process of negotiation that took place in the coun-
try in the early 1990s. The past had to be dealt with in some way, it
could only be dealt with in a way that kept together a very fragile
new democracy. Many aspects of the structure and procedures of
TRC were consequences of this compromise.
Human rights activists easily accepted a TRC in South Africa,
and particularly its legitimacy. Up until the first democratic elec-
tions, there had been a universal consensus that apartheid was a
crime against humanity. The United Nations passed a Resolution
that apartheid was a crime against humanity. In addition, South
Africa was one of the first countries that the United Nations
Human Rights Commission took action against. 55 And certainly
by the time that South Africa started negotiating, the shape and
substance of the new democracy in the early 1990s, human rights
was the language of progressive politics. This emancipatory script
of human rights certainly had a great bearing on the TRC and
made things easier and smoother.
Now, of course, the language of human rights is a very contro-
versial one, and it is a topic that I cannot deal with here. But this
controversy plays out in some of the conflicts in the TRC
processes. The TRC was deliberately chosen to be victim-centered,
and the choice of Archbishop Desmond Tutu as head of the TRC
recognized that the legal processes were not necessarily the best
ways to deal with the way that victims tell their stories. And so, to
some extent, the rules of evidence and formal legal processes had
to be suspended. Of course, the law, and certainly the Constitu-
tion, loomed large in the hearings, because as perpetrators began
to be named, they started challenging what was happening in the
hearings.
Despite this, the TRC certainly gave victims a venue to tell their
stories. Telling the stories would restore dignity to the victims.
More importantly, the narratives became part of official history,
preventing national amnesia.
There were several problems that surfaced from the TRC. One
was the designation of "victim." Essentially, what the TRC did was
154. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteenth Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Com-
parative Study, 16 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 597 (1994).
155. See Michael Humphrey, Windows into the Nature of Conflict, XXI, AFRICAN
STUDIES REVIEW & NEWSLETTER, Dec. 1999, at 20, 23.
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to individualize justice and to distinguish between the extraordi-
nary and the ordinary victims of apartheid. 156 The mandate of the
TRC was to investigate gross human rights violations. But of
course the people that were systematically humiliated on a daily
basis through the whole system of apartheid were not to be in-
cluded in the definition of victim.'57 For example, the apartheid
government moved whole communities of black people as part of
designating areas "white."
This is a very important issue. The victims of systemic racism
and exploitation see themselves as victims, and there has to be
some forum in which they too can tell their stories . 8 But of
course in South Africa this was a part of political compromise, and
some limitations had to be placed on the process.
The other set of victims ignored in the process were the people
of the neighboring countries that the South African Government
systematically wreaked havoc against. The South African army en-
gaged in military raids and essentially destabilized Mozambique
and Angola; it conducted regular raids into Swaziland, Lesotho and
Botswana and in the process destroyed communities. 59 I am sure
many of you are aware of the regional political and economic situa-
tion at this moment; Angola has been at war for decades and
Mozambique is economically crippled. The South African
apartheid-era Government is to blame for this legacy. There is no
forum, as of yet, for those victims.
A second problem arose as the process unfolded. As South Afri-
cans became mesmerized by their television sets at night, and as
they listened to their radios to these appalling tales of horror and
abuse, it became clear that the process needed to be stage man-
aged. This was essential because the hearings were supposed to
generate ideas of reconciliation and forgiveness; soon, however,
there was the danger that revenge and resentment began to sur-
face. And so, increasingly, Archbishop Tutu needed to guide the
156. See David Dyzenhaus, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH,
RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER (1998).
157. For an interesting exploration of these matters, see Colin Bundy, Truth... or
Reconciliation, 14 SOUTHERN AFRICA REP. 8 (1999).
158. See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES To BLACKS
(2000) (discussing reconciliation and reparations in the United States).
159. See John Daniel, The Truth About the Region, 14 SOUTHERN AFRICA REP. 8
(Aug. 1999).
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hearings in a way to ensure that the TRC would not degenerate
into a quagmire of cynicism and skepticism.
160
Ultimately the TRC was a very important process. Symbolically
it was important for South Africans, for the victims of apartheid,
albeit a select group, to come and tell their stories. It was impor-
tant for the perpetrators to come and be cross-examined by their
victims; but also substantively I think it provides a model for other
societies.
PROFESSOR MtNDEZ: My theme is basically an announce-
ment of a research project. It is something I do not think we have
explored in depth yet. That is, how much deference does the inter-
national community owe to domestic arrangements like truth com-
missions, partial amnesties, or total amnesties, in the interest not
only of state sovereignty but also of justice?
Quite frankly, this has been suggested to me by this veritable
revolution in international law - the Pinochet case. As you know,
the Chilean Government's position - in litigation and in diplo-
macy - is that the international community must respect, to the
letter, to the hilt, everything that the Chilean society and state has
decided to do about violations of its recent past.161 Of course,
Judge Baltasar Garz6n in Spain and the government of Her Maj-
esty in Britain contest this.162
Let me start with an assertion: International Law imposes obli-
gations on states to deal with the past, especially the legacies of
recent egregious and serious human rights abuses. I cannot go into
the details as to why this is so, but it is what we call an emerging
principle - you will not find it in the letter of any particular treaty
or multilateral convention. Interestingly, however, there is very lit-
tle argument about whether this emerging principle is really there,
or even on its binding force over all states.163
160. For the most poignant account of the TRC hearings, see ANTJIE KROG, THE
COUNTRY OF MY SKULL (1998).
161. See Anthony Faiola, Pinochet Supporters, Critics Cheer Verdict, Both Sides Say
Their Causes Will Benefit, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1999, at A27 (reporting Chilean
President Eduardo Frei's statement that only Chile has the right to determine Pi-
nochet's fate).
162. See T.R. Reid, Spaniard Will Press Pursuit of Dictators, WASH. POST, Jan. 16,
2000, at A29 (describing Judge Garz6n's perspective); T.R. Reid, Pinochet's Arrest
Upheld, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al (reporting that Britain's highest court
found Pinochet not immune from criminal prosecution for alleged human rights
abuses).
163. See Juan M6ndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255 (1997);
Juan Mdndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
ROLE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) [hereinafter
Mdndez, Accountability for Past Abuses]; Diane Oreutlicher, Addressing Gross
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To summarize this principle quickly, what governments have to
do about legacies of past abuse is basically a four-fold obligation.
First, a government is obligated to do justice. That essentially
takes the form of an obligation to investigate, prosecute, and even-
tually punish perpetrators.
Second is the right to truth mentioned before. It can be fulfilled
through truth commissions or by other means, but mostly the prac-
tice of nations has been to establish truth commissions.
The third obligation is to provide reparations.
The fourth one is to cleanse the security forces of all those peo-
ple who, even if they cannot be punished, at least are known to
have committed very serious abuses. Newly democratic states can-
not afford to keep in the ranks of their security forces people who
have perpetrated these crimes.
Now, let me rush to say that these are obligations of means and
not of results, in the language of French civil law. States discharge
these obligations to the international community as long as they try
in good faith to comply with these four steps. We cannot expect,
the international community has no right to expect, that every sin-
gle case will be investigated, prosecuted, the truth disclosed, et
cetera, because there would be insurmountable obstacles. But
each obligation is to be performed in good faith. I would insist on
that.
Further, it is not a menu. Governments cannot pick and choose
and say, "We will give them a truth commission but we will not
prosecute," or, "We will give them reparations but we will not
cleanse the security forces." In this sense, in 1997, the European
Court of Human Rights, which finally now has to deal with some of
the serious abuses that the Inter-American system has had to deal
with, said that in serious cases of torture, destruction of property,
and forced eviction, it is not enough to pay reparations; there is
something more that the state has to do."6 This principle emerges
from decisions like that.
Forgiveness has been offered as a justification for blanket amnes-
ties, and that is why, in Latin America at least, we do not use "for-
giveness" very often. Even the word "reconciliation" does not ring
Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (Louis Henkin & John Hargrove eds., 1994).
164. See Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1996); Akdivar v. Turkey, 23 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 143 (1997).
2000] 1437
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
very true to Latin American victims of human rights abuse, be-
cause it has always been no more than a code word for impunity.
165
It is now clear that blanket amnesties, unconditional amnesties,
amnesties that prevent knowledge of the truth, that prevent even
any serious inquiry, and that leave the perpetrators not only free
but also even ascending through the ranks in the security forces,
are inconsistent with the obligations of a state under international
law. The kind of reasoning that the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations has used several times to criticize these amnes-
ties, is that they create an "atmosphere of impunity," and are thus
inconsistent with a State's obligations under the International Cov-
enants on Civil and Political Rights.166
But other arrangements may pass international muster. What
we do not know is what will and will not.
In the case of South Africa, I am illuminated here by a recent
article by a famous, well-known South African jurist, John Dugard,
where, after a very close exploration of the international obliga-
tions of South Africa, he comes to the conclusion that at least, in
principle, the law that creates the South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, with its conditional amnesty and leaving
open the possibility of prosecutions, seems to be in compliance
with international law.1 67 But Dugard goes on to criticize the Con-
stitutional Court's decision in the AZAPO case. 68 The families of
Steve Biko and several others challenged this law and tried to set
aside the amnesty part of the law.1 69 The Constitutional Court un-
fortunately, in a very poorly elaborated decision, ruled against the
claim of unconstitutionality. 71 Most of us would probably have
come to the same result but I criticize it because, for example, it
goes to the practice of nations, but it leaves out some practices. It
sometimes misquotes or mis-cites the facts of some other practices,
165. See AMERICA'S WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA, AN
UPDATE (1991), cited in Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights Syis-
tern: Establishing Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI IN-
TER-AM. L. REV. 297, 326 n.150 (1995).
166. See Concluding Observations: Argentina, United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add. 96 (1995); Concluding Observations: Peru,
United Nations Human Rights Commission, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 72 (1996).
167. See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South Africa Experience, 8
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROas. 277, 301 (1998).
168. Id. at 302-03 (criticizing Azanian Peoples Organization v. The President of The
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (cc), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20).
169. See Azanian Peoples Organization, 1996 SACLR LEXIS at 28-29.
170. See id. at 34.
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and it does not, like Dugard says,'171 even mention the Velasquez172
precedent or several decisions by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights173 that would go in a different direction.
We are making progress here. The Guatemala amnesty, for ex-
ample, was passed as a result of the peace accords. It is the first
Latin American amnesty law that is not unconditional, that does
exclude cases that qualify under what we would call crimes against
humanity. But I do not think that that should be the end of the
story. Also, Guatemala has an exemplary truth commission, which
just published a report that did not mince words and said, in so
many words, that what was done to the indigenous community of
Guatemala was genocide.
So is that enough? Should the inquiry stop there? I think not.
Both in South Africa and in Guatemala, the processes still have not
concluded. We do not know whether there will be prosecutions
after the selective amnesties. Especially in Guatemala, we are so
used to what we call in Latin America "de facto impunity," inertia
by which prosecutors do not investigate cases, judges look the
other way or the military find all kinds of reasons to impose their
will. Military code jurisdiction is an infamous mechanism of impu-
nity in Latin America. All of those things can make the effort that
is going in the right direction right now be completely trumped in
the end.
The point is that, when we have new Pinochet-like cases, and we
will have new Pinochet-like cases, fortunately, we have to be able
to decide whether what a country has done passes international
muster or not. That decision should not rely only on the general
scheme of things, but on the facts of the case, on the particular
171. See Dugard, supra note 167, at 306.
172. See supra note 143.
173. While AZAPO cites, approvingly, that amnesty laws have been a part of re-
cent Latin American history, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
repeatedly said that amnesty laws of a blanket nature are inconsistent with the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights. See Cases 10,288 and others, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
28, OEA/ser. L/V/II.83 (1993) (Argentina), available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/an-
nualrep/92eng/ch3c.htm>; Cases 10,029 and others, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 29, OEA/ser .L/
V/II.83 (1993) (Uruguay), available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/92eng/ch3s.
htm>; Cases 11,505 and others, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser. L/V/II.98, doc. 7 rev.
(1997) (Chile), available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/97ench3a41an.
htm#REPORT N' 25/98>. The Commission reaffirmed its position this year in the
Romero case, which involves the massacre of the Jesuits in El Salvador; the English
translation will be available upon publication of this Symposium. See <http://www.
cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99span/De%20Fondo/El%2OSalvador1O.488.htm> (Spanish
version); <http://www.cidh.oas.org/reports.htm> (English-language site for recent
commission reports).
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responsibility of the potential defendant that we may have jurisdic-
tion over, on whether the government has tried to comply in good
faith with the four obligations. All of those things, unfortunately,
are still very much in a state of flux and we still need a lot more
theoretical and practical research about them.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: (Comments presented in detail in her
Essay written in connection with this Symposium.) 74
PROFESSOR FLAHERTY: We have time for a few questions.
AUDIENCE: I think that a common theme among all the pan-
elists is this question of accountability. It strikes me that, on the
question of debt forgiveness, perhaps the strongest argument I
heard you allude to is irresponsible lending. In many cases much
of the money never got to the people, never got to the public ser-
vice projects, and so on.
In a sense, forgiveness may not be the right or the most politi-
cally powerful rhetoric to use, but, instead, fraudulent lending. The
language of fraud and corruption would be much more persuasive
politically in the West, and I have heard some Transparency Inter-
national 175 folks talk about some really interesting ideas on both
legal and political mechanisms to get debt forgiveness, such as as-
signing the debt to plaintiffs' lawyers who then can use legal mech-
anisms in this country to get it from the expatriate community and
so on.
The question of accountability and democratization may be a
pretty powerful tool in the debt forgiveness approach.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: I agree with that. I think one thing
that Professor Murphy alluded to was the distinction between for-
giveness as relinquishing a right and forgiveness as a discussion
about moral accountability. 176 Both of those ideas have been in-
voked in talks about reducing debt.
The most important part is reducing the actual debt obligation,
but there has also been a lot of discussion about the moral account-
ability of irresponsible governments. Often, corruption is used not
as a reason for forgiveness but as a reason against forgiveness.
People say, "the governments misspent this money, they were
wrong." An example is Mobutu Sesseseko, who in his thirty-year
reign stole more from the country of then-Zaire and now the Dem-
174. See Chantal Thomas, International Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty Re-
duction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711 (2000).
175. Information about Transparency International is available at <http://
www.transparency.de>.
176. See Murphy Keynote Address, supra note 124.
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ocratic Republic of Congo than was spent on education, health,
and social services combined.'77 That is an argument for holding
debtor governments accountable.
The problem is that lenders, as you suggested, have been also
somewhat complicitous with this. Mobutu originally took power
by wresting power away from the democratically-elected prime
minister of the Congo, Patrice Le Mumba, with the support of the
U.S. Government, 78 so if there is blame, it must be spread around.
I think that has to be taken into consideration, in addition to the
fact that to ultimately hold the people of countries responsible for
the wrongdoings of their governments is to meet one wrong with
another wrong.
There are a lot of initiatives on debt reduction and a lot of re-
search is going on into it.' 79
AUDIENCE: From what I understand, the law that established
the TRC did not preclude trials, but it seems that, in practice, trials
are a road that South Africa has decided not to take. People like
Botha and De Klerk have basically walked away without being
held accountable. What is your opinion of that, both sort of exis-
tentially in terms of the whole question of justice, and also more
practically in terms of the political consequences for the future?
PROFESSOR ANDREWS: I do not think that there will be
large numbers of criminal trials. There are practical reasons, the
South African criminal justice system just could not accommodate
that.
But part of the problem emanates from the TRC hearings them-
selves because the hearings were not meant to be legal proceed-
ings. This subsequently raises questions about the nature of the
evidence presented, particularly since much of the evidence has not
been corroborated.
So these are very difficult questions. It is not to say that the
perpetrators ought not to be penalized, but I think it raises lots of
practical questions.
177. See Michela Wrong, The Dinosaur at Bay, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at
7, cited in Nora M. Rubin, Note, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to
Curb Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Impli-
cations of the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Ger-
many, and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 257, 320 n.6 (1998).
178. See Christopher B. Jochnick & Josh Zimmer, The Day of the Dictator: Zaire's
Mobutu and United States Foreign Policy, 4 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 139, 139-40 (1991).
179. See, e.g., Msgr. Dennis M. Schnurr, A Jubilee Call for Debt Forgiveness, avail-
able at <http://www.nccbuscc/sdwp/international/adminstm.htm>.
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In terms of what it does to the process of reconciliation, it is hard
to tell. My observations have been that when you went to South
Africa three years ago and you sat in on a hearing, or you listened
to people talk about the TRC, there was lots of hope and people
were optimistic about the process. Today the mood is different,
and part of it is because there were two parallel developments in
the country.
The first is that the TRC sat between 1996 and 1998 and listened
to the tales of horror. At the same time, not confined to that pe-
riod, certainly starting before and still carrying on today, South Af-
rica has been gripped by violent crime, and some people have
argued that particularly the crimes against women constitute viola-
tions of their human rights. 8 ° This discrepancy with what was go-
ing on at the TRC and the excessive violence outside, means that
the criminal justice system cannot cope with developments with re-
spect to violence in the last few years. Those are very difficult
problems, and it is not clear if the TRC has impacted on the way
that South Africans deal with each other. The criminal statistics
indicate that there is something dreadfully wrong. 18 1 We can find
economic reasons for this, but the nature of the crime raises all
kinds of issues.
Personally, I do not know. The TRC was a political compromise,
and the government does not have the resources to embark on
large numbers of criminal prosecutions, and so blanket amnesty
will probably be granted. It is a pity. In an ideal world, all the
perpetrators would have been brought either before the TRC or
before a court of law, and the victims would have been compen-
sated. But as it stands now, the Reparations Committee, which is
one of the committees of the TRC, has been very ineffective in
either compensating victims monetarily or in dealing with what the
country has to confront as a result of the TRC hearings.
It is a work in progress. In time - it is too early to tell now -
the benefits of the TRC will be evaluated and its influence will
probably be limited.
And, as you said, it is an existential thing. The problem is I do
not live in South Africa. I go back very often and so I can under-
stand why people do not want to pursue the perpetrators. But, on
180. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1995).
181. See Jon Jeter, Millions of S. Africans Partake in Peaceful Election, WASH.
PosT, June 3, 1999, at A19 (describing South Africa, with an average of 70 killings a
day, as "one of the most dangerous places in the world").
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the other hand, I think it has meant to some extent that there has
been a shortfall in the way the transformation has taken place.
PROFESSOR MItNDEZ: On the same topic, I think it is im-
portant to note that the killers of Steve Biko, for example, have
been denied amnesty. This is little known, because Biko's relatives
challenged the law and lost, but then the killers were denied am-
nesty because, among other things, they were untruthful in what
they supposedly "confessed." They claimed that he had killed him-
self, and so the Amnesty Committee decided that they did not get
amnesty. The same happened with the killers of Chris Hani, for
example, one of the most egregious cases that happened when the
peace process was already underway.
I have been reading the web page that Professor Minow men-
tioned today.'82 Maybe 80 percent of the cases have been denied
amnesty, but you have to calculate that many of those are really
common crimes, that people who were in custody were trying their
luck at asking for amnesty, claiming that they had committed
crimes with a political motive. Of the people who were members
of the political groupings and of the armed forces, a good 28 or 29
percent, by my calculation, were also denied amnesty. Now, this
does not mean that there will be prosecutions for those cases, for
the reasons that Ms. Andrews said.
I also understand that the prosecutors in South Africa are the
same prosecutors from the apartheid regime, and so even the case
of General Magnus Malan, that did go to trial, was very deliber-
ately botched by the prosecutor. The court issued an unusual ad-
monition to the prosecutor on that account. 183
The stakes are enormous. It is very difficult to predict that there
will be prosecutions. But, on the other hand, I think it would be a
very serious mistake, and a great disappointment to the rest of the
world, if South Africa decided to implement a blanket amnesty
policy. I know there are pressures there and I know there will con-
tinue to be, but at least the present policy, even if it does not result
in a lot of prosecutions, leaves open the possibility of prosecutions.
Hopefully it allows the victims to come up with evidence that can
stand in court and then eventually, when some new prosecutors are
in place - and some new judges, I would say - some justice can
be achieved. The present system in South Africa at least consti-
tutes an attempt at a good-faith effort to comply with international
182. See MINOW, supra note 1.
183. See Angus Shaw, Acquittals Reopen Apartheid Wounds, WINNEPEG FREE
PRESs, Oct. 12, 1996, at All, available in 1996 WL 17253325.
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obligations and with moral obligations to the victims in South Af-
rica. That obligation to the victims is more important than comply-
ing with the international community's interests.
PROFESSOR ANDREWS: I agree with Professor M6ndez, but
I think another problem that is peculiar to South Africa is that the
African National Congress ("ANC") was implicated in gross
human rights violations, and therefore I think politically this was
difficult for the government. When the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission report was published, the ANC immediately went to
court to try and squash parts of it. 184
The other thing that concerns me is what I regard as a very puni-
tive turn taken by some groups in the human rights community. I
think it is important that perpetrators who commit gross human
rights violations be punished. We need to focus on what happens
in the long term. South Africa has an official unemployment rate
of 48 percent and I think most people in the country would rather
obtain housing, water, and education than continue this process.
Ultimately, transformation in South Africa is about changing peo-
ple's economic circumstances.
AUDIENCE: I believe that the right to truth is fundamental for
humanity. However, Congressman Chipoco Ciceda mentioned
that source institutions should publish the identity of the protago-
nists of the violations. Wouldn't that be a demonstration of a viola-
tion of the human rights for the individuals and wouldn't this open
the door for the victims of the families to take justice into their
own hands?
PROFESSOR CHIPOCO CACEDA: I think that, first, you
have to distinguish between judicial processes and reports from
truth commissions. Legal processes that involve investigations and
prosecutions imply a whole series of procedural rights both to the
accused and to the plaintiffs or to the victims. A truth commission
report has much more to do with the social and political process
that focuses on collecting testimony and describing investigations,
as opposed to prosecuting an individual.
Remember that the duty related to the right to truth is to tell all
the truth. When I was on the Truth Commission in El Salvador, in
184. See Wally Mbehele, ANC, TRC Clash Over Final Report, WKLY. MAIL &
GUARDIAN (S. Africa), Oct. 9, 1998, available at <http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/
981009/news2.html>; Wally Mbehele, Bid To Delay TRC Report, WKLY. MAIL &
GUARDIAN (S. Africa), Oct. 23, 1998, available at <http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/
981023/news5.html>.
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the case of the assassination of the seven Jesuits,'85 they obtained
the names of the army officials who gave the orders to other of-
ficers to have the priests killed. The commission members felt that
their sources were good and that the evidence they had was valid
evidence, but they were faced with a moral dilemma of whether to
reveal names in their report, and thereby basically accuse these
officers.
The right to truth often revolves around political processes,
which often with truth commissions imply amnesties or amnesty
laws, such as in Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador, or South Africa.
The process of the right to truth is that you need to have this com-
plete, impartial truth to then be able to create conditions for some-
one to ask for pardon and for that pardon to be granted. So what
you get with the right to truth is the moral sanction, and this moral
sanction is a necessary component of the transition process.
Let me say in English that during the investigation of the truth
commission in El Salvador, we respected the due process of the
perpetrators. We tried to respect the human rights of the perpetra-
tors, but we had the duty to say the whole truth, and the whole
truth means to say the names of the perpetrators.
PROFESSOR MItNDEZ: On that point, I think if the possibil-
ity of prosecutions is a real one, it is preferable that the truth com-
missions do not name names so as not to taint evidence that can be
used in future cases. But if the possibility of prosecution is com-
pletely not in the cards, for example because there is a prior am-
nesty, then of course there is no full truth unless the names are
named.
The questioner makes a very good point, that even in the cases
where no names are given, there has to be some semblance of due
process, and at the very least, the people who are going to be
named should be confronted with the evidence and given a chance
to tell their side of the story.
185. See Tina Rosenberg, Terror, Tribunals and Truth, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1993,
at C1.
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APOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONS:
EXPLORING AN EXAMPLE FROM
MEDICAL PRACTICE
Jonathan R. Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
In previous work, I examined the potential of apology in civil
lawsuits. There I argued that to better serve their clients, under
existing laws, lawyers should consider discussing the possibility of
apology with them more often. For example, many lawyers fail to
consider that offering an apology can greatly facilitate settlements
and that "safe" apologies, which cannot be used as proof in court,
can often be made within mediation. I also argued that in order to
encourage apologies after injury, we ought to consider reforming
our laws to exclude apologies from admissibility as evidence.1 In
this Article, I focus on injuries committed by members of organiza-
tions, such as corporations, and examine distinct issues raised by
apology in the organizational setting. In particular, I consider: (i)
the process of learning to prevent future errors; (ii) the divergent
interests stemming from principal-agent tensions in employment,
risk preferences and sources of insurance; (iii) the non-pecuniary
benefits to corporate morale, productivity and reputation; (iv) the
standing and scope of apologies; and (v) the articulation of policies
toward injuries to others.
I begin my analysis with an article published in the Philadelphia
Inquirer (the "Gerlin article"). The article reports about an atypi-
cal, and in some ways revolutionary, approach to instances of med-
ical error that the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington,
Kentucky (the "Lexington VA") initiated in 1987 and has followed
since. This hospital's approach and its effects have been docu-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law,
Gainesville, FL. A.B., 1987, J.D., 1992, Ph.D., 1993 (Harvard). I thank Bryan Liang,
Lars Noah, Barbara Noah, Tom Cotter, Clark Freshman, Christopher Guthrie, Jeff
Seul, Sharon Rush, Joe Jackson, Richard Pearson, Laurence Savett and Karl Singer
for their helpful comments and Shannon Reilly and Mark Caramanica for their valua-
ble research assistance. All errors are mine alone.
1. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv.
1004, 1009 (1999). See also Aviva Orenstein, Apology Expected: Incorporating A
Feminist Analysis Into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L.
REv. 221 (1999) (arguing for an independent evidentiary exclusion for apologies).
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mented subsequently by recent academic publications.2 I reprint
the newspaper account below, because it simultaneously offers an
overview of the hospital's approach and addresses many of the cen-
tral issues of apology and organizations.3 After the Gerlin article, I
supplement the framework established by her report with further
specific information obtained from academic publications and from
telephone interviews.4
A. Newspaper Account
Accepting Responsibility, by Policy5
by Andrea Gerlin
The Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington, Ky., han-
dles medical errors differently from most hospitals.
The 400-bed hospital does not simply encourage its staff to tell
patients and their families the truth about errors. It has a tough
policy that requires giving the information as soon as possible by
aggressively seeking out patients and families, even after dis-
charge if necessary. Beyond that, hospital employees persuade
the occasional reluctant victim to accept financial compensation.
"Almost every risk manager and attorney says, 'We always
tell the truth,"' said Steven Kraman, the hospital's chief of staff
and chairman of its risk-management committee. "But I don't
know of any other hospital that goes out and calls the family
when there's been an error."
2. See Steven S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty
May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963 (Dec. 1999); Albert W.
Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense?, 131 ANNALS OF IN-
TERNAL MED. 970 (Dec. 1999).
3. Descriptions of fully-litigated cases are commonly given in judicial opinions
and provide the "data" for much legal research. For cases that are settled through
negotiation or other non-adjudicatory processes, records are far rarer. Hence, to
study non-adjudicatory settlement, descriptions must be found elsewhere. Here we
are fortunate that the Lexington VA's experience is well and concisely described by
Gerlin's newspaper account and that Gerlin's account is confirmed by subsequent
academic publication.
4. I conducted telephone interviews with Dr. Steven Kraman, the hospital's chief
of staff and chair of its risk management committee; Attorney Ginny Hamm, the hos-
pital's counsel and a member of its risk management committee; and Nurse Connie
Johnson, a quality assurance nurse and a member of its risk management committee,
on December 6, 1999. I conducted further telephone interviews with Dr. Kraman and
Attorney Hamm on January 14, 2000 [hereinafter Telephone Interviews with Kraman,
Hamm & Johnson].
5. Andrea Gerlin, Accepting Responsibility, by Policy, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Sept. 14, 1999, at A18. Reprinted with permission from The Philadelphia Inquirer,
September 14, 1999.
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Is the VA Medical Center inviting its patients to sue it into
oblivion? Not really, hospital officials say. Rather, they say,
they are just accepting responsibility when they are at fault.
"Telling the truth is the right thing to do," said Connie John-
son, a clinical analyst and quality assurance nurse at the
hospital.
"The attorneys around here in Lexington used to think we
were crazy," said Ginny Hamm, the hospital lawyer. "But we
have an ultimate responsibility to the veterans and their
families."
The VA hospital in Kentucky has learned that doing the right
thing can also mean saving money. By going out of its way to be
open and honest with patients and their families, the hospital
has found that it is minimizing its legal exposure because fami-
lies are not as angry when they learn of a medical error.
Leonard J. Marcus, director of the Program for Health Care
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the Harvard School of
Public Health, has analyzed malpractice mediation sessions in
an effort to determine what plaintiffs really want.
Marcus concluded that most patients who are harmed by
medical errors want three things: an explanation of what hap-
pened; an apology from whoever was responsible; and an assur-
ance that changes have been made to prevent harm from being
done to someone else. Money seems to be a distant concern.
Lexington VA officials may have found a way out of the litiga-
tion thicket using this approach. The hospital's average total
payout for settlements has been about $180,000 a year over the
last decade, on eight to 10 cases in a typical year. The hospital
has reduced its claims payments from among the highest in the
178-hospital VA system to one of the lowest.
Hospital officials admit that they arrived at that point pain-
fully. In 1986, the hospital lost two malpractice lawsuits at trial,
costing it a total of $1.5 million in awards. For a government
facility that primarily treats older patients, whose claims usually
result in lower damages, that was an eye-opening sum. Kraman
was a defendant in one of the cases and said the outcomes for-
ever changed the hospital's approach.
Hospital officials now begin assembling dossiers and taking
testimony soon after incidents. Hamm said that as soon as they
determine that a mistake has occurred, they notify the patient or
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family members. If they believe harm has been done, rather
than evade the truth in an attempt to avoid liability, they advise
the family to hire a lawyer and they seek to quickly resolve the
problem with a fair settlement.
That is what they are doing with Lloyd Brown, a 77-year-old
veteran from Stanford, Ky. Last year, he temporarily lost sight
in his right eye. Brown had previously lost most of the vision in
his other eye to a cataract. His wife, Martha, said she called the
VA's triage hotline and left a message with a receptionist
describing the episode. No one ever called the Browns back be-
cause some messages were not being relayed by the triage
hotline.
Two more episodes and six weeks later, they went to the med-
ical center. A doctor there told them that an artery in the right
side of Lloyd Brown's neck had closed due to a stroke and that
he would be permanently blind in the affected eye. Worse, none
of that had to happen.
"They said that if we'd gotten it within four hours they could
have saved the eye," Martha Brown said. "We didn't think
about seeing a lawyer."
Three months later they received a letter from the hospital
advising them to get a lawyer so they could begin discussing a
settlement, which is pending. Kraman said the couple, touched
by having been dealt with honestly, became teary-eyed at the
meeting during which the hospital acknowledged its mistake.
VA officials have also been helping Lloyd Brown obtain full
disability benefits. The Browns are impressed: Lloyd Brown
even returned to the medical center this spring for treatment of
a heart problem.
"We think a lot of them," Martha Brown said. "They're taking
responsibility. I never had experience with it, but I've never
heard of a hospital admitting a mistake."
Kraman said the hospital drills its policy into its staff, espe-
cially the residents who train there, seeking to create a culture in
which mistakes are acknowledged and lead to changes that pre-
vent recurrences. Some of the ethics seminars it has held for em-
ployees have featured patients who were injured by treatment at
the hospital, explaining how honesty reinforced rather than un-
dermined their trust.
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As obvious as this approach seems, there are reasons that a
VA hospital can use it and that other hospitals will be slower to
follow. As government facilities, the VA's liability is limited
under the federal Tort Claims Act. Its hospitals are self-insured
and its physicians are employees, and do not pay higher mal-
practice insurance premiums after a costly settlement.
Still, Kraman and his colleagues argue that their approach
should be a model for other institutions.
"If everybody did this nationwide, every patient who was in-
jured would get fair compensation, the lawyers would get noth-
ing, and you wouldn't see $12 million verdicts," Kraman said.
B. Further Information
Before 1987, the Lexington VA's response toward instances of
medical error was an adversarial combination of little disclosure
and much opposition.6 In 1987, following failed defenses of two
malpractice claims that resulted in verdicts totaling $1.5 million,7
the Lexington VA implemented a policy of proactively assuming
responsibility for medical mistakes.8 The essence of the policy was
to maintain a care-giving relationship toward the patient following
medical error rather than adopting an adversarial one.9
6. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
7. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964.
8. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
9. In 1999, the Lexington VA formally adopted a policy on "Patient Safety (Inte-
grated Risk Management Program)", VAMC Memorandum No. 00-1, VA Medical
Center, Lexington, Kentucky, Nov. 4, 1999. Telephone Interviews with Kraman,
Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. Posted on easels at the hospital's entrances are ex-
cerpts including:
2. PHILOSOPHY: Human error is inevitable, even among the most consci-
entious professionals practicing the highest standard of care. Identification
and reporting of adverse events, including those that result from practitioner
error, are critical to our efforts to continuously improve patient safety. Like-
wise, medical managers have a duty to recognize the inevitability of human
error and attempt to design systems that make such error less likely; and to
avoid punitive reactions to honest errors.
3. POLICY: Key components of the patient safety/risk management policy
and approach are:
a. All employees and practitioners are responsible for fully cooperating in
efforts to improve patient safety and eradicate potential risks. This includes
the reporting of events which result in actual or potential injury to a patient.
b. Patients and their families will be informed about injuries resulting
from adverse events and the options available to them.
c. The Risk Management Committee is [the] hub of responsibility for pa-
tient safety activity. This includes overseeing the investigation, reporting
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The policy involved multiple steps. The hospital encouraged
workers to report mistakes to its risk management committee,
which included Dr. Steven Kraman, the hospital's chief of staff and
chair of the risk management committee, and Ginny Hamm, the
hospital's in-house counsel. Once a mistake was reported,10 a typi-
cal case proceeded as follows. The committee rapidly investigated
the mistake and attempted to determine its root cause. If the root
cause was deemed "systemic," efforts at systemic reform were un-
dertaken.1' If the mistake resulted in harm to the patient, irrespec-
tive of whether the patient was aware of it, the patient was
informed of the error. In some cases, the patient was not aware
nor likely would have become aware of the mistake absent the hos-
pital volunteering the information.' 2 The risk management com-
mittee then brainstormed about ways to aid the patient through
further medical treatment, disability benefits and compensation. 13
and analysis of patient safety and adverse event data as well as orchestrating
family notifications and interventions when warranted.
While the approach of assuming responsibility for errors was implemented in practice
in 1987, the Lexington VA did not formally articulate this policy until November,
1999. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm, & Johnson, supra note 4. For a
discussion of the delay, see infra text accompanying notes 114-119.
10. As the policy became established, the prevalence of reporting increased so
that often an error was reported by multiple sources. Telephone Interviews with
Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. Such multiple-source reporting no doubt
provides an incentive for the person who has committed the error to report it directly
and promptly.
11. A mistake was deemed "systemic" if another individual in the same circum-
stances would have been likely to have committed the same error. Telephone Inter-
views with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. For example, on one occasion,
after a patient received the wrong dilution of the medication herapin, it was discov-
ered that dilutions of different strengths (1:1000 and 1:10000) were stored in the phar-
macy on the same shelf next to one in highly similar bottles. Changes to prevent
future confusion (e.g., using differently colored bottles and putting bottles of different
dosages on different shelves) were then made. Since the adoption of their new policy,
the hospital has "fixed" several systems based upon such analysis. Id. See infra text
accompanying note 79 (discussing a similar instance of poor medication labeling at
Kaiser Permanente in Denver); see infra text accompanying notes 69 - 80 (on the need
for systemic approaches to the prevention of such medical errors).
12. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964 ("Since this policy has been in
place .... [f]ive settlements involved incidents that caused permanent injury or death
but would probably never have resulted in a claim without voluntary disclosure to the
patients or families.").
13. While the hospital fully discloses all errors that cause harm to the patient, after
much careful deliberation, the hospital decided that, where the mistake does not re-
sult in harm to the patient (i.e., "harmless error"), the hospital would not inform the
patient of the mistake. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra
note 4. (The description by Kraman & Hamm of error reporting does not address the
harmless error scenario. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964). Dr. Albert Wu
critiques this position suggesting that, "Even if the mistake did not result in an ad-
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The committee arranged a meeting between itself, the patient and
anyone the patient wished to bring, usually family members and an
attorney.'4 If the risk management committee believed that the
hospital or its employees had been at fault, Dr. Kraman apologized
to the patient at that meeting, including admitting fault verbally
and, if the patient desired, subsequently in writing. 15 Members of
the committee then discussed further steps the hospital could take
to aid the patient medically and any disability benefits to which the
patient might be entitled.1 6 In cases where the risk management
committee believed the hospital or its employees had been at fault,
the committee made what it believed to be a fair settlement offer.17
Typically, settlement ensued rapidly. 8
From the financial viewpoint, the new approach of assuming re-
sponsibility, including apology, passed the Hippocratic test: it ap-
pears to have done the hospital no financial harm and may have
done some financial good. Recall that in 1985 and 1986 the hospi-
tal paid two malpractice verdicts that together totaled $1.5 mil-
lion.19 From 1990 through 1996, the hospital paid an average of
only $190,113 per year in malpractice claims, with an average
(mean) payment of $15,622 per claim. 20 This placed the Lexington
VA in the lowest quartile of thirty-six comparable VA hospitals for
malpractice payments and in the bottom sixth in terms of average
liability payment per claim. 2' As Kraman and Haemn modestly put
verse outcome, I still recommend that the near miss be disclosed." Wu, supra note 2,
at 971; see infra text accompanying notes 108-113.
14. Dr. Kraman, Attorney Hamm and Nurse Johnson represented the hospital at a
typical meeting. The employee who committed the error (e.g., the negligent physi-
cian) did not usually appear. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 108-
113.
15. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Kraman estimated that, following the apology and the settlement offer, "nine
out of ten cases settled very rapidly." Id.
19. Though I have not seen other pre-1987 data, these two verdicts totaling $1.5
million may be "outliers," greatly exceeding the average payment in pre-1987 years.
Hence, some caution is warranted in comparing the 1990 to 1996 results with those
two verdicts.
20. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964. In their published study, Kraman
& Hamm report on the years 1990 through 1996 because data for comparable VA
hospitals was only available for those years. However, the data for the Lexington VA
for other years since the adoption of the new policy (i.e., 1987 through 1989 and 1997
through 1999) are similar. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson,
supra note 4.
21. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 965 (the latter statistic is derived from
a comparison of the tables).
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it, "[Under the policy of assuming responsibility], the Lexington
facility's liability payments have been moderate and are compara-
ble to those of similar facilities. 22
This may understate the overall financial benefits of the new pol-
icy for it overlooks savings in litigation costs. Under the new pol-
icy, most cases settled rapidly, and rapid settlement undoubtedly
reduced expenses generated by litigation (e.g., legal fees, employee
time, expert witness fees). Based upon an accounting of an earlier
case, Kraman and Hamm estimated that apart from the ultimate
award the hospital incurred roughly $250,000 in other expenses for
a single case litigated through the appellate level.24 By fostering
rapid settlement, the new policy helped avoid such litigation costs.
During the period of their study (1990-1996), "[s]even claims pro-
ceeded to federal court and were dismissed before trial. One claim
proceeded to trial and was won by the government [VA]." 25 If
Kraman and Hamm's estimate that a single case litigated through
the appellate level entailed $250,000 in legal expenses is even
roughly accurate, then the decreased expenses through rapid settle-
ment were likely significant sources of savings due to the new pol-
icy. In short, it appears that the approach of "assuming
responsibility" helped rather than harmed the financial "bottom
line" of the Lexington VA.
Other parts of the VA system have begun to take notice. In
1995, the Department of Veterans Affairs adopted a risk manage-
ment policy toward medical errors resulting in injury. The policy
required that, "the medical center will inform the patient and/or
the family,... [offer appropriate medical treatment] ... [and fur-
ther] "inform[ ] the patient and/or family of their right to... Appli-
cation for Compensation and Pension . . . or to file an
administrative tort claim."'26 Within the past few years, two other
VA hospitals have adopted the Lexington model.27
22. Id. at 965-66.
23. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
24. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966; see also Henry S. Farber &
Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medi-
cal Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 778 (1994) (indicating markedly lower legal
expenses for medical complaints settled early within informal processes).
25. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964.
26. Id. (quoting Patient Safety Improvement, Department of Veteran Affairs, VHA
Manual 1051/1 (1998)).
27. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
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C. Preliminary Observations
Before further discussing the Lexington VA's experience, several
observations are in order. First, the rules governing liability for
VA hospitals and their employees differ from those of their private
sector counterparts. As Gerlin's article mentions, VA hospitals are
government organizations, and malpractice actions against VA hos-
pitals must be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FICA"). There are procedural and substantive differences be-
tween such claims and ordinary malpractice actions. 28 Procedur-
ally, claims brought under the FTCA are heard by a federal bench
trial, which has no jury, and only after administrative remedies
have been exhausted.29 Substantively, while state law governs the
claim, there is no possibility of punitive damages under the
FTCA.3° This substantive bar on punitive damages, along with the
distinct procedural rules, certainly reduces the liability exposure of
VA hospitals compared to private hospitals.3 Note, however, that
the presence of punitive damages in the private sector may actually
help promote the use of apology in that sector. A private sector
injurer may apologize in an effort to avert punitive damages.
A physician employed by the VA is also in a very different posi-
tion from his private sector counterpart. As a VA employee, she
has virtually no personal exposure for malpractice.32 Unlike her
private sector counterpart, the VA physician will also experience
no increase in her medical malpractice premiums following a suc-
cessful malpractice suit, because she need not carry any. Her error,
however, can be reported for certain licensing purposes and, in re-
peat or egregious cases, can result in dismissal or the loss of medi-
cal license.33 In short, the VA physician faces far less personal
28. See Thomas K. Kruppstadt, Determining Whether a Physician is an Independ-
ent Contractor in a Medical Malpractice Action Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47
BAYLOR L. REv. 223, 226 (1995).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
31. Though admitting the comparison's imprecision, Kraman and Hamm suggest
that VA hospitals face roughly half the liability exposure of their private sector coun-
terparts on a given claim. "It is difficult to accurately compare the Veterans Affairs
experience with that of the private sector, but [comparisons of U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statics reports] indicate[ ] that [in the early 1990's] the average medical malpractice
judgment in the private sector ($1,484,000) is considerably greater than that in the
Veterans Affairs system ($720,000)." Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966.
32. See Kruppstadt, supra note 28, at 226.
33. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966.
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exposure than her private sector counterpart.34 Note, however,
that while the Lexington VA and its employees enjoy certain pro-
tections under the FTCA that their private counterparts do not, the
Lexington VA is on a level "legal playing field" vis A vis the other
VA hospitals in the Kraman and Hamm study.
Second, while apology is an aspect of the Lexington VA's ap-
proach to medical mistakes, it is but one piece of an overall system
of response. The overall system might be called "assuming respon-
sibility for errors." Defense attorneys commonly assist defendants
in denying responsibility for their mistakes .3  By contrast, the Lex-
ington VA embraced responsibility. Beyond the single act of apol-
ogy, the broader orientation of accepting responsibility was reflec-
ted in acts such as offering fair compensation for injuries, attempt-
ing to prevent similar mistakes in the future, and developing chan-
nels for open, direct communication. 36 This general posture fits
with VA's historical mission and organizational philosophy of car-
ing for veterans. 7
Third is the matter of equity in patient compensation. Putting
aside for the moment the issue of the overall level of liability pay-
ments to patients, the Lexington VA's approach of assuming re-
sponsibility may also have produced more equitable results than
the "lottery" of litigation that could ensue more often from a com-
bative approach. A critique of our current malpractice liability sys-
tem is that, as a means for compensating patients for medical
errors, litigation is highly sporadic a.3  Most cases of medical mal-
practice go undetected, 39 and even once detected, jury awards fre-
34. For an overview of legal and financial incentives in private health care, focus-
ing particularly on limited liability faced by managed care organizations because of
ERISA provisions and how such provisions influence patient care, see Bryan A. Li-
ang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (1998)[hereinafter
Liang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law].
35. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1009-10, 1042-46.
36. For an apology to "work," the injured party generally must perceive it as sin-
cere. See id. at 1017-18. By coupling the apology with what it believed was a fair offer
of compensation, the Lexington VA "put its money where its mouth was." Such ac-
tion no doubt promoted the belief by the injured party that the apology was sincere.
37. See 38 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
38. See generally PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDI-
CAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993). For
references to more recent works, see David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States
Afford A "No-Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury, 60 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 2 (1997).
39. See, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims
and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Malpractice
Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) (analyzing a study of 31,429 patient
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quently fail to reflect the underlying merits of the case. 4° By
contrast, I suspect that the new policy helped produce more equita-
ble results across patient awards and fairer results in terms of tying
compensation to the actual merits of the individual case. Not only
were patients more likely to learn of medical errors under the new
policy,41 but there was also a high probability of a moderate level
of settlement then ensuing. Out of the thirty-six comparable VA
hospitals, the Lexington VA was the among the fifth highest in
terms of the number of claims against it but among the lowest sixth
in terms of liability payment per claim.42 Compare these results
with a litigious model, where the polar outcomes of either a large
award or no award commonly ensues. Under the new policy, most
cases settled quickly, in Kraman and Hamm's assessment, at mod-
erate levels of compensation based upon "reasonable calculations
of actual loss."'43 While one cannot draw definitive conclusions
about either the distribution of payments or the merits of individ-
ual payments from such aggregate statistics and such a subjective
assessment," it is probable that the new approach promoted
greater equity between cases and greater fairness in an individual
case. If so, then these too are laudable achievements.
A question arises as to whether the Lexington VA's possible cost
savings are fairly attributable to their adoption of the assuming re-
sponsibility approach. For example, could the statistics placing the
Lexington VA in the lowest quartile for total claims payments and
the lowest sixth for average payment per claim have resulted from
factors other than its approach of assuming responsibility, includ-
records finding malpractice claims were filled in less than two percent of cases in
which medical negligence caused injury to a patient).
40. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events
and Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1966
(1996) (analyzing a study of 51 malpractice suits finding that malpractice awards were
correlated only with the severity of plaintiff's disability and not with the provider's
negligence). See generally Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments to
U.S. Reform, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1, 28-38 (1999) [hereinafter Liang, Error
in Medicine] (surveying shortcomings of the American malpractice liability and sug-
gesting alternatives); Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing
Medical Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient, Physician, and Attorney,
S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming).
41. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964.
42. See id. at 965.
43. Id. at 964.
44. The statistics reported in Kraman & Hamm are aggregate statistics (e.g., show-
ing means and frequencies). While some inferences about the distribution's shape
may be drawn from them, as they do not give precise information on the shape of the
underlying distribution of data, these are probable inferences, but by no means cer-
tainties. See id. at 965.
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ing apology, for medical errors?45 Might it simply be that the Lex-
ington VA committed fewer, less serious errors during this period
than the other hospitals? These are certainly valid questions. The
Lexington VA's experience may have resulted from many possible
causes, and, as a single case study, its results are subject to multiple
interpretations.46 Yet, while such concerns should be recognized,
they should not be overemphasized. The data appear to show that
the Lexington VA's new policy of assuming responsibility, includ-
ing apology, did not harm and may have helped the hospital finan-
cially. One cannot say for certain that this is so, but this seems to
be a reasonable conclusion.
Many lawyers see only the obvious economic risks to apology
but overlook the possible economic benefits.47 Stepping back for a
moment from the example of the Lexington VA, two reasons apol-
ogy can be economically beneficial to the apologizer are as fol-
lows. 48 First, in some cases injured parties may refrain from suing
if they receive an apology. Often a "vicious cycle" exists where
following an error, an injurer (e.g., physician) wants to apologize
but refrains from doing so out of fear of legal liability, and it is
precisely this absence of an apology that triggers the lawsuit.4 9 For
example, one study found that twenty-four percent of the families
who sued their physicians following prenatal injuries filed medical
malpractice claims when "they realized that physicians had failed
to be completely honest with them about what happened, allowed
them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled
them. '50 While there are some patients who say that they would
45. Id. at 964-66.
46. The Kraman and Hamm study is at root a descriptive study using comparative
data, rather than a casual study testing hypothesis through methods such as experi-
mentation. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2.
47. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1042-46.
48. Some other reasons that apologizing following injury can be economically ben-
eficial to the injurer, such as facilitating error prevention, are discussed below. Note
that apologies also can offer non-economic benefits to the apologizer such as helping
to repair a damaged relationship or alleviate guilt.
49. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1011-12.
50. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Mal-
practice Claims Following Prenatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992). In addi-
tion, 19% said they filed suit because of the "desire to deter subsequent malpractice
by the physician and/or seek revenge," concerns that may also have been met by apol-
ogy. Id. See also Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of
Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994) (finding
that 377 British patients and their families might not have brought malpractice suits
had there been a full explanation and apology - and arguing that these are more
significant factors than monetary compensation in determining whether to file a suit).
For other related references, see Cohen, supra note 1, at 1011 n.7.
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not have sued if they had received an apology but in fact would
have, surely there are some patients who can be taken at their
word.51 Second, an apology can greatly facilitate the settlement
process and thereby reduce settlement costs. 5 2 An apology often
cannot substitute for compensation for the injury but can be a way
of avoiding compounding insult upon the injury-insult that can
prevent settlement.
I am not reducing apologies to mere matters of economics or
suggesting that parties make insincere apologies solely for strategic
advantage. Apology should be rooted in responsibility and re-
morse rather than in economics and strategy. It is the ethical re-
sponse to injuring another, irrespective of the economic
consequences. However, I think that parties often fail to make
apologies out of their fear of adverse economic consequences and
thereby fail to seriously consider both the potential risks and bene-
fits of apology.53 As VA hospital lawyer Ginny Hamm described,
"The attorneys around here in Lexington used to think we were
crazy [when we initiated our new policy]. ' 54 As one who studies
the possible benefits and risks of apology, I can attest that many
attorneys and legal academics greet the idea that apology can fi-
nancially benefit the apologizer with much skepticism. The Lex-
ington VA's experience helps refute the skeptic's view that apology
necessarily entails financial suicide. Rather, it indicates the oppo-
site: apology can be to the apologizer's financial benefit.
51. The experience of one of my colleagues illustrates this poignantly. His first-
born son, who recently died, was born with a rare metabolic disease. When he was
fourteen months old, the child suffered a stroke and developed persistent seizures, the
prevention of which required very high doses of powerful anti-convulsant medica-
tions. Several weeks into the child's hospitalization for the stroke and seizures, my
colleague, who was then a law professor, received a telephone call at work from the
doctor in charge of his son's care. The doctor instructed my colleague to come to the
hospital as soon as possible. When my colleague arrived, the doctor informed him
that the child had slipped into a coma and that it probably happened as a result of an
accidental overdose of the anti-convulsant medication. He then apologized for the
incident. Fortunately, the child survived the mishap. Upon hearing these events, I
asked my colleague whether the physician's apology made any difference. His re-
sponse was simple:
Because the doctor apologized, we would never have sued. Everyone is
human. In fact, the fact that he was honest gave us greater confidence in his
future evaluations and recommendations concerning my son's care. But if
he hadn't been honest - if he had denied the mistake and I had somehow
found out later - I would have considered suing him because it would have
raised doubt about my son's entire course of care.
52. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1019-23.
53. See id. at 1022-23.
54. Gerlin, supra note 5.
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One may ask whether other organizations, particularly private
organizations, can achieve cost savings by adopting this approach
of assuming responsibility, including apology and fair offers of
compensation. At this point, I think the best one can say is that
this is an open question, which is itself a significant statement. As
noted above, under the FTCA, the Lexington VA faces reduced
liability exposure when apologizing as compared to a private hospi-
tal or other private organization, which may in part help explain
the willingness of the Lexington VA to apologize. However, even
in the private sector, an approach of assuming responsibility by an
organizational defendant can yield surprising results.
Consider the experience of the Toro Company ("Toro"), a major
manufacturer of lawn care products including power mowers,
blowers and trimmers. Toro is subject to many personal injury
claims, roughly one hundred and twenty five annually. For years,
"Toro handled all lawsuits filed against it by immediately referring
them to outside counsel to be aggressively defended. [The strat-
egy, said] Toro's assistant general counsel James Seifert, could be
summed up as 'litigate everything'. 56 In 1991, Toro decided in-
stead to respond to claims in a non-confrontational manner by of-
fering to mediate them.5 7 In mediation, after exchanging essential
information about the claim, Toro's counsel would typically express
sympathy for the claimant's injury and then make what Toro saw as
a fair offer of settlement. Note, however, that while Toro com-
monly expressed sympathetic words, it appears that Toro typically
did not apologize in the sense of admitting its own fault.58
Despite much initial skepticism from the defense bar,59 the net
result was that under this new approach Toro settled claims far
more rapidly and at far less cost. Pre-1991, the average lifespan of
a claim from filing until settlement or verdict was twenty-four
months, whereas from 1992 to 1996, the average lifespan was four
55. J. Stratton Shartel, Toro's Mediation Program Challenges Wisdom of Tradi-
tional Litigation Model, 9 INSIDE LITIGATION 10 (June 1995).
56. Id.
57. John J. Upchurch, Pre-Litigation Resolution of Claims through Early Interven-
tion/Mediation, THE REVOLUTIONIZING LITIGATION MANAGEMENT REPORT, June,
1995, at 9; see also John D. McKinnon, Cutting Legal Fees, FLORIDA TREND, May
1996, at 27 (describing Toro's adoption of mediation "as a way of trimming its fast-
growing litigation cost"); Miguel A. Olivella, Jr., The Toro Company's Early Interven-
tion ADR Program at 3 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished paper on file with Fordham Urban
Law Journal) (describing the adoption of a "pre-litigation intervention program that
featured mediation as the cornerstone of claims disposition").
58. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
59. See Olivella, supra note 57, at 4.
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months. Pre-1991, the average payout per claim on both verdicts
and settlements was $68,368. From 1992 to 1996, it was only
$18,594. Pre-1991, the average costs and fees per claim were
$47,252. From 1992 to 1996, they were only $12,023. In sum,
Toro's average total cost per claim fell from $115,620 to $30,617,
saving Toro $54,329,840 during that period. In addition, Toro
saved on insurance costs. 60 Based upon the documented liability
savings following the adoption of the new program, Toro's liability
insurance premiums were reduced by $1.8 million per year for
three years, after which Toro opted to self-insure.6' The savings
have continued beyond 1996. Toro's counsel Miguel Olivella, Jr.
estimates that by 1999, the Toro company saved over $75 million
from the new approach to settlement that it had adopted in 1991.
Several comparisons between Toro's program and that of the
Lexington VA should be made. First, Toro attempts to settle their
cases within mediation. This setting frequently provides statutory
confidentiality protection. Further, Toro insists upon written confi-
dentiality agreements designed to exclude statements made within
the mediation from admission in court. As with the Lexington VA,
here too is a case where special legal provisions, though of a differ-
ent sort, help to promote settlement. Second, the cost savings in
legal fees per claim were considerable, falling by seventy-four per-
cent from $47,252 to $12,023. In the Lexington VA case, the data
on decreased litigation costs were far less precise; however, Toro's
experience is suggestive of how significant rapid settlement can be
in reducing litigation costs. Third, unlike the Lexington VA, Toro
does not usually apologize in the sense of admitting fault during
the mediation. Consider the words of Mr. Olivella,
Apology to an injured claimant has been something I do from
the beginning [of the mediation]. It lets the claimant know that
despite the accident's fault, no one takes any pleasure in know-
ing that a human being has been injured, seemingly putting the
claimant more at ease when he discovers that the company is
not the cold, cruel evil empire he may have thought we were. In
the context of a mediation, it is possible to act in such a fashion
without it being a sign of weakness.62
60. See id. at 12-13. Based on such remarkable results, Toro's program received in
1994 the Center for Public Resource's Institute for Dispute Resolution Significant
Practical Achievement Award. See Shartel, supra note 55, at 10.
61. Olivella, supra note 57, at 9.
62. Electronic correspondence from Miguel A. Olivella, Jr. to Jonathan R. Cohen
(Dec. 3, 1999).
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Some may describe this statement as crafty. By strongly expres-
sing sympathy, the statement gives the claimant the feeling of hav-
ing been apologized to without an actual admission of Toro's fault.
I, however, do not see it as fundamentally duplicitous. Unlike the
Lexington VA, Toro typically has limited information about the
cause(s) of the accident. Whereas the Lexington VA has access to
most of the relevant factual information concerning its role in a
malpractice claim, Toro often does not. Hence, even if Toro sought
to admit its fault fully at the commencement of the mediation, it
would be difficult to know exactly what Toro should admit.
Rather, I would suggest that Mr. Olivella's statement, though loose
in its use of the word "apology," is suggestive of a richer sense of
humanity63 and perhaps a more complex understanding of respon-
sibility64 than is seen in most litigation.
Professor Owen Fiss has argued that justice is what takes place in
a courtroom and that the settlement process is an inferior substi-
tute, "a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets...
[and] a capitulation to the conditions of mass society [that] should
be neither encouraged nor praised."65 Yet our current system of
litigation is largely based upon parties denying responsibility, and
thus forcing the opposing party to prove one's fault rather than
directly accepting responsibility and admitting those acts that one
understands to be one's fault. By apologizing, parties assume re-
sponsibility for their mistakes rather than denying it. If the injurer
is willing to apologize, surely this is the preferable path. Further,
our legal system usually leads to dichotomized understandings of
rights, bifurcating responsibility when it can be more just to appor-
tion the responsibility.' Settlement discussions, by contrast, fre-
quently produce understandings of shared and partial
responsibility. Perhaps Mr. Olivella's statement, "despite the acci-
dent's fault," reflects a more complex understanding of responsibil-
ity, and hence of justice, than is found in most litigation.
It is easy to be "hard-nosed" and reflexively conclude without
evaluation that approaches of assuming responsibility for injuries,
63. Id. ("[N]o one takes any pleasure in knowing that a human being has been
injured, seemingly putting the claimant more at ease when he discovers that the com-
pany is not the cold, cruel evil empire he may have thought we were.").
64. Id. (observing that, through mediation, Toro acknowledges "despite the acci-
dent's fault").
65. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
66. See John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise - The Uses of
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964); John E. Coons, Compromise as
Precise Justice, 68 CAL. L. REv. 250 (1980).
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including apology, increase legal expenses. The Lexington VA's
experience is one striking example where accepting, rather than
denying, responsibility for errors, including making a fault-admit-
ting apology, was financially viable, if not beneficial.67 While Toro
does not typically make fault-admitting apologies, its response of
accepting financial responsibility in mediation rather that denying
it through litigation has produced tremendous economic savings
for Toro. Such experiences should make even the most "hard-
nosed" skeptic take a second look at the potential economic bene-
fits to the injurer of accepting responsibility for injuries, including
apology. While the best motives for responsible approaches, in-
cluding apology, are not financial, for those driven solely by finan-
cial considerations, the question is not whether such approaches
can save money, but where and when they can.68
67. Some may question whether the aforementioned reports on the experiences of
the Lexington VA and the Toro Corporation could be biased due to the sources of the
reports. The main report of the Lexington VA's experience was written by Kraman
and Hamm, who were also central in creating and implementing the hospital's new
policy. Similarly, some of the reports on Toro come from Miguel Olivella, Jr., who
was central in creating and implementing Toro's program. That said, independent
sources help confirm both accounts: Kraman and Hamm's article was subject to peer
review; both the Lexington VA and Toro were reported in journalistic accounts; and
Toro received a national award for its program.
Perhaps the concern about possible bias should be applied to this paper as well.
Below, I use the Lexington VA's experience as a springboard for speculating about
the possible effects - and generally positive effects - of apology in the organiza-
tional setting. In so doing, I have tried to be objective. However, as one who believes
in the potential of apology, perhaps what I "see" in the data, especially when some of
that data is anecdotal rather than statistical, may too be biased. For example, while
Kraman and Hamm believe, based upon their experience, that the hospital's new ap-
proach of apology helped reduce future mistakes, they have no "hard data" to con-
firm this. Rather, they simply mention instances in which systemic reforms were
made following investigations of errors. They cannot say for certain that such reforms
would not have been made absent the approach of assuming responsibility. See Tele-
phone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. Hence, I stress that
below I offer conjectures about some organizational dimensions of apology. Evaluat-
ing the validity of such conjectures awaits further research.
68. Elsewhere, I have argued that we ought to consider reforming our laws to
exclude apologies from admissibility as evidence and thus encourage, rather than dis-
courage, apologies after injury. See Cohen, supra note 1. See also Orenstein, supra
note 1. The experiences of the Lexington VA and Toro help to support this argument.
The Lexington VA's fault-admitting apologies and the Toro company's apologetic ex-
pressions of sympathy both arose in contexts where the liability exposure engendered
when making such statements was limited as compared to typical litigation by particu-
lar legal rules, viz., the FTCA and mediation confidentiality provisions respectively.
This is not to discount the significance of the actions of the Lexington VA or Toro.
Rather it is to say that creating more "safe" havens whereby an apology could not be
used as evidence in court against the apologizer (e.g., creating an independent eviden-
2000] 1463
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
I. LEARNING TO PREVENT FUTURE ERRORS
There can be little doubt that organizations are more likely than
individuals to commit multiple, serious injuries over time. This is
not a statement about the morality or intentions of organizations
but simply a reflection of their size. Consider car accidents. Indi-
viduals involved in more than twenty accidents over their lifetime
are rare. By contrast, a large organization with a fleet of vehicles,
such as the U.S. postal service, may be involved in thousands of
accidents each year. A doctor may be considered unfortunate if he
is sued even once for malpractice in a given year, but the hospital
at which he works may expect to receive dozens of such suits
annually.
This basic difference raises a possible collateral benefit of apol-
ogy in the organizational setting: learning to prevent future er-
rors.69 Both individuals and organizations can learn from their
errors, but with organizations, the possibility of preventing future
errors and lawsuits is much greater. Errors frequently stem from
internal deficiencies and can afford particularly valuable learning
experiences. 70 For example, in the nuclear power and aviation in-
dustries, extensive investigations of accidents and "near misses"
are undertaken with the central aim being to undercover systemic
tiary exclusion for apologies) would likely help foster apology and thus promote
settlement.
How exactly the use of such mechanisms bears upon the sincerity of the apology is
a more complex question. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1067-68 (arguing that apolo-
gies made within "safe havens" can be both sincere and ethically acceptable, provided
that both sides understand that the apology is offered within such a mechanism). Cf
Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135(2000). While there is merit in the concern that apologizing within a "safe" mecha-
nism may "cheapen" the moral act of apology, it should be noted that, where an
apology is offered within a "safe" mechanism, (a) the injured party can and should
take note of the context in which the apology is offered, and (b) the apologizer always
has the option of making an offer of financial compensation along with the apology.
Thus, "safe" mechanisms increase the modes of communication available to the par-
ties. Absent such "safe" mechanisms, we are more likely to witness the vicious cycle
discussed above whereby the injurer fails to apologize out of fear of liability and it is
precisely the absence of the apology that triggers the lawsuit.
69. The cost of medical errors is tremendous and has recently received much at-
tention. See To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T.
Kohn et al., eds., 1999)(reporting studies estimating that between 44,000 and 98,000
Americans die each year from medical errors, which is more than from motor vehicle
accidents, breast cancer or AIDS).
70. On evaluating the sources of medical error, see id. at 42-48 (distinguishing be-
tween "active" errors and "latent" or systemic errors stressing the need to reduce the
latter); see also Liang, Error in Medicine, supra note 40.
1464
APOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONS
problems and thereby prevent future errors.71 As part of its ap-
proach of "assuming responsibility," the Lexington VA undertook
a "root cause" analysis once an error was reported and, on multiple
occasions, implemented systemic changes to prevent such future
errors.
72
What exactly is the link between apology and preventing future
errors? Could an organization fully investigate errors and under-
take systemic reforms without embracing an external apology?
While such investigation and reform are possible without apology,
I believe that they are facilitated by apology. As an act of external
honesty, openness and humility, apology can facilitate the same in-
ternally and thus promote change. When an organization adopts
the stance of assuming responsibility for its errors, its members are
likely to be more prompt in reporting errors,73 more honest in in-
vestigating them, and more willing to embrace reform. Common
wisdom suggests that "you can't fix a problem until you admit you
have one." I believe this applies both to individuals and to organi-
zations. The converse may also be true. Organizations that deny
or "cover up" problems may face difficulties not only in correcting
those errors but in maintaining internally honest communication.
Further, they risk damaging corporate morale.
Often members of organizations fail to report the errors they
commit internally to their superiors and externally to those they
harm. For example, one study found that "[hlouse officers re-
ported discussing the mistake with the supervising attending physi-
cian in only 54% of cases ... [and] discussed the mistake with the
patient or patient's family in only 24% of cases."'7 4 No doubt, part
of this failure is motivated by liability concerns. A doctor may cor-
rectly think, "If I tell either the patient or my boss about the mis-
take I made, that admission will just come back to be used against
me in court, but if I keep it to myself, I may well get away with it."
Such concerns have led to the arguments that we should consider
71. See Liang, Error in Medicine, supra note 40, at 28-31. As with nuclear power
and aviation, medical errors arise within complex systems and can result in grave
consequences.
72. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
73. For errors to be properly investigated, prompt reporting is best so that the
investigation can begin when people's memories are fresh and the equipment is still in
place.
74. Albert Wu et al., Do House Officers Learn from Their Mistakes?, 265 JAMA
2089, 2092 (1991).
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excluding both internal reports of medical errors and external apol-
ogies from admissibility in court.75
Putting aside the question of whether the legal rules about the
admissibility of such internal reports and external apologies should
be changed, my suspicion is that when an organization expresses its
willingness to accept the responsibility for errors, its employees be-
come more willing to report their own errors and those of their co-
workers. Just as external denial may breed internal denial, exter-
nal responsibility may breed internal responsibility. By accepting
responsibility for its errors, including apology, the Lexington VA
implicitly gave its employees a message that, "It's okay for you to
be open when you err, for we will be open with that information.
We aren't going to hide it, so you need not either." The hospital's
experience reflected this. Since the hospital initiated its new ap-
proach in 1987, there has not been, in the risk management com-
mittee's assessment, a single non-frivolous malpractice claim
against the hospital where the hospital did not first learn of the
medical mistake through internal reporting.76
Apology may also help enlist the injured party's involvement in
the error reduction process. Sometimes injured parties will have
information relevant to or ideas about error prevention that they
are unwilling to share absent an apology. Suppose that an organi-
zation is trying to correct an internal pattern of sexual harassment.
While the organization could attempt to correct the problem with-
out input of those who have been harassed, such input would be
highly valuable, and absent an apology, that input may be much
more difficult to obtain. Just as organizations have an incentive to
prevent future injuries, so do those who are injured. Apology can
be critical to building a "team" approach to error prevention be-
tween the injurer and the injured.
To some, the possibility that openly admitting mistakes and ac-
cepting responsibility for them, including apology, could decrease
legal costs, or the possibility that the evidentiary immunization of
reports of medical error could decrease the level of medical error
seems counterintuitive. The key is the difference between short-
75. On internal reports of medical errors, see Liang, Error in Medicine, supra note
40, at 39-43 (indicating that such internally reported information will often be discov-
erable in subsequent litigation despite the peer review privilege and arguing for legal
reforms to ensure the confidentiality of such information); see also To ERR 1S
HUMAN, supra note 69, at 94-113; Cohen, supra note 1 (arguing for consideration of
evidentiary reforms to exclude apologies from admissibility to prove fault in court);
Orenstein, supra note 1.
76. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
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run effects and long-run dynamics, dynamics that include the possi-
bility of learning. For example, suppose that society wishes to de-
crease the incidence of an undesirable event like medical
malpractice. How can this best be achieved? Generally speaking,
the "legal" approach is to sanction instances of that undesirable
event: when a doctor commits an error, punish him. By doing so,
the law gives doctors a strong incentive to avoid committing errors.
In essence, such reasoning is rooted in a static microeconomic per-
spective: if one raises the price (i.e., expected cost, including the
chance of detection and the level of punishment) of malpractice,
doctors will commit less of it.
The world, however, is dynamic. While sanctioning doctors for
medical errors gives doctors an incentive to avoid committing er-
rors,77 it may have other side effects. For example, if doctors be-
come unwilling to share information with one another about their
medical errors for fear that such revelations will be used against
them in malpractice suits, then medical education, in the broadest
sense, and error prevention may become less effective.78
In short, external apology can prompt the disclosure and the in-
vestigation of errors that is needed for preventive measures. A re-
cent report in the New York Times illustrates the relationship
between disclosure and error prevention within a private medical
practice:
Dr. Michael Leonard, an anesthesiologist and chief of surgery
for Kaiser Permanente in Denver, was operating on a cancer
patient a few months ago when he reached into a drawer for
medicine. Inside were two vials, side by side. Both had yellow
labels. Both had yellow caps. One was a paralyzing agent, which
Dr. Leonard had correctly administered to keep the patient still
during the operation. The other was the reversal agent, which he
77. Other factors, such as medical ethics and reputation, also give doctors strong
incentives to avoid committing errors.
78. A parallel argument has been advanced concerning genetic patenting. In the
short run, granting what is in essence a monopoly right for scientific discoveries is a
powerful incentive driving such discoveries. However, if the monopoly rightholder is
stingy in allowing others to license that discovery (and, if the rightholder is a corpora-
tion and its central motive is profits, why shouldn't it be?) or if the transactions costs
(e.g., legal fees) involved in obtaining licenses are prohibitive, the long run effects of
such a legal regime could be socially suboptimal. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCIENCE 698 (May 1, 1998)(suggesting that excessive patenting can produce an
"anticommons" inhibiting overall scientific discovery). See also Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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needed next. "I grabbed the wrong one," Dr. Leonard recalled.
"I used the wrong drug."
It would have been easy for the doctor to keep quiet; the drug
wore off and the patient was not harmed. Instead, he talked -
to the surgeon and scrub nurses, the patient's wife and the hos-
pital pharmacist, who has since relabeled the paralyzing agents
with red stickers and put them in a separate drawer. He also
talked to his five partners, whose reaction unnerved him.
"Four of the five of them said, 'You know, I've done the same
thing,"' Dr. Leonard said. "One of them said, 'I did the same
thing last week.' And I'm thinking, I've been chief of this de-
partment for five years. Now I'm chief of surgery. And nobody
has ever said to me, 'We have this problem.' A lot of it comes
back to this culture of silence."79
Until an organization is willing to admit its errors - and apologiz-
ing by definition involves admitting error - preventing future er-
rors will be difficult.80
II. DIVERGENT INTERESTS
Divergent interests are a second source of complexity regarding
apology in the organizational setting. Below I discuss three salient
features: principal-agent tensions between organizations and their
employees, differences in risk preferences between organizations
and individuals and self-insurance versus third-party insurance by
organizations.
A. Principal-Agent Tensions
An individual who injures another when working as an employee
may ask whether revealing the mistake and apologizing for it will
be in his best interest. However, for the organization, the relevant
utilitarian question is whether apologizing will be in the organiza-
tion's best interest.8' Put differently, will the employee/agent do
79. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Do No Harm: Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Si-
lence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at D1.
80. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1014-15 (discussing definitions of apology).
81. The best reason to apologize is not a simple utilitarian one. A person should
apologize when she has harmed another because it is the right thing to do, rather than
because it is in her own self-interest (e.g., leading the other party to drop the case).
See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1065-67 (discussing ethical concerns regarding apologies
made for strategic purposes). However, when analyzing the principal-agent tension, it
is simplest to focus upon the utilitarian perspective. For characterizations of the utili-
tarian model of choice, see Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, in
CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 54 (1982); Amartya Sen, The Formulation of
Rational Choice, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 385-90 (May 1994). See also Jonathan R. Cohen,
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what is in the organization's/principal's best interest? For example,
throughout the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Bill Clinton may have
refrained from apologizing fully, including fully admitting those
acts, for fear that such admissions would have cost him the Presi-
dency. However, from the viewpoint of the Office of the Presi-
dency, it might have been best for him to apologize fully, because
irrespective of whether he was replaced, the integrity of the Office
would have been upheld.
While principal-agent tensions are prevalent throughout soci-
ety,82 they can be particularly acute in the dispute resolution set-
ting.83 Not only are the interests of agents and principals
commonly at odds in dispute resolution, but the strategic possibili-
ties for interacting with the opposing side can also complicate mat-
ters further. 4 Moreover, economic theory suggests that such
tensions cannot be eliminated fully. We cannot make them disap-
pear, rather the best we can do is address and manage such
tensions.
In many hospitals, a doctor will refrain from revealing his error
to the patient out of fear of adverse consequences, such as an in-
crease in his experience-rated medical malpractice premiums.86
Undoubtedly, part of what induces physicians at the Lexington VA
to reveal their errors, both to patients and to hospital administra-
tors, is that they are largely shielded from personal financial expo-
sure.87 While other factors may still weigh against their reporting
of a mistake, such as risking their reputation or having the mistake
reported to state licensing agencies or the National Practitioner
Data Bank,88 compared to a private physician, a VA physician as-
sumes little personal risk by reporting his own mistakes. At root
the VA system, rather than the individual physician, bears the
Reasoning Along Different Lines: Some Varied Roles of Rationality in Negotiation and
Conflict Resolution, 3 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 111, 111-22 (1998) (arguing that the rec-
ognition of the plurality of roles that reasoning plays is central to understanding nego-
tiation and dispute resolution).
82. See PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
83. See NEGOTIATION ON BEHALF OF OTHERS (Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence
Susskind eds., 1999).
84. See id. at 6-8.
85. See id.
86. For a fine overview of incentives in medical care, see Liang, Patient Injury
Incentives in Law, supra note 34.
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
88. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966. On the National Practitioner's
Data Bank, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152 (1999) (section 11132 discusses the re-
porting requirement of sanctions taken by Boards of Medical Examiners).
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brunt of the cost of the individual physician's mistake. This pro-
vides an incentive for VA physicians to reveal their mistakes and
apologize for them.
B. Risk Preferences
There are good reasons to suspect that individuals and organiza-
tions have different attitudes toward risk. First, organizations usu-
ally have far greater financial resources than individuals and are
likely to be more risk neutral than individuals toward a given risk.
Second, While a doctor may commit only one serious medical error
a year, the hospital at which he works at may experience scores of
such errors committed by different physicians per year. As a re-
sult, the hospital is able to spread the risks of a given legal strategy,
such as apology, across multiple cases. 89 Both of these reasons sug-
gest that, vis A vis a particular case, the organization is likely to be
more risk neutral than the individual physician.
How does this apply to apology? The implication is not entirely
clear. On the one hand, admitting a mistake and apologizing for it
is a risky step. If the apology is not offered within a "safe" mecha-
nism, such as certain mediations, then the opposing party can use
the admission as proof in court. This suggests that organizations
might be more willing to embrace apology than individuals. On
the other hand, failing to apologize can also be a risky step, poten-
tially destroying an already damaged relationship and resulting in a
prolonged suit or punitive damages that might have been averted
through an apology.90 From an economic perspective, both apolo-
gizing and not apologizing can be seen as gambles. If organizations
tend to be more risk neutral than individuals, one would expect
organizations to embrace apology more often than individuals if
apologizing is riskier than not apologizing.
C. Self-Insurance versus Third-Party Insurance
A distinctive feature of the Lexington VA is that it self-insures.
In contrast to many private hospitals that carry third-party liability
insurance, the VA system does not, but as a large organization di-
rectly bears its liability costs. This too has ramifications regarding
apology, since organizations and their third-party insurers may
have divergent interests concerning apology.
89. This reasoning also applies to claims, such as many private medical malprac-
tice or automobile accident claims that are ultimately paid by insurance companies, as
spreading risks across many cases lies at the heart of the insurance business.
90. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1015-23.
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Though at times an organization that has third-party insurance
will be more willing to apologize than one that self-insures,91 I sus-
pect that self-insurance may actually promote apology overall.
Third-party insurers may give little weight to some of the benefits
of apology that an organization may value. For example, the Lex-
ington VA's embrace of apology helped promote the well-being of
its patients, its internal morale, and its reputation as a caring insti-
tution - all interests that a third-party insurer might very well
disregard.92
Self-insurance also gives the Lexington VA greater control over
its approach for handling errors, including apology, than would
third-party insurance. Most insurance contracts impose upon the
insured a general duty of cooperation with the insurance company
in defense of the claim.93 Some insurance contracts specifically
prohibit the insured from voluntarily assuming liability, a restric-
tion that some courts have taken as a condition precedent to the
contract. 94 Hence, there is an issue of whether a hospital or doctor
might void the insurance coverage by apologizing. The short an-
swer to that question is "probably not,"95 and I know of no case in
which an organization's insurance coverage was voided by apolo-
gizing. However, this concern may still have a chilling effect on the
use of apology by an injurer that carries third-party insurance. 96
91. An organization with third-party insurance may think, "It's the insurance com-
pany, and not we, who will have to pay for the cost of the mistake." Consider one
example. Following a crash off of Nova Scotia in which 229 people were killed, Swis-
sair was forthcoming in assuming responsibility and seeking a settlement in which it
accepted responsibility for compensatory damages provided punitive damages were
dropped. See Hope Yen, Swiss Airline Offers To Pay the Families of 229 Crash Vic-
tims, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Aug. 6, 1999. The fact that Swissair carried
third-party insurance was likely a factor. As Swissair's Chairman Philippe Bruggisser
commented, "We are well insured and able to face [compensation payments.]" AIR-
LINE FIN. NEWS (Mar. 1, 1999).
92. Similarly, in the case of the individual injurer, he may have interests in apolo-
gizing (e.g., protecting his reputation or alleviating his guilt that a third-party insurer
may disregard).
93. See JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, 8 INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 4771 (1981); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CON-
TRACTS § 31.9 (1994).
94. See APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 93, § 4780; 14 COUCH ON INSUR-
ANCE 2D § 51: 22 (rev. ed. 1982).
95. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1025-28.
96. See, e.g., Naneen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention,
61 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 464 (1995) (indicating that concerns, ungrounded in Baden's
view, over increased insurance costs are a factor inhibiting airline companies from
assuming responsibility for injuries). The central concern of Baden's article-that Jap-
anese airline companies have sought to have restrictions on their liability for interna-
tional accidents imposed by the Warsaw Convention removed-is intriguing. While
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With the control of the "purse strings," may come some control not
only over the litigation but the dispute resolution processes that
precede it. I find it noteworthy that in the Toro example, soon af-
ter switching to a policy readily accepting responsibility within me-
diation, Toro switched from third-party insurance to self-insurance.
Third, self-insurance gives an organization a strong incentive to
prevent future errors: the organization itself will have to pay for
them. Therefore, if adopting a policy of apology will help prevent
future errors, a self-insuring organization will be inclined toward it.
Now compare this to an organization that carries third-party insur-
ance. While an organization that carries third-party insurance does
have an incentive to keep its insurance premiums from rising by
preventing errors, having the insurance does reduce the "sting" of
such errors.97 Consider also the interests of the third-party insur-
ance company. After the insurance contract is signed and the pre-
miums are set, reducing future errors is no doubt a good thing.
Fewer errors mean fewer claims payments and hence greater prof-
its for the insurance company. Let us call this "incentive one."
However, before the contract is signed, the insurance company has
no incentive to help reduce future errors. Indeed, if ways could be
found to prevent all future errors, the insurance company would be
out of business for there would be no need to buy insurance. More
generally, if one supposes that an insurance company's profits are
tied to the volume of their business and that this volume is tied to
underlying levels of errors, then an insurance company has little
incentive to promote error reduction. 98 Let us call this "incentive
two."
denial may be a central part of American culture, assuming responsibility for mis-
takes, including apology, is far more prevalent in Japan. For references to the use of
apology internationally, see Cohen, supra note 1, at 1013 n.10. See generally NAOMI
SUGIMOTO, JAPANESE APOLOGY ACROSS DISCIPLINES (1999).
97. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 193-94
(1991).
98. A cynic might argue: "To err is human. To make money off of it is the business
of lawyers and insurers. Thus, both lawyers and insurers benefit because errors oc-
cur." While it goes to far to say that lawyers or insurers actively seek to promote
errors from such interests, perhaps it is right to view such passive beneficiaries and the
systems within which they work with a critical eye. Recall Lincoln's advice, "Discour-
age litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out
to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, expenses and waste of
time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man.
There will still be business enough." Abraham Lincoln, Lecture Notes, in 2 COL-
LECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 81 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). More recently,
some scholars have suggested that legal disputes may have a prisoner's dilemma ele-
ment in which each side is better off getting a lawyer than not, but both sides are
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I do not suggest that incentive two outweighs incentive one.
Rather, I wonder whether incentive two decreases the desire of in-
surance companies to pursue approaches to dispute settlement, in-
cluding apology, that might help prevent future errors as vigorous-
ly as self-insuring organizations. In short, a self-insured organiza-
tion has a clear and direct incentive to prevent future errors and
thus has a strong incentive to use mechanisms like apology. In con-
trast, where an organization buys third-party insurance, the organi-
zation's immediate incentive to avoid errors decreases, and the
insurer's incentives may be mixed. By spreading the responsibility
for errors between the organization and its insurer, some of the
responsibility may get lost in the cracks.
m. NON-PECUNIARY BENEFITS TO CORPORATE MORALE,
PRODUCTIVITY AND REPUTATION
From both positive99 and normative' °° perspectives, it is easy to
conceive of organizations, like corporations, in largely economic
terms. Yet corporations are more than just economic entities.
They are centers of human activity, and as such, are and should be
centers of moral activity too.
Though it is a mistake to envision perfect parallels between indi-
vidual and organizational functioning, limited parallels do exist.
An individual injurer who apologizes may relieve his internal sense
of guilt and increase his self-esteem. Similarly, an organization
that apologizes for errors may bolster its corporate morale. When
Connie Johnson, a quality assurance nurse, states that, "Telling the
truth is the right thing to do," or when Steven Kraman, the hospi-
made worse off when both sides get lawyers. For discussions and references, see Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 510 n.7, 524 n.43
(1994) (suggesting lawyers may actually help solve this prisoner's dilemma).
99. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPI-
TALISM (1985) (arguing that firms arise because contracting to cover all future contin-
gencies in the production process is impractical). For references to both economic
and sociological approaches to understanding organizations and their interaction with
the law, see Marc C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 903 (1996);
Lauren B. Edelman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc.
479 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of A Business is to In-
crease Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (arguing that fidel-
ity to shareholders requires corporate executives to seek profits and disregard broad
conceptions of social responsibility). For a critique of narrow, role-based conceptions
of ethical responsibility, see ARTHUR I. APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE
MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
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tal's chief of staff and chair of its risk management committee,
states that, "Almost every risk manager and attorney says, 'We al-
ways tell the truth,'... But I don't know of any other hospital that
goes out and calls the family when there's been an error[,]" the
pride these people feel in the Lexington VA is apparent.' Such
pride fosters organizational loyalty and productivity. Offering an
apology after an injury is a matter of respect, and treating others
with respect generates self-respect. In the medical setting, the ethi-
cal impetus to apologize for error is even stronger than in other
organizational settings. Medical ethics require that physicians put
the patient's best interests first, and it is hard to imagine many
cases where, having been harmed by the doctor's errors, it is not in
the patient's best interests for the doctor to apologize.
Some benefits associated with apologizing are external to an or-
ganization. For example, offering an apology can enhance an or-
ganization's reputation. Although some organizations would
rather deny responsibility than admit error, other organizations
benefit from embracing responsibility. For example, when the Lex-
ington VA apologized to the Browns, the Browns gladly "came
back" for more business.10 2 Errors happen, and apologizing to cus-
tomers following errors can promote greater customer loyalty and
hence profitability. Goodwill can be a highly valuable corporate
asset. Indeed, non-apology can have a price, and sometimes orga-
nizations may offer apologies because failing to do so would be too
costly. For example, following reports of racism toward its own
employees, Texaco repeatedly apologized publicly for that racism.
While one may wonder whether such apologies were motivated
primarily by sincere contrition or by the fear of losing customers
who might otherwise have perceived Texaco as a racist organiza-
tion and thus opt for non-Texaco products, the fear of losing cus-
tomers was likely one motivating factor.'03
101. See Gerlin, supra note 5.
102. See id. (Of course, the Lexington VA may have remained the best financial
choice for the Browns, but their attitude toward the hospital reflected more than
finances.)
103. See Hanna Rosin, Cultural Revolution at Texaco, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 2,
1998, at 18:
[O]nce the Times story appeared [documenting Texaco's racism], Texaco
CEO Peter Bijur quickly adopted a strategy known in public- relations cir-
cles as "total contrition." With [a] p.r. maven ... at his side, Bijur issued a
series of tortured apologies. "We care about each and every employee," he
said on a satellite broadcast. "I care deeply.... I am sorry for our employ-
ees and both ashamed and angry that such a thing happened in the Texaco
family."
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The internal and external benefits to organizations of assuming
responsibility often go hand in hand. Although apology was not
involved, consider the effects of Johnson & Johnson's responsible
response in the Tylenol poisoning episode. °4 Johnson & Johnson
reacted to reports of poisoning by rapidly pulling Tylenol from re-
tail shelves at a cost to Johnson & Johnson of over $50 million.10 5
Once it was confident the Tylenol supply was safe, Johnson &
Johnson reintroduced the product with added safety features under
the same brand name, rather than under a new brand name as
many had suggested. John H. Bryan, Jr., chairman and chief exec-
utive officer of Sara Lee Corporation, commented,
[C]ommunity responsibility is an important measure of corpo-
rate excellence. By enhancing a company's reputation, it makes
it easier to hire better people, easier to sell products, and easier
to cope with difficult problems. For example, Johnson & John-
son well-deserved reputation as a good corporate citizen un-
doubtedly helped the Tylenol brands survive in the marketplace,
despite the potentially devastating impact of the poisoning
scares.10
6
Johnson & Johnson's responsible handling of the Tylenol episode
seems to have also enhanced its external reputation. Note too that
Johnson & Johnson's response did not occur in an organizational
"vacuum." Instead, its response was consonant with its famed cor-
porate credo of making responsibility to those who use its prod-
ucts, rather than its own profits, the corporation's first priority.10 7
Id. Within two weeks, he turned the nightmare into an opportunity for enlighten-
ment. He met with Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton and asked for their help in making
Texaco a "model of diversity." He bravely shouldered the historical burden. "The
moment is now, and the responsibility is ours to demonstrate to the nation that dis-
crimination can be eradicated. That true inclusion can exist. And that equal opportu-
nity can be provided to every man and woman," he said, sounding totally contrite at a
November 15, 1996, press conference. "We will work ceaselessly and tirelessly, day
after day, to build a company of undisputed opportunity for all individuals." Id.
104. For descriptions, see Tylenol's "Miracle" Comeback, TIME, Oct. 17 1983, at 67
(observing that a year after the poisoning, public confidence was restored); Mark L.
Mitchell, The Impact of External Parieties on Brand-Name Capital. The 1982 Tylenol
Poisonings and Subsequent Cases, ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Oct. 1, 1989, at 601; John B.
Cullen et al., An Ethical Weather Report: Assessing the Organization's Ethical Climate,
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Sept. 22, 1989, at 50.
105. See Tylenol's "Miracle" Comeback, supra note 104.
106. John H. Bryan, Jr., The Corporation and the Executive in the Community, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 695, 697-98. For a list of recent awards Johnson & Johnson has
received for good corporate citizenship, see Johnson & Johnson, Awards and Recogni-
tion (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.johnsonandjohnson.com/whojis-jnj/awards.
html>.
107. The first paragraph of Johnson & Johnson's credo provides:
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Legal expenses paid in compensation of injuries will typically ap-
pear on most organizations' balance sheets. However, many of the
non-pecuniary benefits of apology (e.g., to organizational morale,
loyalty, communication, productivity, reputation, and customer
loyalty) will not typically appear on an organization's balance
sheet. Hence, organizations that overly focus on short-term profits
as reflected in balance sheets may tend to neglect apology. In
some ways, a policy of apologizing for errors is like an investment:
though the immediate price may be clear, the long run economic
benefits, though real, are less defined. If the current CEO cares
primarily about short-run profits, he may "underinvest" in an ap-
proach of apology that may financially benefit a future CEO.
IV. STANDING AND SCOPE
Two issues arising with apology in the organizational setting, but
far less in the individual setting, are standing and scope. 10 8 By
standing, I mean who has the moral authority to apologize. By
scope, I mean what the apology will cover. When an individual
acting on his own commits an injury, generally speaking, both
standing and scope are clear: that individual should apologize to
the extent that he believes himself to be at fault.109 In the organi-
We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to
mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services. In
meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality. We must con-
stantly strive to reduce our costs in order to maintain reasonable prices. Cus-
tomers' orders must be serviced promptly and accurately. Our suppliers and
distributors must have an opportunity to make a fair profit.
Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.johnsonandjohn-
son.com/whojis-jnj/cr_usa.html>. The last paragraph of that credo provides, inter
alia, "Our final responsibility is to our stockholders. Business must make a sound
profit." Id. For a history of that credo, its significance within the organization, and
mention of its influence of the organization's handling of the Tylenol episode, see
Johnson & Johnson, The History of the Johnson & Johnson Credo (visited Mar. 30,
2000) <http://www.johnsonandjohnson.com/who isijnj/crindex.html>. Discussion
of this credo forms an important component of ongoing employee training, especially
among executives, and influenced how the Tylenol episode was handled. See Speech
of David E. Collins, Formerly Member of Executive Committee and Vice Chairman,
Board of Directors, Johnson & Johnson and the employee principally responsible for
the management of the Tylenol crisis (Sept. 23, 1999, Notre Dame Center for Ethics
and Religious Values in Business, South Bend, IN). Perhaps it is not surprising that
Johnson & Johnson, a corporation that had both clearly articulated and regularly ad-
dressed its policy of corporate responsibility, acted so responsibly to the Tylenol
poisoning episode.
108. For factors to consider when making an apology, including standing and scope,
see Cohen, supra note 1, at 1047-52.
109. In some cases, a lawyer or other agent might offer an apology on the individ-
ual's behalf.
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zational setting, standing and scope are less clear. If an employee's
error injures a customer, who should apologize, the employee, the
head of the organization, or an ombudsperson? What should that
person say? In the case of the Lexington VA, Dr. Kraman, the
hospital's chief of staff and chair of the risk management commit-
tee, offered an apology to the injured patient. Is he the right per-
son? Could one argue that the person who committed the error
(e.g., the treating physician) should be the one to apologize? After
all, if Dr., Kraman did not make a mistake, what does he have to
apologize for?
No doubt much will depend upon the particular facts of a situa-
tion, and it is beyond my aim here to fully explore the issues of
standing and scope. Rather, let me suggest two levels at which
these issues ought to be considered: the theoretical and the
practical.
A. Theoretical Level
At the theoretical level, one would think that standing and scope
when making an apology should be tied to an agent's moral culpa-
bility. In the individual case, this means that a person who com-
mits an error should apologize for that error to the extent that he
believes himself at fault, and that, concomitantly, he has no moral
capacity to apologize beyond the extent to which he believes him-
self to be at fault. The organizational context is more complex. In
the organizational context, the injurer's fault can be both mul-
tidimensional and overlapping. The individual injurer may place
the fault upon himself, "If only I had paid more attention the mis-
take would not have occurred." The organization may also see it-
self at fault and think, "We shouldn't have workers on twelve-hour
shifts," or "We should have been more careful in screening those
we hire," or, most generally, "We are responsible for what happens
at our hospital."" 0 Respondeat superior is not just a legal concept
but a moral one: if the individual committed the injury while acting
in his scope as an employee, then the organization bears some re-
sponsibility. As mentioned above, at the Lexington VA, apologies
are typically offered by Dr. Kraman rather than by the individual
110. The first two statements ("we shouldn't have workers on twelve-hour shifts"
and "we should have been more careful in screening who we hired") point to system-
atic errors. The latter statement ("we are responsible for what happens at our hospi-
tal") does not point to a systemic error but simply represents a broad understanding
of organizational responsibility.
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who made the error. While this practice might be critiqued,"' per-
haps this policy stems in part from a broad understanding of orga-
nizational responsibility.
B. Practical Level
Practical considerations also bear upon who should make an
apology. Consider the case where the error is caused by an individ-
ual physician's mistake. At the Lexington VA, Dr. Kraman and
Attorney Hamm suggest that the main reason to have Dr. Kraman
rather than the erring physician apologize is practical: If the indi-
vidual physician attends the face-to-face meeting with the patient,
emotions tend to run very high, both on the part of the patient and
on the part of the physician, and easily obstruct settlement.112 In
contrast, if the physician is absent, emotions tend to be much
"cooler," thus settlement is facilitated." 3 Consider also the com-
mon case where following the injury, the organization discharges
the injuring employee. That employee may be unwilling to apolo-
gize to the injured party, and if the organization wants to apologize
to that party, it must select someone else to offer the apology. The
scope and content of that apology will be quite different than had
the injurer apologized directly, but the apology may still be of
much value.
V. POLICY ARTICULATION
While many individuals are highly reflective about how they
should respond when they have injured another, few ever formally
articulate a policy about it. 1 4 Generally speaking, there is no need.
Even if the individual consciously decides on a particular approach,
111. Albert Wu has critiqued the Lexington VA's practice, suggesting that the indi-
vidual who made the error should offer the apology. See Wu, supra note 2, at 971.
112. Some may say that allowing strong emotions such as shame and anger to be
released is ultimately helpful and hence that it is good when high emotions accom-
pany apology rather than being buried or avoided. Yet such intense emotions may
sometimes interfere with reaching a settlement, and, if reaching settlement is the goal,
using agents can be helpful. For barriers to conflict resolution generally, see BARRI-
ERS TO CoNFLIcr RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). For a discussion of
the use of agents to at times overcome such barriers, see NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF
OF OTHERS, supra note 84; Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, When Should We
Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative Negotiation, 4 NEGOTIATION J. 4, 395, 395-401
(1988).
113. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
114. Some individuals look for advice, such as psychological or religious prescrip-
tions, about how to act when they have injured another, but that is quite different
from articulating their own policies.
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he can simply follow it without formally expressing it. Yet the situ-
ation is different with organizations. Organizations regularly artic-
ulate a variety of policies, for unlike individuals, organizations
often need to formally articulate policies to implement them. Fur-
ther, organizations are also more likely than individuals to commit
multiple injuries over time, and the policies that they adopt may
receive multiple applications.
From the viewpoint of a scholar studying dispute resolution, the
ideal scenario would be if an organization formally articulated a
policy, implemented that policy, collected data on the effects of
that policy, and then formally revised that policy in light of the
data. In such an ideal world, policies toward dispute resolution
would undergo iterative design and development. Our world, how-
ever, is far muddier than that. Consider the experience of the Lex-
ington VA. Following two large, adverse verdicts in 1985 and 1986,
and also shortly after hiring Dr. Kraman and Attorney Hamm," 5
the Lexington VA implemented a new approach of assuming re-
sponsibility, including apology and a fair offer of settlement. Yet,
in part due to bureaucratic complexities of working within the VA,
a large government system,116 this approach was not formally ar-
ticulated as a hospital policy until 1999. In other words, the reality
preceded the writing by more than a decade.
This suggests two questions: (i) to what extent is an organiza-
tion's actual approach consistent with its articulated policy, and (ii)
to what extent does policy articulation influence actual organiza-
tional behavior? It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to re-
solve such questions here. Let me simply suggest several
considerations. Regarding the first question, organizations fre-
quently articulate policies that members do not follow. For exam-
ple, many hospitals have ethical guidelines calling for the reporting
of medical errors, but medical errors often go unreported. 1 7 Sec-
ond, the fact that policies are not always followed does not mean
that the articulation of a policy has no influence. Articulating a
policy may help an organization to follow it. For example, part of
what influenced Johnson & Johnson to handle the 'Tylenol poison-
ing episode so responsibly was its credo." 8 Similarly, the Lexing-
115. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
116. See id. Note, too, that the formal policy articulation in November 1999 slightly
preceded the publication of Kraman & Hamm's study. See Kraman & Hamm, supra
note 2.
117. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 74; To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 69, at 74-93 (dis-
cussing existing error-reporting systems and recommending reforms).
118. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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ton VA may now feel more bound to follow the approach of
assuming responsibility now that it has formally articulated that
policy. Articulating a policy can be a form of self-constraint at the
institutional level.119 Though it may not work perfectly, it may still
have some bite.
CONCLUSION
The approach of the Lexington VA to medical errors over the
past decade provides a glimpse of the potential of apology in the
setting. In this paper, I have discussed the following issues con-
cerning organizational apology: (i) the process of learning to pre-
vent future errors; (ii) the divergent interests related to principal/
agent tensions between organizations and their employees, risk
preferences and sources of insurance; (iii) the non-pecuniary bene-
fits to corporate morale, productivity and reputation; (iv) the
standing and scope when apologizing; and (v) the effects of policy
articulation.
Before ending, let me underscore several points. First, I do not
suggest that under the current legal and economic arrangements,
all organizations can adopt the approach of assuming responsibility
for injuries, including apology, with financial consequences similar
to the Lexington VA's. The legal and economic arguments gov-
erning VA hospitals and their employees, as well as the VA's his-
torical relationship with its members, differ from those typical in
the private sector.120  Further, the medical setting has features,
119. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUB.
INTEREST 94-118 (Summer 1980); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES
IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
120. Unlike the Lexington VA example, the private sector often presents the com-
plexity of multiple defendants with multiple sources of insurance. Such multifaceted,
structural differences between legal and economic incentives within the VA system as
compared to private medical practice may help support arguments for multifaceted,
structural reform of the latter. For example, if legal and economic incentives discour-
age private physicians from apologizing when they make errors, a question arises of
whether structural reforms should be undertaken to change those incentives. See To
ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 69, at 3 ("A comprehensive approach to improving pa-
tient safety is needed. This approach cannot focus on a single solution since there is
no 'magic bullet' that will solve this problem, and indeed, no single recommendation
in this report should be considered the answer. Rather, large, complex problems re-
quire thoughtful, multifaceted responses."). Consider, too, the prevalence of apology
under Britain's system of nationalized health coverage. See Frances H. Miller, Medi-
cal Malpractice Litigation: Do the British Have a Better Remedy? 11 AM. J. L. & MED.
433, 434-35 (1986) (describing how nationalized health care has fostered the markedly
lower incidence of malpractice suits and much greater role of apology in cases of
medical error in Great Britain); see also Charles Vincent et al., supra note 50.
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such as pre-existing relationships between doctors and patients and
an ethic of care, not found in many other contexts. Rather, exper-
iences of organizations like the Lexington VA, the Toro Company
and Johnson & Johnson suggest that, if only from a financial view-
point, the approach of assuming responsibility for mishaps - at
times even including apology - is worthy of much broader organi-
zational consideration. Many lawyers fear that apology will inevi-
tably produce financial ruin. The experience of the Lexington VA
helps disprove that claim and thus shifts the discourse. From the
financial viewpoint, the question is no longer whether the approach
of assuming responsibility including apology can be economically
viable, if not profitable, rather the question is where and when.
Second, this Article has considered the economic ramifications
of apology, because much of the skepticism toward apology is
rooted in economic concerns. I do not suggest, however, that
adopting the approach of assuming responsibility, including apol-
ogy, to injuries should be evaluated solely, or even largely, on eco-
nomic terms. There is more to life than profits and more to
apology than the economics of it. An apology is meant to show
regret, and an insincere apology that is motivated by economic fac-
tors alone, rather than by internal remorse, is little apology indeed.
Whether or not it is profitable to do so, individuals and organiza-
tions have moral obligations to apologize when they have injured
another. Assuming responsibility is not just a matter of economics
but of ethics.
Third, the above discussion of special issues concerning apology
in the organizational context is a theoretical exploration. For ex-
ample, I make no claim that by adopting an approach of assuming
responsibility, including apology, an organization will necessarily
decrease future errors, bolster corporate morale or ultimately ben-
efit financially. The experience of the Lexington VA is but one
"data point." Rather than drawing deductive conclusions, my goal
has been to inspect that "data point" closely and to use it as a lens
for offering conjectures about some central dimensions of organi-
zational apology. Evaluating such conjectures awaits future
research.
When social systems are awry, it is easy to lose sight of the way
things should be. In some respects, our current medical system, so
driven by economics and the fear of malpractice liability that doc-
tors are afraid to apologize to patients when they have made er-
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rors, is a system gone awry.12 1 The Lexington VA took a
courageous step in adopting the approach of assuming responsibil-
ity, including apology, for errors. There was no doubt that this pol-
icy would better serve its patients. How good it is to see that it was
also financially sound. Perhaps their experience can serve as an
impetus for other organizations to consider embarking on similar
paths.
121. The same can be said of how injuries are handled generally within our society,
with injurers frequently focused on avoiding, rather than accepting, responsibility.
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OF PARDONS, POLITICS AND
COLLAR BUTTONS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
DUTY TO BE MERCIFUL
Margaret Colgate Love*
[Pardon] has never been crystallized into rigid rules. Rather, its
function has been to break rules. It has been the safety valve by
which harsh, unjust, or unpopular results of formal rules could be
corrected.'
INTRODUCION
Few provisions in the Constitution are as misunderstood and un-
derestimated as the President's power to pardon.2 Most people to-
day associate pardons with politics and controversy, and do not
know that for much of our nation's history the pardon power was
exercised regularly and without fanfare to give relief to ordinary
people convicted of garden-variety federal crimes. Once an inte-
gral part of the justice system, pardon is considered anachronistic
in an age devoted to rules and wary of discretion, a vestige of a
simpler time whose occasional exercise is either capricious or
pointless, or both. Indeed, until quite recently the prevailing view
among criminal justice practitioners and philosophers was that the
* Lecturer in Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. I wish to thank Kathleen Dean Moore for her comments on an earlier draft
of this article. Many of the opinions expressed in this article and some of its back-
ground information are the product of my seven years' service as Pardon Attorney in
the Department of Justice, from 1990 to 1997.
1. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PARDON 295 (1939) [hereinafter SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES].
2. "The President shall.., have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Of-
fences against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1. Sixty years ago, the introduction to what is still the only systematic study
of the federal pardon power noted that "the vast majority of people have a very hazy
idea of the meaning and of the implications of the President's pardoning power. The
persistence of erroneous ideas, the lack of exact information, and the absence of pub-
licity concerning the acts of the pardoning authority envelop the power in a veil of
mystery." W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 6 (1941). In
the intervening years, and notwithstanding episodic scholarly interest in particular
sensational grants, the public understanding of the pardon power has changed very
little, and constitutional texts devote little space to it. See, e.g., P. SHANE & H. BRUFF,
THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1988) (discussing pardon power on four of 811
pages of text).
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time had come for pardon "silently to fade away - like collar but-
tons, [its] usefulness at an end." 3
At the same time, the intense competition for partisan advantage
in matters touching on crime control has made pardoning politi-
cally problematic. This was brought home to the Clinton Adminis-
tration in the summer of 1999 by the public furor that greeted the
President's offer of clemency4 to sixteen members of a Puerto Ri-
can nationalist group ("FALN") who were serving lengthy prison
sentences for terrorist offenses. The President defended his deci-
sion in terms of "equity and fairness,"5 but it was widely criticized
as a thinly-veiled attempt to curry favor with Hispanic voters in
New York on behalf of his wife's expected Senate candidacy.6
Given the great risk and uncertain return of pardoning, it seems
less surprising that the President does it rarely than that he does it
at all. But the concern for political risk threatens to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy: as the power is exercised less and less fre-
quently and produces fewer and fewer grants, it is more and more
likely to be regarded with suspicion and cynicism.
It is unfortunate that the federal pardon power seems to have
fallen into disuse and disrepute just when it appears that it might
once again prove useful. The harsh inflexibility that has come to
3. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST 84 (1989); see also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting
the Pardoning Power From the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 604, 611 (1991) [hereinafter
Kobil, Quality of Mercy] (the clemency power has been "trivialized," having "failed to
evolve with the rest of the judicial system"). Both Moore and Kobil argue for a revi-
talized role for pardon as an "extrajudicial corrective" for unjust outcomes of the
legal system. See infra note 70.
4. The term "clemency" is a comprehensive term that has come to be used for all
types of relief available pursuant to the pardon power, to avoid confusion with the
narrower technical use of the term "pardon" in the Justice Department's clemency
regulations which denotes the limited grant of relief after completion of sentence. See
Executive Clemency, 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2000). Clemency includes commutation of sen-
tence, reprieve, and remission of fine, as well as full or unconditional pardon. The
term "amnesty" is usually used where a grant of clemency is extended by proclama-
tion to a class of individuals. Throughout this paper I have also used the constitu-
tional term "pardon" in this same comprehensive sense, though I have attempted,
where appropriate, to distinguish it from the post-sentence relief described in the Jus-
tice Department's clemency regulations.
5. Letter from the President to the Honorable Henry Waxman, Ranking Minor-
ity Member, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 21, 1999) [hereinafter FALN
Letter] (copy on file with author).
6. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, Ex-Clinton Lawyer Says Politics Had No Role in
Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A10; Katherine Q. Seelye, Clinton Says
Clemency Plan Was Unrelated to First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1999, at B4; David
Johnston, Federal Agencies Opposed Leniency for 16 Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1999, at Al.
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characterize the federal criminal justice system in the past two de-
cades is becoming a matter of public concern, in part because of
"hard cases" in which the legally mandated punishment seems
morally wrong, and in part because of a growing crime control in-
frastructure that reflects poorly on our national humanity. Also,
for the first time in many years, questions about the role of clem-
ency in capital cases are being raised at the federal level. There are
many who believe that it is time to declare victory in our thirty-
year war on crime, assess its costs, and begin the work of reconcili-
ation. In this connection, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look
at the presidential pardon power in the constitutional scheme.7
The FALN grants, along with several other recent clemency ac-
tions by President Clinton, are a hopeful sign that reports of par-
don's death are greatly exaggerated. In this Article, I hope to
contribute to its recovery by proposing that the President has a
duty to pardon, not so much to do justice in particular cases, but to
be merciful as a more general obligation of office. As background,
I will briefly describe how in recent years the President's pardoning
power has come to be neglected. In a final section I will suggest
some ways in which the President can revive the power by making
a more considered and generous use of it.
A. The Evolving Role of Federal Pardons
What Alexander Hamilton called the "benign prerogative of par-
doning"'has two quite different but equally public aspects. The
first is to permit the President to dispense "the mercy of the gov-
ernment" where the outcome dictated by law seems harsh or un-
just.9 The second is to enable him to deal expeditiously with
7. See Editorial, Wrong Way on Pardons, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2000, at A22
[hereinafter Wrong Way on Pardons] ("The Founders envisioned [the pardon power]
as a robust political check on a criminal justice system that would inevitably produce
excesses. With tremendous growth in the reach of federal criminal law, the need is
greater than ever. Yet as this growth has taken place, the practice has withered.");
Editorial, The President's Pardons, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1999, at A24 ("Given the
harsh mandatory minimum sentences that govern drug offenses, including nonviolent
offenses, there must be many cases where presidential clemency would be a powerful
tool for justice. The president should not routinely second-guess the court system.
But given the desultory use of this constitutional power over the past 20 years, there
seems to be no danger of that. The danger, rather, is that a valuable check on the
justice system has wilted into symbolism.").
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed.,
1987).
9. Id. ("The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary sever-
ity that, without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel."); James Iredell, Address in the
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situations involving political upheavals or emergencies.' 0 The par-
don power is not subject to limitation by Congress" or the courts, 2
and the President is held accountable for its exercise only through
the political process.13 It has always been assumed (though evi-
dently never authoritatively decided) that the power to pardon is
one of the very few whose exercise the President may not delegate
to a subordinate official, and in fact no President has ever tried.14
North Carolina Ratifying Convention, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
17 (P. Kurland and R. Lerner, eds., 1987) [hereinafter Iredell Address] ("[T]here may
be many instances where, though a man offends against the letter of the law, yet
peculiar circumstances in his case may entitle him to mercy. It is impossible for any
general law to foresee and provide for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore
an inflexible adherence to it, in every instance, might frequently be the cause of very
great injustice.").
10. Hamilton considered the utility of pardon in case of domestic disorder: "[I]n
seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments when a well-
timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the
commonwealth, and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall." THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 8, at 423. Iredell also
mentioned pardon's usefulness in time of "civil war," and added the need to obtain
the testimony of accomplices and to protect spies who have proved useful to the gov-
ernment. See Iredell Address, supra note 9, at 18.
11. See In re Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) ("This [pardon] power of the Presi-
dent is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his
pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.").
12. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998) ("Pardon
and commutation have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are
rarely, if ever, decisions appropriate subjects for judicial review" (quoting Connecti-
cut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981))); In re Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 121 (1925) ("[W]hoever is to make [pardon] useful must have full discretion to use
it"); see also Yelvington v. Presidential Pardon and Parole Attorneys, 211 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (the court will not compel compliance with internal Justice Depart-
ment clemency regulations so as to interfere with administration of pardon power).
13. Proposals during the Constitutional Convention that the power be shared with
Congress were rejected on grounds of efficiency, and on the theory that the Presi-
dent's personal accountability to the electorate was a sufficient check on abuses. See
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 419 (Aug. 25, 1787) (statement of
Sherman) (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (rejecting proposals to allow reprieves until the en-
suing session of the Senate, and to condition pardon on the consent of the Senate); id.
at 626-27 (rejecting proposal to vest the power to pardon treason jointly in the Presi-
dent and the Senate); see also William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 501-06 (1977) [hereinafter
Duker, President's Power]. Hamilton argued that the pardon power was vested in
"one man" rather than "a body of men" for two reasons: first, "the sense of responsi-
bility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided," and second, "as men gener-
ally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in
an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or
censure for an injudicious or affected clemency." THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note
8, at 422-23.
14. Cf TERRY SANFORD, MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOV-
ERNOR TERRY SANFORD, 1961-65, 552 (1966), quoted in Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribu-
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The public is most familiar with the occasions throughout our
history when the pardon power was used for purposes of calming
and unifying the country after a period of strife, notably the amnes-
ties that have followed almost every one of our wars.' 5 President
Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon, which cost Ford his own political
future, is properly regarded as a legitimate measure to restore what
Hamilton called "the tranquility of the commonwealth.' 1 6 Other
examples of pardons granted in whole or in part for political pur-
poses are President Jackson's pardon of the Barataria pirates as a
reward for their assistance in defending New Orleans in the War of
1812,17 President Cleveland's pardon of Mormon settlers in Utah
to shield them from prosecution for polygamy,' s President Nixon's
conditional commutation of Jimmy Hoffa's prison sentence barring
tion and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 75 CHI. KENT L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with author) ("To decide when and
where such mercy should be extended is a decision which must be made by the execu-
tive. It cannot be delegated even in part to anyone else, and thus the decision is a
lonely one. It falls to the Governor to blend mercy with justice as best he can, involv-
ing human as well as legal considerations, in the light of all circumstances after the
passage of time, but before justice is allowed to overrun mercy in the name of the
power of the state.").
15. Perhaps best known are the great Civil War pardon proclamations of Presi-
dents Lincoln and Johnson. See DUKER, supra note 13, at 509-21. Also well known
are the amnesties issued by Presidents Ford and Carter to persons guilty of military
and selective service violations following the Vietnam War. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975) [hereinafter CLEMENCY
BOARD REPORT]; Proclamation No. 4483, 3 C.F.R. 4 (1978); see also Kent Greena-
walt, Vietnam Amnesty - Problems of Justice and Line-Drawing, 11 GA. L. REV. 1
(1976). In addition, Washington used the pardon power to pacify the Whiskey Rebels
in 1794-95; see 1 Annals of Congress 1411-1413; Adams also used the pardon power to
bring an end to the Tariff Insurrection in 1800, see 1 Annals of Congress 1552-53; and,
Madison used it on three separate occasions during the War-of 1812 to persuade de-
serters from the army to return to service. See JAMES D. RICHARDSON, 2 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 413, 497, 528 (1897)
[hereinafter RICHARDSON, MESSAGES]; see also BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMNESTY IN
AMERICA 22-24 (Morris Sherman ed., 1974). The pardon power was also used, as it
had been in England, to man the military. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 341, 342 (1820).
Presidents Wilson and Truman both issued a number of pardons to mark the end of
the two world wars. See CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT, supra, at 374-79.
16. Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (rejecting chal-
lenge to pardon based on both timing and merits). See also Stephen L. Carter, The
Iran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29 Hous. L. REV. 883, 887 (1992) ("Although our national
anger seemed to demand punishment for Nixon's crimes, Ford believed that in the
long run, the national interest would be better served by enabling the ex-President to
avoid prosecution, leaving him untouched by legal proceedings that would otherwise
have kept alive our national obsession with Watergate, which, in retrospect, it was
plainly time to put aside.").
17. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, supra note 15, at 543-45.
18. See JAMES D. RICHARDSON, 13 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENT 5942 (1897).
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him from union management after his release from prison, 19 and
President Reagan's commutation of a foreign spy's life sentence in
contemplation of a "swap" for several of our nationals imprisoned
abroad.2" Considerations of politics also underlay President Bush's
Iran-Contra pardons,21 as they did Jefferson's pardon of those con-
victed and sentenced during the preceding Federalist period under
the Alien and Sedition Act.22
What is less well-known is that the pardon power has also been
exercised by the President over the years on a more mundane and
less visible level, to make exceptions to the law in a wide variety of
circumstances. The archival records of clemency actions from
George Washington's administration onwards reveal the frequent
use of the pardon power to cut short a prison sentence, to delay an
execution, to return forfeited property, and to restore civil rights.23
For much of our history, several hundred pardons or commutations
were routinely granted each year, most generating little public in-
terest.2 4 While there have been colorful clemency recipients in
every period of our history - such as Eugene Debs, Tokyo Rose,
19. Hoffa was unaware of the condition in the commutation warrant, inserted by
White House Counsel John Dean, until after he had been released from prison, and
sued to declare it unenforceable. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1223-24 (D.C.
1974). His appeal of the district court's decision against him was dismissed after he
disappeared and was presumed dead. See Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Par-
dons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon
Power Been Exceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1976).
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, WARRANTS
OF PARDON, 1935-1999, Exec. Grant of Clemency to Marian W. Zacharski, June 7,
1985 [hereinafter WARRANTS OF PARDON].
21. See Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992) (recipients of pardon
among "the best and most dedicated of our countrymen," who were motivated by
patriotism and not by hope of private gain, and whose prosecution resulted from the
"criminalization of policy differences").
22. See Duker, President's Power, supra note 13, at 530; Kobil, Quality of Mercy,
supra note 3, at 593.
23. Portions of these records from 1794 to 1935 are on microfilm in the Office of
the Pardon Attorney. That office also retains the original pardon warrants from the
first administration of Franklin Roosevelt until the present, as well as the originals of
many pardon recommendations signed by the Attorney General addressed to the
President. See WARRANTS OF PARDON, supra note 20. While pardon warrants are
public records, pardon recommendations are generally not disclosed by the Depart-
ment of Justice, even where a subject is deceased. Clemency case files are acceded to
the National Archives on a regular basis in accordance with established records poli-
cies, except for a few involving notorious individuals or issues of special interest, and
most are destroyed after a certain period of time.
24. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY ACTIONS
BY FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 1900 TO JUNE 20, 1945 (Mar. 24, 1999); PRESIDENTIAL
CLEMENCY ACTIONS BY ADMINISTRATION, 1945 TO PRESENT (Feb. 1, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter, collectively, OPA CLEMENCY ACTIONS].
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George Steinbrenner, Patty Hearst, and Marvin Mandel - the vast
majority of pardons have gone unnoticed and unremarked.
Reflecting the pardon power's historically close ties with the op-
eration of the criminal justice system, its administration has been
entrusted to the Attorney General since the middle of the nine-
teenth century. 2 He is assisted by the Pardon Attorney, who is
responsible for accepting and reviewing clemency applications and
preparing recommendations for their disposition. 6 At least since
the beginning of the twentieth century, with only a handful of ex-
ceptions, the President has made each clemency grant pursuant to
a report and recommendation drafted by the Pardon Attorney and
signed by the Attorney General or his designee.27 In fact, pardon
25. Until 1853, the Department of State administered the pardon power, perhaps
reflecting the power's frequent early use to restore forfeited property and remit fines.
A copy of each warrant was kept in longhand, as well as a separate ledger book con-
taining a brief description of the offense being pardoned, and the reasons for the
grant. Pardons that had the effect of cutting short a prison sentence were generally
made pursuant to the recommendation of the prosecutor or sentencing judge. After
1854 the administration of the pardon power was shifted to the Attorney General,
though warrants were still drawn up in the State Department. In 1893 President
Cleveland by executive order formally transferred all administrative duties in pardon
matters to the Attorney General. See Exec. Order of June 16, 1893 (on file at the
Office of the Pardon Attorney). See also Reed Cozart, Clemency Under the Federal
System, 13 FEDERAL PROBATION 3 & n.1 (1959). The first Justice Department clem-
ency regulations, signed by both the Attorney General and the President, were issued
in 1898. A complete set of clemency regulations, from the 1898 McKinley regulations
to the current regulations approved by President Clinton in 1993, is on file at the
Office of the Pardon Attorney.
26. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35-0.36 (1983). In 1865 Congress appropriated funds to pay
a "pardon clerk" to assist the Attorney General, and in 1891 the first Pardon Attor-
ney was appointed. See 13 Stat. 516 (1865); 26 Stat. 946 (1891). The Pardon Attorney
reported directly to the Attorney General until the late 1970s, when Attorney Gen-
eral Griffin Bell delegated responsibility for clemency matters, and supervisory au-
thority over the Office of the Pardon Attorney, to the Deputy Attorney General. See
Interview with Terrence B. Adamson, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
1977-1979, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2, 2000). Since 1983 the Attorney General's
responsibility for providing advice to the President in clemency matters has been dele-
gated to the Pardon Attorney, but recommendations to the President are generally
signed by the Deputy Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.35 (Attorney General re-
sponsibility delegated to Pardon Attorney, whose clemency recommendations are
made "through" the Deputy Attorney General). During most of the 1980s, the Asso-
ciate Attorney General was responsible for supervising the criminal components of
the Department, and for approving and signing clemency recommendations; in 1989,
this responsibility was returned to the Deputy Attorney General, where it has
remained.
27. By the late 1930s, the Attorney General was too busy with other matters to
prepare a separate recommendation to the President in any but the most important or
controversial clemency cases, and usually simply "endorsed" the recommendation of
the Pardon Attorney. See HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 90 n.15. At some later point,
probably during the Kennedy administration, the practice of having these "letters of
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warrants often incorporate a reference to the Justice Department's
recommendation. The degree to which the President has histori-
cally depended upon the Attorney General's advice in clemency
matters is suggested by the fact that, until the Kennedy Adminis-
tration, most applications that the Attorney General did not sup-
port were not even forwarded to the White House, but closed
administratively without presidential action in the Pardon Attor-
ney's office.28
Until the early 1920s, the pardon power was used most fre-
quently to commute a prison term, often because of some miscar-
riage of justice or equitable defect in the underlying conviction, but
more commonly because the prisoner was simply deemed to have
served sufficient time in prison.29 With the advent of indetermi-
advice" personally signed by the Attorney General resumed. In addition, during the
Kennedy administration, reports in summary form recommending denial of clemency
(also signed by the Attorney General) were sent to the President. Previously, most
cases in which the Department did not recommend favorable action had been closed
administratively by the Pardon Attorney. See 1963 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 63 jhere-
inafter 1963 AG ANNUAL REPORT]. The Attorney General personally signed all
clemency recommendations until about midway through the Carter Administration,
when the Deputy Attorney General assumed this responsibility. See Interview with
Terence B. Adamson, supra note 26.
28. See 1963 AG ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 63.
29. While in modern times the President has not usually disclosed his reasons for
granting a pardon, the early pardon ledger books and the annual reports of the Attor-
ney General between 1885 and 1931 record each clemency grant with the reasons for
recommending relief. Many of these involve doubt as to guilt, lack of capacity, or
excuse - a reminder of how relatively primitive our early justice system was. Some-
times the reasons for a favorable recommendation involve the prisoner's age or health
(fear of contagion was as likely as imminent death to qualify a prisoner for early
release) or immigration status (pardon to "avert deportation"); sometimes they re-
flect operational considerations like reward or immunity; sometimes they depend
upon an official recommendation, including that of prison officials; and sometimes
they are simply quaint (e.g., "to enable petitioner to catch steamer without delay," "to
enable farmer prisoner to save his crops," and "not of criminal type"). See HUMBERT,
supra note 2, at 124-33. The range of reasons reveals the idiosyncratic sense of com-
passion in the recommending official. For example, Attorney General Charles J. Bo-
naparte observed in 1908 that:
I have always considered with especial care the possible claims to clemency
of unenlightened and apparently friendless criminals, particularly those
whose crimes might have been the fruits of sudden and violent passion, igno-
rance, poverty, or unhappy surroundings and to deal less favorably with ap-
plications on behalf of offenders enjoying at the time of the crime good
social position, material comforts, the benefits of education, and a happy
domestic life.
1908 ATr'VY GEN. ANN. REP. 8. Unfortunately, after 1931 these fascinating records
were no longer compiled and published for reasons of efficiency, and they exist now
only in the uncatalogued letters of advice signed by the Attorney General on file in
the Pardon Attorney's office, a treasure trove for interested scholars. It has been
Department policy for many years not to divulge the basis for its clemency recom-
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nate sentencing and an administrative parole system, as well as
greater opportunity to appeal convictions through the courts, par-
don no longer played such a central operational role as a post-con-
viction remedy.30
While there were fewer commutations after 1930, however, post-
sentence pardons "to restore civil rights" remained a popular way
for the President to recognize and further the rehabilitation of
criminals who had served their sentence and returned to a produc-
tive life in their communities. 31 Between 1932 and 1980, there
were well over a hundred post-sentence pardons granted almost
every year; in some years, the President signed more than 300 sepa-
rate pardon warrants. 32 These grants were generally made on a
mendations in particular cases, though general standards are set forth in sections 1-
2.112 (pardon) and 1-2.113 (commutation) of the U.S. Attorney's Manual.
30. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 1, at 296 ("Are not judicial
review and modern release procedures like parole sufficient to do all that pardon ever
did - and do it better? To a large extent the answer must be yes.").
31. Under the Justice Department's first clemency rules promulgated in 1898 and
continuing to the present, eligibility to apply for a post-sentence pardon depends
upon satisfaction of a waiting period after release from prison (originally "a consider-
able period," and now five years). Unless granted for innocence, a pardon has no
implications for the validity of the underlying conviction, and the-conviction remains
on an individual's record to be reported whenever requested. However, a presiden-
tial pardon removes disabilities imposed as a result of conviction under federal or
state law. See Memorandum for Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, Office of
Pardon Attorney, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re: Effect of a Presidential Pardon 1 (June 19, 1995)
(presidential pardon relieves a federal offender of state firearms disabilities that at-
tach solely by reason of a federal conviction); cf. In re Elliott Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 9-
18 (D.C. 1997) (holding that presidential pardon did not nullify court's authority to
impose professional discipline based on conduct underlying the conviction). For some
illustrations of the post-sentence benefits sought and gained through the pardon pro-
cess, see Cozart, supra note 25, at 5-6; see also Henry Allen, Uh, Pardon Me, Mr.
President, Caspar & Co. Weren't the Only Ones Let Off the Hook Last Week, WASH.
POST, Jan. 1, 1993, at D1; Ted Gup, For Seekers of Forgiveness at Lofty Levels, A
Presidential Pardon, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1987, at A21.
32. See OPA CLEMENCY ACTIONS, supra note 24. Franklin Roosevelt issued a
total of 2721 pardons, commuted 491 prison sentences and remitted fines in 475 cases;
Truman commuted 133 sentences and issued 1911 pardons. Eisenhower commuted 47
sentences and pardoned 1110 individuals; Kennedy commuted 103 sentences and
pardoned 472 individuals; Johnson commuted 228 sentences and granted 959 pardons;
Nixon commuted 63 sentences and granted 863 pardons; Ford commuted 27 sentences
and granted 381 pardons; and Carter commuted 32 sentences and granted 534 par-
dons. See id. (numbers of commutations include both commutations and fine remis-
sions). Until the Eisenhower Administration, each pardon grant was evidenced by its
own separate warrant signed by the President. President Eisenhower began the prac-
tice of granting pardons by the batch, through the device of a "master warrant" listing
all of the names of those pardoned, which also delegated to the Attorney General (or,
later, the Deputy Attorney General or Pardon Attorney) authority to sign individual
warrants evidencing the President's action. All but a few pardons today are granted
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regular basis through the year, evidence that the business of par-
doning was regarded as part of the ordinary housekeeping work of
the Presidency.33 More significantly, the percentage of pardon pe-
titions acted on favorably remained high, approaching or exceeding
thirty percent in every administration from Franklin Roosevelt's to
Jimmy Carter's. 34 Even the number of commutations remained
surprisingly high throughout this period, given the availability of
alternative early release mechanisms like parole.
During the Reagan Administration the number of clemency
grants each year began to dwindle, both in absolute terms and rela-
tive to the total number of applications acted on. President Rea-
gan pardoned a total of 393 individuals in eight years, compared to
the 534 pardoned by his predecessor in four, and commuted only
thirteen sentences. The percentage of Reagan's favorable actions
in pardon cases dipped to a low point for the century of twenty
percent, and his overall grant rate to thirteen percent. President
pursuant to such a master warrant, though commutations are generally evidenced by
separate warrants so that the prison warden can satisfy himself of the grant's
authenticity.
33. See WARRANTS OF PARDON, supra note 20. Until the Bush administration,
pardons were granted at periodic intervals throughout the year, with the exception of
the Nixon grants which came only at Christmas. President Bush issued very few
grants during his four years in office, but none at Christmas until the end of his term.
Most of President Clinton's pardons have been granted a day or two before
Christmas.
34. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY ACrIOINS
BY ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1996 (through Jan. 31, 1996) (Jan. 31, 1996); PRESIDEN-
TIAL CLEMENCY ACrIONS BY ADMINISTRATION AND RELIEF SOUGHT, 1969-1996
(through Jan. 31, 1996) (Jan. 31, 1996) [hereinafter, collectively, 1996 OPA CLEMENCY
ACTIONS]. Because statistics on the total number of clemency applications acted
upon were not compiled separately for pardons and commutations until 1967, it is
impossible to tell exactly what percentage of pardon petitions alone were granted
until the Nixon Administration. That said, Franklin Roosevelt granted 27.8% of all
clemency petitions acted upon during his tenure, Truman granted 41.5%, Eisenhower
granted 26.7%, and Kennedy granted 40.9%. (In light of the fact that Eisenhower
commuted only 47 sentences in eight years, it is likely that his 1110 pardons represent
more than 30% of the total number of pardon petitions acted on during his two
terms.) Nixon granted 51% of the pardon petitions acted on during his tenure, and
26.3% of pardon and commutation petitions combined; Ford granted 39% of pardon
petitions and 31.2% overall; and Carter granted 34% of pardon petitions and 21.6%
overall. See id.
35. See id. Often the commutation took the form of sentence modification to
make the petitioner eligible for parole, leaving the actual release decision up to the
Parole Commission. See, e.g., WARRANTS OF PARDON, supra note 20 (granting clem-
ency to Eileen Rock Lowe on October 27, 1983, for kidnapping, commuting the life
sentence to 21 years' imprisonment, "which will make her immediately eligible for
parole consideration"). Sometimes the sentence was reduced so as to make the recip-
ient eligible for mandatory release on parole, thereby ensuring his supervision for at
least some period of time after release.
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Bush granted even fewer pardons: his sixty-eight grants36 repre-
sented only seven percent of the pardon petitions acted on during
his four years in office. Factoring in his three commutations, his
overall grant rate is four percent. President Clinton's record at this
point in his presidency is about the same as that of President Bush:
during the seven years of his presidency, through the end of 1999,
he has pardoned 145 individuals, or about thirteen percent of those
whose pardon petitions were acted on during that period. 37 His
fifteen commutations38 and two fine remissions bring his overall
grant rate through the end of calendar 1999 to about 4.5%.
One might predict that the reduced likelihood of favorable ac-
tion on a clemency petition since the mid-1980s would be reflected
in a corresponding reduction in the number of annual clemency
filings. However, it appears that seekers after clemency remain
ever hopeful. Since the beginning of the Clinton administration the
rate of pardon filings has remained relatively steady at about 225
petitions each year, more than were filed annually during the Bush
administration and almost regaining the level of filings during Pres-
ident Reagan's second term.39 The number of commutation peti-
tions filed annually has increased dramatically during the Clinton
administration, up from about 150 each year during the Reagan
36. This figure does not count the six Iran-Contra grantees, who did not file appli-
cations with the Pardon Attorney and were pardoned by proclamation. See 1996
OPA CLEMENCY AcrnONS, supra note 34.
37. It is difficult to compare President Clinton's pardon grant rate with that of his
predecessors at this point in his term because of the large number of petitions filed
during his administration that have not yet been acted on. While in the recent past
the number of pardon cases carried over from year to year has tended to remain
relatively stable, since 1995 the number of pending pardon cases has grown each year
by about one hundred cases, so that 737 pardon cases awaited action in February,
2000. See OPA CLEMENCY ACrIONS, supra note 24.
38. Prior to the FALN commutations in 1999, President Clinton had granted only
three commutations: one in 1994 to Ernest Krikava, a Nebraska hog farmer sen-
tenced in 1993 to five months' imprisonment for perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding,
whose clemency petition had attracted intense media interest and support of family
farm groups; and two in 1995 to individuals convicted of drug trafficking offenses who
had cooperated with the government. One of these was made to Johnny Palacios,
sentenced in 1991 to 71 months' imprisonment for distribution of marijuana, whose
cooperation the court refused to recognize for jurisdictional reasons; and the other
was made to Jackie Trautman, sentenced in 1992 to 33 months' imprisonment (as re-
duced) for distribution of cocaine, whose cooperation had already earned her two
sentence reductions from the court on motion of the U.S. Attorney. See WARRANTS
OF PARDON, supra note 20.
39. See OPA CLEMENCY AcrIONS, supra note 24.
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and Bush administrations, to an average of 500 annually after
1992.40
B. Causes of Pardon's Decline
What lies behind the recent trend towards fewer pardons de-
scribed in the preceding section? As noted above, statistics on an-
nual clemency filings rule out a decline in demand, for there
appears to be no slackening of interest in obtaining either sentence
reduction or post-sentence relief. Indeed, there are few alternative
early release mechanisms available to most federal inmates,4' or
other means of relieving many of the civil disabilities resulting
from a conviction.42 Finally, the declining rate of pardoning is too
pronounced and too persistent to be the result of accident or coin-
cidence. So it is reasonable to conclude that the declining number
of clemency actions in recent years is the result of considered exec-
utive policy.
It has been suggested that pardon's modern "atrophy" is attribu-
table to changes in penal philosophy: initially, in the early part of
the twentieth century, "the rehabilitative ideal reduced the impor-
tance of pardons by giving their job to paroles and indeterminate
sentencing. '' 43 Later, in the 1970s, the "new retributivism" rejected
pardon as an unprincipled tampering with lawfully determined
40. Given the negligible number of commutations since 1980, it is fair to assume
that the increase in inmate petitions is attributable as much to the growth of the fed-
eral prison population and longer determinate sentences as to any realistic hope of
favorable action.
41. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for persons sentenced
after November 1, 1987, and provides only one avenue other than clemency by which
an inmate may gain release prior to expiration of sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (1987) (providing that inmates may seek early release from the
sentencing court, on motion of the Bureau of Prisons, "for extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons"). An analogous provision is available for inmates serving paroleable
sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (2000). The Bureau of Prisons uses these provi-
sions only in particularly extraordinary or compelling circumstances which could not
reasonably have been foreseen by the court at the time of sentencing, generally inter-
preted to mean when the inmate is terminally ill and close to death. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 571.60 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE SEN-
TENCING PROJECT (1998); OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
(1996); see also Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994) (holding that federal
felons may regain firearms privileges only through a federal restoration procedure,
which currently is limited to a presidential pardon).
43. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 83.
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penalties ("an unwelcome intrusion on an enlightened process"44 ).
However, while it is certainly correct that pardon has not played an
important role as a sentence reduction mechanism since the 1930s,
the pardon power thrived long afterwards in the federal system as a
means of relieving civil disabilities stemming from a conviction, of
recognizing and encouraging rehabilitation, and of signaling official
"forgiveness. '45  While retributivism may resist unprincipled ad-
justments to punishment, it cannot account for an unwillingness to
make merciful gestures that are largely symbolic. But now even
this "stripped down and hollowed out ' 46 form of clemency is
threatened with obsolescence, bespeaking an official unwillingness
to be merciful quite independent of a retributivist commitment to
just deserts and truth in sentencing.
It appears more likely that pardon's declining incidence since
1980 is attributable to the politics of crime control, a politics that
has produced some of the most potent and divisive electoral issues
of the last thirty years. Since the early 1980s, Republicans and
Democrats have competed for advantage in a "race to incarcer-
ate, 47 producing a "prison industrial complex" with a powerful in-
stitutional constituency.48 Politicians and bureaucrats alike have
been far more interested in feeding the front end of the justice sys-
tem through enacting more laws, hiring more prosecutors, and
building more prisons, than in helping people avoid becoming en-
meshed in the system in the first place, creating opportunities for
them to earn their way to freedom, or finding ways to encourage
44. Id. at 84; see also Rapaport, supra note 14, at 9 ("The neo-retributivist critique
of clemency reflects, reinforces and expands upon the impulse to improve if not per-
fect criminal justice by circumscribing discretion.").
45. See supra note 32.
46. MOORE, supra note 3, at 83.
47. Marc Mauer describes the interplay of crime and politics in the 1980s and
1990s. See MARC MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 56-
80 (1999); see also David Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719
(1999) (discussing the recent growth in U.S. prison populations). In 1997, former
President Jimmy Carter recalled that,
as a young Governor of Georgia, he and contemporaries like Reuben Askew
in Florida and Dale Bumpers in Arkansas had 'an intense competition' over
who had the smallest prison population. 'Now it's totally opposite, Mr.
Carter said. 'Now the governors brag on how many prisons they've built and
how many people they can keep in jail and for how long.
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, quoted in MAUER, supra, at 56.
48. Eric Schlosser describes this phenomenon as "a set of bureaucratic, political
and economic interests that encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regard-
less of the actual need." Eric Schlosser, The Prison Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 51, 54 (Dec. 1998).
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their reintegration into the community. It is hard to find a place
for pardon in a system with such priorities.
The process by which pardon came to be devalued in the federal
justice system was hastened by the Attorney General's decision in
the Reagan Administration to delegate authority to approve clem-
ency recommendations to the same subordinate official within the
Department of Justice who exercised day-to-day supervisory re-
sponsibility over federal prosecutions.4 9 This had important conse-
quences for the independence and integrity of the Department's
clemency program. Clemency recommendations prepared by the
Pardon Attorney no longer carried the symbolic and political
weight of the Attorney General's personal imprimatur, or reflected
the perspective of the Attorney General's dual role as chief law
enforcement officer and political adviser to the President. Rather,
they increasingly reflected the perspective of prosecutors, in policy
positions in Washington and in the field, who did not always have a
clear understanding of or appreciation for clemency. 0 In this envi
ronment, it did not take long for the Department's clemency pro-
49. See supra note 26. Since the late 1970s, the functions of reviewing the Depart-
ment's clemency recommendations and supervising federal prosecutions have been
performed by the same official, the Associate Attorney General for most of the 1980s
and the Deputy Attorney General since 1989. For most of this time that official has
either been a former prosecutor himself, or has had career prosecutors on his staff
review the clemency recommendations drafted by the Pardon Attorney. This has
tended to reinforce the traditional policy of giving substantial weight to the views of
the United States Attorney whose office prosecuted a clemency applicant in deciding
whether to recommend a case favorably. See, e.g., HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 123-28
n. 42 (citing Hearings on S.J. Res. 282, 67th Cong., Before the Joint Comm. on the
Reorganization of the Admin. Branch of Gov't, 68th Cong. 1 (1924) (statements of
Harry M. Daugherty and Rush L. Holland)); see also U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 1-
2.111 ("The views of the United States Attorney are given considerable weight in
determining what recommendations the Department should make to the President.").
50. See, e.g., Larry Margasak, Any Pardons Would Come After Election Day, Ob-
servers Say, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 18, 1988 ("the administration's use of career prosecu-
tors to screen pardon requests has 'resulted in a natural inclination for tighter
scrutiny"' (quoting Deputy Associate Attorney General William Landers)). It may
be presumed that the Department's pardon program suffered in the early years of the
Reagan administration because of the President's decision, only a few weeks after
taking office, to abort through a preemptive pardon the Justice Department's prose-
cution of two FBI officials convicted of authorizing illegal "black bag jobs," report-
edly without notifying the prosecutors or involving the Attorney General. See Pardon
for W. Mark Felt & Edward S. Miller, Statement of the President, 17 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 437 (Apr. 15, 1981) (generosity due "two men who acted on high principle
to bring an end to terrorism that was threatening our nation"); see also REPORT OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE, REC. Ass'N B. N.Y.C., The Felt-Miller Presidential
Pardon, Oct. 1981, at 411, 414. In 1983, the Office of the Pardon Attorney was relo-
cated from downtown Washington to Chevy Chase, Maryland.
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gram to become an extension of its "tough on crime" law
enforcement agenda.
Particularly during the latter part of the Bush administration, an
unofficial policy of parsimony in pardoning was firmly in place at
the Justice Department, as the war on crime went into high gear.
The Willie Horton episode was a lively reminder of the possibility
of embarrassment or worse if a recipient of clemency turned out to
be less than deserving. 51 During the first years of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, the determination of the White House not to cede
anything to the political opposition on crime issues virtually as-
sured prosecutors' continued influence over the pardon program in
the Department.5 Over time, standards for recommending a case
for pardon were set higher and the review process became more
rigorous, 53 resulting in a corresponding drop in the number of par-
don cases sent forward to the White House for favorable action.
As for commutation petitions, it was generally anticipated that
most would be summarily recommended for denial. In these cir-
cumstances, absent an independent interest at the White House in
the routine work of pardoning, it was inevitable that the number
and frequency of ordinary clemency grants would steadily decline.
51. See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA:
HOW THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995). Another
danger was that a particular grant might be distorted and give a mistaken impression
of the Administration's commitment to crime control. For example, after President
Bush pardoned a particularly deserving and well-known individual who had been con-
victed of a minor marijuana possession offense thirty years before, the grant was char-
acterized as "especially ironic, given the administration's current push to enact
tougher penalties on drug offenders .... " Tom Watson, In Rare Move, Bush Pardons
Drug Offender; Civic Service, Campaign Win Forgiveness for Harlem Globetrotter,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1; see also Pardon Me, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996
(quoting Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa,: "I don't know how you can champion yourself in
the debate on drug use when you pardon drug dealers.").
52. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., All the President's Pardons: The Real Scandal, NAT'L J.,
Oct. 30, 1999, at 3116. ("Clinton's neglect of his pardon power apparently derives
from the same determination to out-tough the Republicans on crime that explains his
support for draconian mandatory minimum prison sentences.").
53. See, e.g., Pete Earley, Presidents Set Own Rules on Granting Clemency, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 1984, at A17 (Pardon Attorney David Stephenson reports that his
office has become more "exacting" in its scrutiny of pardon applications, "to better
reflect the administration's philosophy toward crime."). Deputy Associate Attorney
General William Landers also states that
It's not enough that someone convicted does not commit another offense
and is gainfully employed .... There has to be extraordinary conduct after
conviction that shows they contributed to the community in a unique or sig-
nificant fashion, such as charitable contributions or community volunteer
work - something that shows they have gone the extra mile over what an
ordinary citizen may do.
Margasak, supra note 50.
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Based on the number of pardons granted by President Clinton in
the first six years of his tenure, one might predict that his overall
pardoning record would be about the same as President Bush's.
However, there have recently been some hopeful signs that he is
interested in exploring both the justice-dispensing and symbolic as-
pects of clemency. Perhaps most significantly, President Clinton
justified his 1999 FALN grants in retributivist terms by reference to
the disproportionate prison terms involved. 4 In addition, he is-
sued three pardons in 1999 and early 2000 whose evident purpose
was to correct a miscarriage of justice. One of these was an unprec-
edented posthumous grant to Henry Flipper, the first African-
American graduate of West Point, whose 1881 court martial had
long been officially acknowledged as unwarranted and unfair.
54. See FALN Letter, supra note 5, at 2 ("[T]he prisoners were serving extremely
lengthy sentences - in some cases 90 years - which were out of proportion to their
crimes."); see also id. at 3 ("For me, the question . . . was whether the prisoners'
sentences were unduly severe and whether their continuing incarceration served any
meaningful purpose."). This letter also made reference to the "worldwide support"
for clemency in the cases on "humanitarian grounds." Id. at 2 (quoting letters from
President Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Coretta Scott King). Presi-
dent Carter reportedly had written that each individual recipient of clemency had
"spent many years in prison, and no legitimate deterrent or correctional purpose is
served by continuing their incarceration." Id. Bishop Tutu and Mrs. King were said
to have sought clemency because the prisoners "have spent over a decade in prison,
while their children have grown up without them." Id. Cognizant of the political
furor stirred up by the grants, President Clinton emphasized that "political considera-
tions played no role" in his decision or in the decision-making process. Id. at 4. Doc-
uments subsequently released to the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that law
enforcement agencies had opposed clemency, and that the Department of Justice had
at least initially recommended against it. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee Concerning Clemency for FALN Members, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 1999
WL 27595875 (Oct. 20, 1999) (statement of Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen.). As
noted previously, the clemency decision proved extremely controversial, and its mer-
its were debated in the press for a number of weeks. See, e.g., Editorial, Puerto Rican
Clemency, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1999, at A36 ("It was perhaps inevitable that Mr.
Clinton's action should be assessed through the prism of New York politics, but it is
also unfortunate. Whatever the President's motives, the case for clemency is
strong.").
55. See Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon
of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251 (1999). The Flipper grant was
unprecedented because it had long been the Pardon Attorney's policy not to accept or
process posthumous pardon applications, in reliance on Supreme Court precedent
analogizing a pardon to a "deed" that must be accepted. However, Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder is reported to have explained that "[t]he Justice Department's
recommendation was up to him ... and he favored it." Elizabeth Amon, The Pro
Bono Pardon: How Arnold and Porter Cleared a Man's Name a Century Later, NAT'L
L. J., June 28, 1999, at Al, col. 2. In their brief in support of the pardon application,
lawyers for the Flipper family noted that the stigma of Lt. Flipper's conviction had
discouraged inclusion of his statute in a "Walk of History" under consideration by the
City of El Paso. Jackson et al., supra, at 1264. They urged that pardon be granted to
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Another was a grant to Freddie Meeks, one of two surviving mem-
bers of a crew of African-American sailors convicted of mutiny in
connection with a racially charged incident at the Port Chicago Na-
val Magazine during World War 11.56 The third significant pardon,
also in a case with racial overtones, was granted to Preston King,
an African-American who had lived in self-imposed exile for al-
most four decades after his 1961 conviction in Georgia for draft
evasion.57
The FALN grants recognize the hardships imposed by prison
sentences whose length is disproportionate to the crime, while the
three pardons recognize the hardships imposed by the lingering
legal disabilities and stigma of a criminal conviction. Perhaps the
spirit of humanity and reconciliation that motivated these well-re-
remove "the unjust blot upon his outstanding reputation and character," for "Lieu-
tenant Flipper and his descendants, for the good of the military justice system, and for
the good of our country.. ." Id. at 1291. At the White House ceremony at which the
pardon was granted, President Clinton stated that "This good man has now com-
pletely recovered his good name." Id. at 1254. Deputy Attorney General Holder
stated in a subsequent interview that "'This has resonance beyond this case, beyond
Lt. Flipper . . . . What happened to him was really troubling - it was racism."'
Amon, supra, at A14.
56. While the pardon warrant in the Meeks case does not explicitly refer to the
reason for clemency, it is significant that his case was singled out from other pardons
granted on the same day for special treatment in a separate and unusually detailed
warrant. See Executive Grant of Clemency to Freddie Meeks (Dec. 23, 1999). Press
accounts of the pardon reported that "a legal review of the case by the Navy in 1994
found that the black sailors were the victims of racial prejudice," and that
"[1]awmakers, veterans' groups and the NAACP had urged Clinton to grant the par-
don." Associated Press, President Pardons Veteran Convicted in 1944 Mutiny, WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 1999, at A4. See also Editorial, The President's Pardons, WASH. POST,
Dec. 27, 1999 ("the pardon is recognition that the conviction was a terrible injustice").
One of the effects of the pardon was to restore Meeks' military benefits. See Associ-
ated Press, President Pardons Veteran, supra.
57. According to press accounts, King refused to report for induction after his all-
white draft board in Georgia refused to renew his student deferment, on grounds that
the board had treated him in a racially discriminatory fashion. He was sentenced in
1961 to 18 months in prison on a conviction for draft evasion, but fled the country
while on bail and returned to England where he had been pursing graduate studies at
the London School of Economics. At the time of his pardon he was a professor of
political theory at the University of Lancaster and father of a British Member of Par-
liament. In support of pardon, the sentencing judged acknowledged that King had
been subjected to a "long-lasting, deeply rooted method of racial discrimination," and
that he had "followed his conscience just as Rosa Parks had followed hers." Philip
Shenon, Pardon Lets Black Exile Come Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A12;
Reuters, Black Professor Pardoned in 1961 Draft Board Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2000, at A2. King's application for pardon was supported by the NAACP and several
human rights groups. The White House noted that the clemency process had been
expedited to permit Dr. King to return to the United States for his brother's funeral,
out of "humanitarian concerns." Id.
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ceived pardon grants, coupled with optimism over the "lowest
crime rate in thirty years, 58 will inspire the President to look care-
fully at some of the less visible cases that have historically consti-
tuted the vast majority of clemency applicants.
C. The President's Duty to Pardon
1. Pardon as Public Mercy
The fact that there have been so comparatively few pardons
since 1980 invites speculation about whether the President might
decide to stop pardoning entirely, simply letting the power lapse.
This in turn raises the questions whether the President has any duty
to pardon, and what the source of such a duty might be. Judicial
precedent is not very helpful in providing answers to these ques-
tions: on the one hand, the courts describe pardon as a "part of the
Constitutional scheme" to be exercised for the "public welfare; 59
on the other, they call it "a matter of grace" that need not be justi-
fied or defended within the legal system.60 While pardon's "pub-
lic welfare" aspect might support an argument that the President
has some obligation to "afford relief from undue harshness or
evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal
law,"' 6' its "grace" aspect points the other way, indicating that
an individual is not entitled to a pardon in the same sense that
he is entitled to receive a just punishment. Therefore, while the
President may not be entirely free of constitutional constraints
58. Marc Lacey, Clinton Isn't Running for Office, But He Has a Lot to Say About
the Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A18 (quoting the President at his news confer-
ence on February 16, 2000).
59. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) ("A pardon in our day is not a
private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the
Constitutional scheme. When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate author-
ity that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judg-
ment fixed." (citing In re Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120, 121 (1925))). In Perovich, the
Court upheld the President's authority to commute the death sentence of a convicted
murderer, over the objections of the purported beneficiary of the grant: "Just as thp
original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and
in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, and not his
consent determines what shall be done." Perovich, 274 U.S. at 485.
60. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 282, 285 (1998).
Where the federal pardon power is concerned, the courts have consistently declined
to limit its exercise; see, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264-66 (1974) (upholding
President's right to commute a death sentence conditional upon service of life without
parole); cf. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1915) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may not be overcome by device of
preemptive pardon).
61. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120-21.
1500
PRESIDENT'S DUTY TO BE MERCIFUL
in his exercise of the power,62 it seems clear that he cannot be
legally compelled to grant a pardon even in case of "evident mis-
take. "63
Nor would one expect to find much support for a duty to pardon
in prevailing theories of punishment, which presume that the law
reflects society's judgment about each person's "just deserts." In-
deed, the conventional retributivist view of pardon is as something
akin to a gift, and thus inconsistent with justice.64 Recently, how-
ever, concern over statutory limitations on flexibility and discretion
in sentencing has given rise to new interest in pardon as a neces-
sary (though extraordinary) means of adjusting an imperfect legal
system. In her influential 1989 monograph, Kathleen Dean Moore
looks to pardon to compensate for the absence of a mechanism in
the law whereby punishments can be individualized.65 She posits a
distinction between legal liability and moral desert, urging that
punishments be at least partially uncoupled from a legal frame-
work and tested against a set of retributivist categories such as in-
nocence and excuse. In this fashion, she argues, pardon can be
applied systematically to make exceptions to the rules "when the
62. The Supreme Court has recently indicated that the Due Process Clause applies
to the clemency process, although the level of protection it provides may be minimal.
See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 282-85. In Woodard, the justices split 5-4 on the issue
whether a clemency applicant is constitutionally entitled to due process, with the mi-
nority taking the position that clemency is "a matter of grace" entirely outside of the
judicial process. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 282, 285. Of the five who thought some pro-
cess was due, four thought it minimal: the governor could not "flip[ ] a coin," or
"arbitrarily den[y] a prisoner any access to its clemency process." Id. at 289
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, took the position that Ohio's creation of mandatory clemency application and
review procedures made it part of the adjudicative process and thus fully amenable to
judicial oversight. See id. at 292-93 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Court did not decide the question whether clemency proceedings might be
subject to the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 276. Justice Stevens noted, how-
ever, that "no one would contend that a governor could . . . use race, religion, or
political affiliation as a standard for granting or denying clemency." Id. at 292 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. This is not to say that the President may not have a legally enforceable duty to
consider granting clemency. It is simply to say that his decision on the merits is not
subject to judicial review, except perhaps on Equal Protection grounds. See id.
64. Jeffrie Murphy notes Immanuel Kant's view that "[tlhe right to pardon a crim-
inal, either by mitigating or by entirely remitting the punishment, is certainly the most
slippery of all the rights of the sovereign. By exercising it he can demonstrate the
splendor of his majesty and yet thereby wreak injustice to a high degree." IMMANUEL
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 107-08 (J. Ladd trans., 1965), quoted in
Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 174 n.9 (1988).
65. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 128-29.
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general presumptions are defeated by exceptional circumstan-
ces."
66
Consistent with her retributivist model, however, Moore concep-
tualizes pardon as "an act of justice rather than an act of mercy. 67
If a just system is obligated to punish each person the same as
others similarly situated, and pardon is a way of assuring that each
person receives the punishment he deserves, then each morally de-
serving person who has not received a just punishment deserves a
pardon. And, if a person deserves a pardon in this sense, then
there is a corresponding duty to give him one. Thus, she argues,
"pardons are not discretionary. ' 68 It follows that, as a matter of
fairness, a pardon would have to be given to all similarly situated
and presumably equally deserving individuals. In effect, Moore
would have pardon function as an adjunct of the legal system, if not
to replicate it at least continually to correct its outcomes.
Moore's effort to justify clemency on retributivist grounds neces-
sarily devalues its historical association with compassion and re-
demption, making it substantively indistinguishable from justice.
This in turn has procedural implications that would convert clem-
ency proceedings into "judicial courts of last resort. '69 If pardon is
a nondiscretionary duty of justice, its administration necessarily re-
quires the establishment of a full-blown executive apparatus for
making judgments about "just deserts" in individual cases that par-
allels the judicial system, and that is grounded in clearly articulated
standards and supported by procedural protections, such as the giv-
ing of reasons and the right to appeal.70 At the very least, such a
66. Id.
67. Id. at 129. See also id. at 213 ("a justified pardon is one that corrects injustice
rather than tempers justice with mercy").
68. Id. at 214.
69. Rapaport, supra note 14, at 21. Professor Rapaport disagrees with Moore's
reduction of clemency "to a type of remedial justice," and urges a greater use of "dis-
cretionary lenity" in accordance with justice-based norms as well as "the storehouse
of traditional nonretributivist justifications for clemency," like post-conviction reha-
bilitation and heroism. Id. at 19, 27-30. See also Michael A. G. Korengold et al., And
Justice for Few: The Collapse of the Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20
HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 366 (1996) ("clemency is necessarily and properly separate
from the judicial system" and "may be granted on different factors than those consid-
ered in appellate review").
70. Daniel Kobil develops the administrative implications of Professor Moore's
theory of clemency-as-justice by proposing to place clemency's "justice-enhancing"
functions in "a professional board that is independent of the political pressures which
inevitably distort the decisions of elected officials." Kobil, supra note 3, at 622. In
making decisions about the mitigation of punishment, his "clemency commission"
would be guided by "explicit, internally consistent standards," and operate pursuant
to a full panoply of due process protections, including the giving of reasons and an
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duplicative system would be highly inefficient, unless pardon were
somehow co-opted into functioning as part of the legal system, as it
does in the military and in some states.71 Of greater concern, this
"bureaucratization of the clemency power" 72 would sacrifice ex-
actly those qualities that commended pardon to the framers: quick
action, broad discretion, and personal accountability to the
electorate.73
A sounder philosophical justification for pardon, one that pro-
vides support for Moore's notion of executive duty without major
revisions in pardon's historical character, has been suggested by
Jeffrie Murphy. Murphy grounds pardon squarely and exclusively
in the concept of mercy, which in his view is an "autonomous moral
virtue" entirely separate from justice.74 A private individual shows
mercy when she voluntarily, out of compassion, waives a right to
impose a penalty, a right that could in justice be claimed. Extrapo-
lating from this private law paradigm, Murphy finds a justification
for pardon as a collective exercise of mercy by the community as a
whole, through its chief executive:
If each citizen can justly exercise mercy individually when his
individual interests are at issue, why may not all citizens justly
join together and exercise mercy collectively when their collec-
tive interests are at issue? And if they may do this by statute,
may they not call on the governor to pardon? And if they may
opportunity to be heard, similar to those applicable in "the analogous release proce-
dure of the parole process." Id. at 624, 634. In this fashion "[tihe extrajudicial correc-
tive of clemency provides a safety valve for our criminal justice system, another
opportunity for an offender to tell her story more thoroughly, or at least differently,
than she could at trial." Id. at 613.
71. See Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive
Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413 (1999); THE NAT'L GOVERNORS' Ass'N
CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERI-
CAN STATES (1988) [hereinafter GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY]. In Georgia, for
example, an inmate who is not eligible for parole may seek administrative early re-
lease by pardon from the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. See id., at 59-61.
72. Rapaport, supra note 14, at 37.
73. See supra notes 11-13.
74. See HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 175; see also Jean Hampton, The
Retributive Idea, in HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 158-59 ("mercy is the
suspension or mitigation of a punishment that would otherwise be deserved as retri-
bution, and which is granted out of pity for the wrongdoer"); cf. Carla A.H. Johnson,
Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 LAW & PHIL. 109, 116-17 (1991)
("to eliminate the concept of legal mercy ... because it is in most cases a means of
doing justice is to ignore the message of history .... It is precisely because the law
defines justice narrowly, limiting power before the law to the institutional power of
entitlements and rights, that it can require genuine mercy to achieve genuine
justice.").
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call on the governor to pardon in a particular case, may they not
simply delegate to the governor ... the power to exercise mercy
on their behalf whenever he believes that they would, out of
love and compassion, so desire - even if they have not peti-
tioned and even if they are not unanimous on the issue?75
Murphy does not suggest that an individual is entitled to mercy, or
that an official with power to show mercy may be under any obliga-
tion to do so. To the contrary, he is careful to distinguish between
the discretionary decision to pardon that is reposed in a head of
state, usually by some organic document, from the nondiscretion-
ary legal duty of justice owed by a prosecutor, judge, or parole
board.76
By conceptualizing mercy as separate from, rather than a subset
of justice, Murphy avoids most issues of individual entitlement.
Yet his mercy is not a "free gift or act of grace."77 He argues that
mercy "must not be arbitrary or capricious but must rather rest
upon some good reason - some morally relevant feature of the
situation that made the mercy seem appropriate."'78 Where public
mercy or pardon is concerned, "good reason" may be determined
not simply by reference to what an individual morally deserves, but
also by what serves the public welfare:
The "job description" [of a chief executive] may ... involve a
concern for the common good or common welfare of the com-
munity in the executive's care. This might mean that, in deciding
whether to pardon an individual, the chief executive (unlike a
trial judge) might legitimately draw upon values other than the
requirements of justice and thus might legitimately ignore the
just deserts of an individual and pardon that individual if the
good of the community required it.79
75. HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 177-78 (emphasis in original).
76. See id. at 173-74 ("Judges in criminal cases are obligated to do justice. So too,
I would argue, are prosecutors and parole boards in their exercise of discretion. Thus
there is simply no room for mercy as an autonomous virtue with which their justice
should be tempered."); see also id. at n.8 ("The focus of a judge, either in enforcing a
rule or in seeking a way to modify or get around it, is to be on the question of what is
required by justice - not on what he may be prompted out of compassion to do.").
Murphy's rejection of mercy in what he describes as the "criminal law paradigm" has
sometimes been misunderstood as a rejection of mercy itself. See Joan H. Krause,
Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women
Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 748-49 (1994); Rapaport, supra note 14, at 20.
77. See HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 180.
78. Id. at 181.
79. Id. at 174 n.9.
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In short, in making pardon decisions the chief executive may look
to "the requirements of justice," but he may also ignore those re-
quirements and grant a pardon for "the good of the community."
Moreover, Murphy argues that mercy is not constrained by prin-
ciples of fairness in the same way that justice is, because it is en-
tirely voluntary and, in the case of public mercy, because it has a
political dimension. For example, mercy "is more likely to be
needed by the poor and weak than by the rich and powerful."80
There is also a pragmatic reason why mercy is not constrained by a
conventional obligation to be even-handed: "[I]f rational persons
thought that once having shown mercy they would be stuck with
making a regular practice of it, they might be inclined never to
show it at all." 81
Murphy does not elaborate on what standards ought to guide the
exercise of the pardon power within the general parameters of mo-
rality and the common good. It is reasonable to suppose that, with
one caveat, he would consider them best left to the discretion of
the executive who has been popularly chosen to be the "dispenser
of the mercy of the government."82 The caveat is that it would be
inappropriate and perhaps an abuse of power to withhold mercy in
a case where moral desert had been established (proof of inno-
cence comes to mind as an obvious example), whatever public sen-
timent might be. On the other hand, a gesture of mercy could be
appropriate simply because it would be popular, thus satisfying a
felt need in the community to alleviate a legally determined pun-
ishment in a particular case, or across the board.
To summarize, Murphy sees pardon as a manifestation of public
mercy that has a legitimate role in a retributivist legal system, to
override the law where its outcome is unjust or where the common
welfare otherwise requires it. Thus Murphy might elaborate on
Hamilton to advise the President that he is empowered to make
"exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt," but ordinarily is not
obliged to - except in cases where a compelling moral claim has
been established. He might also suggest that pardon decisions will
ordinarily be guided by considerations of moral relevance, but
80. Id. at 182.
81. Id. at 183.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 8, at 423. One might predict a certain
amount of discomfort with this idea in an age where we tend to distrust both discre-
tionary decision-making and our elected leaders. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 3, at 614
("Unfortunately, both justice-enhancing and justice-neutral aspects of clemency suffer
when the executive has recourse only to her own moral and political sensibilities in
making clemency decisions.").
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need not be if the welfare of the community provides an alternative
justification. Finally, he might tell the President that he ordinarily
has no duty to treat like cases alike.83
2. The Political Duty to Pardon
In Murphy's theory of public mercy, there is generally no incon-
sistency between pardon as an uncompelled "matter of grace,"'
and pardon as an authoritative act that is "part of the constitutional
scheme." This theory thus reconciles seemingly contradictory
Supreme Court precedent and provides a coherent framework for
analyzing particular exercises of the pardon power. It also pro-
vides the basis for an argument that the President has a duty to
pardon, not just where moral desert has been established in a par-
ticular case, but also as a more general obligation of office. This
latter aspect of the duty to pardon is neither grounded in nor lim-
ited by considerations of law or morality, but is essentially one of
politics.
The political duty to be merciful "if the good of the community
require[s] it" may be inferred from the several ways in which par-
don helps the President carry out his other constitutional duties.
First, pardon serves the purpose of checking the legislature when
the criminal law is static and inflexible, by signaling the need for
changes in the law itself.8 5 Thus, for example, the President's deci-
83. While there is no duty to pardon all similarly situated offenders, absent simi-
larly compelling moral claims, the pardon power may not be exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Murphy seems to equate an "act of grace" and a "free gift," see Murphy, supra
note 64, at 180, but I would argue that they should be conceptually distinguished, at
least insofar as pardon is concerned. Pardon may be an "act of grace" in the eyes of
the law, but it is not a "free gift" as a political matter because it is subject to standards
of moral relevance and the public welfare.
85. See SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 1, at 295-96:
[Pardon] has been the tool by which many of the most important reforms in
the substantive criminal law have been introduced. Ancient law was much
more static and rigid than our own. As human judgment came to feel that a,
given legal rule, subjecting a person to punishment under certain circum-
stances, was unjust, almost the only available way to avoid this rule was by
pardon... Quickly pardons on such grounds became a matter of course; and
from there to the recognition of such circumstances as a defense was only a
short step. This is what happened with self-defense, insanity, and infancy, to
mention only three examples.
Id. This law reform function is consistent with the retributivist theory that the need
for pardon provides a rough assessment of the moral legitimacy of the law. See
MOORE, supra note 3, at 129 ("If pardons grew to an unmanageable number, one
would have to be suspicious that the legal codes were seriously out of kilter with the
moral code."); Rapaport, supra note 14, at 39-40 (while clemency is "ill-suited as a
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sion to commute a sentence mandated by the terms of a statute,
based on his conclusion that the punishment was disproportion-
ately harsh in light of all the circumstances (including some that the
law could not take into account), might encourage legislative in-
quiry into the possible need for changes in the law to allow individ-
ual circumstance to be considered.86 A grant of clemency might
also reveal shortcomings in the appeals process that limit a court's
ability to consider new evidence or changed circumstance. But, be-
cause pardon is a political duty and not a duty of justice, the Presi-
dent would be under no obligation to grant clemency to all
offenders with arguably similar equitable claims.
Pardon also serves as an executive check on courts' discretionary
decisions.87 While much of the current interest in federal clemency
arises precisely from the limits on judicial discretion imposed by
the federal sentencing guidelines and statutory mandatory mini-
mum sentences, it is possible that an act of executive mercy might
lead a court to rethink its own discretionary powers and interpret
them more broadly.
Within the executive branch, pardon can play an important role
in carrying out the President's obligation to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed in two ways. First, it enables the President
to intercede directly to change the outcome of a case that he be-
lieves was wrongly handled by his subordinates, where no judicial
remedy is available.88 Second, it permits him to send a very direct
and powerful message to his subordinates about how he wishes the
means to overcome wholesale legislative failures," it "may play a role in reopening
channels of politics to systemic reform").
86. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 76, at 719-42 (discussing relationship between gu-
bernatorial clemency actions and legislatively authorized reviews and releases for bat-
tered women unable to offer battering defenses at the time of their trials).
87. See In re Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925) (justifying pardon on grounds,
among others, that "[tlhe administration of justice by the courts is not always wise or
certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt."). The par-
don power also came into play as a check on the power of the court-appointed In-
dependent Counsel in the Iran-Contra cases. See supra note 20.
88. See Thomas E. Sharp, The President's Policy Pardon: A Misunderstood Tool
of Presidential Decision-Making 26-33 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Sharp argues that the pardon power gives the President an ability to control
discretionary decisions of prosecutors that become legally irreversible before he is
aware of them. See id. at 30 (citing Attorney General William Randolph, Am. State
Papers, Misc. I, 46, No. 26 (1791)) ("[I]t may frequently arise that the United States
may be deeply affected by various proceedings in the inferior courts, which no appeal
can rectify."); see also Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforce-
ment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286-87 (1989). The inherent difficulty of supervising the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion has become a matter of greater concern because
of the number of federal prosecutions that result in guilty pleas, and the dislocations
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law to be enforced in the future, including in particular the manner
in which they should exercise their discretion.
Finally, the President's personal intervention in a case through
the pardon power reassures the public that the legal system is capa-
ble of just and moral application. It enables him to correct legal
errors that for one reason or another could not be corrected by the
courts, and to make equitable accommodation where a sentence
has been imposed according to the strict requirements of the law
but nonetheless seems unfair.89 It is especially important that the
public be confident in clemency as the "fail safe" of the justice sys-
tem in capital cases, which are now moving forward through the
federal system for the first time in many years.' At the other end
of the clemency spectrum, the President can use the opportunity
provided by post-sentence pardons to emphasize the rehabilitative
goals of the justice system by recognizing criminal justice success
stories.
The President's duty to pardon does not arise from any single
one of these "public welfare" grounds for pardon, but from a com-
bination of them all. And it is a duty that resists quantification, or
enforcement in any court other than that of public opinion. The
point is simply that if the President neglects the pardon power,
public confidence in it may be so undermined as to make it con-
structively unavailable to serve the benign purposes the framers
envisioned for it. In this way, failure to exercise the power may
have the same consequence as abusive exercise. Conversely, a gen-
erous and regular exercise of the power in circumstances evidently
warranting it, provides the President with an unparalleled opportu-
nity not simply to do justice in particular cases, but also to set an
in discretionary decision-making that have been produced by the federal sentencing
guidelines. See K. ST'ITH & J. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 130-42 (1998).
89. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 1, at 299 (enumerating situa-
tions in which clemency in the form of commutation may be appropriate, including
those involving "calm second judgment after a period of war hysteria, during which
persons were given very severe sentences for political offenses later realized to have
been very minor; "changed public opinion after a period of severe penalties against
certain conduct which is later looked upon as much less criminal, or as no crime at
all," citing prohibition as an example; and "[tiechnical violations leading to hard
results").
90. See Naftali Bendavid, Clinton Won't Follow Illinois on Executions, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 17, 2000, at 1; see also Excerpts from Clinton's Comments at Wide-Ranging News
Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A19 ("We are ... in the process of develop-
ing guidelines for clemency applications [in capital cases] where any individual claims
of innocence or question [about] the sentence, even though guilt is not a question, can
be pressed.").
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example for his appointees in the executive branch, for the other
branches of government, and for the public.
D. Reviving the Power
In this final section I propose a number of simple ways in which
the President can make his exercise of the pardon power more reli-
able and respectable, and therefore less politically risky. I do not
recommend that he attempt to insulate himself from public criti-
cism by establishing advisory boards and elaborate administrative
structures, since these tend to defeat the very virtues of the power
that the framers most valued: efficiency, discretion, and accounta-
bility.91 Nor do I think he should necessarily feel constrained to
explain himself or be consistent, which would be required of a deci-
sion-maker within a legal system, for the same reasons. 92 But there
are other ways he can reassure the public that the power is being
used wisely and for the general welfare.
1. Shore up the Attorney General's Advisory Role
Historically, the President has relied on the Attorney General
for advice in pardon cases, and this has afforded him the combined
91. See SANFORD, supra note 14 (discussing the "lonely" situation of the par-
doner); see also EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A
GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row 163 (1989) ("It was an awesome, ultimate
power over the lives of others that no person or government should have, or crave.").
Professor Rapaport observes that:
most state executives and the national executive are cautious compared to
their predecessors earlier in the century . . . . From the beginning of the
century through the 1960s, a rhetoric of claiming responsibility for the final
decision to execute or commute, to confine or release, came naturally to
governors. The governor of today is more likely to portray himself as bound
to respect the decision of a jury, the due process of trial and appellate courts,
and to heed obdurate victims.
Rapaport, supra note 14, at 5-6.
92. Professor Rapaport makes a compelling argument for a requirement that the
chief executive explain the reasons for each grant and denial of clemency: "Discre-
tion can give a better or worse account of itself; the body of cases and reasons ought
to exercise significant control over future practice. Such a record provides a basis for
criticism and even political repudiation of an executive." Rapaport, supra note 14, at
41. I do not disagree that full disclosure is often indispensable to full accountability.
Nor do I disagree that the executive should consider whether giving reasons for an act
of clemency will enhance the beneficial effects of the grant. But I am concerned that
there are also disadvantages of requiring the executive to give reasons in every case
that may outweigh the advantages, in constraining what Professor Rapaport calls "un-
ruly discretion" and ultimately discouraging its exercise. See also Wrong Way on Par-
dons, supra note 7 ("A bill that would diminish executive branch confidentiality
within the pardon process will only make presidents more wary of stepping into the
minefield that executive clemency has become.").
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perspective of law enforcement official and political adviser. The
President's acquiescence twenty years ago in the delegation of the
Attorney General's clemency-related responsibilities within the
Department of Justice meant that the advice he received was less
likely to reflect the views of a member of his Cabinet and more
likely to reflect those of prosecutors and other law enforcement
officials. It also left him without a high-level political appointee to
take some responsibility if a particular grant turned out to be ill-
advised or politically unpopular.
The Clinton administration also created substantive problems for
itself by undercutting the Justice Department's historically central
role in the clemency process.93 If the Attorney General is only one
of several possible sources of advice in clemency matters, and the
process is no longer a regular one, questions inevitably arise about
the relative importance of justice and politics in clemency decision-
making, and thus about the accessibility of official mercy to ordi-
nary people.
2. Be Generous and Expect No Credit
Generosity in extending mercy beyond the strict framework of
the law has been called "an important attitude of a healthy soci-
ety."' 94 Purely as a practical matter, a policy of generosity is likely
to be more effective than a policy of caution in avoiding unwar-
ranted criticism of particular grants. Until quite recently presidents
have been shielded from public criticism in connection with par-
doning by the frequency and regularity with which they acted on
pardon applications, as well as the sheer volume of their grants.
When the President signed a pardon warrant every couple of
months, granting relief to dozens of unknown "little people" sim-
ply because they had been recommended by the Attorney General,
he could credibly distance himself from the merits of any particular
93. See FALN Letter, supra note 5, at 4 (President's decision based on an in-
dependent investigation and recommendation of his White House Counsel). In rou-
tine responses to inquiries about the clemency process, the White House has stated
that it relies on advice from many quarters, including the Department of Justice, in
deciding whether to grant clemency. As a result of congressional concern over the
FALN grants, legislation was introduced to require the Justice Department to consult
with victims of crime and law enforcement agencies in connection with making a
clemency recommendation to the President. See § 2042, The Pardon Attorney Re-
form and Integrity Act, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 146 Cong. Rec. S538-05, 2000 WL
142206 (Feb. 9, 2000). The editors of the Washington Post opined that this bill might
encourage the President "to circumvent the Justice Department entirely." See Wrong
Way on Pardons, supra note 7.
94. SANFORD, supra note 14.
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case. But so few people have been pardoned in the past twenty
years that each new clemency action is regarded with suspicion and
subjected to intense scrutiny, no matter how apparently innocuous.
In any event, pubic criticism goes with the territory, as President
Clinton recognized in defending his FALN grants.95 It is never
possible to be absolutely certain about the wisdom of a particular
grant or the virtue of particular grantees, particularly given the de-
fining characteristic they share, but it is part of the President's job
to take risks in this regard. This means that he should decide cases
at a time when he can be held properly accountable for his actions,
and not at the very end of his term.96
3. Act First, Explain Later
Presidents have in the past acted on clemency cases without first
vetting them publicly, a practice which recent experience has
shown tends to bring the progress of a clemency case to a stand-
still.97 Where the White House calls attention to a clemency action
before it actually occurs or before it becomes final, a host of ques-
95. See FALN Letter, supra note 5, at 4.
Grants of clemency generate passionate views. In vesting the pardon power
in the President alone, the framers of our Constitution ensured that clem-
ency could be given even in cases that might be unpopular and controversial.
The history of our country is full of examples of clemency with which many
disagreed, sometimes fervently.
Id.
96. It is perhaps inevitable that a chief executive will be tempted to make pardon
grants just prior to leaving office, but it is equally inevitable that giving in to this
temptation tends to bring the power into disrepute. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 76,
at 721-25 (describing the furor resulting from the last-minute clemency actions of
Ohio Governor Celeste, which led to a 1995 amendment of the state constitution to
make the governor's clemency power subject to regulation). It is also true that there
have apparently been few instances of actual corruption in connection with the power.
See Rapaport, supra note 14, at 10 (noting that there were only two documented par-
don-selling scandals in the 20th century - one resulting in the 1920 impeachment of
Oklahoma Governor Walton, and the other resulting in the 1980 indictments of sev-
eral members of the administration of Tennessee Governor Blanton).
97. An example is the extensive media coverage during President Clinton's first
consideration of Jonathan Pollard's clemency petition. The Administration's appar-
ent attempt to take the public's pulse on the case back-fired when law enforcement
and intelligence agencies opposed to clemency took their own case to the media. See,
e.g., Michael Isikoff & Ruth Marcus, Justice's No. 2 Official May Propose Leniency for
Pollard, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1993, at A10; Barton Gellman, Aspin's Allegation
About Pollard Affects Clemency Campaign, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1993, at A6. In the
end the public opposition of senior administration officials, as well as the almost uni-
formly adverse reaction from the media, virtually foreclosed the President's ability to
act favorably, had he wished to do so. While clemency applicants and their supporters
often take their case to the media, problems of a different order are created when the
executive itself "goes public" prior to a grant. See also Krause, supra note 76, at 725
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tions arise that require prompt and thorough response lest the
power itself be compromised in the public eye. These questions are
much easier to answer after the fact. While the framers fully antici-
pated that clemency decisions would take into account popular
opinion, they would not likely have favored plebiscites even in this
context.
4. Make Considered Use of the Power in Light of Its
Public Purposes
The pardon power provides the President with an unparalleled
bully pulpit from which to speak about criminal law issues, large
and small, in the context of a specific fact situation. Issues that
come to mind include the harsh inflexibility of the drug sentencing
laws, the mandatory deportation of aliens convicted of minor and
sometimes dated offenses, the mitigating impact of domestic vio-
lence, and legislative curtailment of post-conviction judicial reme-
dies. But there are other less ambitious things that the pardon
power can accomplish, like recognizing and rewarding rehabilita-
tion, enabling individuals who have served enough time in prison
to return to their communities to make a new start (or, in case of
grave illness, to die at home with their families), or simply satisfy-
ing an individual's desire for an official gesture of forgiveness. It is,
in short, an effective way to shape criminal justice policy and tell
good news about the justice system at the same time.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that pardon will ever fade away entirely, even if the
criminal justice system could be made to work perfectly. Unlike
collar buttons, pardon will always be useful from a political stand-
point. But its current underutilization is disturbing, in light of the
mounting evidence that the justice system is not working perfectly,
or even close to it. The underutilization of pardon is disturbing
not so much because of its impact on disappointed individuals, but
because of what it reflects about the justice system and the message
it sends to those who administer it, as well as to the public. A
President's pardons say a lot about his priorities and overall goals
for the administration of justice. If rehabilitation and reconcilia-
tion are aspirations of government, pardon serves an important
symbolic purpose in marking a successful law enforcement effort.
(publicity surrounding Maryland Governor Schaefer's consideration of clemency for
battered women "almost stopped the 'mass' clemency in its tracks.").
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If, however, punishment is the primary objective, then it is unnec-
essary to be concerned about mercy or redemption, much less to
make a point of crediting them.98
The Constitution gives the President the power to pardon not as
a personal privilege but as an obligation of office. If he is willing
and able to use the power in the fashion envisioned by the framers,
courageously and creatively, he gains important opportunities to
signal the need for changes in the law, to set an example for discre-
tionary decision-making by his subordinates, and to shore up pub-
lic confidence in the overall morality of the criminal justice system.
98. Susan Bandes points out that "a legal process devoid of such 'soft' emotions
as compassion or mercy is not emotionless; it is simply driven by other passions."
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 11 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). The essays in this collection
describe some of those passions as vengeance, rage, contempt, disgust, and indigna-
tion - many of which seem to have gained a certain new legitimacy in the criminal
justice system. Perhaps it is not coincidental that mercy and compassion seem at the
same time to have lost their place as counterweights. Indeed, it may even be that
certain of the "hard" emotions have turned in judgment upon the "soft," so that
mercy is held in contempt and compassion looked on with indignation and disgust.
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FORGIVENESS AND PUBLIC TRUST
Linda Ross Meyer*
Gentlemen of the jury, if we convict and punish him, he will say
to himself: ... I am even, I owe them nothing now, and owe no
one anything forever and ever .... But do you want to punish
him fearfully, terribly, with the most awful punishment that
could be imagined, and at the same time to save him and regen-
erate his soul? If so, overwhelm him with your mercy! He will
be horror-stricken; he will be crushed by remorse and the vast
obligation laid upon him henceforth. And he will not say then,
"I am even," but will say, "I am guilty in the sight of all men and
am more unworthy than all."1
Is forgiveness a personal, emotional experience unfitted for the
public realm? Many have argued that only victims can forgive, and
that justice, respect for victims and'equal protection of the laws are
sacrificed when forgiveness overflows its smallish province. 2 I re-
spectfully disagree and venture to support the idea that forgiveness
is neither just personal, "merely" emotional, nor only private, but
that forgiveness grounds the basic trust that makes community
possible.
In order to understand why someone other than a direct victim
may forgive a wrong, it is important to look closely at our concept
of wrong itself, and to see that a wrong is public, not just private or
personal. Part I addresses this issue. Once wrong is understood as
the breach of a community bond, I undertake some explanation of
community, which is the subject of Part II. In Part III, I argue that
forgiveness should not only be understood as an emotional experi-
ence, but also as including cognitive and speech-act dimensions;
hence, forgiveness is not just a subjective emotional experience by
a particular victim. I explain why community members not only
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac Law School. I thank Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Neal Feigenson, Steve Latham, Jeff Meyer and Ron Olson for comments and sugges-
tions on earlier drafts, and I thank Dean Feerick, the members of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal, and the participants of The Role of Forgiveness in the Law Symposium
held on January 28, 2000 for enriching my understanding of forgiveness.
1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 710 (1976).
2. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
1-34; 162-86 (1988); Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); LEWIS B. SMEDES, THE ART OF FORGIVING 39
(1996).
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can, but ought to, forgive. I then sketch briefly the relationship of
this community forgiveness to punishment and (human) justice.
I. WHAT'S WRONG WITH WRONG
Relegating mercy or forgiveness to the private realm results in
part from assuming that crime wrongs only its direct victims (those
who suffer tangible pain or loss from the crime3), and that there-
fore only those direct victims have standing to seek redress or to
forgive. If the wrong of wrong, however, was limited to its tangible
effects on the victim - to its harm, that is - several rather strange
consequences would follow. First, there would be no wrong to vic-
tims who suffered no harm (no mental or physical pain). Even the
sense of insult, invasion and betrayal that accompanies otherwise
harmless or attempted crime, and hence differentiates crime from
misfortunes, would go unfelt by an infant, for example, or a men-
tally ill person. Taking candy from a baby would not only be easy,
it would be morally neutral. Second, wrong would be greater in
proportion to the harm done. Momentary negligence that caused
serious and permanent physical injury would be a greater wrong
than malicious but impotent racial animus.
Of course, we do believe that infants can be wronged, and we
grade crimes by the offender's mens rea, not the tort measure of
damages done. So what is wrong with wrong, if not the physical
and mental harm to the victim?
Another common but unworkable suggestion of what's wrong
with wrong is that it free-rides on the sacrifices of others.4 So un-
derstood, wrong does wrongs more than the direct victim because
it creates unfairness in the distribution of liberty. But this sugges-
tion would mean that the only community members who are
wronged are those who restrain their criminal impulses merely in
order to get the benefit of others' like restraint. Those who simply
have no criminal impulses in the first place would have no standing
to complain. In other words, only potential criminals would be
wronged by wrong.
The problem with the traditional theories of wrong is that they
rest on social contract premises, presuming that right is defined by
a social contract that answers the following question: why would
equal individuals associate and cooperate with each other? The
answer is always in terms of getting goods available only through
3. For an account of wrong that would ground such a view, see Heidi M. Hurd,
What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994).
4. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968).
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social cooperation (such as property or safety). Hence, wrong is
defined as maldistribution or individual loss. The problem lies with
the question, however - it assumes that we are individuals who
must be somehow bonded to each other.
If one assumes the other optional default position, i.e., that we
are already bonded,5 the question about wrong is asked differently.
The wrong of wrong is not harm to the victim as an individual, but
the breaking of trust with one's community and the injury to the
victim as a community member. The bonds between members of a
community are not tangible as physical injury or property loss, but
they are nonetheless real. As Hannah Arendt states:
The physical, worldly in-between along with its interests is
overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an altogether different
in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its ori-
gin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one an-
other. This second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since
there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; the
process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results
and end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is
no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common.
We call this reality the "web" of human relationships, indicating
by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality.6
Accordingly, Nietzsche7 (as well as Durkheim8 and Hegel9) saw
crime as the moment of the individual's emergence as an individ-
5. Other societies may understand this more deeply. For example, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu has explained the African concept of Ubuntu as the following:
It speaks about the essence of being human: that my humanity is caught up
in your humanity because we say a person is a person through other persons.
I am a person because I belong. The same is true for you. The solitary
human being is a contradiction in terms. That is why God could say to
Adam, "It is not good for man to be alone." No one can be fully human
unless he or she relates to others in a fair, peaceful, and harmonious way. In
our African understanding, we set great store by communal peace and har-
mony. Anything that subverts this harmony is injurious, not just to the com-
munity, but to all of us, and therefore forgiveness is an absolute necessity for
continued human existence.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Foreword to EXPLORING FORGIVENESS xiii (Robert D.
Enright & Joanna North eds., 1998).
6. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 182-83 (1958) (emphasis
omitted).
7. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 98-99 (R.J. Hollingdale
trans., 1896).
8. See DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 73-75 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds.,
1983); EMILE DURKHEIM, ON MORALITY AND SOCIETY 114-33 (Robert N. Bellah ed.,
1973).
9. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 99 (T.M. Knox trans., 1st ed.
1952). For full treatment of Hegel's understanding of punishment/sanction, see Phi-
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ual, as an entity separable and separate from the community, an
"outlaw," someone standing outside the law defining the
community. 10
Seeing the wrong of crime as a breach of public trust solves the
following puzzles:
1) Why do we care so much about mens rea?
We care because the guilty mind has set itself against, strayed
farther from, the norms of the community.
2) Why do we require public prosecutions?
We require them because the guilty person has betrayed us all
and broken the communal bonds.
3) Why do we understand wrong "objectively," as something
apart from the subjective experiences of crime victims (and hence
something that exists even when the victim is unaware of it)?
We understand wrong "objectively" because the wrong is in part
the breaking of the social bond, and the objective (that is, public)
disrespect shown to the victim (whether or not the particular victim
feels loss or pain, and whether or not the victim understands the
wrong as disrespectful).
Indeed, even the individual victim's experience of being wronged
is formed in part by public norms - what counts as insulting or
even assaultive behavior, what counts as theft, what counts as rape,
what counts as carelessness, what counts as the act of a "guilty
mind" rather than a mere misfortune are all public norms (imper-
fectly embodied in criminal and tort law). It is because the victim
is a member of a community that she sees herself as a victim of a
malicious or reckless act, rather than as a victim of circumstance or
bad fortune. Her trust and security are shattered precisely because
another community member has violated the expectations and
trust that are so basic to social interaction they become unspoken
expectations in any encounter with another.
lippe Nonet, Sanction, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 489 (1995); see also TRISHA OLSON, PUNISH-
MENT AS COMING HOME (1989) (unpublished paper on file with author, construing
Hegelian view of punishment as atonement).
10. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 7, at 98-99. Nietzsche celebrates the assertion of
free will that is implicit in the criminal act. The deep irony of crime is that it is in
rebellion against law/God that we actualize our individuality and experience a sense
of free will. We will to be gods unto ourselves - overcoming the conditioned nature
of our own finitude. The freedom we achieve, however, is only nihilistic negative
freedom - the destruction of the conditions of our being, doing, or thinking anything
at all. "The sole and desolate being of the wrong lies in the outcast existence of the
broken will, seeking itself in the night of its own self-estrangement, and crying the
word of despair in the work of wrong." Nonet, supra note 9, at 514-15.
1518
FORGIVENESS AND PUBLIC TRUST
IH. WHAT COMMUNITY BONDS?
We like to think that in our diverse world, we no longer have
community, and hence no basis for talking in terms of community
norms. Which community: the suburban, inner-city, African-
American, Catholic, gay, skin-head, survivalist or intellectual? We
have so many different cross-threads in our culture that we can
each define ourselves in myriad ways. I'm white, Midwestern, veg-
etarian, environmentalist, intellectual, Anglo, WASP, academic,
leftist, Lutheran, feminist, pro-family, straight, democratic, upper-
middle class, middle-aged, professional, small-town, Irish, married-
with-children, pro-gay, etc. There is no one community, and per-
haps even these labels describe only interest groups, not true
communities.
And yet, deep beneath the all-too obvious differences between
us, we share a great deal that goes unnoticed because it is assumed.
We speak similar languages that share deep roots and common an-
cestors. Our common linguistic heritage means that we share many
basic concepts, concepts that include understandings of meaningful
human action and basic norms of respect. Anthropology would not
be possible without these deepest of all commonalities - the abil-
ity (even need) to make sense of another's action as intentional
and meaningful, to recognize, as Kant would say,1' that we all are
creatures of reason.
The way we make sense of each others' actions lies deep in our
language and understanding of the world, given to us by a common
past. The post-modern discovery that we are "socially con-
structed" beings is now commonplace, usually asserted to under-
score cultural differences and distinctions, but it also entails that we
have a deep connection to each other - we already share lan-
guage, ways of thinking, ways of feeling, and ways of going on that
we were born into and that shape our human world. We may vary
in our expressions of respect, in the details of our expectations and
our norms, but we still share some bedrock.
From a "communitarian" standpoint, I have described a fairly
"thin" or "watered-down" community, a community that still con-
tains deep normative divisions. But this "deep community" is still
a very important, if not a very salient one, for it grounds our basic
intuitions about right and wrong, what counts as a human goal,
what counts as rational, and what counts as intelligible.
11. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE META-
PHYSIC OF MORALS 56-58 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1987).
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When we meet a stranger, we assume that stranger will make
sense. We must assume this in order to get the process of interpre-
tation off the ground.12 Part of "making sense" is having goals that
we can recognize as human goods, and part of making sense is fit-
ting into cultural "scripts" that we recognize. 13 We assume, at least
until we have evidence otherwise, that the stranger is not mali-
cious, is not crazy, and that we can communicate with him or her.
This is basic public trust. It is the necessary beginning for any
human interaction - buying a cup of coffee at McDonald's, walk-
ing across a street on a green light or taking a seat on a bus. More
personal relationships also build special trust, but the basic public
trust is necessary for simply leaving the house in the morning.
Do we really trust each other? What about the wary meeting of
black and white on a city street?' 4 The assumptions of bad faith in
a "high crime" area? 15 The discriminatory mistrust shown a black
woman by a Benetton store?' 6 How can I speak of public trust, or
single communities, in such a world?
I can speak of public trust in our world because we still think of
these scenarios as "problems" we would like to solve. We notice
them and dwell on them precisely because they "stick out" and are
salient. The background they stick out from is still trust, the taken-
for-granted trust that most of us operate with most of the time, the
trust we don't even notice. Next time you drive on the highway,
notice how much you trust the other drivers - to stay in their lane,
to go the right direction, to avoid radical changes of speed, not to
bump you off the road intentionally, etc.
12. See DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACrIONS AND EVENTS 221-23 (1980).
13. See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY
1-19 (1998).
14. See Jerome -McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and
Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 553 (1991)
(describing a black-white encounter and calling into question the application of tradi-
tional tort law concepts).
15. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676-77 (2000) (upholding a Terry-stop
based on "reasonable suspicion" when the police saw the defendant run away from
them in a "high crime" area). The Court said that running away in such a setting
could be enough for police to reasonably suspect a person of a crime. See id. The
dissent, by Justice Stevens, countered that those who live in high crime areas may
have innocent reasons to fear and flee the police, given the level of police harassment
and brutality, and the likelihood of being caught in the cross-fire of a violent situation.
See id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's assumption that the guilty are
more likely to flee the police than the innocent assumes a certain level of public trust;
the dissent questions that assumption. See id. at 679-80.
16. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-47 (1991)
(telling the story of her exclusion from a Benetton store).
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The more deeply a crime breaches basic public trust, the more
"strange," "inhuman" and "senseless" it seems. The criminal ap-
pears to stand out from the "rest of us" as incomprehensible, inas-
similable. We ask, why would anyone do this? The criminal is an
individual, an outlaw, a predator, 7 a monster, 8 a barbarian,1 9
outside the bounds of human comprehension and community. The
breach of public trust creates a chilling shiver of fear and insecurity
because it strikes at the very bonds that make it possible for us to
live together.
1I. REINTERPRETATION OF FORGIVENESSIMERCY
If a non-victim community member can forgive, forgiveness must
be more than the subjective emotional experience of overcoming
anger or resentment. I acknowledge that when a victim has the
courage and generosity to forgive a wrongdoer, the victim is chang-
ing the way she feels about the wrongdoer. To change one's emo-
tions, however, one has to change one's mind. Emotions are
cognitive at least in part,2° otherwise they would not be amenable
to conscious change, and forgiveness would be only an event, not a
virtue.2' Hence, forgiveness cannot be "just" a change in how one
feels.
17. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C, §§ 7-8 (West 1999) (describing New Jersey's en-
actment of "sexual predator" statutes); Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Min-
dless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 669-70 (1998) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
to uphold Kansas's sexual predator law).
18. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, The Monsters Next Door: A Special Report on the Colo-
rado School Massacre, TIME, May 3, 1999, at 20; LEwis B. SMEDES, FORGIVE AND
FORGET: HEALING THE HURTS WE DON'T DESERVE 106 (1984) (referring to forgiv-
ing "monsters"); Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363,
1421 (1995) (presenting an account of a gangster whose "nom de guerre" is "Mon-
ster" Kody).
19. "Barbarian" was the word the Greeks used to refer to those whom they could
not understand; whose language sounded like "barbarbar." See WEBSTER'S THIRD
INT'L DICrIONARY 174 (1986). Someone who does not make sense is a barbarian.
See id.
20. For a sampling of this burgeoning literature, see SUSAN BANDES, THE PAS-
SIONS OF LAW (1999); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND
TALK ABoUr ACCIDENTS 69-86 (forthcoming May 2000); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1996); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN HELLENISTIC ETHICS 507-10 (1994).
21. See Joanna North, The "Ideal" of Forgiveness: A Philosopher's Exploration, in
EXPLORING FORGIVENESS, supra note 5, at 20 (arguing that for forgiveness to have
moral value, it must be an active process, and not a "mere cessation of hostile
feelings").
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As philosophers, theologians and psychologists have recognized,
forgiveness begins22 from a new vision of the wrongdoer that tries
to empathize with him and see him as more than his crime. 23 Un-
derstanding the wrongdoer and his action is a way of bringing him
back inside the human sense-making community so that he no
longer looks like an "inhuman predator" and stands out-law. Mak-
ing sense of the wrongdoer's action means looking at him as more
than his one act and filling out the picture of the past, as well as
acknowledging the possibilities inherent in his future, and seeing
him therefore once again inside the sphere of humanity.24 This ex-
panded frame of reference opens the possibility for the next aspect
of forgiveness - its forward-looking and action-oriented part - a
22. Before forgiveness can come into play, however, we must know much of the
truth of what happened and be able to characterize it as a wrong. This "moment of
truth" may be a confession followed by apology, see Symposium, The Role of Forgive-
ness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347, 1414-19 (2000) [hereinafter Forgiveness
Symposium] (remarks of Jonathan R. Cohen), or the result of a state investigation or
truth commission. The importance of saying the truth is rightly emphasized as the
beginning of the process of any forgiveness or reconciliation. See id. at 1436-40 (re-
marks of Juan Mdndez) (regarding the recognition of a human right to truth); Mar-
garet Walker, Forgiving: Not One Path, No Single Destination (forthcoming
conference paper to be published with Obert C. and Grace A. Tanner Humanities
Lectures, Apr. 13-14, 2000, Univ. of Utah) (emphasizing that a facet of forgiveness is
putting the wrong in the past - which requires factualizing it). Truth, of course, may
never be complete or undisputed or settled, but some resolution of it is perhaps the
beginning of the process. See Forgiveness Symposium, supra, at 1375-78 (remarks of
Frederick W. Gay) (describing the first part of a victim-offender mediation as often
involving a clarification of what happened and why).
23. See G.W.F. Hegel, Who Thinks Abstractly?, in TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 116-
17 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1977).
A murderer is led to the place of execution. For the common populace he is
nothing but a murderer. Ladies perhaps remark that he is a strong, hand-
some, interesting man. The populace finds this remark terrible: What? A
murderer handsome? How can one think so wickedly and call a murderer
handsome; no doubt, you yourselves are something not much better! ... This
is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact
that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this
simple quality.
Id.
24. See LEwIS SMEDES, FORGIVE AND FORGET 45-49 (1984); North, supra note 21,
at 26-27; MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 84-87; Everett L. Worthington, Jr.,
The Pyramid Model of Forgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations about Un-
forgiveness and the Promotion of Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS: PSY.
CHOLOGICAL RESEARCH & THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 118-23 (Everett L.
Worthington, Jr. ed., 1997). This expansion in view also works on the victim as well,
making the victim aware that her life, too, is not defined and confined by the crime.
She is not just a "victim." Hence, forgiveness is said to set the victim free from the
crime as well. See Smedes, Worthington, supra.
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commitment to "deal" with the wrongdoer that paves the way for
potential reconciliation.
That the victim is committed to deal with the offender does not
instantly put the offender back at status quo ante. The battered
woman need not welcome her abuser back into the home. It
merely places the victim at the table, ready to begin the perhaps
painful process of working on a rapprochement, and further pro-
gress depends on the remorse and return of the offender.
This "commitment to deal" is a necessary part of forgiveness,25
so that forgiveness is not just an emotional change in the victim. If
you say you forgive me, but will not talk to me or interact with me
in any way, then I do not believe you have forgiven me. Forgiving
may not require forgetting, but our usual use of the term means
more than "I'm not actively angry anymore." I can also imagine
someone saying, "I am still angry, but I forgive you anyway." (I
have said so myself, to my children.) Here, "I forgive you" looks
like a speech act26 - a commitment to deal.27 Emotion may lag
behind, but the commitment is the key.
If reconciliation is central to forgiveness, however, how can we
forgive the dead, as we say we do? If they are dead, we can no
longer have a future relationship with them, can we?28 On the con-
trary, the "forgiving of the dead" may also be more than an emo-
tional experience. The public rehabilitation of the deceased's
memory, or a "clearing of her name," may mean something much
more like forgiveness as reconciliation than forgiveness as emo-
tional transition. We honor the dead with medals, remember them
with statues, poems, music and art. We read and argue with the
dead all the time (especially we philosophers). All of these actions
are quite public and much more akin to active reconciliation than
subjective emotional experience. The communal remembering that
keeps great spirits in our midst, even after their bodies are gone, is
25. See, e.g., Martin E. Marty, The Ethos of Christian Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS
OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 23, at 9; Elliot N. Dorff, The Elements of Forgiveness: A
Jewish Approach, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 23, at 29. Both au-
thors argue that return or reconciliation is at least one facet of forgiveness.
26. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 12 (1962) (arguing that
one's statement can also be described as an act).
27. Others have argued, with Murphy, that forgiveness is not performative. See,
e.g., R.S. Downie, Forgiveness, 15 PHIL. Q. 128, 132 (1965); H.J.N. Horsbrugh, For-
giveness, 4 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 269, 270 (1974). But see William R. Neblett, Forgive-
ness and Ideals, 83 MIND 269 (1974) (defending the idea that "I forgive" may
sometimes be performative).
28. Jeffrie Murphy makes this objection in his conference remarks. See Forgive-
ness Symposium, supra note 22, at 1353-66 (Keynote address of Jeffrie G. Murphy).
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part of what it is to be part of community and therefore linked to
the past.
We are not, however, any more "at risk" from the dead. They
can do no further wrong to us. Or can they? Are we safe from
Hitler because he is dead? Or is he, and what he stands for, not
still a risk? Does he not still gain admirers and adherents? Though
sometimes the forgiveness of the dead is a bit cheap (it is often all
too easy to "forgive" when we are safe), the dead do haunt us still.
What becomes impossible, however, is for the dead to change,
grow, or learn. Hence, they cannot meet forgiveness half-way to
complete the reconciliation. We may gain new information about
who they were, but we are stuck with the past as best we can know
it.
In sum, the victim's forgiveness means, in part, seeing the of-
fender as a sense-making member of the human community and
committing to deal with him again. These actions require that the
victim herself be a member of the community, for they employ
public norms of what counts as sense-making and what counts as
"being a member" again. Hence, it is not the victim as subjective
sufferer who forgives, but the victim as member of the public com-
munity, the victim as an "Everyman."
If forgiveness is in part sense-making and committing to deal,
then forgiveness is not just a change in "subjective" feelings, and
therefore not restricted in principle to victims. In fact, the victim
might forgive, while the community may not.29 Community mem-
bers who are indignant, shocked and baffled by a criminal's actions
and who have lost their trust in him can also undergo the discipline
of sense-making and committing to deal. I argue, indeed, that this
is part of the ritual of public punishment (below). The breach of
public trust is not just a wrong to the direct victim, but a wrong to
all whose security and trust are broken by crime.
Just because non-victims can forgive, it does not follow that they
have standing to forgive, or ought to forgive even when the victim
refuses. Isn't it presumptuous and doesn't it demean and trivialize
the victim's pain to forgive on the victim's behalf? How could I
29. See, e.g., Rachel Gottlieb, Victims: Megan's Law Backfires: In Some Family
Abuse Cases, Publicity Compounds the Hurt, HARTFORD COURANT, March 3, 1999, at
1 (reporting that Megan's law injures a victim's family when the father-abuser, after
years of intensive counseling, reconciles with the family and resides at the same ad-
dress, but neighbors will not attend the victim's birthday parties and send hate-mail to
the family).
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presume, for example, to forgive Hitler or Stalin or the murderer
of someone else's child? 30
Though this is a powerful objection, I believe it makes two mis-
takes. First, it takes a see-saw view of punishment that understands
punishment as a reaffirmation of the victim's value, which the
crime has devalued (victim goes up when offender goes down). I
explore this further in Part IV. Second, it ignores the fact that the
future-looking nature of forgiveness is risky not only for the victim,
but also for other potential victims. The community representative
is a potential victim and must be willing personally to take the risk
of recommitment to dealing with the offender. From this angle, the
victim can never forgive only for himself, but must forgive for the
future and for the future potential victims. 31
One problem arises when violence or wrong is done within a
subcommunity. Can representatives of a non-minority group for-
give a wrong targeted at a minority group only? I would venture
that the community doing the forgiving must be the community "at
risk" and in relationship with the offender. There is no coming
over to the other, and hence, no forgiveness, when one need not
"deal" with the offender because one is a stranger and is not at
risk.32
IV. FORGIVENESS AND PUNISHMENT
Many scholars have pointed out that retributive justice is the
only morally defensible current theory of punishment; utilitarian
theories always have the difficulty that there is no utilitarian reason
not to punish the innocent if it will achieve whatever good end is
prescribed by the theory (e.g., deterrence, education, victim sup-
port, etc.). 33 Yet, even in retributivism's most persuasive guise, it
30. See, e.g., LEWIS B. SMEDES, THE ART OF FORGIVING 39 (1996) ("No one -
not a president, not a peasant - has a right to forgive anyone for wounds he himself
did not suffer. Charity for the mothers of Nazi sons is fine. But no one but their
victims can forgive Nazi sons.").
31. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases:
A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1277-82 (1994) (arguing that victim-of-
fender mediation omits consideration of deterrence and other purposes of the state).
That even private forgiveness can have public consequences is exemplified in Jane
Austen's Pride and Prejudice when Jane and Elizabeth forbear from "exposing" the
character of Wickham. See JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 226-27, 277-78 (Ox-
ford Illus. ed. 1813). Their private act of forgiveness for his deceptions, of course,
results in his being able to seduce their sister Lydia. See id.
32. Punishment between strangers makes no sense either. See HERBERT MORRIS,
ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 96 (1976).
33. For excellent arguments against utilitarian theories of punishment, see Michael
Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE
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fails in its own aim - to end the cycle of vengeance. Instead, pun-
ishment must involve an element of forgiveness and even of mercy
(mitigation of just deserts). Hence, I disagree that forgiveness is an
optional "add-on" to punishment34 and also that mercy and for-
giveness differ as act versus emotion.
A. Retribution as a See-Saw
One of the most tempting formulations of retributivism takes se-
riously the dignitary harm done by crime and understands that
wrong is not just tangible harm, but also disrespect. The victim is
treated in a demeaning fashion by the criminal act, and even if the
victim's intrinsic worth is untouched, the victim's self-esteem may
be injured.35 Punishment, then, serves to show society's respect for
the victim by taking away the offender's wrongfully gained status,
honor or mastery and countering the message, implicit in the crimi-
nal act, that the victim does not count.36 I call this the see-saw view
of retribution, because it places the victim and offender on a moral
see-saw - as the offender goes up, the victim goes down and vice
versa. This sort of retribution is ultimately unsatisfying, however,
because it falsely ties the victim's value to the offender's punish-
ment. Moreover, we cannot "balance" victim and offender without
degrading the offender and perpetuating the wrong.
If we believed the victim's value to be tied to the offender's pun-
ishment, then it would be hard to justify the use of excuses in the
criminal law. For example, in a case of mistaken defense of others
(or "imperfect" self-defense), the victim is still assaulted intention-
ally and thereby demeaned - arguably demeaned even more in
that the offender unreasonably thought the victim was an aggres-
sor. To excuse the aggression (or even to mitigate the punishment)
because of the aggressor's unreasonable mistake would seem to
leave the victim at the low end of the see-saw, unredeemed and
undervalued. However, to punish the offender for a negligent act
to the same extent as for an intentional wrong also seems unjust.
EMOTIONS (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory
of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981).
34. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 182-83. Mercy is both required
and not deserved, a grace we are obligated to extend to offenders. See id. This takes
some of the "gift" nature away from forgiveness - though no less than the "duty" of
charity generally. See id. In parallel, one is obligated to be charitable, but no one has
a right to receive a gift. See id.
35. See David Sachs, How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFn. 346-60 (1981).
36. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 122-47.
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Instead, we must acknowledge that the victim's true worth or
dignity is never touched by criminal actions. The more society ac-
knowledges this, refuses to see the victim "as victim only" or as
sullied somehow by the crime, the better. Of course, society does
not always understand this, but tends to treat victims as pariahs, at
fault somehow, out of a reflexive urge to explain crime as some-
thing that will happen to others, not oneself.37 To the extent that
the conviction of an offender serves as a public acknowledgment
that the offender, not the victim, was wrong, the conviction or
guilty plea serves to fix blame and exonerate the victim (as a mat-
ter of communal psychology). But the extent of the punishment,
while a rough gauge of how seriously we take an offense, should
not be calibrated to the worth or redemption of the victim. We
have no business "valuing" the victim in the first place - the vic-
tim is beyond value, beyond price. Indeed, we often complain that
capital punishment, for example, is too likely to reflect a jury's
"valuation" of the victim rather than the crime.38
More telling, however, it seems that one can never achieve bal-
ance between the victim and offender unless the offender gets what
he dished out. Raping the rapist, beating up the bully or torturing
the torturer, however, only perpetuates the wrong, dehumanizing
the offender and the punisher as well. 39 If we accept some "moral
equivalent" but humane punishment instead, then the offender is
simply not balanced with the victim - reparation is no repara-
tion 40 - because part of the harm the victim suffers is the dignitary
harm of being treated offensively and demeaned.4 1 We cannot re-
store balance without demeaning the offender, and demeaning the
offender perpetuates the wrong.
37. See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors
Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61,
136-37 (1995).
38. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COMMISSION 114 (Stephen R. Donziger ed., 1996) (citing statistics that killers
of whites are eleven times more likely to get the death penalty than killers of blacks).
39. See James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107
YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). For a contemporary example, see Periscope, Pakistan, NEWS-
WEEK, Mar. 27,2000, at 5 (reporting the outcry over a murderer who was sentenced to
be strangled, cut into 100 pieces and put into acid).
40. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91-92 (1999); MIROSLAV VOLF, Ex-
CLUSION & EMBRACE: A THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF IDENTITY, OTHERNESS,
AND RECONCILIATION 122-23 (1996) (agreeing that punishment never repairs or re-
pays the victim).
41. See Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1931 (1992).
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When we promise victims closure, redemption from pain and
complete satisfaction through an offender's punishment, we lie to
them. We do not give offenders their just deserts, and if we did, we
would be wrong to do so. We must do more to help crime victims
than we do, and we should not lead them to expect all their solace
from punishment.
B. Retribution As Just Deserts
Another attractive vision of retribution is the idea that punish-
ment is nothing more than taking the offender seriously as a legis-
lator with free will in the Kantian kingdom of ends and
universalizing the maxim of his wrongful act so that it falls on his
own head.42 If I act with reason, then I will my action to be applied
in all similar cases. Therefore, if my action is criminal, then I will
that I be treated the same way in similar circumstances. Thus, if we
respect the offender as a reasonable actor, we should give him his
punishment, the punishment he has in a way decreed for himself.
To treat him any differently - to mitigate or excuse his act - is to
deny him his free will and personhood, to see him as subject to the
forces of cause and effect rather than able to act.43
Or, to put it at perhaps a deeper level: The criminal has actual-
ized his (negative) freedom by rejecting the moral standards of the
community, setting himself up as his own god. In doing so, how-
ever, he has negated the possibility of his own positive freedom as
a reasonable agent, for in rejecting cultural norms, he rejects the
norms that articulate and define reason itself. By rejecting that
which makes him what he is, he sets himself at war with himself.
He has put himself outside, made an exception of himself (as a
42. See KANT, supra note 11, at 49.
43. See Morris, supra note 33; HEGEL, supra note 9, 100.
[The penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly just - as
just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right; on
the contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e., in
his objectively embodied will, in his action. The reason for this is that his
action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is something
universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law which he has
explicitly recognized in his action and under which in consequence he should
be brought as under his right... punishment is regarded as containing the
criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a rational
being. He does not receive this due of honour unless the concept and mea-
sure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still less does he re-
ceive it if he is treated either as a harmful animal who has to be made
harmless, or with a view to deterring and reforming him.
HEGEL, supra note 9, 100.
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Kantian would put it44), by adopting a course of action for others
that he would not will for himself. Punishment, by bringing home
to him the universalized consequences of his own action, restores
him to the human community and makes of him a creature of rea-
son once more. His "will" is broken to the yoke of reason and he is
rescued from the oblivion of his rebellion from his own humanity.
In his return, the law of reason itself becomes actualized in the
world - has power, is at work45 - and the renewed being together
with others becomes a chosen, active expression of positive free-
dom rather than a mere status quo ante.46 The bond of community
itself is felt, seen, and active in the world, instead of merely in-
ferred from the fact of living alongside one another. The prodigal
son's return is cause for celebration; the reunion of father and son
is more salient and vivid than the preexisting union because it has
been explicitly chosen and longed for, rather than taken for
granted.
Again, however, the problem of moral equivalence haunts us.
The wrongness of the wrong that the offender committed is in part
in its disrespect for and humiliation of others. Yet, to give him "his
just deserts," or the full recoil of his own dehumanizing action,
would be to disrespect and humiliate him - contrary to the very
rule of respect to which we want to bring him home. Hence, he
cannot get his just deserts and return to the community.
The problem is that the universalization of the offender's maxim
(rule of action) is not possible unless the premise of inequality on
which that maxim relies is rejected. In assuming that the maxim
applies to all "like cases," we must treat the criminal herself as
"like us," thereby granting her the respect due a rational being. So,
we have already "brought her back to us" in the very act of trying
to universalize her action. We cannot then demean her without
violating the condition precedent to universalizing her maxim -
her own humanity. The very attempt to "give her her just deserts"
requires giving her less than her just deserts.
44. See KANT, supra note 11, at 52.
45. See HEGEL, supra note 9, 97.
46. See id. 220 ("Objectively, this is the reconciliation of the law with itself; by
the annulment of the crime, the law is restored and its authority is thereby actualized.
Subjectively, it is the reconciliation of the criminal with himself, i.e. with the law
known by him as his own and as valid for him and his protection; when this law is
executed upon him, he finds in this process the satisfaction of justice and nothing save
his own act.").
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C. Punishment As Atonement
In the end, it is not the equivalence of punishment to the crime
that is important, but the return to community. Hence, punish-
ment is exactly NOT the criminal's due, but a mitigated one - a
merciful one. In this view, mercy must be part of every punish-
ment, because punishment is never equal to the crime without be-
ing criminal.47 The criminal does not get her due, but receives
grace - and is, as Dostoevsky would say, forever in our debt and
therefore forever tied and obligated to us in relationship.
4 8
Punishment thought this way looks more like a form of forgive-
ness - a bringing home of the offender and being again willing to
deal with her. Because punishment is bounded by the humanity of
the community, it is never equivalent to the crime, but always
merciful. Forgiveness, mercy, and punishment become interwoven
and inextricable. As Hegel, among others, has articulated, punish-
ment might look more like the religious practice of atonement than
the quid pro quo of retribution.49 Stephen Garvey, following the
religious model, suggests that atonement has two steps, expiation
and reconciliation.5" The first involves repentance, apology, repa-
ration and penance by the offender; the second, forgiveness by the
victim.51 As Garvey explains:
47. Jean Hampton disagrees that the confinement of punishment to the "humane"
should be considered mercy. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 160 (arguing
that offender's moral worth "must always be respected in the construction of a genu-
inely retributive, rather than vengeful, response[; s]o a judge isn't being merciful if he
refrains from torturing a torturer").
48. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1.
49. See Nonet, supra note 9, at 521 (quoting Hegel) (emphasis omitted):
As the fulfillment of this return, die Erinnerung is the at-one-ment of the
self with itself, in German die Versohnung, the return of the son to his filial
belonging with the father, that is mortal man's unity with the godhead. In
this return, the self rises again in its Auferstehung, its resurrection to its
proper identity with itself in the spirituality of selfhood. Hence it is that the
transformation of revenge into punishment accomplishes "the atonement of
the law with itself," as well as that "of the offender with himself," by which
"the law is restored," and "first known by the offender as his own," so that
he "finds in it the peace of justice."
HEGEL, supra note 9, 220. For an intriguing vision of punishment as atonement
using the Christian paradigm, see Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999).
50. See Garvey, supra note 49, at 1804-05. The parallel in Hegelian terms is die
Vernichtung, die Aufopferung, die Erinnerung and die Vers6hnung. See Nonet, supra
note 9, at 521-22. Both authors rightly emphasize the importance of remembering the
wrong, even while forgiving the wrongdoer. Forgiveness here is not condonation or
amnesia.
51. See Garvey, supra note 49, at 1805.
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the atonement model provides punishment with an end - the
atonement of the wrongdoer and his victim and the restoration
of the relationship that existed between them before the wrong
- but treats punishment as an intrinsically appropriate way in
which to pursue and achieve that end. The ends and means of
punishment are thus fused.52
If punishment is atonement, and the atonement is with the com-
munity, not just the direct victim, 53 then it requires a commitment
by the community to reintegrate the offender and be willing to deal
with her. In this sense, Arendt is right to say that if we cannot
forgive, we cannot punish and if we cannot punish, then we cannot
forgive.54 In traditional communities, it is exile or shunning, not
death, that is the "last ditch" expedient for dealing with crime. By
contrast, in traditional societies even a death penalty is a moral
judgment that recognizes the offender as responsible and human,
though perhaps able to atone only in death.
In our day, prisons and mental hospitals are where we "keep"
our moral monsters in exile. We talk retributivism and "just
deserts," but the truth is that we don't really believe that offenders
are "equal" again once they have paid their "debt to society." In-
stead, we do not care much about what happens to offenders as
long as they stay away from us. We "incapacitate" them as though
they were mere animals, blaming their keepers, not them, when
they escape and reoffend. 56 Reintegration has not been the focus
52. Id. at 1806.
53. Garvey is not so clear about this, but does recognize that victim-offender me-
diation is not by itself sufficient. Id. at 1829-30. He sees a place for public penance,
though mostly as a way of expressing the victim's worth (a characterization I would
resist as too close to the see-saw view of retribution) and working out the offender's
self-hatred. See id. at 1819. I would just add that the reason penance and not just
restitution to the victim is required is because the wrong is a wrong to all. The pen-
ance serves as a public, tangible, demonstration of remorse that prepares the defend-
ant to receive the community's forgiveness. If the offender is not penitent, the
reconciliation never is realized. However, the community may nonetheless have the
obligation to set the stage and give the offender the opportunity to make his self-
imposed exile into a penance. Punishment, then, is the opportunity for penitence, as
in the original understanding of the penitentiary.
54. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 241.
55. See Garvey, supra note 49, at 1838; see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note
2, at 158 (community would hold reconciliation feast with offender who was to be
hanged); Plato, Crito, in EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY CRITO PHAEDO PHAEDRUS 147
(Harold North Fowler trans., 1914) Socrates chooses death over exile, because he
cannot leave his community without leaving himself behind. See Plato, supra.
56. See Meyer, supra note 17, at 668-69; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAw-
KINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME ch. 1
(1995) (noting that incapacitation has, by default, taken a dominant role in justifying
punishment).
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of most of our current schemes of punishment. On the contrary,
we segregate offenders even after they have done their time
through Megan's laws, loss of voting rights, sex offender civil com-
mitment statutes57 and job disqualifications. We have lost the
sense of the jury and grand jury as a voice of the community, set-
ting the terms of reintegration. The restorative justice movement,
however flawed, that emphasizes reintegration of offenders and of-
fers models for bringing victims and offenders together,58 offers a
note of hope that a new paradigm for punishment will emerge from
the demise of retributivism and recapture some older intuitions
about criminal justice. 59
D. Ground in Human Finitude
The centrality of forgiveness has its root in the basic condition of
human life: we intend, plan and think like gods, but we are finite
both in power and duration and we live only one moment at a time.
Hence, for example, though we act and intend as though we can
control our destinies, we cannot be master of all the consequences
of our actions.
Hannah Arendt has written that the human condition requires
something like forgiveness in its very basis, because we cannot, as
57. See Sherry F. Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of "Mentally Ill
and Dangerous," 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341 (1999).
58. See, e.g., MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RE-
STORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING L.ENSES
(1990). Insofar as the movement leaves out community and puts the burden of recon-
ciliation on the victim exclusively (and it is a heavy burden, see Brown, supra note
31), I would suggest amendment. However, some models include community partici-
pation. For example, Vermont has a community-based reparative probation board.
See Michael Tonry, U.S. Sentencing Systems Fragmenting, 10 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1,
10 (1999). We should also not forget that the state itself serves as a community voice,
at least with respect to those deeply-agreed-upon norms at the heart of the criminal
law. The state, however, has abdicated its obligation to reintegrate and forgive.
59. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND CULTURE 207 (1990).
Puritan penal rituals - in theory at least - were not intended to isolate
offenders and show them to be alien. Instead the arrangements of the cere-
mony ... were intended to demonstrate an intimate link between the of-
fender and the community of believers. Onlookers were made to feel that
they too could be tempted into sin ... In other words the sinner-offender
was not conceived as "Other" but rather as a kind of Protestant Everyman, a
living example of the potential for evil which lies in every heart and against
which every soul must be vigilant. In keeping with this conception, the de-
nouement of each public ceremony was aimed not at the vanquishing of the
enemy, but instead at the reinclusion of the atoned and repentant sinner.
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finite, be responsible for all the consequences of our actions into
infinity.6 ° She writes:
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what
we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined
to one single deed from which we could never recover; we
would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike
the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break
the spell.61
Reason would require responsibility, but finitude makes it impossi-
ble. Hence, for example, the legal doctrine of proximate cause in
both criminal and tort law seems a sort of arbitrary, though neces-
sary, limitation on human responsibility.
Arendt says that the cure for the infinity into which we project
ourselves is forgiveness - a commitment to cut off the conse-
quences of past actions in order to make possible a new start,62
which is action itself. We cannot act unless we are forgiven. Yet
one cannot forgive oneself - someone else has to do it. Hence,
contrary to Kant,63 the presence of others is necessary for the very
actualization of human reason - community, not individuality, is
the ground of human action. As Archbishop Tutu put it, "a person
is a person through other persons. 64
Heidegger puts the thought the other way around: we are re-
sponsible only because we take over being a basis for ourselves65
- accept responsibility for what we are (and what we did not make
or do). What we are is already set out for us by the world and the
others in it; we are finite and do not make ourselves. Our place is
made before we fill it. Yet, this "self," to be responsible for its
actions, must first take responsibility for being as it is, though no
action of the self made the self. Hence, responsibility cannot be
only for what we do, and at the same time, cannot be for every-
thing we do. The basic premise of criminal law must be tempered
by the recognition of finitude at both ends: we are responsible for
more and for less than we do. More needs to be done to work
60. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 240-41.
61. Id. at 237.
62. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 237. Martha Minow has explored how forgive-
ness makes possible a "new start" after a regime of terror. See Minow, supra note 40,
at 91-92.
63. See KANT, supra note 11, at 53-54, 57-63 (deriving duties to others from an
analysis of the concept of will).
64. See Tutu, supra note 5.
65. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 330 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962).
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through the underpinnings of human responsibility,6 6 but the direc-
tion in which we need to go is clear.
If responsibility is itself not a creature of individual will, then
punishment need not be the "just deserts" or universalized maxim
of that will. The individual cannot be so neatly marked off from
the rest of us, either as an actor or as an offender, and hence, the
basic condition of being-with-others should focus and undergird
the theory of punishment. This opens the door for an understand-
ing of mercy that does not undermine punishment, but completes
it.
V. FORGIVENESS AND PITY
The quotation I began with67 shows another, less attractive, side
of forgiveness - what Nietzsche calls "pity. '68 "I forgive you" can
be condescending, widening the gap between self and offender
rather than closing it.69 The defendant in Dostoevsky's quotation
will be "crushed" by mercy and "horror-stricken" and "more un-
worthy than all."'70
Nietzsche recognized that pity demeans and shames, "an agreea-
ble impulse of the instinct for appropriation at the sight of what is
weaker."71 It also makes the suffering of another superficial:
But whenever people notice that we suffer, they interpret our
suffering superficially. It is the very essence of the emotion of
pity that it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is
distinctively personal. Our 'benefactors' are, more than our en-
emies, people who make our worth and will smaller.72
66. For attempts at this daunting philosophical task, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Re-
sponsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992); see also
LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY (1992). Also, see the emergence of "charac-
ter theories" of responsibility. See Sherry F. Colb, The Character of Freedom, 52
STAN. L. REV. 235 (1999); Sherry F. Colb, The Three Faces of Evil, 86 GEO. L.J. 677
(1998); Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992). See gener-
ally Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment. An Essay on Choice,
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719 (1992).
67. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1.
68. See infra notes 70-74.
69. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 31.
70. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1. See also Romans 12:19-20 (stating that generosity
to an enemy will "heap coals of fire on his head").
71. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 176 (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
1974).
72. Id. at 269.
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And, the power and "richness" to forgive may also accompany a
view of offenders as mere "parasite[s]," "incapable of discharging
their debt."73
And yet, (for Nietzsche there is always an "and yet") Nietzsche
himself calls for the "self-overcoming of justice: . .. grace ' 74 and
justice as "love with seeing eyes."75 He seems to envision an un-
derstanding of grace or love that does not demean others like pity
does, but becomes a better justice. He cannot, however, get there:
the superman is above all a self-willed willer who cannot love an-
other without destroying the otherness of the other in an imperial-
istic embrace. The superman can either reject the other, or will the
other to be self, resulting in pity-like appropriation, not love. But
the superman cannot give over the power to will to another, even
in part, i.e., cannot accept another's authority.76
What even Nietzsche, smasher of cultural idols, is unable to do is
to give up individualism,77 our precious enlightenment inheritance.
Yet, to cross over to the other is to give up some part of one's self.
The offender must accept more than his due, accept a gift, a reun-
ion he does not deserve, that will not make him "even." He must
also give up his willful selfishness that was the root of his crime,
and accept the "yoke" of reason - reason he did not will for him-
self but must take also as a given. The victim must give up her
"rights" to justice and compensation, her injured pride and resent-
ment, her boundaries and security (doubly precious now after be-
ing invaded), take a less personal perspective on the offender that
replaces repugnance with understanding, and risk "dealing" with
the offender.78 For this, our individualism does not prepare us well.
We are not at all sure that we want the "vast obligation" of forgive-
ness instead of the "I am even" of justice. We are not at all sure
73. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 72 (Walter Kauf-
mann trans., 1967).
74. Id.
75. Friedrick Wilhem Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
NIETZSCHE 71 (T. Common trans., Modern Library ed. 1937).
76. See Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990) (convey-
ing a similar understanding of Nietzsche).
77. Or, perhaps, what we are unable to do, given our philosophical position in
history.
78. I will no doubt be chided as anti-feminist for my views here. We are supposed
to be raising our consciousnesses and allowing ourselves the self-esteem to feel re-
sentment, anger, and seek retribution. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 109-27
(1997). Although men may have much to teach women about self-respect, if I may be
so "essentialist," women may have much to teach men about forgiveness. See id. at
22-93. We need not degrade ourselves or consent to abuse, but we must take risks.
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that we want our individual boundaries permeated. Again, Nietz-
sche puts it so well:
There was a time in our lives when we were so close that nothing
seemed to obstruct our friendship and brotherhood, and only a
small footbridge separated us. Just as you were about to step on
it, I asked you: "Do you want to cross the footbridge to me?" -
Immediately, you did not want to any more; and when I asked
you again, you remained silent. Since then mountains and tor-
rential rivers and whatever separates and alienates have been
cast between us, and even if we wanted to get together, we
couldn't. But when you now think of that little footbridge,
words fail you and you sob and marvel.79
To change our understanding of punishment is to change our un-
derstanding of community to something we are, and not something
we will. Its reverberations require even a new understanding of
justice itself.
VI. REDEFINITION OF JUSTICE
Scholars often separate forgiveness from mercy, defining the for-
mer as an emotional change in the victim that may come before or
after punishment, and the latter as an act of remission or mitigation
of punishment. 80 Scholars have also argued that justice is the staff
of political life and mercy should only nibble at the edges lest it
overwhelm justice and destroy community.8 1
I have argued, however, that forgiveness and mercy are deeply
related and that they are more central to the creation of commu-
nity than is justice. As a factual matter, justice is not the norm, but
the exception. Few crimes are reported, few offenders are ar-
rested, few arrests are prosecuted, and very, very few offenders go
to trial to seek "justice" rather than a negotiated settlement. At
each stage, some of the offenders are forgiven (by victims, police
and/or prosecutors).82 In civil cases, the same is true: settlement,
79. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 71, at 90; see also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND
GOOD AND EVIL 224 (Walter Kaufman trans., 1966).
80. See supra note 27.
81. See R.J. O'Shaughnessy, Forgiveness, 42 PHIL. 336 (1967); Joseph Beatty, FOR-
GIVENESS, 7 AMER. PHIL. Q. 246 (1970); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 161,
162-86; P. Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness, 36 ANALYSIS 84 (1976); H.R.T. Roberts,
Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352 (1971); KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY,
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 188-92 (1989).
82. An emphasis on justice may overlook that forgiveness is often not extended as,
readily to minority offenders. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 38, at 109-
13. Though the response to this is usually to call for eliminating "discretion," I believe
this is neither realistic nor helpful. Even the rule of law requires rulers who honor it
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not justice, is the norm. Although not all failures to prosecute are
instances of forgiveness, often the contrition of an offender and
restitution to the victim will contribute to a decision to give a case
lower priority or to "let bygones be bygones." Moreover, in every-
day life, we give many second chances and even more benefits of
the doubt to friends, family members, and associates for the sake of
continuing and preserving the relationships.83 As the quotation
from Dostoevsky underscores, equality may also mean anomie, dis-
tance and lack of relationship;84 obligation, on the other hand, is
relationship - literally a ligature binding us together.
At a deeper level, however, we have still to answer Anselm's
paradoxes.85 Mercy seems either irrational or redundant, because
if it followed reason, it would be justice.8 6 And, mercy seems un-
and must be trusted not to fiddle around with the rules. Excessive or convenient
formalism is also unjust. Instead, we must work harder to fill out the vision of offend-
ers who are not "like us" in order to avoid characterizing them as "outlaws" and
"others." See id.
83. Children may be an exception, for their punishments are necessary to moral
education. See Morris, supra note 33. But neither do they "get what they would de-
serve" were they adults - I don't punish my children's' lies as I would adult perjury
- and reconciliation is essential.
84. See ROBERT H. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (arguing that individualism undermines
moral commitment and community service); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (same).
85. See ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, PROSLOGION chs. IX-XI, in A SCHOLASTIC
MISCELLANY: ANSELM TO OCKHAM 78, 81 (Eugene R. Fairweather ed., 1946); MUR-
PHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 168-69 (discussing Anselm's paradoxes).
But how canst thou spare the wicked if thou art wholly just and supremely
just? For how does the wholly and supremely just do something that is not
just? But what justice is there in giving eternal life to one who deserves
eternal death? 0 good God, good to the good and to the evil, on what
ground dost thou save the evil, if this is not just, and thou doest nothing that
is not just? Can it be that thy goodness is incomprehensible, lying hidden in
the inaccessible light where thou dwellest? Surely in the deepest and most
secret place of thy goodness there lies hidden the source from which the
river of thy mercy flows. For though thou art wholly and supremely just, yet
thou art kind even to the evil, just because thou art completely and su-
premely good. For thou wouldest be less good, if thou wert not kind to any
evildoer.... At the same time, though we may be able to grasp why thou
canst will to save the wicked, we can find no reason to explain why, among
men who are equally evil, thou does save some, and not others, through thy
supreme goodness, and dost condemn the latter, and not the former, through
thy supreme justice.
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, supra, chs. IX-XI.
86. See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 181; H. Scott Hestevold, Dis-
junctive Desert, 20 AMER. PHIL. Q. 357 (1983); James P. Sterba, Can A Person Deserve
Mercy?, 10 J. SOC. PHIL. 11 (1979).
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fair, because it treats like cases differently.8 7 How can mercy not
undermine justice?
I would answer Anselm's paradox this way: it seems a paradox
only when applied to God, not when applied to human beings who
exist in time.
First, justice is not equality simpliciter, of course,88 but the treat-
ment of like cases alike. But when are cases alike? We finite crea-
tures see only a few cases at a time, and we are ourselves
constantly in motion, changing and growing daily. Each case poses
new facts, and as we see the facts in new lights against other facts,
justice glimmers differently. We cannot capture it in a code for all
time, we can only capture it for a moment, perhaps, in a particular
case. As the common law recognizes, justice keeps moving, just
around the bend, and the cases of yesterday are distinguished in
light of new facts. 89 For finite creatures, justice can never be codi-
fied and eternalized, but is a pilgrim's progress.
Second, as our view of the world is finite and in time, so also is
our language. True justice is equity not equality, 90 but equity can-
not be said in the clumsy generalities that we must use to say it. As
human reason and language itself requires generalization and fuzzy
family-resemblance sorts of categories, human reason can never
fully contain justice. We instead must live by the rough justice of
the rule of law, which is of course better than lawlessness, but itself
depends on a cultural commitment to justice. Without the gui-
dance of ever-elusive justice, the rule of law would be a senseless
and mindless formalism. Without judicial good faith and cultural
87. For example, Justice Blackmun expressed this frustration with current death
penalty jurisprudence, which tries to cabin juror's discretion in order to promote
equality at the same time that it allows full exploration of all mitigating evidence, in
an eloquent dissent from denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S.
Ct. 1127 (1994). Justice Thomas has also famously argued that the "power to be leni-
ent is [also] the power to discriminate," and argued that capital sentencing jurors
should not be allowed to give unfettered effect to mitigating evidence. See Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 492 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. See Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY
HOUSE 7-13 (1968) (imagining a world of absolute equality, where those born beauti-
ful must disfigure themselves, those born graceful must hobble themselves, etc.)
89. See Linda Ross Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 423, 465-76 (1994) (discussing the temporality of the common
law).
90. See ARISTOTLE, 5 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS x. 3-8 (1951).
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commitment, 9' the rule of law would be a Kafkaesque farce and
pretense.
Third, there is no way to guarantee that equity is not perfidy: the
power to give justice is the power to discriminate, to paraphrase
Justice Thomas. We never know whether parity or disparity in sen-
tencing is unfairness or better justice, except when we judge
roughly by aggregation. We never know all the facts, we never
prove all the facts, we never exhaust the possible comparisons and
contrasts with other cases, we never perfectly define the rule.
Fourth, people do not exist in an eternal moment, either, but are
constantly changing their minds, projecting new actions into the
world, learning and growing. We cannot reduce them to one mo-
ment only, to one crime' or one good deed.93 Justice for yester-
day's action, therefore, may be unjust by the time it is determined
and imposed - justice always races ahead and lags behind us.
So, if justice is equity, it cannot be the usual, the modal form of
interaction with a few merciful exceptions. Justice itself is at best
the exception. (But that does not mean we do not seek it and live
with the uncertainty). 94
CONCLUSION
We grant ourselves and each other forgiveness and mercy in rec-
ognition of the uncertainty of justice and in recognition of our own
finitude and need for new beginnings. We must be humble in judg-
ing.95 We cannot rely on justice to arbitrate our relationships; we
have to take risks. It is mercy and forgiveness, that lets us get on
with living and recognizes that we cannot be litigating Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce96 forever. To live is to forgive and to risk and to be uncer-
tain and to outstrip language and reason itself. To use Jean Hamp-
91. Here, I am thinking of something along the lines of Llewellyn's "steadying
factors." See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
19-61 (1960).
92. See HOWARD ZEHR, DOING LIFE: REFLECTIONS OF MEN AND WOMEN SERV-
ING LIFE SENTENCES (1996) (attempting to humanize "lifers" for us through a series
of portraits).
93. See Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting plea for leni-
ency based on prior good deeds).
94. We do live with the uncertainty. See Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable
Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1467, 1525-28 (1996); BALKIN, supra note 13, 142-70.
95. See Brett Scharffs, Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 127 (1998); Linda Ross Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal
Truth, 67 U. CINN. L. REV. 727, 753 (1999).
96. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HouSE (George Ford & Sylvere Monod eds.,
1977).
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ton's term, we can only "morally hate" the dead, but, if we are to
continue to see another as human, we must forgive the living.
9 7
97. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 2, at 146-47.
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A DIALOGUE CONCERNING HERESIES
Jack L. Sammons*
INTRODUCTION
The editors have asked me to write an introduction to the dia-
logue that follows connecting it to the conference theme of forgive-
ness in the law. I am pleased to do so.
The dialogue is based, very, very loosely, on a dialogue with the
same title written by St. Thomas More in 1529 and revised in 1531.
In addition to moving More into the present, I have, I fear, taken
other great liberties with the good St. Thomas. Rather than de-
fending the Catholic faith against the religious zeal of Luther in-
spired reformers, as he did in his dialogue, I have him defending
the legal profession against the moral zeal of certain, forever to be
unnamed, legal ethicists. It is my opinion, one that will probably
not be shared by all, that the arguments used in these two defenses
are much the same. We find Judge Moore, as I call him, a partner
in a large law firm just at the point of accepting a governmental
appointment, one that we know, from the real More's life, is not
going to go well.
And so, then, what does this dialogue have to do with forgive-
ness in the law? It reminds us, I think, why there is so little room
for forgiveness in the law, that is, that More lost the argument with
Luther, and then shows us that what remains of the possibilities for
forgiveness in the law depend upon lawyers, like Judge Moore, lo-
cating their work as lawyers within a certain understanding of our
craft.
I think I can make all this clearer by playing off of a recent arti-
cle by Tom Shaffer on our theme of forgiveness and law entitled
"Forgiveness Disrupts Law."' Shaffer, by writing a hypothetical
midrash from the point of view of the elder brother in the Parable
of the Prodigal Son, argues that forgiveness is a threat to the legal
order. The elder son can forgive his brother, as his father has done
and, according to Shaffer, as his father wants him to do, only at the
very high price of the loss of the community's legal order. This
legal order is supported by its own theological and moral claims,
* Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law, Mercer University. My thanks to Tom Shaf-
fer and Ted Blumoff for comments.
1. Tom Shaffer, Forgiveness Disrupts Law, 4 GRAVEN IMAGES 127 (1998).
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Shaffer tells us, but it is, ultimately, backed by force. And so, Shaf-
fer continues, forgiveness must disrupt the law by calling us to life
in a different community, a community of forgiveness as opposed
to our legal (or even moral or even theological) communities of
force. Shaffer's community of forgiveness, like Luther's church, is
mostly an abstraction, but he does offer us the helpful example of
the struggles of sixteen century Anabaptists.
The image of law and of lawyers at work in Shaffer's argument is
a rhetorical caricature. It is law, not as a process, but reduced to
that force which is necessary to preserve the legal order as a false,
though compelling, security against the uncertainties of our lives.
In this order, lawyers are those who use the apparent necessity of
this force for the benefit of their clients. They can do this because
the people of this community depend upon this force for an order
in which their lives can have some security, however false it may
be, and can make some social moral sense, even if it is only re-
venge. So, although he does not say it exactly this way, in using the
law's force for their clients, lawyers are really preying on the inse-
curities and the faithlessness of others. About the best Shaffer can
say about these lawyers is that they had better practice "selec-
tively" if they want to be good Christians.2 With Luther, Shaffer
might say that "one needs two hundred parsons to starve off one
lawyer."3
The implicit image of law and lawyers in More's life and work is
very different. For him, law and lawyers upheld the legal order of
communities, to be sure, but they also worked against the force
required to do so. They worked most especially against political
force, whether exercised by tyrants or by the herd, by hemming it
in through the restraints of a structured conversational tradition
which, at its best, could nicely balance the preservation of the com-
munity with an openness toward the truth of the uncertainties of
our lives, the uncertainties that force, as a solution, seeks to deny.
More's image of law and lawyers is more like the law we hear in
the folk song, Diamond Joe: "There is a man you'll hear about
most any place you go. And his holdings are in Texas and his name
is Diamond Joe. And he carries all his money in a diamond stud-
ded jaw. And he never was much bothered by the process of the
2. See id. at 134.
3. RICHARD MARIUS, MARTIN LUTHER: THE CHRISTIAN BETWEEN GOD AND
DEATH 383 (1999). I have cited to Marius a couple of times in this introduction but
this is because his books are close at hand. I cannot, however, recommend his biogra-
phies of either Luther and More to you as anything other than interesting.
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law."4 When More saw Henry VIII as a law unto himself, when he
saw him as Diamond Joe, if you will, and when Henry demanded
More's complicity in this, there was nothing for More to do but die.
If this was to be the law, More thought, the practice of it could no
longer be God's work, but, like Shaffer's image of it, only the en-
forcement of a false order, one that denies the uncertainties of our
lives, denies our responsibility in the face of these uncertainties,
and preys upon those who fear both uncertainties and
responsibility.
Of course, More might not have been so theoretical about all
this. Man of practical affairs that he was, More might say to Shaf-
fer that even a community of forgiveness, including Shaffer's
Anabaptists, is going to need something very analogous to law and
lawyers as More understood them, if it is to remain a community of
forgiveness. It will need, for example, a communal way of arguing
the subtle and difficult distinctions between matters of injustice
and matters of misfortune before decisions about such matters, in-
cluding the decision to forgive, are made. He may have pointed
out to Shaffer how the Mennonites, modern descendants of Shaf-
fer's Anabaptist, start with Paul's prohibition in Corinthians about
taking people to the law, but end with guidelines on the use of
lawyers that could have been written, just as easily, by certain sec-
tions of the ABA.5
But there is something more important in the difference be-
tween More's image of law and lawyers and Shaffer's than just this
appreciation of their practicality. After all, we could just say that
More was still futilely proclaiming Christendom as encompassing
the entire world while Shaffer is very content to find it in small
faithful communities, and let their differences be explained by the
demographics involved. No, I think we can see a much more basic
difference between these images by returning to Shaffer's midrash
from the Parable of the Prodigal Son.
4. HOUSTON, JACK OF DIAMONDS (Sanga Music Co., BMI 1967).
5. See Stanley Hauerwas, Reconciling the Practice of Reason: Casuistry in a
Christian Context, in STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS
ON CHURCH, WORLD, AND LIVING IN BETWEEN 199-219 (1988). What I say in the
text about Mennonite and lawyers is not what Hauerwas intends to say in the article.
I think, however, that lawyer readers will see this evolving from Paul's prohibition to
ABA regulations in his description of the Mennonites. In any event, when Hauerwas
describes what is required for casuistical reasoning in a Mennonite community, he
came so very close to describing a need for something that looks very much like law-
yers, that the same point is made.
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For More, I bet, the elder son is not asked to forgive his brother,
as Shaffer would have it, for that forgiveness is uniquely the prov-
ince of the father. The elder son is asked, instead, to forgive his
father for the harm, the very real harm, his father has done by for-
giving the Prodigal Son. This reading, then, for More, would be
closer to what it could mean to be a community of forgiveness. It is
a community that knows that our lives are uncertain - "contin-
gent" would be the way to say this now - but does not see this
uncertainty as something to be feared. Such a community would
accept that the world is a tragic place where we often do harm
when we seek only to do good and where decisions are very, very
difficult to make. Such a community is not at odds with the law or
with lawyers. It knows it needs them. Knows, that is, that in a
world that is always up for grabs, and one in which tyrannical re-
sponses to this truth, even in Anabaptist communities, are always
just around the corner, the process of the law or, as More would
have it, a structured conversational tradition, is a very good thing.
More would think, I believe, that a community of forgiveness is
one that knows God forgives us for the tragic nature of our lives,
asks that we do the same with each other, and joins us in our best
efforts to do the best we can. In such a community forgiveness
does not disrupt legal order; it is essential to it.
These arguments, the ones I have imagined between More and
Shaffer, are not that far removed from some of More's arguments
with Luther. Luther read Paul on the law in such a way that the
law, failing as it must to satisfy the introspective woes of our very
private consciences, reveals our need for salvation by other means. 6
Shaffer's article is a secularized version of the same and he strug-
gles, as Luther did, to describe the Church we turn to for these
"other means." The opposing interpretation of Paul, that is, that
the blame for our failings is Sin, "and that in such a way that not
only the law but the will and mind of man are declared good and
are found to be on the side of God,"7 is what we would expect to
hear from More. In Luther's reading of Paul, as in Shaffer's article,
there is very little room in the law for forgiveness. For More, how-
ever, law is there to help move us toward forgiveness. As I have
noted, however, More lost; Luther won,8 and so, for now, Shaffer is
6. See KRISTER STENDAHL, PAUL AMONG THE JEWS AND GENTILES 78-96 (1976).
7. Id. at 94.
8. St. Thomas More was arguing against the Reformation brought on by Luther,
so by saying that More lost and Luther won I mean that the Reformation happened,
but I also mean to imply that those changes brought on by the Reformation that led
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quite right and there is, in fact, very little room for forgiveness in
the law.
But More, and his argument, did not just disappear. They left
center stage, to be sure, but we can still see them off in the wings
patiently awaiting a more public role. When we notice them now,
we may be shocked to find that More's argument takes on a radical
form. This is because there is no longer any other form it could
take. Luther's winning argument was that history, tradition and
custom could validate nothing (and so when Shaffer takes Chris-
tians out of the legal order nothing of any Christian importance is
really lost.) More's position was the extreme opposite. He ac-
cepted, for example, in opposition to his friend Erasmus, that "if
pious Christians had venerated a supposed relic of a saint for a
long time the adored object had to be genuine."9 Now, almost five
hundred years later, when we see this argument off in the wings, it
is stunning. Remembering that More was committed not to partic-
ular propositions about the faith, but to the project of truth by pi-
ous Christians within a Church that corrected itself through careful
attention to language and to reason (with something very close, he
thought, to common law reasoning in Counsel), what we can now
see in More's argument is a very direct, and very modern, confron-
tation with the Platonic distinction between appearance and real-
ity. From this perspective, More starts to look to us, perversely
perhaps, like the opposite Enlightenment bookend, Nietzsche,
more than he does anyone of his own time.
Most importantly for our purpose, however, the More seen in
this confrontation with Plato is very much a rhetorician. What I
want you to see in Judge Moore in the dialogue that follows is that
lawyers, at least those who still practice the Greek art of judicial
rhetoric and turn force into conversation, are what is left of St.
Thomas More and his argument for us. They are all that remain of
a public version of this most public of men. And, they are, then,
what is left of the possibility of a role for forgiveness in law.
The More I have described for you here is not the More you may
have come to expect. There are a lot of More's out there, far too
many for me to rehearse in a brief introduction, and each reflects
its creator as obviously, I suppose, as my More reflects me. I do
to the Enlightenment were also at stake in the debate. In More's time, and in Eng-
land, the loss of the argument meant the creation of the Church of England by Henry
VIII. Part of what More lost, then, was the claim that there was one true universal
church maintained by the traditions, customs and practices of the Catholic Church.
9. MARIUS, supra note 3, at 456. Marius describes this argument as "absurd." Id.
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want to mention one persistent version, however. This one has
been described most recently by Professor Robert Bork.10 Bork's
More is a man who is forced, at the crucial moment of his life, to
choose between two competing authorities: the legal order and
God's order. God, of course, wins the competition. Nothing, I
think, could be further from the truth of More's life than this. For
Bork has it exactly backwards in seeing More as torn between
these two powers. More's life, as I understand it, was instead a
living out of their reconciliation through the traditions of the
Church. More is, more than anything else, the archetypical one
Kingdom man. The latest biography of More, and in my opinion
the finest, comes closest to capturing this unity in More's life and
death because it is the first to truly recognize how essential the
practice of law was to his theology." For other biographers,
More's practice of law is either an embarrassment, as it was for
Erasmus, or is valued only because it is More's practice. For
Ackroyd, it is the central feature of his life and thought.
Of course, More himself can be blamed, at least in part, for such
misunderstandings. Often, he was just too clever for his own good.
Let me end this introduction, then, with one relevant example of
this to help you get a feel for the man. Some of More's final words
are very well known: "I die the King's good servant, but God's
first."' 2 Now surely, one would think, we have in these words
strong confirmation of Bork's version of More as a man divided,
but actually we do not. More's last words were taken from the
directions his client, Henry VIII, gave to him upon his appointment
to the King's service as councillor attendant13 and his appointment
as Lord Chancellor."n Henry told More, in times when Henry was
still interested in More acting as a good lawyer: "I want you to
10. See Robert H. Bork, Thomas More for Our Season, 94 FIRST THINGS 17
(1999).
11. See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE (1999). The second best
source for this view of More's life is co-authored by the author of the article I have
played off of here, Thomas Shaffer. See Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas Shaffer, Hope
Faces Power: Thomas More and the King of England in STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHRIS-
TIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, WORLD, AND LIVING IN BETWEEN
199-219 (1988). If you plan on doing any research on More, you will want to purchase
MICHAEL D. WENTWORTH, THE ESSENTIAL SIR THOMAS MORE: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR MODERN STUDIES (1995). This is a remarkable resource
which, we can hope, Mr. Wentworth will update soon.
12. ACKROYD, supra note 11, at 405. See also, JAMES MONTI, THE KING'S GOOD
SERVANT BUT GOD'S FIRST: THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS MORE (1997).
13. See ACKROYD, supra note 11, at 192.
14. See id. at 289.
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serve God first and your master second."' 5 By repeating this
charge from his client at the hour of his death, More was saying to
his client: "I am still doing your bidding as a lawyer. I am being
faithful to you in the only way a good lawyer can." My guess is
that Henry VIII, even as the tyrant he had become, understood.
I hope you enjoy the dialogue. There are three voices in it. The
third voice is in footnotes done by Judge Moore's unnamed law
clerk. The law clerk's part of the dialogue is often as important, if
not more so, than that of the main characters. He offered to me a
way of slipping in problems, qualifications, and other thoughts
about Judge Moore's thoughts that would not have been appropri-
ate for the other characters. My own option is that he is the most
sensible of three - certainly the one I like the best. In addition to
helping with the presentation, however, the law clerk also does the
usual job of providing citations, references, and so forth. Because
the law clerk's voice joins the dialogue after this introduction, the
numbering of the footnotes starts over again.
15. Id. at 192.
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We open in the study of the law suite of Judge Moore, a partner in
a large law firm located in Chelsea, Massachusetts. The title "Judge"
is honorific now, a constant reminder of his days on the appellate
bench. Judge Moore is in his mid-sixties. He is dressed in what is
considered casual attire at the firm: a well-worn corduroy jacket,
one size too large, with darker corduroy pants. The image, one of
warmth, ease and comfort, is disrupted only by a collar and tie too
tight for the Judge's large neck. Both are obviously an annoyance to
him and, at first sight, one wonders why the Judge does not loosen
the fit. He never does.
We find the Judge boxing up books and gathering stacks of papers
into files. The process is slow. The Judge pauses over many items,
especially the older books.
There is a knock on the door.
JUDGE: Come in.
COURIER: Judge Moore?
JUDGE: Yes?
COURIER: Your secretary said it was all right...
JUDGE: And it is. I'm just packing. Now you are a familiar face to
me, but ... I ... no, wait ... a courier? Yes! Afraid I don't
remember the rest, but I do remember seeing you ... around the
... uh ....
COURIER: (Pleased at the recognition) Yes, I was a courier with
Fisher, Pole, and...
JUDGE: Oh, yes, yes, yes. Of course. But I haven't seen you in
awhile, have I?
COURIER: I'm in law school now.
JUDGE: (With genuine enthusiasm) Well, then, congratulations!
So we didn't frighten you off?
COURIER: (Abruptly) No. No, you didn't. Uh . . . one of my
professors sent me to see you.
JUDGE: Oh! And here I am leaving the firm, on my way to troub-
lesome things: a government appointment. Sorry, I won't be able
to help you much with our hiring committee.
COURIER: No, Judge. I'm not here for that.
JUDGE: Well, then, let me stop guessing. Why did your professor
send you to see me?
COURIER: He sent me because he said you were a Christian
lawyer.
JUDGE: (A little too loud) He did, did he? Don't tell anyone
around here; they just think I'm good. (The Judge laughs. Again a
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little too loud. The Courier is puzzled; does not join him) Did he
say it that way? Did he say I was a Christian lawyer?
COURIER: (Confused) Uh... I think he said... he said ... he
knew you were a Christian and that you were a very good lawyer.
JUDGE: (More seriously; slightly lowered tone) How nice. How
very nice.
COURIER: He sent me because.., well, he's my advisor. We went
to lunch. I told him that.., as a Christian... I was worried about
becoming a lawyer.
JUDGE: Tell me about it.
COURIER: It's pretty much as I said. From what I have learned in
law school classes, I'm not sure it is possible for a Christian to be a
good lawyer.
JUDGE: What have you learned?
COURIER: I have a professor this semester, Tyndale. He's helping
me to see the problem.
JUDGE: What does he teach?
COURIER: Legal ethics.
JUDGE: Hmmm.
COURIER: Yes, well, I see now what troubles me about my other
classes.
JUDGE: Yes?
COURIER: There are moral issues in those classes, but no one, es-
pecially the professors, seems concerned with them. No one really
seems concerned with what is just, good, right or who should win.
These are not just ignored - they are squelched. We look for legal
arguments for either side as if it really doesn't matter who wins. It
would be okay, I guess, if there was real substance to the argu-
ments, and the best arguments prevailed, but it doesn't seem like
that's the case. You just try to be as persuasive as you can whether
you should or not. So we have to make persuasive arguments, as
best we can, whether we agree with them or not, and I end up
having to argue against things I believe in and argue for people I
really wouldn't want to represent. The more I do this it the more I
feel my own faith is being ... well ... I guess I feel as if it is being
left behind.
JUDGE: I certainly hope so. (The Judge pauses. His unexpected
comment does not register with Courier. The Judge let's it go).
COURIER: In fact, I'm not sure it's good to sue anybody. It doesn't
seem to me to be the way Christians should act. So why help other
people do something I think is wrong?
JUDGE: Tyndale taught you all this?
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COURIER: No, not exactly. What I've learned from him is that we
have to be ourselves first and lawyers second. The other courses
seem to be about getting ourselves, our true selves, out of the law;
Tyndale, I think, tries to put us back in it.
JUDGE: Hmmm.
COURIER: (Mistaking the Judge's reaction) Oh, but don't get me
wrong. The other professors care about ethics. Don't think they
don't. Sometimes they raise ethical issues in class. Things about
confidentiality, discovery abuse and so forth. But what they are
really doing to us, the real ethic I think they are teaching us, never
gets examined very much. And that ethic.., what they are teach-
ing us to be... whether they mean to or not.., just seems so... so
• . . so much totally at odds with what Tyndale is teaching. So
you've got ethics in one class working against the ethics of the
practice in all the others or, at least, that's how it seems to me. It's
unfair. Tyndale has to put who we really are as people, as moral
people, back in the practice, but the problem of not being in the
practice was caused by the courses we took, as much as by anything
else.
JUDGE: So why come to me? This Tyndale seems to be your man.
COURIER: I thought so for a while. It is true that most students, at
least the ones who take this seriously, have no trouble with his say-
ing "be true to yourself," but ... I ...
JUDGE: Tell me about the ones who don't take it seriously. What
do they think?
COURIER: They just dismiss him as preaching. No, not preaching
really, since he mostly just gets us to talk about what we think. He
wants us to express our values and so forth, but it does ...
JUDGE: (Sub rosa) As if having their freedom, they needed noth-
ing else.
COURIER: ... divide the class.
JUDGE: How's that?
COURIER: We've got... uh... the moral group and we've got the
... oh, I don't know what to call it,... the lawyer group, I guess. is
how I'd say it. The lawyer group dismisses the moral group and the
moral group thinks the lawyer group is thoughtless.
JUDGE: And you are in the moral group, are you?
COURIER: Yes, but I have trouble with it, Judge. When Tyndale
gets to his bottom line ... that part about being true to yourself,
about being a person first and a lawyer second, about recognizing
that you are in a role that limits your moral reflections, and the
need for true self-reflection, and all the rest of it - (with sudden
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enthusiasm) he does this in a lot of interesting, really memorable,
ways. It's a good class! We watch videos; talk about movies; read
novels ... (pauses) ... but it all does seems to come down to the
same message. Anyhow, for me, being true to myself is not such an
easy thing to do. I know I need to learn the context of lawyering,
to make the moral connections and rules connections, and some-
body like Tyndale can help with this, but, to be true to myself? I
have to figure out what a Christian should do. It's not just up to
me.
JUDGE: (Sincerely) Good for you, Courier, good for you.
COURIER: The simple answer some of my friends give me is that I
just have to be a Christian lawyer. Only represent the causes I
believe in, use the methods I think a Christian should use, and so
forth. I imagine I would have to find a Christian law firm or some-
thing like that, because nobody else would hire me. Maybe I
would have to represent only Christian clients who would under-
stand what I was doing. This makes sense to me. Besides, how
could I counsel someone who wasn't a Christian? I wouldn't know
what to say. I'm not sure any of this would work, though. Maybe I
shouldn't sue people at all. How can you win someone to Christ
when you are suing them? Maybe I should just try to help people
find peaceful solutions ... you know, mediate, or something like
that. I've heard some of the other students, not just the Christians,
saying the same thing. Some said they could only prosecute; some
said they could only represent criminal defendants ... some said
they would...
JUDGE: (Speaking to himself) It sounds as if it is getting worse; the
path to war is too well paved. (Turns back to Courier) You know,
Courier, I think this old man might just be in the wrong place at the
wrong time. (Aside) What am I to do when the very language we
use works against me? (Pauses) So what have you concluded?
COURIER: (Confused) Uh... I think ... I started to think that the
practice Tyndale was describing to me was too much of a tempta-
tion, a "near occasion of sin," and, it occurred to me that maybe I
was off the path. Maybe I just shouldn't be a lawyer. What's the
point? What is the point if being a Christian means always watch-
ing out for what the practice of law might do to you?
JUDGE: And this is what you said to your advisor, did you?
COURIER: Some of it.
JUDGE: And this is why he sent you to me?
COURIER: Yes, and he asked me to come see him after we talked.
1551
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
JUDGE: Well, tell me, what do you know about the practice?
About the life of a lawyer?
COURIER: Not much.
JUDGE: But your impressions? What are they?
COURIER: I keep hearing...
JUDGE: From Tyndale?
COURIER: From Tyndale, but from others sources too. I hear that
it's corrupt; driven by greed. There's little sense of community left
among lawyers. Morality doesn't matter much; it's just about
money. The top lawyers develop narrow specialties - mostly
transactional work for corporations - and they look down on the
rest of the practice. They denigrate what ordinary lawyers do with
ordinary clients. A lot of lawyers are unhappy in their work. They
drink too much, don't find it rewarding; don't find meaning in it,
and ... (obviously ready to continue).
JUDGE: (Interrupting) Let me stop you there. I agree with you!
That's good! We can agree that the current practice is becoming
corrupt if these are the things we mean by "corrupt." There is,
however, going to be a tension between us.
COURIER: Why?
JUDGE: My answer to this corruption is to remind lawyers that
they are lawyers and to try to get clearer about what being good at
lawyering might mean. You want a revolution, a Christian revolu-
tion, maybe just a private one, but what I think is needed is reform.
And that's very different. Much harder, really. I take it, though,
that this would ... or, at least from what you have said so far...
this should puzzle you. Since being a lawyer - an ordinary lawyer
representing ordinary clients, some of whom are good and some of
whom are not; some whose claims you agree with and some you
don't, and always trying to be as persuasive as you can for your
client - is suspect, thanks to your Professor Tyndale, you'd have
to ask yourself: Why would anyone want to be good at ordinary
lawyering? Your revolution has you looking elsewhere for what
could be good in the practice of law. That's what you mean, I
think, by wanting to be a Christian lawyer. You accused me of the
same thing, but, now that we know what it is, I can tell you I am
not a Christian lawyer.
COURIER: What are you then?
JUDGE: Just a lawyer. Look, you have come to ask me about this
as a fellow Christian so let me answer you in a different way. Did
you know I'm a former seminarian?
COURIER: No, I didn't.
1552
A DIALOGUE CONCERNING HERESIES
JUDGE: Yes, back in my wild youth, before I decided to be a law-
yer instead of a priest. Former seminarians love to preach, you
know, so you wouldn't mind too much if I imitated your professor
and preached a little, would you? You wouldn't deny me this small
pleasure, would you?
COURIER: No, of course not, Judge.
JUDGE: Okay, then. The practice of law has a lot to teach you.
What your professors, the good ones, not your Tyndale for good-
ness sake, but the good ones, are doing in class is teaching you an
ethic. You got that exactly right. They are teaching you the ethic
of the practice and they are also teaching you the theology of the
practice, and it is Christian, Courier, whether they know it or not.
Take that back to your 7Tyndale!
COURIER: Judge, half my professors are Jewish!
JUDGE: And thank God for that! It's exactly what you need.
(Calmer) Look, what I am saying to you is that the practice of law
carries a theology just as it carries an ethic. As a Christian, I have
to claim that the theology of the practice of law is Christian. I have
to. If it isn't, if it isn't Christian, you and I should get the hell out
now ... well for me, I guess it's muchtoo late.
COURIER: I don't understand. I really don't. And I've got lots of
questions. But, first ... uh ... if I said something like that...
(pauses hesitantly) .... Judge, I know if I said something like that
at the law school a lot of people would be offended. Forgive me for
this, but isn't that really presumptuous?
JUDGE: If they know you love them, they are not as likely to be
offended, so first better be clear that you love them. (Pauses) I
think the real offense would be to say it any other way. (Quickly,
looking at his watch) Have you had lunch yet? Some folks here
are gathering for a very casual farewell luncheon for me - no
speeches - nothing like that. Why don't you join us? Who knows
what you ... and they ... might learn?
COURIER: Thanks. I'd love to. (The Judge and the Courier exit)
The Judge and the Courier walk back in the suite, chatting. They
are more comfortable with each other now. The Judge goes back to
the last box he was working on. It is apparent the Judge has invited
the Courier to stay and continue the conversation with him.
COURIER: Can we come back to the theology of the practice?
JUDGE: (Walking behind the desk) Mind if I continue boxing these
up while we talk?
COURIER: Can I help?
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JUDGE: No, not really. Have a seat.
COURIER: Thanks. Don't Christians just have a theology of prac-
tice and Jews, Muslims the same?
JUDGE: They may, but not as good lawyers.
COURIER: What do you mean?
JUDGE: Look, for Christians the world is Christian; for Jews the
world is Jewish, for Muslim ... well ... you get the idea. It would
certainly sound terribly presumptuous, to return to your concern,
to say to a Jew that the truth to be revealed in halakha, for exam-
ple, is in the Kingdom made possible by Christ, but announcing the
Kingdom is really nothing other than the Christian version of tik-
kun olam, the repair of the world, that is the responsibility of all
Jews. I don't hear tikkun olam as presumptuous or as a threat. Do
you? To me it's a relief. The reason people, good people, react so
negatively to claims like this is out of fear. And with good cause!
The history is dreadful. But what should flow from this Christian
presumptuousness, if that is what it is, is the conclusion that as a
Christian I must want Muslims to be good Muslims and Jews to be
good Jews, and ... here I may lose you... even lawyers to be good
lawyers. For me, this is part of the message of the Incarnation.
COURIER: But aren't you telling them what their being good
means?
JUDGE: No! Just the opposite. The goodness is up to them. It has
to be. You are right, however, that I will name that goodness
within my own tradition. Sure, I tell Jews, Muslims, and even law-
yers, that they live in the Kingdom too. What else can I do? But
you are asking the right question. If what I want of Jews is their
goodness as Jews, because Jews are living in the Kingdom too, then
surely I cannot, at least without self contradiction as a Christian,
attempt try to explain Judaism to a Jew! Or lawyering to a lawyer
for that matter! If the Kingdom is what is there to be revealed
through Hebraic tradition, then one of the reasons I want Jews to
be good Jews is that I doubt that Christians can be good Christians
without it. For each of these traditions has the potential to reveal
the meaning of the Kingdom to a Christian in ways that a Christian
could never understand on her own.
COURIER: I think I understand that, but you said "even lawyers."
Does this really work for lawyers? Aren't you making a religion of
the practice of law when you talk this way?
JUDGE: (Laughs) Yeah, but there is no heresy in that, is there?
Don't you know I'm a humanist? A Catholic to be sure, but a hu-
manist! I catch hell for it in the Church, but I don't want you mak-
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ing it into a heresy. The Church of Lawyering! I like that.
(Louder) And no place for accountants because the god of lawyer-
ing he is a jealous god! No, the heresy, if there is heresy in this,
would be to think that I can understand lawyering in the Kingdom
without the Church or understand the Church without lawyering in
the Kingdom. Don't you think the Church needs the insights of-
fered through the long history of those rhetoricians who have been
doomed to plow forever the rocky conversational fields of our
disputes?
COURIER: But, Judge, you are talking about two different tradi-
tions, like different religions, and, well, as ... uh ... lawyers ....
we are in both, aren't we?
JUDGE: Yes, that's good! There is a difference for us, isn't there!
But what this mdans, I believe, is not that as a Christian I can
somehow apply my faith to the practice to establish moral stan-
dards for it that aren't there in it already. I am sure you have
heard ... I haven't been very subtle about this... that I... I really
do not tolerate well adjectival uses of Christianity, as in "Christian
Lawyering," for I must believe that all good lawyering, truthfully
understood, is Christian. As a Christian and as a lawyer ... and I
hope to be a good one, one of these days, I have ... potentially
now ... a unique capability and, always, a unique responsibility to
be a witness to the Kingdom that is there in the work that we do as
lawyers. If I had to say that in a sermon, I guess it would be: "The
responsibility of a lawyer as a Christian is to witness to the practice
its own truth." I know that's confusing, but I can't think of another
concise way of saying it. So, you know, I don't want you telling
people I'm a Christian lawyer. I really don't. I want them to see
me as just good. They know I'm a Christian. I don't try to hide it.
COURIER: But how do you do that? How do you witness to the
practice its own truth?
JUDGE: By being good . .. by being accepted as good . . . and,
through that acceptance, having a say in what being a good lawyer
means. The claim Christians must make, the claim that good lawy-
ering is their own, has to be made within the tradition of the prac-
tice for the theological reasons I have given you. There is no other
audience to whom this could be addressed legitimately. The argu-
ment must be made in an ongoing internal conversation about the
teleology of the practice. So, you look at the way the practice of
law carries on this internal conversation about itself, and you join
in. And as rhetoricians, we know, or we should ought to know,
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that there are good and bad ways of making these arguments
persuasively.
COURIER: But Judge ... and I know you are not going to like me
saying this.., there is still a presumptuousness in your claim about
the theology of the practice, isn't there?
JUDGE: Courier, you are very concerned with presumptuousness!
Is there a Church of Non-presumptuousness out there that I have
missed? (Catching himself) Moore, why do you say things like
that? What is it?
COURIER: No, that's okay. It's presumptuous, isn't it, to talk
about "the" theology of practice, presumptuous to claim that what
one person, one Christian thinks about the purposes of the practice
is right. I mean ... I know you are a good...
JUDGE: (Interrupting) My goodness, Courier! Did I say that?
You'll have to forgive me! I am trying as hard as I can to get the
theology right, but I really have no confidence that I have done so,
and I can't because I don't know well enough what getting it right
means. Look, the purpose in saying "the" theology is to structure
the conversation.
COURIER: What do you mean?
JUDGE: Well, the real purpose in talking about "the" theology is
... I've stopped preaching now and started confessing.., the real
purpose is to make you do it as well. I want you to see that there is
a theology within the tradition of the practice. It's real. It is really
there. And it is that theology that I am trying to describe. Since it
is real, it has authority over what I might say about it, how I might
describe it. So I describe "the" theology not as a judgment on the
efforts of others to do the same, but as a judgment on myself...
hoping that you will respond in kind; that you, too, will see the
need to describe honestly and accurately something that is there
and that is not a matter of our choice. I want this to be an argu-
ment about what is the case, Courier! (Pauses) I'm really just
building on your own insight that the practice, the practice taught
to you in your classes on torts, contracts, property and all the rest,
has an ethic. Your Tyndale wants you to choose an ethic ... and a
theology.., for your practice. He wants this to be your choice so,
of course, you choose a Christian practice. Oh, he wants it well
informed, to be sure, but he sees you as free to choose this way. I
don't. I believe there really is something called legal ethics.
COURIER: I can see that for ethics, but for theology?
JUDGE: It's a little easier to see the ethic because it is so clearly
justified by any measure of true success in the practice's own terms.
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It's functional, in other words. But do we know what true success
is so easily? Do we? If not, it shouldn't be that much more diffi-
cult to see the theology involved. Should it? At bottom, Courier,
perhaps there is no clear division between the two.
COURIER: Perhaps, but I really had not thought about this as theo-
logical, and if I didn't, I don't think any other student has. Do you,
Judge?
JUDGE: No, maybe not. Nevertheless, in this practice, this prac-
tice of law, there has to be an inquiry.., more than an inquiry...
an implicit statement about the nature of the world. This is neces-
sary not only for the working of the practice, but to adequately and
honestly locate the practice of law among other practices. There is
... there must be . . . something descriptive about the way the
world is ... even if the description is only implicit in a lived under-
standing of true success within the practice . . . in any adequate
conception of what it means to be a good lawyer. Doesn't there?
And, if so, this, then, is a theology carried... that's the way I want
to say it... carried by the practice of law.1
COURIER: How does a lawyer go about discovering this theology?
1. LAW CLERK: My apologies for interrupting. I am supposed to be footnoting
this dialogue and I have not had much to do so far, but I cannot help interrupting just
a little to warn you about a potential issue here. It could trouble you, as it did me,
throughout the dialogue. It would be fair to ask the Judge, at some point in what is to
follow, why we cannot derive from practices general virtues, perhaps the virtues that
are necessary for the existence and continuation of any practice, and from these gen-
eral virtues derive a theology and an attendant ethic that is not practiced based, that
is, in rhetorical terms, one that could be addressed to a universal audience. The Judge
would agree, perhaps, that we could do that, but might argue, if he had thought about
this at all which, I can assure you, he has not, that there is no good reason... okay, no
really good reason ... to give preference to such generalization over the specifications
found within the practices from which the generalizations were derived. And it needs
a really good reason, he might continue, for the process of applying practice derived
generalizations, which are not themselves based within a particular practice, back
upon the practices from which they came is an exercise fraught with the potential for
great distortion. It may, in fact, and I think the Judge would think it would, jeopard-
ize the very understanding of a life well-lived that one seeks through the generaliza-
tions. There is a lot to what the Judge might say and I hope I have got him right here.
A friend of mine, Rabbi Michael Goldberg, put it this way in a conversation we had
the other day: Often, the way in which we come to know someone as a good person is
through initial encounters with that person in their performances within the roles that
are defined by the practices that constitute their lives. The later description of the
person as a good person adds little to this understanding. That's a nice way of putting
it and I hope I remember to tell this to the Judge. And, oh yeah, footnoting... the
Judge's use of practices here is from Aristotle by way of Wittgenstein by way of
Maclntyre. This practice has its own unique tensions with this history, however, be-
cause it is a practice of rhetoric.
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JUDGE: Carefully! It's creative discovery! I don't mean to be fa-
cetious, Courier, but you do have to do it carefully. Temptations
abound. What I might describe to you as the ethic or the theology
of the practice could be just wishful thinking on my part.2 It could
be just selective perception; perhaps even self-deception, and so
forth: all the problems inherent in examining a tradition you're in,
especially examining a tradition in the current context, the one I
conceded to you early, of a practice that is becoming more and
more corrupt. One whose institutions seem to be forcing it away
from its own tradition. That's another way of saying "corrupt,"
isn't it? You know - I was thinking about this the other day -
there may come a difficult time when we have to make descriptive
claims about the ethics, the theology, of this tradition - claims
about what it requires of us - that are opposed by everyone in the
current practice. We may have to claim only the agreement of
most who have gone before. But I don't see us in that situation
yet.
COURIER: So, if I understand, we witness to the tradition the truth
of the tradition, and you see that truth for Christians as having to
be Christian?
JUDGE: Yes. I think of this as - but I may have this all wrong,
seminary was a long time ago - as a Barthian inquiry. It implies
that our first moral task, our first theological task, is to discern the
story of which we are a part. There is another theologian, a Bap-
tist, James William McClendon... you should read his work some-
times ... whom I connect with this as well. McClendon teaches
that good biography is theology.3 What I want to say is the same.
But our biographies are composed, in very large measure, aren't
they, of the practices that constitute our lives?
2. LAW CLERK: The Judge is right to be worried about this for he is very prone
towards wishful thinking. (Maybe I shouldn't be telling you this.) I have heard him
say before, for example, that the suppression of women and minorities that has been a
part of the history of the practice of law, as it has of most practices, was always at
odds with its tradition. He said that this was true even in those times when there may
have been no one within the tradition who understood it. This suppression always
was wrong within the tradition, he said, and wrong because of the requirements of the
practice. I cannot remember exactly how he put this, but I do remember that it had
something to do with a requirement of equality of voices within good rhetoric and the
need the rhetors of this rhetorical culture have to speak for others. Something like
that, anyhow.
3. LAW CLERK: The Judge did not give enough information to the Courier to
find the book quickly so here it is: JAMES MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY As THEOLOGY:
How LIFE STORIES CAN REMAKE TODAY'S THEOLOGY (1990).
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COURIER: But if you are looking at the practice to determine the
theology what difference does being a Christian make? I mean, I
know you claim... you name ... the good within the practice as
Christian, but...
JUDGE: (Interrupting) "Name" is good. It is a question of who will
name this, of who will locate it within a story, isn't it? But I am
very troubled by your question.
COURIER: Why, Judge?
JUDGE: This question about "what difference does it make" - a
question that seems so sensible to ask these days - is, I believe, a
sign of a theological problem. Do you know the Greek term
phronesis?
COURIER: Yes, practical wisdom or something close.
JUDGE: More like practical judgment. It's the knowledge fitted to
a particular praxis or practice, such as the practice of law. Our
world lives in almost morbid fear of our need for phronesis. I am
not exaggerating here.
COURIER: Why?
JUDGE: Because the need we have for phronesis reminds us of the
contingency and the interdependency of our lives. You can see this
fear very much alive and well in all the professions. They don't
credit their own phronesis. Don't credit the forms of phronesis that
they both create and depend upon for their own excellences! In-
stead, they all try to move towards techne, as if more knowledge,
better technique, more data for goodness sake, would somehow
make the contingency of our lives go away, as if through techne
somehow we could no longer be dependent upon ourselves. But,
of course, contingency never does go away and we are always de-
pendent upon ourselves. You will think I am an ideologue, but I
must tell you that it is not unusual that lawyers would see this
clearly, perhaps more clearly than others, for the legal practice has
always resisted techne.
COURIER: But how does this relate to the question I asked, the
question about what difference being a Christian makes?
JUDGE: The dominance of techne within Christianity produces a
question like that.
COURIER: I don't follow you.
JUDGE: I'm sorry. I don't mean to be obscure. To accept our need
for phronesis would mean accepting the contingency and interde-
pendency of our world, but accepting these imposes upon us a
daunting responsibility, doesn't it? And this scares the hell out of
people. So they look to techne because they see in it a security, a
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security from responsibility. The way this shows up in Christianity
... no, wait ... let me say it this way: The most obvious example of
this in Christianity is fundamentalism. Fundamentalism comes
from a fear of the human - the same contingency and interdepen-
dency ... or the fear, as I like to describe it, of living in Biblical
times. But we do live in Biblical times and fundamentalists just
jump out of the frying pan into the fire: the frying pan of the re-
sponsibility our faith imposes upon us, the fire of the false security,
the lie, of techne. They take the God of history out of history and,
in doing so, they reject even the possibility of a Christian phronesis.
COURIER: It is not just fundamentalists though, is it?
JUDGE: No. Fundamentalism is just the most obvious example.
You are right. The problem is truly pervasive. It is there, for ex-
ample, whenever people turn Christianity into propositions to be
applied.., applied.., to life. They do this, I think, because they
don't trust Christian phronesis. Don't see enough in it to maintain
the strictures of our faith. And the reason they don't.., maybe the
reason they don't ... is that they have so little faith to begin with.
(Pause; notices reaction of Courier) Have I gone too far.?
COURIER: You've condemned a large number, Judge! But my re-
action was surprise that you could start from where you did and
end in the prophet's role!
JUDGE: Oh my! Is that what I have done? Well, there you have it
- my own romantic escape.
COURIER: (Puzzled) Uh ... can we go back a bit? I am not sure I
understand how this relates to the question again, the one about
what difference does it make?
JUDGE: Yes, fair enough. When people ask "what difference does
it make" they are often asking the question from the same perspec-
tive of fear of the human and with the same retreat to propositions
I have been trying to describe. What difference does being a Chris-
tian make in the practice of law? How should I know? How could
I know in advance of good Christians living their lives to the fullest
in the practice of law? And, you know, I look to find the product
of these lives in our practice.
COURIER: Isn't that uh ... what's the word... antinomian?
JUDGE: Antinomian? No, not really. It's morally normative. And
in the only way, the only true way, that fallen creatures ever are
morally normative. Look, the effect of the Eucharist, the effect of
the other sacraments, the effect of the Church, when it works as it
should, is a transformation of the person. This transformation is
one that does not just provide us with a motivation to be moral, to
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be holy - motivations for well-lived lives that are already known.
Instead, the transformation is one that leaves us fully dependent
upon our own goodness. And, I see this dependency as inevitable
for there are no propositions that are not also dependent upon our
own goodness. You learn this in law school, don't you? Being a
Christian ... we are back to your question now ... makes all the
difference, but I certainly can't tell you what difference it will make
for you in advance of your living the difference.
COURIER: I don't know. I'm wondering now what role God plays
in this? Is nothing revealed?
JUDGE: (Suddenly looking at his watch) What time is it? Oh, no!
Look at the time! I have to leave to get ready for a dinner with the
Judicial Reform Commission. (Pauses) Tell you what. Why don't
you join us? I'll tell them you are my law clerk. Come, walk with
me, and I'll give you the directions on the way out. (They leave
together hurriedly)
It is several hours later that evening. The Judge and the Courier
have come back to the Judge's law suite after the dinner meeting to
pick up a few items the Judge needed before going home and, as
both are now anxious to do, to try to reach some closure on their
dialogue. As they enter the suite, they are chatting about the conver-
sation the Courier heard at the Judicial Reform Commission dinner.
COURIER: ... and I saw some of those connections!
JUDGE: Good! That's good to hear. Perhaps I am not too far off
then?
COURIER: I wonder, Judge, if you could spell out for me a little
more about what the ethic and the theology of the practice are?
JUDGE: (Returning to his files) Yes, well, we have talked around
the subject, haven't we. But I'm reluctant to do this.
COURIER: Why?
JUDGE: In part because I am likely to make a mess of it, but, in
other part, because it will sound too much like a theory to you.
This can only be done bottom up. It's not a top down inquiry. The
4. LAw CLERK: Oh, the Judge is in trouble here! Taken out of this context, he
would object strenuously to any description of our lives as dependent upon our own
goodness for this is the kind of claim made by those who no longer fear God and only
fear each other. What the Judge has in mind here, God fearing man that he is, is
something quite different, having more to do with the hermaneutic freedom God has
given us in our relationship with Him. Being dependent upon our own goodness in
this way is not to be in control of our own lives. But I am seriously out of role here,
aren't I? I should leave the Judge to his own devices.
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way I got started was by struggling with the practice when I first
joined it. Ordinary issues ... very ordinary issues ... and .... I'll
tell you what. I have a few notes here from a speech I have been
preparing for a bar meeting on a similar topic. Perhaps you can be
a practice audience for me. (Shuffles through one of the piles of
papers until he finds what he is looking for) Ah! Here it is.
COURIER: Good!
JUDGE: Maybe I should preface this. I believe that the story of
which we lawyers are a part is the story of rhetoric. But it isn't the
story of just any rhetoric. It is the tradition of a very particular
form of rhetoric, a particular form of representative rhetoric,
within a particular rhetorical culture, with particular forms of argu-
ments5 addressed to particular audiences who are restrained by
particular roles.6 This is a story then about maintaining a very par-
ticular conversation.7 The ethic I am looking for in the practice
5. LAW CLERK: I have learned from the Judge, on other occasions, that it is very
important to his concept of the legal practice that it maintain the ability, over time, to
understand the quality of arguments such that there can be very successful arguments
that are nevertheless very bad arguments. He is particularly concerned with argu-
ments that are bad because they corrupt the audiences the legal conversation requires
to be a good conversation on its own terms. I wish the Judge had said these things
here, but he did not. I think he was getting tired.
6. LAW CLERK: The Judge, as you may have noticed, is not terribly concerned
with problems of role morality. Perhaps part of the reason is that the practice of law
leads lawyers, like the Judge, to appreciate the restrictions of roles more than most
professions do. A lawyer's most important audiences, judges and jurors, are role re-
stricted. (And clients, too, when it is understood that we impose a particular role
upon them by changing their dispute to a social conversation). And, praise God for
this! If they were to act true to themselves in these positions, it would be far more
difficult to distinguish law from advertising. (Which is not to say that there is no ethic
of the rhetoric of advertising, but it is a very different one). "One can sometimes
observe marvelous changes in individuals as when some passionately biased person
becomes a member of a jury or arbitrator or judge, and when his actions then show
the fine transition from bias to an honest effort to deal with the problems at issue in a
just and objective fashion." I read that in MAX WERTHEIMER, PRODUCrIVE THINK-
ING 135-136, as quoted in CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW
RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 21 (1969). And for a beautiful under-
statement of the potential problem: "If then one allows the existence of audiences of
corrupt persons, whom one nonetheless does not want to give up convincing, and, at
the same time, if one looks at the matter from the standpoint of the moral quality of
the speaker, one finds oneself led, in order to solve the difficulty, to make distinctions
and dissociation that do not come as a matter of course." Id. at 25. The shaping of the
legal audiences is toward audiences that accept rhetorical proof and, because they do,
they accept the lawyer's conversion of force to conversation. But here I am getting
ahead of the Judge. Sorry.
7. LAW CLERK: The Judge has left something out here, but it is not surprising. It
must seem so obvious to him that it does not occur to him that it needs to be said.
Yet, I have learned that for some, and perhaps for the Courier, this is the most impor-
tant thing he could say, and for others, it reveals a serious flaw in his thinking. What
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this tradition maintains is the only sort of ethic a tradition can
carry. It is a virtue ethic with the virtues being those things that
move those in the practice towards its excellences, and the vices
those things that head them off in the other direction. And this
practice must have - for its own purposes - an ongoing internal
inquiry about the teleology, the ends, of the practice. Okay, if
you've got all that... (pauses, no interruption) ... then the virtues
of this practice, it seems, define for us a particular kind of person,
even a particular way of life, because they reach beyond the prac-
tice itself. I don't think this adds much to your own insights about
your education.
COURIER: I do see the connection, but each of us lives in a number
of practices maintained by a number of traditions, don't we?
JUDGE: Good! Yes. Yes, of course we do! Of course we do! And
there are always tensions among the varied traditions in which we
live. This does not mean, however, that there is an ethic, or a self
for that matter, that is somehow outside of any of these traditions.
Nor does it mean that trying to locate our ethics, as defined by the
traditions that constitute our lives, is a mistake.
COURIER: Well, I'm not sure... I... uh... you have us made up
of competing ways of life. Where's the integrity in that?
JUDGE: I don't have you "made up," you are made up of what can
be competing ways of life. And that is just as confusing as our lives
he has left out is his conviction that the legal conversation he is referring to is always a
moral conversation. As with the characteristics of the conversation the Judge does
mention, it is a very particular form of moral conversation. In the legal conversation,
there are moral appeals made on both sides of any issue because moral appeals are
persuasive. This is not to say that the legal rhetor appeals to the particular morality of
the judge or of the jury, but that behind each legal argument lies an often unstated
moral claim. This moral claim is always toward those without an interest in the mat-
ter and is, therefore, more in the nature of a communal appeal about what "we"
should do. Thus, the rhetoric required here moves the argument, and therefore also
the counseling of clients, away from purely personal appeals or individual demands.
It is important, however, to see that these social moral appeals are never, or almost
never, directed to a universal audience, but to the role restricted audiences of the
legal conversation. Lawyers often enough take a selfish or retributive motivation and
convert it not to what it should be in a moral sense, but to what it must be in a
rhetorical sense to be persuasive as a social moral appeal to these role restricted audi-
ences. And, in doing so, they give us a decent way to talk about such "all too human"
things. One of these days I am going to tell the Judge about another book because it
is helpful here. Thomas B. Farrell, as I read him, says that in this way the rhetorican
implements a practical wisdom through the complementary participation of someone
else, namely, the rhetorical audience. THOMAS B. FARRELL, NORMS OF RHETORICAL
CULTURE 73 (1993). I'm pretty sure the Judge would like that way of putting it, but
you never can tell. It's not a good idea to make predictions about the Judge. What is
best about him is the way he can surprise you.
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are, and integrity is just as difficult as it really is. Look, I said that
the practice this tradition of rhetoric maintains must have within it
an ongoing inquiry about the teleology of the practice.
COURIER: Yes? I can see that. It would have to - to stay on
course, to adjust to changes, to stay alive, I guess.
JUDGE: Yes! Exactly right! Well then, the practice requires practi-
tioners capable of providing a good internal critique of the practice
- one that is good because it considers those things beyond the
practice that could threaten the quality of it or the maintenance of
it or both. Let me put this in terms that will be all too real to you
too soon. In this firm, I am proud to say, after much argument, we
decided to drop minimum billable hours for associates, to en-
courage our associates to spend time with their families, to move
them through departments so that they did not specialize too early,
to design our offices and plan our schedules so that relationships
among associates and partners could develop more informally, and
to ask associates to join partners in doing pro bono work so that
they would see other kinds of clients, other parts of the community,
develop a sense of the profession, and so forth. And we did these
things for two good reasons, although we did not talk about it this
way. The first reason is what we are talking about. The story of
which we are a part as lawyers needs real, well balanced, thought-
ful people who are just like what our associates can now become.
Or so we hope.
COURIER: And the second?
JUDGE: The second is that we still believe that what we offer to
clients is a particular form of phronesis and, even though it is a
particular form, even though, that is, it is a phronesis perfectly fit-
ted to this practice; it too reaches beyond the practice because it
has to! Our work is done in relationships with many other people
in many other roles and our phronesis as rhetoricians has to reflect
this.
COURIER: Tell me if I have this wrong, but what you are describing
here is not that far from what we were saying this morning about
the relationships among religious traditions.
JUDGE: No, not wrong at all. There's a connection. I hadn't
thought of it in that way, but you are right there is a connection.
And there is a way of understanding integrity in this, although it is
certainly not a simple matter, is it?
COURIER: No. It isn't and I am still troubled by it.
JUDGE: Let me try to address this. We are in deep waters here,
aren't we?
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COURIER: Yes, I guess, we are.
JUDGE: And I don't swim that well. (Pauses in thought) There is
no doubt that there is a story, a narrative, of each single life. As
Aristotle put it, man is one in number. What we talk about when
we use the word "integrity" is, I think, the coherence of each indi-
vidual narrative. Integrity is the "fittingness" or the "appropriate-
ness" of a person's conduct within the overall narrative of his or
her life. If this is true, then it is wrong to think that integrity is to
be found in some private, some internal world for the very sense of
this "fittingness" is not our own. I think this is psychologically true
as well. The virtues, even the general virtues that we might use to
describe the integrity of a whole life, for example, can never be
adequately understood as things that we carry around inside our-
selves.8 You know, even our strongest emotions are not our own in
this way, but are based on narratives that are beyond ourselves.9
(Pauses again in thought) But these are, as you can see, very com-
plex matters, and I don't know that I am up to the task this present
to us, and ... uh...
COURIER: (Interrupting; seeing the Judge's difficulty) No, Judge,
that's enough. I am sorry I took you away from your lecture notes.
Let's go back.
JUDGE: Thanks you for coming to the rescue. What I was planning
on saying ... these notes are still sketchy... is a summary of what
I think I have learned from the practice about its ethics. I have
tried to be descriptive. (Pauses) I'm not at all sure this is a good
idea. (Shuffles through notes, sits down, looks up again) Are you?
COURIER: Please go ahead, Judge.
JUDGE: Okay, I was going to say that I have found, in my own
practice, five requirements of our practice, interrelated require-
ments, that are the source of a lawyer's ethics. There is first the
ethics of the required relationship with the one for whom the law-
yer is speaking. There is nothing so personal as to speak for an-
8. LAW CLERK: This is the kind of statement the Judge should back up at least a
little, don't you think? He could do so by citing to OWEN FLANAGAN, VARITIES OF
MORAL PERSONALITIES: ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM (1991). I have read
Flanagan and, as I read him, he is very much in the Judge's camp.
9. LAW CLERK: I am not sure how the Judge comes up with this stuff. There is
an excellent article - I remember this one from graduate school - that makes the
same point. It's Martha Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of
Love, ETHICS 225 (1988). But I don't think the Judge read it. If I remember cor-
rectly, it has some nasty language in it that would not be his cup of tea. Let me tell
you what the Judge said to me once, which I did not understand at the time. Maybe it
fits here. He said: "We cannot understand our lives until we can hear them being
played by somebody on a Martin D-18."
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other and, because this is true, the form this relationship must take
for the speaking to be truly for another is very ethically demand-
ing. It is for this relationship that we honor client confidences,
avoid conflicts, give preference to our clients over our own needs,
and so forth. But the purpose of the required relationship also lim-
its what we do for our clients.
COURIER: Limits?
JUDGE: Well, for example, the confidentiality we offer our clients
is not just some general obligation of loyalty or even fidelity. It is
certainly not there just to encourage client disclosures to their law-
yers. It is the particular confidentiality needed to preserve a rela-
tionship necessary to speak for another within this rhetorical
culture, and, if in a particular issue the questioned confidentiality
does not serve this purpose or is even destructive of it, then we
know that it is not the confidentiality that good lawyering requires.
Nor, for that matter, is it something a client can, with any justifica-
tion, insist upon. For clients must respect the fact that they came to
a lawyer; accept, that is, that a good lawyer will practice true to the
requirements of her craft. Thinking about it this way... I hope...
offers a far more nuanced way of addressing confidentiality issues.
(Pauses) Perhaps, this is the kind of thinking your Tyndale should
be doing. But, let me go on because this may become clearer.
COURIER: Of course.
JUDGE: A second requirement is our obligation as good lawyers to
maintain the legal conversation and to try to improve its quality.
COURIER: Is that like "officer of the court?"
JUDGE: No! Not like that at all! If that expression is meant to
describe what I just said, it is a terribly misleading way of doing it.
COURIER: Why?
JUDGE: Because, from a lawyer's perspective, the legal conversa-
tion stands in judgment of the courts, of the adversarial system, of
judges - of all those potential sources of ethical authority over
your "officer." We are responsible for the maintenance and the
quality of the legal conversation. Sometimes this means we have to
resist the court, resist the judge, resist the entire adversarial system
if need be, when we see it corrupting that for which we are respon-
sible and upon which we depend for the quality of our work.
(Pauses) We do so, however, in anguish and not in anger. (Pauses)
No, what I have in mind is similar instead to the obligation to pro-
tect the playing field that is there in all practices, the general obli-
gation not to foul one's own nest, not to warp the carpenters rule
before using it, and so forth. There are lots of metaphors, because
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it is so pervasive. For lawyers, it includes, to be sure, protection
over time of the unique language we use, the language into which
we translate our client's claims, but it is far more than this.10 And
notice, Courier - I said earlier that these were interrelated re-
quirements - how the ethics of the playing field are both in ten-
sion with and depend upon the ethics of the required client
relationship. If the client is hiring a lawyer, the client surely needs
to accept that the lawyer will not foul her own nest. The lawyer,
however, must present this limitation, a limitation upon a relation-
ship the client may feel he is entitled to, in ways that do not destroy
the relationship that is required for good lawyering. For what qual-
ity could the conversation possibly have if it does not remain the
conversation of our clients? So there is tension between these first
two requirements of good lawyering . . . ah, now there is fertile
ground for hard work by your Professor Tyndale!
COURIER: You are going to give him a lot to do! Judge, he's a very
thoughtful man, a very intelligent man, well read. I think I gave
you the wrong impression. He would love to be a part of this
conversation.
JUDGE: Perhaps. 1' (Quickly returning to his topic) Now the third
requirement is closely related to the second. I have thought of
keeping them together, but they are better apart. The third sources
of our ethic is the ethics of persuasion. Again, though, this is not
just any persuasion - remember all the limitations of my little
preface: particular audience and so forth - but the ethics of per-
suasion within our particular rhetorical culture with its clearly de-
fined roles. I have in mind here a certain respect for our audiences
and their roles, but I also have in mind those constitutive rules of
the conversation such that if you use some other methods to per-
10. LAW CLERK: I know, because I have had the opportunity to consult the
Judge's lecture notes, that the Judge is thinking here of the work of James Boyd White
on our obligations as lawyers to the language of the law. No surprise; the Judge loves
White. The Judge's notes on this express some disappointed, however, that White has
never spelled out the practical applications of this ethical obligation. I wish the Judge
would take a look at BERNARD SUITS, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE, AND UTO-
PIA (1990). There is much in the Judge's descriptions, with it's playing fields and so
forth, that is spelled out very nicely in Suit's work.
11. LAW CLERK: The Judge sees Tyndale, I know this to be true, as incapable of
offering any response to Nietschze's challenge to morality, and he does not think
Nietzsche would love to be a part of this conversation so he is not likely to take the
Courier up on this. Nietzsche is always there, somewhere, in the Judge's thinking. In
some ways I think his life has been an exercise in learning how to come to terms with
Nietzsche. If you have no place to stand in reading Nietzsche, if you can find no way
of turning him fairly to your own purposes, then the Judge is not really that interested
in you although, of course, he would never let on that this is true.
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suade you are no longer engaged in the legal conversation but are
outside of it. I am afraid I have not said that very well. Is it clear
enough?
COURIER: I think so. For example, bribery, in all its many and
subtle forms, is out, because it corrupts the audience.
JUDGE: Yes. Good. You have it. Bribery, in fact, would not only
be corrupting and outside the constitutive rules of the game, but
also destructive of the practice in the same way that cheating is
destructive of any game. But I don't want you to think.., and I
can see by your description of bribery that you don't think.., that
this requirement only involves egregious wrongs. You can see the
same wrong that bribery is in very subtle tempting of our audiences
to make decisions upon improper bases. The issue is there appears
in every time we consider a closing argument. It is there in every
evidentiary issue; in every conversation with a journalist, in every
negotiation with another lawyer, and on and on. It reaches all that
we do as lawyers. So this is not just about egregious wrongs. In
fact, the ethics of this are very subtle, wholly pervasive, and require
great discernment. It is very troubling, for example, when the
temptation the lawyer faces is to take advantage of the other side,
to deny to your opponent's client her own participation in the con-
versation, and so forth. And the question for the lawyer is whether
the proposed advocacy is within the game, to use the metaphor
again, or outside and destructive of it. This is part of what lawyers
talk about when they talk among themselves about ethical dilem-
mas. It is part of that ongoing internal inquiry I was talking about
before. Of course, good lawyers don't talk about it the way we are
doing here. They do it better, far more naturally.
COURIER: I heard some of this at dinner, I think.
JUDGE: Different context. But, yes, I think you probably did. The
fourth requirement ... let me look back at the notes again for I
have lost my train of thought . . . (reading paper) . . . okay, the
fourth source ... no, wait, I think I can put the fourth and fifth
together. So the next one would be the ethics of critique: internal
critique, similar to what we were just saying, and external critique
done internally. (Amused by the expression)
COURIER: (No reaction)
JUDGE: (Returning to his notes) Uh... the fourth requirement of
our practice, the fourth source of the lawyer's ethics is the need we
have as rhetoricians to critique our own rhetorical culture. Here,
let me add this note: (writing) "internally and externally." The in-
ternal critique puts us in judgment of current practice so that the
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question, "Is this true to who we are," is always asked. For us, one
crucial element of this is keeping the language of the law connected
over time so that what I have been calling the legal conversation is,
in fact, a conversation. The external critique . . . (writing on the
paper) . . . " done internally" . . . asks about institutional concerns,
about keeping the practice adequately connected to the culture in
which it is located, and about its place at the table of all practices.
(Looking up at Courier) You can see the interrelationship again,
can't you? The legal conversation must remain understandably
about those things that our clients bring to us. It has to in order to
retain its cultural validity as a way of handling social disputes and it
has to retain that validity if it is to continue as a conversation at all.
So even though we translate our clients' concerns to the language
of law, they must be able see their concerns at least reflected in the
conversation, don't they? Not as they brought them to us, of
course, but at least converted in an understandable way to the par-
ticular persuasive demands of this particular social conversation
about social disputes. Isn't this right?
COURIER: I think so, but I can see that you depend a lot on exter-
nal critique.
JUDGE: I do?
COURIER: Yes, well, if I have it right, the constant accommoda-
tions the practice makes to the culture are the product of your ex-
ternal critique. And these are not just institutional
accommodations, but also individual accommodations. Aren't
they?
JUDGE: Yes, they are. Do you see the problem? Why the external
critique must be done internally?
COURIER: Yes. Otherwise, the culture would corrupt the practice.
The judgement, the balancing, would be very different.
JUDGE: Yes, and, when that happens, the ethic, the theology -
"the goods" - that are carried by the practice are lost. (Pause)
Well, Courier, I see I am not needed here anymore. But I do want
to be clear about something that I may have passed over too
quickly. As you can see, all these requirements are needed to
maintain the practice and to maintain the quality of the legal con-
versation and I'm offering these requirements as the source of legal
ethics. These are the maintenance obligations of one who wishes
to be a good lawyer, and it is in these obligations that we find the
primary ethical restraints .... No! Wait! It's wrong to refer to
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these as restraints. 12 They are in fulfillment of good lawyering.
Let me try again. (Writing on the paper) These constitutive ethical
obligations of good lawyering are something that we impose upon
our clients. The clients, by becoming clients, enters into our world
of practice and, in doing so, must accept those things that are es-
sential to the quality of our work. They have to accept, for exam-
ple, the truthfulness the conversation depends upon, the required
consideration of the persuasiveness of arguments on the other side
- even if for no reason other than to know how to respond to
them - the openness of the conversation to all, the inherent equal-
ity of each voice, the particular requirements of persuading our
particular audiences, and accept the social nature of their own
disputes.
COURIER: Is that the end of your notes?
JUDGE: Yes, but I'm not sure how to end the talk.
COURIER: Do you hold out your four requirements as offering dif-
ferent solutions to ethical issues. I mean are you going to work
though some examples with the audience?
JUDGE: They do offer different solutions, often enough. And I can
work through some examples if you think it needs them.
COURIER: Yes, I do.
JUDGE: The audience may be disappointed though. 3 The same
tensions that show up in the usual discussions of ethical issues show
up in the ones I wish to have.
COURIER: I don't see that as a problem, Judge. Those tensions are
there within the traditions of the practice. What you are doing is
giving lawyers a way of identifying the tensions better than before.
12. LAw CLERK: There you go. The Judge is thinking about Nietzsche again.
13. LAW CLERK: Sorry to keep interrupting but, having heard the Judge work
through examples with law clerks, I know that the Courier may be disappointed with
the examples as well but not for the same reason. If the Courier thinks that the Judge
is going to talk about traditions and practices and the like, he is in for a disappoint-
ment. Mostly the Judge talks about laws, ethical regulations, ethical obligations and
exercises of judgments and it is all very contextual. Every time he and I chat about
ethical issues, he insists that we spend most of the time playing with the hypothetical
to see if the issue will go away. The Judge says that the real moral work is done in
framing the issue. So, what you would likely hear from the Judge would be efforts to
describe the situation as accurately as he can. He surely does not offer a decision
procedure for lawyers. He tries instead to explain what ethical questions in the prac-
tice are questions about. One of the things he has helped me with is in understanding
why some questions are so very difficult. The Judge, by the way, sees legal restraints
on lawyers as those things that cannot be justified in the legal conversation. So when
he talks about the law of lawyering he often comes back around to the same things
discussed here.
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In some ways, those are the tensions that define the practice, aren't
they? So no one should expect them to just go away.
JUDGE: Thank you, Courier. And we have hundreds of years of
trying to work through these tensions, don't we? Surely we have
learned something about them, don't you think? What I would
want to do with examples is to plug lawyers in to what we may
have learned as a practice; to give them a better way of thinking
through these problems, one that is supportive of the practice
rather than, as is too often the case in these discussions, destructive
of it.
COURIER: Can I press you a little, I know it is getting late, but...
JUDGE: (Interrupting) You can, but I know I am no longer needed
here.
COURIER: Maybe. You have a lot of faith in the legal conversation
and I was wondering what justification you think it has.
JUDGE: (Not responding)
COURIER: What's the point, in other words? What does it do?
What do we do as lawyers? I'm not sure how to say this.
JUDGE: No, you've said it well enough. It is just hard to answer.
There is a risk here of imposing something upon the practice that is
not the practice. You know, if you said that the conversation was
about justice, for example, you would have so much explaining to
do about what this "justice" means because the justice that is car-
ried by the practice of law is not at all what most people mean by
justice.'4 But I don't want to go through all that so let me just say
that its justification is ... or, rather ... what we do as lawyers is
convert force to conversation.
COURIER: For peace?
JUDGE: You mean between the parties?
COURIER: Yes.
JUDGE: Then no, not peace, although peace may come. But no, it
isn't about peace. This is a legal conversation for sinners. It is one
that lives within human frailty. Much of what we do is keep people
who want to harm each other from doing so and those who might
do so in the future from getting themselves into tempting situa-
tions. That's not peace. I try very hard, within the requirements of
good lawyering, to keep a potential for peace open, but if peace
between the parties comes it is more a matter of grace than a prod-
uct of my work. (Pauses) I think I want to say this more brutally:
14. LAW CLERK: The judge once told me that the primary example we have of
lawyers seeking "justice" is overzealous prosecutors who think they know what justice
is.
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If I tried to accomplish peace through my practice, I would not be a
good lawyer.
COURIER: So what you do, then, is convert issues and potential
issues between people into conversations and into language games
within the conversation so they aren't resolved by force?
JUDGE: Yes, I guess. And "games" seems right. Good games. Is
that good enough?
COURIER: I don't know. The conversation itself rests on force,
doesn't it?
JUDGE: Of course, it does! It rests on the social force that is a
necessary precondition for the conversation itself.15 There may be
a lot more force in the adversarial system than this, but from a
rhetorician's point of view the justified force is the force needed by
the conversation. Rhetoricians don't try to get rid of force in the
world. We just try to take the inevitable use of force, including the
force we use, and turn it into an argument in our own language as
best we can. (Pauses) And you know, when true tyranny arises,
we can be challenged to give our lives to this effort, and some good
lawyers have. (Catches himself) I must be getting tired, Courier.
I'm making this sound romantic and it isn't. Let me put it more
mundanely: It is a common mistake to think that the use of force
for the client is the goal of lawyering or that the use of peace is the
same. The goal is the legal conversation; the rest is always and of
necessity left to the audiences to whom the speaking is addressed.
And, you know we have not talked about this much, but one of the
audiences is the internal audience of the client.
COURIER: But Judge, why not be peace makers? I am troubled by
your not seeing peace as a goal.
JUDGE: If God cares about peace between neighbors, as we know
He does, should He not also care about the peace of communities
of sinful people over time? Lawyers do not serve peace directly,
but by converting force to conversation, and doing so as best they
can in a fallen world filled with people for whom force has enor-
mous appeal, enormous moral appeal, perhaps lawyers can be
called "peace makers" too without doing too much damage to the
Beatitudes or to the practice. But I am not sure about this. I am
15. LAW CLERK: Apparently, the Judge has forgotten that he got this idea from
reading Perelman back in the early seventies. Here is a citation if you want to see the
sources: For a discussion of the pre-conditions required for argumentative conversa-
tion, see C.H. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREA-
TISE ON ARGUMENTATION 14-17 (1969); and, for more on the requirement of binding
force for decisions made upon rhetorical presentations and the rhetorical requirement
of the connection of argument to action, see id. at 58-59.
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not at all comfortable with it. I usually try to avoid the question of
justification because it is so easy to go astray from the reality of the
practice in the process of justifying. I don't know. The question of
justification just does not arise very naturally from within a
practice.
COURIER: Fair...
JUDGE: (Interrupting) Justifications are sort of the mission state-
ments of philosophy.
COURIER: Fair enough, but aren't we back to theological questions
then?
JUDGE: You mean back to where we started? (Laughs)
COURIER: Yes.
JUDGE: (Bemused) Well, the theological questions have already
been answered, Courier.
COURIER: I was afraid you were going to say that, Judge, but can
we talk them out just a little?
JUDGE: And I was afraid you'd say that. (He laughs and is joined
by Courier) Okay. I think I said something like success, as defined
within the practice, depends upon a certain understanding of the
world. Right?
COURIER: Something like that, I believe.
JUDGE: And I "named" this, to use your term, a Christian theol-
ogy. So, I said, the practice carries with it a certain Christian
theology.
COURIER: Yes, from a Christian perspective.
JUDGE: Which, I think we agreed, is, of necessity, the perspective
that this is the way the world is.
COURIER: Right, I am with you again.
JUDGE: The rhetorical world - the world of good arguments,
good moral arguments, 6 on both sides of every dispute, the world
in which we are dependent upon that which "adheres" to the mind
of our audiences and 'the liaison of ideas" for the good, dependent
upon that which persuades, in other words, and not that which
"convinces,"'17 dependent upon the very language that we use - is
16. LAW CLERK: Didn't I tell you the Judge depended upon this particular unar-
ticulated understanding of the legal conversation.
17. LAW CLERK: The terminology he is using here, "adheres," "liaison of ideas,"
and "convinces" (as opposed to persuasion) is all Perelman talk again. See, CH. PER-
ELMAN AND L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGU-
MENTATION 14 (1969). The Judge puts an awful lot of trust in a sense of what is
appropriate; a lot of trust in what "fits." I see this in his theology and in his practice-
based ethics, don't you? He would say that these are a rhetorician's standards and
they make clear both the interdependency and the contingency of our rhetorical
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a world of contingent and tragic choices by fallen beings who need
force just to be able to talk to one another other about those things
that seem to matter to them the most. Because it is contingent, we
are left fully responsible for the goodness of our choices. What you
saw as your corruption as a Christian in the classroom was no such
thing. It was a display of this contingent world to you. It was, as
you said, a challenge to your faith, but I would insist that it was a
good challenge, a challenge that called your faith to a new matur-
ity, called it to wrestle, more than it had before, with the truthful-
ness of our fallenness and how one might, nevertheless, serve God.
(Pauses) But people don't like to hear about responsibility, do
they? It is distressing.
COURIER: No, I guess they... uh... I guess I don't. But what of
God?
JUDGE: He is involved with us in this same troubling story; not
bracketed away from it.' 8 Isn't the Incarnation about God's will-
ingness to live our lives with us? Look, at least one of the central
messages of our Hebraic tradition is that what we do matters, really
matters. The world is changed, truly changed, by our decisions.
There is more room in this story, for the new, for the created, then
there is in almost any other. There is room in it for the unique
meaning of individual lives.
COURIER: And... ?
world. It looks like an aesthetic ethic, even an aesthetic theology, to me. What do
you think? I think the Judge has some hard work of his own to do here and the kind
he does not like to do: epistemology, justification - the "mission statement" stuff he
treated lightly before. But please do not tell him I said that. Let me do it my way
later on.
18. LAW CLERK: I wish the Judge would use his own words more so I did not have
to keep doing this. These terms are, I think, taken from James McClendon.
Our question must rather be whether the life experience of a Hammarskjold
or an Ives is or is not understood better when it is treated as experience with
God; that is, whether (as I believe) the ongoing story of their lives makes
more or fuller sense when the involvement of God in that story is recog-
nized, or when it is bracketed.
JAMES MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY As THEOLOGY: How LIFE STORIES CAN REMAKE
TODAY'S THEOLOGY 160 (1990). So, I would like to ask the Judge, how does it make
"fuller sense?" I guess the Judge, with some irritation, would tell me that this too is a
rhetorical standard and remind me again of our dependency and so forth. Sometimes
I think the Judge is pretty radical for an old lawyer. He has a Wittgenstein-like aver-
sion to letting things settle down securely in one place, if you know what I mean. For
him, security is a mortal sin, I think. He has said to me many times that 'we" - and I
am never sure what he means by that - are called to insecurity. But when he says
this it sounds something like Sherlock Holmes telling Dr. Watson "Come, Watson, the
game is afoot." You know, he is enthusiastic, even joyful. It's strange.
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JUDGE: And ... then ... the very meaning of your work as a
lawyer is in the recognition that it is ... that it can be ... God's
work with you.
COURIER: In the recognition and not in the revelation?
JUDGE: They are forever together. Surely the world works in such
a way that we cannot escape from our own humanity! God has
never revealed himself to us in ways that do not call upon our dis-
cernment, our ongoing discernment, through history and over time.
For, if this were true, it would not be to us that He was revealed.
To say that God's work is at the heart of our traditions, as I have
tried to say here, Courier, is not to deny God's revelation but to
accept the one to whom God's reveals and with whom He works.
COURIER: But how then does God work with us?
JUDGE: It is all a relationship, isn't it? Isn't that what this is all
about? A relationship? I know this sounds terribly mundane, but
it is true, isn't it? Look, we are, despite our most fervent wishes to
the contrary, always co-Creators with a loving God in a contingent
world.
COURIER: It's frightening to think of it that way.
JUDGE: Yes, I know. I am glad you said it that way. To think that
we are in that kind of relationship with the One who created us!
The truer issue for us as Christians is having the courage to recog-
nize the responsibility of this relationship. As I see it with these
old lawyer's eyes, it is the responsibility of living in contingency,
living in interdependency, living in dependency or, as I said before,
of recognizing that we live in Biblical times. (Pauses)
COURIER: (Starts to speak) Uh...
JUDGE: (Interrupts) You know, Courier, it occurs to me now,
thanks to our conversation, that it is only in this recognition that
we can come to know what it means to be who we are. To say that
the Kingdom is within means, I think, that we cannot know our-
selves until we locate this self within the Kingdom. And, still trying
to answer your good question now, I have to know that, don't I? I
have to know who we are to know how God works with us. Per-
haps, this is what it means to practice law in the Kingdom, this
coming to terms with who we are.
COURIER: And we can do this when we do those things I feared? I
mean as lawyers, we can do this?
JUDGE: You mean making arguments that are not "yours," repre-
senting people you do not agree with, trusting the outcome of per-
suasion, and on and on through the litany of the ethical
condemnation of lawyering?
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COURIER: Yes.
JUDGE: I think so. With a hope and a patience made possible by
Christ. 9 With a trust that man's good work, when truly done well,
is work with God. A trust that the Creation continue. Our lives as
lawyers, rightfully understood, are based on a miracle. This is the
claim Christians offer against the powers that would claim the prac-
tice as their own. Here, let me read something to you if I can find
it. (Thumbs rapidly though a stack of note cards until he finds what
he is looking for) Yes, here it is: Christian hope means "exposing
the non-necessity of supposing, like Nietzsheans, difference, non-
totalization, and indeterminacy of meaning necessarily imply arbi-
trariness and violence."2 I ask you, Courier, who, in the everyday
19. LAW CLERK: There he goes again. The Judge is borrowing here, and dis-
torting a little, something that he got from another theologian, Stanley Hauerwas:
"Patience is not merely what we must do until we are saved. It is our salvation."
STANLEY HAUERWAS, WILDERNESS WANDERING: PROBING TWENTIETH CENTURY
THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 180 (1997).
20. LAW CLERK: I found the same note card later on. On it the Judge attributes
the quote to JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR
REASON 5-6 (1990). He found it in HAUERWAS, supra note 19, at 190 (1997). What
Milbank, a philosophy of religion professor, said may be true about "Nietzsheans,"
but it is hardly fair to Nietzsche who saw himself as offering an alternative, even a
light hearted one, to the pessimism of Schopenhauer - an affirmation of life in the
face of the conditions Milbank describes. People like Milbank, who try to define
themselves against Nietzsche, do not seem to understand how much their view of the
world is Nietzschean. Here is another quote from Milbank to show you what I mean.
This one comes from John Milbank, The Ethics of Self-Sacrifice, 91 FIRST THINGS 33,
37 (1999):
Thus we live under the ethical sway of an abstract otherness, mirroring in
the ethical realm the legal assumptions of the respect for the rights of the
individual in general with indifference to that individual's gender, character
or cultural specificity. Given the assumption of such a state, two things fol-
low: our responsibilities tend to become unlimited because we owe our lives
infinitely to every other person; and the ethical good never arrives - we can
never fulfill this impossible responsibility, and no one could ever legitimately
relax and enjoy the benefits of the sacrifices of others. Thus the only thing
that is achieved is the continued carrying out of self obliteration. Liberals
pretend that continuous self obliteration is the demand of the moral law, but
in reality it is only the demand of the liberal state, which cannot put a brake
upon sacrifice because it is unable to promote any positive goals or values
that would define true humanity. It follows that the exaltation of pure self-
sacrifice for the other is secretly the sacrifice of all individuals to the imper-
sonality of the formal procedural law of the state and marketplace. Like the
antique polis, this alone abides, this alone is eternal.
If you added to the end of this quote "thus spake Zarathustra" you would be off,
but not by as much as Milbank would like us to believe. The Judge introduced me to
Nietzsche. I was, of course, surprised that he did, but now I have a better understand-
ing of what he wanted me to get from him and it was not Milbank's "arbitrariness and
violence." In fact, I now keep having this feeling that there was a holy and terrible
sadness when Nietzsche, at the beginning of his insanity, rushed in to save that horse
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world of practical affairs, other than good lawyers, act as if that
were true? Most either hide from indeterminacy or see in it a
world of power.
COURIER: I can see that, Judge, but it is so hard to see work with
God in so much of what lawyers do?
JUDGE: Because it is so mundane?
COURIER: Well, that, too, but I was thinking because there is so
much complicity with wrong doing.
JUDGE: Well, then, I am about to lose you.
COURIER: You are?
JUDGE: Yes, I was called the other day by an attorney for a ciga-
rette manufacturer who wanted me to consult on a case that might
be brought in this jurisdiction. I could not take the case because
I'm leaving practice, but I probably would have taken it on.
COURIER: That's the complicity part.
JUDGE: I hope it works both ways for you.
COURIER: What do you mean?
JUDGE: I hope you worry just as much about complicity with the
good.
COURIER: I don't follow.
JUDGE: Complicity with what most would see as a good cause,
prosecution of criminals, for example. It's the same issue. But I'll
leave that to get back to my tobacco case. I don't think the prob-
lem of complicity can be solved by withdrawing or refusing to take
the cases you find morally troubling. In fact, that attitude, blinds
you to your complicity in the harm you do in those cases you do
not find morally troubling. In a fallen world you cannot avoid
complicity in evil. You cannot deny that the world is tragic. And
... of course ... this is not an excuse. It is, instead, part of the
truth that allows us to judge evil correctly. The alternative to com-
plicity is not some personal moral purity, but the hope and the pa-
tience - the hope and the patience of the conversation that is our
alternative to force, if you prefer - the hope and the patience I
was talking about.
COURIER: But Judge we don't need the legal conversation to know
that what the cigarette manufacturers are doing is wrong.
JUDGE: Of course not! We need the legal conversation to know
what to do about wrongs, all kind of wrongs, especially those done
in the name of righting wrongs. Look, you are saying, in essence,
from a beating. Did I say that? Sorry. Carried away. Anyhow, take a look at TYLER
T. ROBERTS, CONTESTING SPIRITS: NIETZSCHE, AFFIRMATION, RELIGION (1998) or,
even better, PETER BERKOWITZ, NIETZSCHE: THE ETHICS OF AN IMMORALIST (1995).
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that we know what must be done in this situation. Lawyers just
don't know what others know must be true. This is one of the
many reasons people don't like us. We await the outcome of a
good legal conversation. It takes a lot of patience to do that,
doesn't it? There is nothing more destructive of this conversation,
and of the good it provides, than those who try to make it serve the
known good. You can see that in my prosecution example, can't
you. So I don't really need to pursue that, do I? And when the
"true believers" pursue outcomes other than the conversation's
outcome, trust in the conversation is lost, isn't it? I see that going
on now all the time, don't you?
COURIER: I suppose so.
JUDGE: Lawyers are responsible for the clients they choose; mor-
ally responsible for the work they do.21 But not in the way many
think. Not as an exercise in some personal moral harmony. The
personal moral responsibility of lawyers is a personal responsibility
for those morals carried by the practice such that, for example, the
representation of those with whom we disagree is a moral act. The
selection of clients based on a personal moral agreement with the
justness of the cause, even "all things considered", is a form of de-
nial of moral responsibility for the practice. And I ask you which is
really more important?
COURIER: I suppose - at least in the way you have described the
practice - the morals of the practice. I'm not sure. What did you
mean? Lawyers not knowing what others know?
JUDGE: Do you remember Nathanael?
COURIER: Sure.
JUDGE: Well, Nathanael was willing to go see, with Philip, if "any-
thing good could come out of Nazareth." Most people wouldn't
have bothered to make the trip. Lawyers tend to be more like
Nathanael when they are at their best. (Long pause) Courier, it is
all pretty mundane. Lawyers go about seeing God's work in con-
tractual disputes, in petty domestic squabbles, in slip and falls, and
so forth.22 I've always thought that Christ's messages were much
21. LAW CLERK: Did you notice how the Courier did not ask a question here?
The Judge is off on his own frolic, I think. Sometimes he does this. Sometimes he
seems as if he is arguing with somebody else. It can be annoying.
22. LAW CLERK: Although, it does not look like it, what the Judge is saying here, I
have learned, is connected in his mind with the complex reaction of Saint Thomas
More, a man with whom the Judge is very familiar, to the sanctification of ordinary
life during the Reformation. I have found a very good analysis of this that, while it
does not mention More, helped me make sense of how the Judge makes sense of
More's reaction. See, CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
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the same: do unto others, love your enemies, follow the law except
when it does not make good sense to do so, and live your lives so
that you will come to know what this "good sense" is. God, Christ
announces with His life, is at work in these things with you, so use
your Christian head. This is what is radical and transformative in
the Incarnation, but we want more and this wanting more is itself
the sign of our fallenness. Not evidence of some striving after the
divine, not evidence of the divine spark within us waiting to burst
MODERN IDENTITY 215-229 (1989). For More, it was a theological mistake to think of
monasticism, a practice he conceded was extremely corrupt in his time, as creating a
hierarchy of spiritual life that devalued the ordinary, as a "slur on the spiritual stand-
ing of productive labour and family life." Id. at 218. More, for all his horrible polem-
ics against Luther - Is there any writing in all of literature more disappointing? -
was in the awkward position for a good Catholic of agreeing both with Luther's as-
sessment of the conditions of the Church and his efforts to sanctify ordinary life
(although the latter is not how Luther would have described what he was doing for he
shared with More a fear of a peasant's revolt). For More, Luther, of course, was
making a horrible theological mistake, a heresy that risked the salvation of others.
Sanctification of ordinary life could only come, he knew, through the ongoing tradi-
tion of the Church, a tradition maintained best through the conversation of the Coun-
cil. He saw, better than most, the future that Luther offered and it frightened him to
death.
More, one of the patron saints of lawyering, tried to live a life of faith mediated by
the Church through his work as a lawyer, a work that he saw as deeply connected to
the sacraments because all things must be. He tried, then, to live out as a lawyer his
theological argument against Luther (and he did a better job of it this way than
through his polemics). More believed Luther could lead us one of two ways: a
Church destroying liberalism or a fierce Puritanism that substituted obedience and
command for the ongoing work with God that is the continuing creation of the world
and he wanted to live his life in opposition to both.
I do not think that More would have been troubled at all, and might even have
agreed, with Mill's criticism of the toll on human lives of Calvinists' efforts to make
strict obedience a central virtue. Like modern fundamentalists, these Calvinists
thought that the rigidity of command could take over the role of the living tradition in
maintaining the strictures of Christianity and, in so thinking, they tried to substitute
dead words for a living faith. Or so, I think More would have thought and so, I think,
the Judge would as well. My apologies to you if this footnote goes too far afield from
the dialogue or if it does not interest you. Prompted by the Judge's interest in him, I
have read a lot about More recently and I wanted to get some use out of it. There are
a lot of books on More these days, but I want to warn you that most people see in
More whatever they want to see and what they want to see is often their own reflec-
tion. Can you imagine that? You would be truly amazed at the odd uses people have
made of More's life. Among the works I have read, the best article I found for the
Judge's purposes, the one I am going to copy for him because it is so close to what he is
saying here, is Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas Shaffer, Hope Faces Power: Thomas
More and the King of England, in STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE To-
DAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, WORLD AND LIVING IN BETWEEN 199-219 (1988). This is
true despite the fact that the authors rely almost entirely upon the More of Bolt's A
MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, a More that, to my reading, bears only a resemblance to the
"real" More. The Judge will probably want to be more careful with the facts of
More's life.
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into self-consuming flame. The opposite, I think. It is yet another
way of avoiding the God in whom we would see our own responsi-
bility for the good. Surely there is for all Christians a banality of
goodness that we deny at our peril. (Pauses) But I fight a losing
battle in saying this, Courier, because everyone wants more.
Doesn't help to say, I suppose, that there is a form of sainthood
possible within these ordinary lawyer lives.23
COURIER: And an understanding of evil as well?
JUDGE: Yes, a distinctive way of seeing a separation from God in
those who seek to take themselves out of history, out of co-Crea-
tion, and out of responsibility. We can see a demonic in our institu-
tions, including our churches. We can see a politics based on the
motivations of a quest for the security of simplicity, of intolerance
of ambiguity and complexity, of avoiding the need to wrestle with
the world so that it reflects our own work. A politics of impatience
and fear. Notice how the practice of law run counter to these prac-
tices, proceeding, as it does, in hope and with faith in the potential
redemption of the fallen. Lawyering resist those who do not keep
talking things out, who do not see in the openings provided by the
complexity of our minds, the openings through which God's grace
23. LAW CLERK: Early on, after the Judge told the Courier about McClendon, I
thought I should read him. In one section of the book the Judge refers to, McClendon
relies upon Guardini to recall something similar to what the Judge is saying in the text
here:
So Guardini turns to speak of a "new kind of saint," who can embody sanity
in this generation. In effect, his book is an evangelistic summons to take up
the way of practical holiness in daily life. This way, however, is not nowa-
days to be that of detachment or asceticism; it is to be fulfilled by a self-
abandoning obedience to God's directives just as these are mediated by the
secular situations in which one finds oneself. The saint's way is, therefore,
not to be extraordinary; no one will easily identify a modern saint. 'Their
surrounds are standardized: they work in laboratories, in factories, in ad-
ministrative agencies . . . lives in homes which are often the same to the
slightest detail ... dress the same ... are subject to uniform 'packages' of
education, entertainment, legislation. In such an environment, how could
they lead a Christian way of life which had to express itself in extraordinary
religious practices and experiences? They would have to become strangers
to their own ways of existence; they themselves would have to recognize
their lives as absurdities.' Nevertheless, there is a particular saintly task for
today, and that is the task of changing or reshaping the world God has en-
trusted to human beings. For even today, "man is still answerable for the
world, and the world is entrusted to man .... His mission is not a 'profane'
task paralleling the religious one. It is of itself and as such religious or rather
Christian. In the final analysis there is one obedience, one service which
man owes God in his faith and in his work."
McClendon, supra note 18, at 157 (citations omitted.) I cannot get over how good
that is. I can see why the Judge recommended it.
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can come. Lawyers are, at their best, people trained to live in Bib-
lical times. But it is hard to accept. Hard to see it because it's not
romantic. It is anti-romantic, if that's a word, and romanticism is
how we have come to define our personal selves. (Pauses. Lighter
now.) But enough blathering...
COURIER: Blathering, Judge? I don't...
JUDGE: (Interrupting) Someone is going to want to cut my head off
one of these days for trying to be a good lawyer, trying to turn
disputes about power into conversations about words, trying to
hold on to the traditions in which we come to know who we really
are. There you have it. (Smiles) I have caught myself romanti-
cizing. (Gets up from his chair slowly) Haven't you had enough
from this Christian lawyer? My mundane advice to you is that if
you want to be a Christian lawyer do the things Christians have
done to remain Christians for two thousand years. You know the
rest. Probably better than I do. Isn't much, is it?
COURIER: No, I think it is... uh...
JUDGE: (Interrupting) Tell you what. Let's stay in touch. Here's
my card, let me write in the new phone number.
COURIER: Thank you, Judge. You are ....
JUDGE: (Interrupting again as if uncomfortable) No need; enjoyed
it. And Courier?
COURIER: Yes.
JUDGE: No more Tyndale. Go find a good clinician.
The Courier left quickly after shaking the Judge's hands, took
the elevator down to the parking garage, and drove out into the
sparse late night city traffic towards the interstate that would take
him back to his apartment near the Law School. The radio was on
when he started the car, tuned to the college station as it usually
was, but he didn't notice it. As he was approaching his exit, the
words of the song being played slowly came to his attention: ...
I've seen your flag on the marbled arch, but love is not a victory
march; it's a cold and it's a broken Hallelujah.. . " and he recog-
nized the young man's voice . . . "It's not a cry that you hear at
night; it's not somebody who's seen the light; it's a cold and it's a
broken Hallelujah..." and he wondered if the miracled world was
not much more romantic than the good judge knew.24
24. LAW CLERK: He was listening to Leonard Cohen's song, Hallelujah, as per-
formed by the late Jeff Buckley. There are numerous versions of this song. I only
found the quoted verses in the version sung by Buckley. Okay, that's it for me.
Thanks for reading.
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FORGIVENESS AND THE LAW -
A REDEMPTIVE OPPORTUNITY
Douglas B. Ammar*
I. LYNN'S STORY
Lynn's uncle, a former client, and her mother approached us, the
Georgia Justice Project ("GJP") about representing Lynn. When
I took the case, Lynn would barely talk to me. She was still in
shock from the shooting. We tried to work with Lynn on her
shock. Lynn grew to talk more about what had happened and the
role that she played in this horrible incident.
Lynn and her cousin, both teenaged African-American girls,
drove up near a pay phone outside a convenience store in subur-
ban Atlanta. Their car was loud and the noise disturbed Matt, a
twenty-two-year-old white man, who was making a phone call.
After a brief interchange, Matt began cussing and threatening
Lynn and her cousin. The two cousins quickly left and went di-
rectly to the motel room where Lynn's cousin's boyfriend (Joe)
was staying.
Joe and two friends, all between eighteen and twenty years old,
were in the room. They were drinking and smoking. After hear-
ing what happened, they demanded to be taken back to the store.
Minutes later, the group of five arrived at the store. Matt was still
on the phone. Unbeknownst to everyone else, Joe had a gun.
After the car stopped near the store, Joe and one of his friends got
out and walked toward the pay phones. Joe picked up a phone
near Matt and acted like he was making a call. Suddenly and
without warning, Joe pulled out a gun and opened fire. One shot
pierced through Matt's mouth, another straight through the heart,
another in the chest, another in the groin area, and a fifth shot in
his leg. Without a word, Matt was killed in cold blood.
Joe and his friend quickly ran back to the car that was waiting
beside the convenience store. The five sped away and went back
to the motel. It took the police several weeks to find out who was
* Douglas B. Ammar is currently the Executive Director of the Georgia Justice
Project (the "GJP"), where he has practiced criminal defense for the past ten years.
The GJP is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to provide justice for the indi-
gent criminally accused, and to help them become productive citizens. The author
wishes to thank J.C. Hillis for his generous time and energy in this effort.
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responsible for the killing. A confidential tip led the police to all
five involved in the shooting - including Lynn.
In their statements to the police, everyone but Lynn gave varying
and inconsistent stories. Eventually, they were all charged with
the murder.
Fortunately, the prosecutor was fair and understanding. He did
not believe that anyone but the trigger-man (Joe) was guilty of
murder. Therefore, Lynn got a break. After many meetings with,
and memos to, the prosecutor, Lynn was allowed to plead guilty
to conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Her sentence was
120 days in a detention center with five years of probation to
follow.
During the months leading up to trial, we worked with Lynn, en-
couraging her to address her grief. She began by writing a letter
to Matt's family. Lynn sympathized with their pain. The letter
eventually resulted in a meeting with Matt's father. This occurred
outside the courtroom after Lynn and three other co-defendants
were sentenced. Four of us stood in a circle. Lynn and her
mother cried as they expressed their sorrow over the senseless loss
of life. Her head lowered as she sobbed and begged forgiveness.
Matt's father wept as he listened. He said he was glad that she
contacted him and that she was the only defendant to approach
him. He could not forgive her yet, he said. He was hurt and an-
gry. But some day, he said, he hoped he could.
I wept, too, as the four of us stood in a circle, sharing the grief
and the pain. This is what healing is about. These are the mo-
ments when a law practice is redeemed - possibly even trans-
formed. Moments of healing like this is where we might all begin
to be redeemed - by willingly entering the circle of pain and
suffering, by being exposed to and embracing the suffering of
another.
Forgiveness is not easy, and sometimes not possible, especially in
criminal cases. Even when intentionally fostered, there is very lit-
tle room for forgiveness in the court system. There is rawness in
this kind of opportunity, a brushing up against difficult things.
Some suggest it is a journey we should not be too quick to en-
courage others to take. Others think it is the only journey that
offers us hope.
I believe I was asked to be involved with The Role of Forgiveness
in the Law Symposium at Fordham University School of Law be-
cause of my work with the GJP. The GJP is a legal nonprofit or-
ganization in Atlanta, Georgia. The GJP's unique approach to
criminal defense and rehabilitation is based on a relationship ethic,
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a community-oriented ethic. I have been connected with GJP since
1986, a few months after John Pickens, a refugee from the corpo-
rate practice of law, founded the project. It is our work - working
with the poor and the homeless, it is in our "street lawyering" ap-
proach, and it is our long-term and innovative involvement with
those in the criminal justice system - that informs my view on
forgiveness.
H. ON NOT KNOWING How TO FORGIVE: A RESPONSE TO
JEFFRIE MURPHY'
In cases of criminal wrongdoing, the propriety of forgiveness
hinges upon at least three fundamental considerations: 1) the vic-
tim's selfhood; 2) the moral significance of forgiveness for the of-
fender; and 3) the wellbeing of the community. It is only by
respecting each of these concerns that the moral value of forgive-
ness becomes most apparent. Yet, it is not always apparent. On
the one hand, an act of forgiveness may come only after much in-
ner turmoil and anguish, as when a particularly heinous crime has
been committed and the victim is left to put the broken pieces back
together. Forgiveness in such cases usually arises from a steadfast
religious faith or an enduring moral commitment. On the other
hand, forgiveness is invariably wedded to particular circumstances:
our street, that house, his anger, that knife, her body, your friend,
his blood. Amid such circumstances and emotions, forgiveness
may or may not see the light of day. Yet, the interruption of peo-
ple's lives by a criminal offense and the possibility of living beyond
it make forgiveness an issue. Forgiveness is foremost, though not
exclusively, an issue for the victim, and it is for this reason that one
must consider the victim's selfhood.
What is at stake when someone is the victim of a crime? In addi-
tion to her relations both to the offender and to the larger commu-
nity, the victim's relation to herself has been called into question.
In a sense, the criminal has challenged the notion that the victim is
a person of equal worth and value. In the aftermath of the crime,
the victim may feel compelled to reassert her own sense of identity
and self-worth. Complicating things, it seems, is the possibility of
forgiveness. For if the victim should choose to forgive the offender,
the "language" through which she expresses forgiveness is bound-
1. Parts II and III are co-authored by Patrick R. Leland, who recently finished
his Masters of Theological Studies at Emory University in Atlanta. Patrick has been a
volunteer and intern at the GJP for about a year and one-half. He has been
instrumental in starting a juvenile program at GJP.
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up with the language through which she reasserts her own value as
a human being, and the danger arises that the former message
might very well drown out the latter. In a culture historically influ-
enced by exhortations to Christian charity, knowing when not to
forgive has become something of a problem for some people.
A. Murphy's Focus on the Victim's Selfhood
Recent attempts to resolve this dilemma find expression in Jef-
frie Murphy's work on forgiveness as a qualified moral virtue.2 For
our purposes, Murphy's work is significant in that it articulates a
criterion for adjudicating the appropriateness of forgiveness and
that it does so with direct reference to the victim's selfhood. Spe-
cifically, Murphy has articulated an ethic of forgiveness, or, de-
pending upon the circumstances, an ethic of resentment, based
upon the primary value of self-respect.3 For Murphy, an individual
has a moral obligation to respect all individuals (including oneself)
as ends in themselves. Failure to respect another human being
properly runs contrary to one's moral duty. Failure to respect one-
self is no less of a moral offense. Thus, the victim may bestow for-
giveness upon an offender so long as doing so does not encroach
upon the victim's sense of self-respect. Forgiveness and reasserting
one's self-worth are not immediately compatible. In such cases,
Murphy argues for the moral value of resentment as a means of
restoring the equilibrium.4
The driving force behind Murphy's proposal is a formal ethic, the
fundamental structure of which was articulated in the philosophy
of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, all human beings in possession of a
will and capable of reason are subject to the moral law.' This law is
universally binding for all rational beings and presents itself to us
as soon as we become conscious of our freedom to act. Moral obli-
gation is thus determined by the instrument of universal reason, as
exemplified in the oft-cited formula of Kant's categorical impera-
tive: "conduct yourself in such a way that the maxim of your will
could always simultaneously function as the giving of a universal
law."'6 Phrased somewhat differently, when considering the moral
2. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14 (1988).
3. See id. at 14-34.
4. See id.
5. See IMMANUEL KANT, KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNET 32 (Karl Vor-
linder ed., 1990) [hereinafter KANT, KRITIK]; IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRC-
TICAL REASON 3 (Mary Gregor trans., 1997).
6. KANT, KRITIK, supra note 5, at 30.
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propriety of your behavior, pursue only those actions that you
could honestly desire to become universal human conduct. As sug-
gested earlier, this ethical construal of how one should conduct
oneself is fundamentally formal in the sense that it abstracts from
all particularities and relies solely on the rational form of ethical
behavior - its sole criterion being that it rationally conforms to
the universal law.
Murphy's rationale for deciding when the victim should and
should not forgive her offender emanates from the scheme moral
decision-making espoused by Kant. For Murphy, as with Kant, all
rational persons have a responsibility to respect the rules of moral-
ity. Among these rules exists the obligation to respect all persons
as ends in themselves. When a crime is committed against a per-
son, the victim is denigrated and rendered less than human. As a
rational being, the victim is morally obligated in the first instance
to respect, or in this case reassert, her own self-worth. For Mur-
phy, this may take the form of moral indignation, or resentment,
directed at the offender. Furthermore, it is only after she has ful-
filled her obligation to the moral law that the victim may consider
bestowing forgiveness upon the criminal.
B. Limitations of Murphy's Proposal
Jeffrie Murphy's proposal is admirable on several counts. Fore-
most, perhaps, is that it provides a rational recourse - if not a
source of accountability - for persons who might otherwise for-
give too much; or, in other words, persons whose commitment to
the virtue of charity inadvertently sustains the very denigration of
selfhood which made the criminal act offensive in the first place.
Yet, the manner in which Murphy suggests that we think of forgive-
ness and resentment has some serious weaknesses - limitations
that are arguably inherent in any Kantian ethic. We will briefly
discuss two of these difficulties.
One limitation is that the Kantian character of Murphy's propo-
sal lends itself to a variant of narcissism. If one carefully examines
the moral deliberations of the victim from within the context of
rational moral decision-making, which Murphy advocates, one
finds the victim morally obligated to enter a narcissistic vacuum.
In this vacuum all particularities are excluded leaving only the indi-
vidual and the rational moral law.
It is only from within this vacuum, that is, solely by means of the
universal moral law, that the victim can arrive at an ethical decision
as to whether she should forgive, hate or resent the person who
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wronged her. When the victim asks herself, "Should I forgive
him?," the voice she hears is not that of her friends or community,
but rather the impersonal voice of the universal law, the voice of
reason, the voice for everyone, every time.7 It is not someone
outside of the victim's head who proclaims the long-awaited an-
swer. Rather, the voice emanates from within; with logical preci-
sion the voice arises from the very core of her identity.8 When the
victim asks, "Should I forgive him?," the only voice she can hear is
her own. In a consumer society saturated with narcissism, espous-
ing an ethic that arguably reifies some of our worst tendencies
seems questionable, to say the least.
A second limitation, and one that is more pertinent to the inter-
ests of this essay, consists in the fact that Murphy's account of for-
giveness and moral resentment strikes us as decidedly non-
relational. In the moment of moral deliberation, when the victim
might entertain the possibility of forgiveness, the fundamental axis
upon which everything moves is not the victim's relationship to her
community, much less her relationship to the offender, but rather
the victim's exclusive obligation to fulfill the moral law. As sug-
gested earlier, it is only when the moral equilibrium that regards all
persons as ends in themselves is restored and, with that, the vic-
tim's own sense of self-worth, that the victim may morally forgive
the criminal. Of course, this may yield the positive result of af-
firming the victim's selfhood. Yet, even this is questionable.9 More
problematic though is the fact that, for Murphy, one's moral obli-
gation to a rationally-mediated universal law presumably takes
precedence over all particular human relationships.
As is the case in the Kantian schema, where one abstracts from
the particularities of a situation in order to apprehend rationally
the formal principle of right conduct, the victim's primary response
to the criminal is formulated from within a vacuum where only the
universal moral law is present. All particularities are discounted,
regardless of whether the offender is a fourteen-year-old child, the
old man across the street, a lover from years past, or anyone else.
In this scenario, morally speaking, you and I never relate to each
other directly. Rather, my relationship to you is always mediated
7. See Jacques-Alain Miller et al., A Discussion of Lacan's "Kant with Sade," in
READING SEMINARS I AND II: LACAN'S RETURN TO FREUD 222 (Richard Feldstein et
al. eds., 1996).
8. See id. at 230.
9. Indeed, is there not something existentially dissatisfying about deriving one's
sense of self-worth - even if only temporarily - from a moral obligation?
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by the imperative that my conduct be universally valid for all per-
sons in my (and never our) situation. Thus, you and I, and all
human beings are atomized, separated, as it were, into our cubicles
of individual moral responsibility. Later, when we consider the sta-
tus of the victim in the criminal justice system, the significance of
this non-relational character will become more apparent.
III. THE CRIMINAL LAW: HISTORY AND ISSUES
A. The Role of History
The leaders in the restorative justice movement 10 urge us to look
to the past. There was a major shift in criminal law approximately
one thousand years ago. When William the Conqueror successfully
invaded England, though he was king, he found that his hold over
the people and nobility was lacking. In looking for a way to get the
nobility to pay him respect, he devised an innovative strategy.
Starting at first with violent "crimes," he and his son following him
(King Henry I) made the offender pay the State (either with money
or other penalties)." William injected the State in the resolution of
disputes among citizens.
Prior to this change in English law, even violent offenses had
avenues of making the victim whole (for example, the State rein-
forced a community ethic by making the offender compensate the
victim).' 2 This tradition of the State requiring healing, compensa-
tion or restitution was present in the laws of many cultures.' 3 The
10. Howard Zehr, considered by many to be the contemporary father of restora-
tive justice, summarized restorative justice as: "Crime is a violation of people and
relationships. It creates obligations to make things right. Justice involves victim, the
offender, and the community in a search for solutions which promote repair, reconcili-
ation, and reassurance." HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 181 (1973). He com-
pares this with a retributive justice model, which he defines as: "Crime is a violation
of the state, defined by lawbreaking and guilt. Justice determines blame and adminis-
ters pain in a contest between the offender and the state directed by systematic rules."
Id.
11. See DANIEL W. VAN NESS, CRIME AND ITS VICTIMS 66-68 (1986).
12. See id. at 64-66.
13. See id. For example, in Mesopotamia around 1700 B.C., the code of
Eshnunna, allocated specific levels of compensation when victims lost noses, eyes,
ears or teeth. In the Iliad, Homer refers to victim restitution - even paying a family
after their brother was murdered. Roman law (under the Law of the Twelve Tables in
approximately 449 B.C.) mandated that a thief pay back the victim as many as four
times the amount stolen, depending on the circumstances and discovery of the theft.
Restitution, even in violent offenses, was allowed in Sumeria under the code of Ur-
Nammu in about 2050 B.C. Lex Salica, a German tribal law during the late 400s
A.D., provided for restitution as the remedy in "crimes" from thefts to murder cases.
See id. at 64-65.
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emphasis was on healing and reconciliation between the victim and
the offender (for example, if you stole your neighbor's horse or if
you physically assaulted and injured him, you made your neighbor
whole). After the change in English law, harming your neighbor is
a crime against the State.
Thus, English criminal law took a major shift with William the
Conqueror. Essentially, what the new king did was to replace the
victim with the State. Crimes were now considered against the
State, and the offender owed, first and foremost, the State. Today,
it is accepted almost without question that when someone breaks
the law (criminal law) his or her primary obligation is to the State,
and not to restore the broken relationship with the victim.
B. The Status of the Victim in Murphy's Proposal
Murphy's emphasis is on the victim's obligation to the moral law.
He seems to want to restore a damaged relationship, but the "rela-
tionship" that he primarily emphasizes is that between the victim
and the moral law. This is not a human relationship. Keeping (or
restoring) the abstract equilibrium is his primary concern.
One could argue that Murphy and those who offer theoretical
underpinnings to support a thousand-year-old displacement of
power and relationships are supporting a thousand-year-old mis-
take. Perhaps they are political philosophers offering argument for
why our society gives so much power to the State. It strains reason
to understand why an offender owes the State anything for stealing
his neighbor's goat (or Lexus). These are legitimate complexities.
Murphy's concern for relationships is well placed. Yet, Murphy
is inadvertently serving the same role as William the Conqueror by
offering a rationale that keeps the victim removed from the more
true and vital relationship in a criminal case. One could argue that
he is replacing William's state with the moral law. Both paths lead
away from true restoration, however.
The primary relationship, contrary to Murphy's view, is one be-
tween the victim and the offender, not the victim and the moral
law, nor the offender and the State. Murphy's approach is piece-
meal. Also, Murphy perpetuates the victim's status as victim -
that of not having power. To accept Murphy's arguments, opportu-
nities for the victim to be anything other than a wounded, and pos-
sibly vocal, recipient of the offender's bad conduct are slight.'4 He
14. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: the Role of the Victim, in RETRIBUTION
RECONSIDERED: MoRE ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61 (1992) (almost argu-
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is reinforcing the victim status and giving them neither the tools
nor the opportunity to move beyond it.
C. Restorative Hope
The current state of our criminal justice system leaves more vic-
tims than it finds. Victims lie in its wake by increasing what is con-
sidered a crime, by increasing mandatory sentences, by exploding
prison populations, by eroding our civil liberties (which is often jus-
tified to the public as a price for the war on drugs), and by not
offering the chance for healing and reconciliation. In our experi-
ence, victims are rarely involved in the resolution of cases.'5 In
fact, some trends and practices, such as "no drop" policies 6 , re-
mind us who has the power and who does not. It is no surprise that
the State wins these metaphysical tug-of-war matches. Yet, restor-
ative justice offers the possibility of hope.
Roughly speaking, restorative justice emphasizes that the resolu-
tion of a criminal case should lie in a dialog-based process between
the community, the victim, and the offender. Restorative justice
has profoundly affected the way we in our office practice criminal
defense. It properly pulls back the power of the State and re-allo-
cates it between the victim and the offender within the context of
the larger community. It offers the chance for healing.
D. Hope's Limitations
Though an obvious proponent of the restorative justice move-
ment, I also am witness to its limitations. I practice criminal de-
fense law in the Deep South. To the best of my knowledge, most of
the successful Victim Offender Reconciliation Programs
("VORPs") and other restorative justice practices do not take
place in the South. Instead, they seem to do well (or at least have a
chance of survival) in communities that are more homogenous than
the South. Perhaps in those communities it is easier for the victim
to recognize that they are members of a common community.
ing for the "Victims' Rights Movement" - advocating for a larger role in the criminal
justice system).
15. For instance, in one case the victim contacted the GJP in referring the client to
our office. He wanted to be involved in the outcome of the case. In discussing and
subsequently resolving the case with the district attorney, the victim was intentionally
left totally out of the process by the district attorney, even after I tried to have the
victim included.
16. See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses
to Violent Injustice, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 967, 977 (1998) ("[No-drop policies deprive
or constrict the victim's choices and refuse deference to her own assessment ... ").
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In the South, the criminal justice system operates also as a social
control device. With the highest incarceration rates in the country
(and in the United States, which is second in the world), the crimi-
nal justice system acts to oppress African-Americans, the poor, and
other minorities. Howard Zehr, one of the present-day fathers of
restorative justice, told me a few years ago that attempts to locate a
VORP in Atlanta, the self-proclaimed "human rights capital of the
world," failed. The racial divide is a massive gorge to cross and
perhaps is particularly daunting when one side is harmed.
My experience in employing the above principles of healing rein-
forces my view. We are often successful at some form of reconcili-
ation - most often when the perpetrator and the victim are of the
same race. While attending The Role of Forgiveness in the Law
Symposium at Fordham University School of Law, I was informed
of a failed attempt to bring together our juvenile African-Ameri-
can client and his white victim of armed robbery. On the tele-
phone, the wife of the victim ranted about race issues and
obviously saw our client not as a fifteen-year-old child, but as a
black man. It is important here to acknowledge limitations. I be-
lieve these are not limitations in or about the restorative justice
process per se, but instead are issues of our culture, our prejudices,
and our human limitations, which infect all that we do.
IV. THE GEORGIA JUSTICE PROJECT: SOME REFLECTIONS
FROM A RELATIONAL PRACTICE
A. The GJP: History & Mission
Sixteen years ago, as John Pickens walked among the poor and
homeless on his way home one night, his two worlds were in sharp
contrast. As a person of faith, he had been spending years volun-
teering in soup kitchens and shelters. As a high-powered corporate
litigator, he was accustomed to the plush offices and exalted sala-
ries. How could one reality claim to be the most important (his
faith), yet the other demand all of his time and energy? It was
during that walk, as he saw the two worlds juxtaposed, when he
decided to address personally the paradox of privilege versus
poverty.
In April 1986, he entered the paradox of these disparate images
by founding the GJP in Atlanta, Georgia. There are few places in
the country where one can integrate lawyering and social service
simultaneously. The GJP combines both in a unique way to offer
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clients and staff an opportunity to merge these two worlds that
often remain separate and isolated.
Since its beginning, the GJP has been providing crucial services
to the homeless and indigent populations of metropolitan Atlanta
through an innovation that breaks the destructive cycle of crime
and incarceration. The GJP's mission is to do justice for the indi-
gent criminally accused, and take a holistic approach to assist them
in establishing crime-free lives as productive citizens. People are
initially referred to the GJP because they have a criminal case
pending and cannot afford to hire an attorney. They become a
GJP client if they are committed to making a life change and be-
coming a productive member of society.
Our relationship with our clients does not end when the case is
over. If our clients go to prison, we continue to visit them. We
advocate for their needs and their release. Once released from
prison or jail, we offer a variety of social services such as individual
and group counseling, GED and literacy classes, monthly support
dinners, and employment with our business New Horizon
Landscaping.
Transformation, both theirs and ours, begins when we meet our
clients. During the initial stage (legal representation), we establish
the foundation of trust upon which all our programs are based. By
providing quality and caring representation to the indigent, we are
reversing the way legal services have been traditionally available to
the poor. We make sure our representation is both thorough and
personal and that the client is involved in all stages of the represen-
tation, not just at the courthouse on the day of trial.
The GJP is supported solely by private sources. We do not seek
government funding. Because we are independent of the court sys-
tem, we have total control over our caseload. Thus, we maintain an
independent status with regard to the court system.
17
B. Relationships are the Key to the GJP's Approach
"When a poor person is accused of a crime, most of society sees
this as the end; Georgia Justice Project sees it as a beginning. "
17. This also gives me a unique perspective in this discussion - especially given
that everyone on my panel was (or is) employed by either the Justice Department or a
State's prosecutor's office. As the only criminal defense lawyer (to the best of my
knowledge) at the Symposium, it is incumbent upon me to address one point - of
standing up for the outcast, of being united with those in our communities that are
ostracized. This ethic is not only part of many religious traditions (including mine -
Christian), it is also (I hope) part of the American legal culture.
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Martha Barnett, President-elect, American Bar Association
The most unique and most powerful aspect of our work is that it
is relationship driven. At GJP, we seek long lasting, redemptive
relationships with our clients. It is not uncommon for our staff to
spend time every week with clients whose cases have been over for
years. Some of this time might be structured (e.g. counseling,
working with our landscaping company). Some of the time is infor-
mal - our clients know that there are folks who care about them.
One of our supporters describes the work of GJP as forming a sec-
ond family for our clients. The attorney-client relationship is only
the beginning of the relationship, not the end. It does not act as
the sole temporal boundary of our relationship.
Without a relationship, without working toward it, without in-
cluding it in the paradigm of the criminal justice system, there can-
not be any forgiveness. There needs to be space, creating
opportunity for relationships to begin and grow. Indeed, it is in
this creating of space, that there is need for reform and change -
from the big picture to the small - that creates the possibility of
forgiveness and reconciliation.
In the end, it is the status of the relationship (whether one exists,
whether such a relationship can be fostered) that is at the heart of
forgiveness. Relationship is at the core of restorative justice. For
forgiveness to be a possibility in the criminal justice system, the
issue of relationship is central.
C. Forgiveness
To address forgiveness, to suggest that it has any place at all in
the criminal justice system, is to imply that there is, or could be, or
even should be a relationship. What relationship? The relation-
ship is between the offender and the victim. It suggests some level
of relationship beyond the current criminal justice configuration.
To suggest, or even to advocate for, the possibility of forgiveness
proposes giving the victim more of a role - not less - in the crim-
inal justice system. Before parties can reach the issue of forgive-
ness, there first must be a window of opportunity and space for two
parties to interact.
Should the victim and offender, through some form of mediation
or reconciliation process, not be able to reach forgiveness, even
that conclusion is one that can empower the victim. The result is a
process that creates more options, and not less, for the victim (and
possibly the offender). Most systems today resign the victim to the
dis-empowered role of witness for the prosecution. Reconciliation,
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restitution, even "venting" of one's anger, are all important oppor-
tunities that allow healing. Unfortunately, all of these are the ex-
ception and not the rule.
Overall, I suggest that opening the process to include a wider set
of options benefits everyone. The only winner in keeping the sys-
tem is the State, which continues to retain the power. 18 Empower-
ing the victim and communities is a healthier and more holistic
model.
D. The Practice
The GJP's practice is representing the poor in Atlanta's inner
city. It is this and our relationship ethic that informs our perspec-
tive on forgiveness.19 Having been favorably influenced by restora-
tive justice principles, our office seeks, where appropriate, to work
toward healing not just with our clients but with the victim too.
18. I found it interesting that in discussing these issues at the symposium, many
folks voiced: But what about the State? What about the criminal justice system?
Here is where I ask those questioners to expand their horizons. Are they so con-
cerned about the State losing power or position? I suggest that we as lawyers, as
concerned citizens, ought to be very careful and concerned when the State gains more
power over the citizenry. I also suggest that the State will always take care of itself.
Indeed, the more power we, as a society, give to the State, the more that power is
most often used against the weakest citizens. In our current criminal justice system,
nationally 80-90% of those in its grasp are poor. As middle class folks, giving more
police and incarceration power to the State will probably have little impact on our
lives. Most assuredly, it will and does adversely impact the poor, the minority, the
powerless.
19. If we began to see everyone in our community as part of our community, then
we might become invested in everyone's condition. To the extent that our community
is better, everyone benefits. If anyone in the community improves, then the whole
community improves. Even those who are accused of (and those who commit) crimes
are part of our community. Most non-violent offenders are getting out of prison and
coming back . . . to our community. There are many issues related to our soaring
prison population (such as the increased incarceration rates for non-violent offend-
ers). Regardless, we are inextricably bound to each other.
Some lines in our society are easier to draw than others. Though I doubt it is a
recent phenomenon, the "us-them" continuum has been recently reinforced. One of
the most pervasive ways this occurs in our culture is the criminal justice system. Per-
haps with the fall of the Iron Curtain and Eastern European communism, America
needed a new common enemy. The criminally accused and convicted seem to be the
largest recipients of our collective wrath. Indeed, in our growing rush to judgement,
we often lose our humanity by denying the humanity of the offender. We lose our
perspective by seeing only the criminal as someone other than a fellow member of our
community. Saddest of all, our society has continually given more power to the State
to keep "those people" away from "us." Prison populations are at an all time high -
highest in the Western world - and constitutional liberties are on the ropes. Might
we be ready to turn a corner out of this dark period of our recent history?
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In cases where we believe it appropriate, this first and foremost
translates into not sacrificing our client's legal rights in the guilt-
innocence phase - we pursue restitution and forgiveness. We
often contact and include the victim in our case plan, even in vio-
lent cases. It is not uncommon for the victim to become an advo-
cate for our client, sometimes contacting the prosecutor
independently and coming to court at our request. My experience
has been that we are far more likely to contact and work with the
victim than the prosecution. Too often the victim is seen merely as
"just another witness" by the prosecutor.
On a number of occasions, the victim has contacted us. Knowing
of our social service program and long-term approach, most of
these victims contacted us with the hope that we can work with the
offender to address the underlying issues that led to the offense.
To most criminal defense lawyers, the idea of asking forgiveness
is tantamount to a confession. Indeed, following conventional wis-
dom, what lawyer sabotages his or her own case? I have rarely
seen forgiveness or apology employed by a criminal defense lawyer
either tactically or for moral considerations. The current configur-
ation of evidence law and ethical standards governing the profes-
sion do not allow much room for having a client "confess" by
apologizing or asking forgiveness. It is understandable why so
many criminal defense lawyers would not encourage their clients to
seek forgiveness. On the other hand, too many practitioners are
stuck on seeing only one fight - the guilt or innocence issue. So
many lawyers forget that seeking forgiveness can have an impact
on the second phase of a criminal case. Perhaps because GJP does
so much alternative sentencing with our regular caseload, we are
more prone to incorporate "radical" strategies.
There is plenty of room for the criminal defense bar to examine
the practice and look for "forgiveness openings." Just as alterna-
tive dispute resolution has revolutionized the practice in the civil
arena, there is an opportunity for substantial change on the crimi-
nal side. Though there are structural limitations, some of that
change needs to come from those most closely allied with the
defendant.
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V. TED'S STORY: MORE THAN JUST CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
The Judge looked at Ted. "Do you have anything to say?"
"Yes," Ted responded, "I'd like to say something to the victim."
The courtroom grew silent. Ted turned to face the victim. Un-
rehearsed and unplanned, Ted said:
I had many months in jail to think about what I did, about who I
was and about choices I made .... I am a better person now ....
And I am sorry about what I did .... I was wrong. And I ask
you to forgive me.
The courtroom was still holding its breath. Everyone was
stunned, including us.
It started on a cool spring morning, as church was ending, some-
one tapped me on the shoulder. "Doug, my grandson is in
trouble. He's in jail. They say he robbed some other boys of
their jackets. Could you help him?" My church, a small Episco-
pal outreach in Atlanta's inner city, is composed of all kinds of
folks: black and white, rich and poor. Although GJP turns down
ninety percent of those who ask for help, I knew I would have a
hard time saying no to this concerned and troubled grandmother.
"We'll look into it," I said.
Ted was a likeable eighteen-year-old. Though he dropped out of
high school, he was smart and well spoken. While in jail, he
earned his GED. Ted impressed everyone who talked with him.
He was a nice kid, but one who made some bad choices. He
spent over six months in jail before we got him a bond. When he
was released he came to work on NHL (New Horizon Landscap-
ing - our company operated to employ clients). In addition, he
attended individual and group counseling sessions with our staff
The case didn't look good. He was charged with two counts of
armed robbery. There were two eyewitnesses. Despite this, he
vigorously proclaimed his innocence. GJP's custom is to believe
our clients unless we can prove otherwise. It was not long into
our investigation that we realized, despite his claims, Ted would
be convicted if we went to trial. We confronted Ted and he told
the truth - that he robbed two teenagers of their jackets. It was
then that I asked him to write a letter - a letter asking forgiveness
of the victims.
In the world of criminal defense, writing this kind of letter is lu-
nacy - a sure way to get your client sent "down the road." How-
ever, it could not get any worse. He was looking at twenty years,
at least. GJP has a different philosophy. We are about healing
our clients and the community.
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For the next few weeks, Ted continued to work on NHL. He was
making progress. He talked about his past, his mistakes, and his
pain. He began composing a letter to the kids he had robbed.
The court date came faster than we expected. Due in large part to
a district attorney ("D.A. ") who had heard of GJP's program and
our success with other clients, a miraculous plea bargain was ne-
gotiated - four-month boot camp and eight years of first offender
probation.
The morning of Ted's public act of forgiveness, the courtroom
was crowded. Lawyers, clients, and court staff were running
around. We stopped by the victim's house and brought him to
court. The D.A. presented his case. Then, GJP told the court
about Ted's work with us.
The judge accepted the sentencing alternative. As of this writing,
Ted is still in boot camp - though he should be out in a month or
so. In a letter we recently received, he wrote:
I have learned to take responsibility for my actions ....
I now see where I was making mistakes in my life .... I
have learned to accept the past and try to prepare myself
for the future .... I miss the concern, help, and love that
GJP has shown me since I've been a client.
Ted's change would not have been possible without GJP's multi-
faceted approach. We fought for him. We employed him when
he was released on bond. We counseled him and confronted him
about his conduct. We encouraged him to reconcile with his vic-
tim - to heal the division that he created. Indeed, it is that heal-
ing, that joining of folks, joining of responsibility and conduct,
which has been integral to Ted's rehabilitation.
GJP's approach is unique - not just in our services, but also in
our approach with our clients. We believe in them and we en-
courage them to do things that other lawyers might consider im-
prudent. Ted is not out of the woods yet, but he has made
progress. We will be there for him when he is released, and we
will be along side him as his journey continues.
VI. CLOSING THOUGHTS
Forgiveness, -at least creating some paths for its possibility, is
worthwhile for the whole community because it allows reconcilia-
tion and healing - not just for the offender but for the victim and
the community in general. Healing is the goal, the end result. Let
us not too soon foreclose options that lead us toward this goal.
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WHEN VICTIMS SEEK CLOSURE:
FORGIVENESS, VENGEANCE AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Susan Bandes*
As one who has always opposed the death penalty, I find that my
principles are most sorely tested when I hear of the anguish of the
parents of children who have been murdered. As a mother, I won-
der how a parent goes on to live her life each day after such an
unimaginable loss.
In 1996, I read several articles about the upcoming execution of
William Bonin, also known as the Freeway Killer, in Southern Cali-
fornia. Bonin had confessed to killing twenty-one boys and young
men, and was sentenced to death for fourteen of those murders.'
The victims were mostly hitchhikers Bonin had picked up, raped,
brutalized and strangled.2 He had exhibited no remorse, and in-
deed had seemed to delight in torturing the parents when they re-
quested information from him about their sons' deaths.
Sandra Miller, the mother of a fifteen year old boy who Bonin
had raped, tortured and strangled sixteen years earlier, was one of
several parents of victims who said she expected a sense of closure
from Bonin's death. "At the moment before the injection," she
said, she would be seeing her dead son, Rusty, in her mind, and
thinking, "Rusty, it's almost over. He's finally going to pay." 4 A
victims' advocate who had worked with several members of the
families said that "in the aftermath of the emotional devastation
the murders wrought, some of the relatives had virtually put their
lives on hold as the appeals process dragged out. 'Now,' she said,
they hope the execution will 'open the door to being able to go on
with the rest of their lives." 5
Sandra Miller wrote a letter to Bonin which she hoped he would
read just before his execution, which read, in part:
You taught me a few things: How to hate, that I feel I could kill
you, little by little, one piece at a time. You'd best get down on
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. See Carey Goldberg, Families Hope Freeway Killer's Execution Ends Their
Years of Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at A14.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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your hands and knees and pray to God for forgiveness. I don't
know if even He could forgive you. But I hope the Lord can
forgive me for how I feel about you.6
The victims' rights advocate said that none of the family members
she had spoken to had forgiven Mr. Bonin, and she did not advise
them to try. She said "I tell them there are some things we aren't
able to forgive and we should let God do that."'7
A little more than a year ago, Aaron McKinney was spared the
death penalty for the torture and brutal murder of Matthew Shep-
ard, a gay college student McKinney and his friend Russell Hen-
derson had abducted, beaten, burned, tied to a fence and left for
dead.8 Prosecutors said they had wanted to seek the death pen-
alty,9 but apparently the agreement to a sentence of life without
parole came about largely at the insistence of Matthew Shepard's
parents.10
Here is an excerpt from what Dennis Shepard, Matthew's father,
said at McKinney's sentencing hearing:
I would like nothing better than to see you die, Mr. McKinney.
However, this is the time to begin the healing process, to show
mercy to someone who refused to show any mercy, to use this as
the first step in my own closure about losing Matt ..... Mr.
McKinney, I'm going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to
do so, because of Matthew .... You robbed me of something
very precious and I will never forgive you for that. Mr. McKin-
ney, I give you life in the memory of one who no longer lives.
May you have a long life and may you thank Matthew every day
for it."
He also said that he and his wife had supported the plea agree-
ment because it meant no drawn-out appeals process, no chance of
walking free on a technicality or receiving a lighter sentence and no
opportunity for McKinney to become a symbol. He said "[n]o
years of publicity, no chance of commutation . . . just a miserable
future and a more miserable end. It works for me . . "12
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Michael Janofsky, Wyoming Man Get Life Term in Gay's Death, N.Y.
TiMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al.
9. See id. at A23.
10. See id. (citing David M. Smith, a spokesman for the Human Rights Campaign,
which is described as the nation's largest gay rights group).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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It is agonizing to read such statements. Despite the very differ-
ent reactions of these parents, it is obvious that they are all living in
a kind of hell, and are all seeking the elusive state they call " clo-
sure" to help them go on with their lives. Not that they seek to
forget, or to stop grieving, but that they are frozen in a nightmar-
ish, unbearable moment and must find a way to get beyond it, to
achieve some respite from the images that haunt them. Their quo-
tations are about forgiveness and vengeance - both Miller and
Shepard talk about these, though they see the concepts very differ-
ently. Miller seeks closure in execution. She describes a sense that
only capital punishment will come close to righting the moral equi-
librium. 13 She evokes her experience of the long wait for execution
as another kind of torture, another barrier to closure.14 She sees
forgiveness (both of Bonin and of the hatred in her own heart) as
something that will have to come from God.
Shepard is not opposed to execution on principle, but in the case
of his son's torturer and killer, he finds that there may be a more
satisfying punishment in allowing him to live, knowing his life is a
gift from his victim's family. He finds healing will come more
quickly if he forgoes the long appeals process in favor of a quick
and certain final outcome. He, too, has no intention of forgiving,
but his feelings about mercy and vengeance are more complicated.
What are we to make of these very different reactions? We may
feel that one is more sympathetic, 15 more in line with our spiritual
or political beliefs, or more likely to lead to psychological healing;
and we might know how we would hope to react if a child of ours is
brutally murdered. More likely, though, it is something we try
hard not to think about at all, and surely most of us cannot know
how we would react. Therefore, it seems to me we ought to be
very slow to judge what any particular individual in that position
ought to feel or want.
But there is a separate question: the question of the law's proper
role in helping victims or survivors achieve the closure they need.
This is where we do need to judge, and to decide. And where it
becomes important to at least try to untangle what one's religion
13. The parents of some of John Wayne Gacy's victims described a similar convic-
tion. See Larry Oakes, For Parents of Son Murdered By Gacy, The Years of Waiting
Are Finally Over, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRin., May 11, 1994, at Al.
14. See id.
15. Jacoby and Murphy both note that people tend to feel more sympathetic to-
ward the forgiving victim than toward the angry, resentful victim. See SUSAN JACOBY,
WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 358 (1983); See also JEFFRIE G. MUR-
PHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 16 (1988).
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might urge, from what psychiatry might try to achieve, from what
politics might dictate, and all of those from what the law can,
should or even attempt to accomplish.
When we talk about emotion's role in law, a number of difficul-
ties inevitably arise - many of them a function of the attempt to
employ complex and fluid psychological or philosophical concepts
for narrow and pragmatic legal ends. There is, for example, the
difficulty of finding a fixed definition for any particular emotion, or
emotional state-forgiveness, the desire for vengeance, closure....
There is the difficulty of attempting categorical judgments about
whether a particular emotion ought to be encouraged or discour-
aged in the law, or even in a particular legal context. There is,
finally, the difficulty of assigning a role to the legal system in
achieving particular emotional states - for example in helping vic-
tims attain closure or defendants feel remorse. 16 Yet the alterna-
tive to asking these daunting questions is not simply to ignore the
emotional content of legal proceedings - the emotions, as the
Shepard and Miller statements remind us, won't go away no matter
what. So it is crucial, given the high stakes for victims, survivors,
the accused, and society at large, that we examine and try to disen-
tangle the questions.
We might begin by examining the question: what do victims re-
quire in order to achieve some measure of closure? 17 Assertions
about what victims need are often presented as if they are empiri-
cally based. If this is indeed an empirical question about what con-
ditions are most likely to help, we ought to be looking for empirical
answers, and there are surprisingly few out there.18 The quotations
from Ms. Miller and Shepard indicate, anecdotally, that this is a
question with variable and complex answers, as one might expect.
The little empirical evidence of which I am aware supports the in-
tuitively obvious view that different victims have different needs,
16. See THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1-15 (Susan Bandes ed., 2000).
17. This question, of course, must be distinguished from other questions that often
come up in discussions of forgiveness, vengeance and punishment in general: such as
the question of what will help the wrongdoer, the question of what will deter future
potential wrongdoers, and the question of what will help bring a larger form of clo-
sure, or equilibrium, to society at large.
18. Alternatively, it might be a prescriptive question - an inquiry into the condi-
tions we, as a society, believe are appropriate responses to victimization. I think this
is a more accurate description of the traditional inquiry into victims' needs. However,
the more recent trend has been to couch the inquiry in terms of what victims in fact
require. See Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Im-
pact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545, 551-52.
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and that an individual victim's needs. may change over time.19
Moreover, these studies deal with the victims themselves, for ex-
ample in crimes like rape or robbery, and their findings, inconclu-
sive at best, are also not necessarily applicable:. to the needs of
those who have lost a close relative to murder.2 °
Even if it were so that victims or survivors need certain emo-
tional experiences in order to attain closure, what conclusions
would this lead to? This is the point at which it. becomes crucial
not to fall into the trap of conflating two very separate questions:
the question of what victims need and the question of what the
legal system ought to provide.
For example, what if, as Jean Hampton and others have sug-
gested, victims need to be able to forgive in order to attain clo-
sure?21 There are a host of questions raised here. First, of what
does forgiveness consist? Most of those who write in this field, in-
cluding Jeffrie Murphy, Martha Minow, Susan Jacoby and Willard
Gaylin, describe forgiveness as an internal change in the heart of
the individual victim that doesn't necessarily bring any external or
public consequences.22 Thus the victim's forgiveness may have no
bearing on society's demand for punishment. Indeed, the victim
herself might plausibly forgive and still desire punishment - as
Jean Hampton suggests. The victim might choose to forgive, both
to cleanse her own heart of hatred and because she is willing to
believe the sinner is more than just the sum of his sins - yet also
might desire retribution for the sins themselves. 3 Hampton tells
the remarkable story of the practice in colonial New England of
urging the criminal to repent, holding a reconciliation feast once
he'd done so, and then hanging him the following day.24
19. See, e.g., Edna Erez, Victim Participation in Sentencing: And the Debate Goes
On..., 3 INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 17, 21 (1994); Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell, supra
note 18, at 545; Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 937, 964-66 (1985).
20. Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell, supra note 18, at 550-51 (discussing problems
with drawing conclusions about murder survivors from studies about victims of other
crimes).
21. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 36-38.
22. See WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND: A QUESTION OF
JUSTICE 338 (1982); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 21; JACOBY, supra note
15, at 334; MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 15 (1998). Jean Hampton, how-
ever, describes forgiveness as having an external component, in that it is "bestowed"
upon the wrongdoer. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 36.
23. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 157.
24. See id. at 158.
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Second, who has the right to bestow forgiveness? This question
is a pervasive theme in Gaylin's book, The Killing of Bonnie Gar-
land, in which he describes how many members of the clergy and
community were willing to forgive Richard Herrin for his brutal
murder of Bonnie Garland, and indeed, perhaps as a consequence
he was ready to forgive himself - even before he had repented or
accepted responsibility in any meaningful way." Bonnie Garland's
parents did not forgive him, and of course, Bonnie could not do so.
Yet, as Gaylin describes it, the support and forgiveness of the reli-
gious community had a significant mitigating effect on Herrin's ver-
dict and sentence.26 Perhaps a parent can forgive her child's
murderer for the pain the parent suffers, but can anyone other than
the victim herself, or perhaps one's God, offer forgiveness for the
entirety of the loss? 27 And what effect should the forgiveness of
these others have in the courtroom?
Let's turn from forgiveness to vengeance. What if, as Jacoby and
others suggest, and as the parents of the children killed by the Cali-
fornia Freeway Killer so strongly believed, vengeance is necessary
for a victim's or survivor's closure? This, too, raises a host of ques-
tions. What form ought that vengeance take? Is it based, in whole
or in part, on what the individual survivor needs, or believes she
needs at the time, or on some collectivized notion that takes these
needs into account but doesn't acquiesce to them? And how ought
we factor in the problem that certain punishments, such as the
death penalty, bring with them an agonizingly long wait for survi-
vors, one which they often describe as yet more torture? Should
this wait be seen as another part of the wrong that needs to be
avenged?
One difference between forgiveness and vengeance is immedi-
ately apparent. As I mentioned, forgiveness is often described as
merely internal, a change of heart that doesn't dictate any course
of conduct, and therefore doesn't implicate public justice at all.
Frankly, I don't think this view can be wholly accurate - I believe
25. The notion of repentance as a condition of forgiveness raises another issue -
that while forgiveness might be an internal emotional change, it might depend on an
emotional change, and its external manifestation, in the wrongdoer. See, e.g.,
GAYLIN, supra note 22, at 118; MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 41.
26. See GAYLIN, supra note 22, at ch. 4.
27. This is also a central question of Sue Miller's recent novel, While I Was Gone,
in which the murderer of the protagonist's close friend both asks her forgiveness for
the murder and makes clear that he has been generous in his willingness to forgive
himself, evidently without fully repenting or even accepting responsibility for the act.
See SUSAN MILLER, WHILE I WAS GONE (1999).
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that notions of forgiveness, mercy and compassion are inextricably
part of the process of setting norms for what is criminalized and
how it is punished.28 Nevertheless, vengeance presents a far less
ambiguous case - it clearly is not an internal process. To the ex-
tent a survivor requires a measure of vengeance for closure, either
the legal system is implicated, or we are talking about vigilante jus-
tice, which the legal system was set up to supplant.29
Assumptions about survivors' need for retribution or vengeance
are often explicitly invoked in legal decision making. The failure to
sentence a particular defendant to death or to a long prison term is
often experienced as a devaluing of the worth of the victim's life,
and thus another infliction of pain upon the victim's family, 3° and
indeed prosecutors explicitly call upon juries to return death
sentences in order to affirm the victims' worth.31 One implicit as-
sumption of introducing victim impact statements in capital cases
seems to be that they will make the jury more likely to give a death
sentence to help ease the survivors' evident pain.32
In addition, the lengthy appeals process is seen as an affront, an
additional punishment, to survivors needing closure. Governor Jeb
Bush of Florida, for example, in his current campaign to truncate
the death penalty appeals process in that state, has "emphasized
the suffering of victims' families and complained that inmates
spend about fourteen years on death row before they are exe-
cuted. '33 To what extent, then, should the needs of these families
influence policymaking?
I raise this long list of daunting questions, not because I have
answers to them, but in the hope that we can discuss them further.
First, let us be careful to distinguish the question of what victims
need from the question of what the legal system ought to provide.
Some of what individual victims or survivors need to attain closure
must come from psychological, religious and social support sys-
tems. Such systems have greater ability to individuate among vic-
28. See THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 16, at 1-15; Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366-71 (1996).
29. See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EvOLuTION OF OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM 92-99 (1980); Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, supra note 28, at 407 n.230.
30. See JACOBY, supra note 15, at 237; GAYLIN, supra note 22, at 347.
31. See, e.g., State v. Elliott, 475 S.E. 2d 202, 222 (N.C. 1996); Welsh S. White,
Prosecutors' Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 297, 306-08 (1990-91).
32. See generally Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell, supra note 18 (discussing
Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479).
33. Jim Yardley, A Role Model for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at 5.
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tims and to accommodate the shifting and complex needs of
particular victims. They are not obligated to reach a fixed and cat-
egorical judgment, or any legal judgment at all. Moreover, they
are not obligated to weigh a host of other factors against the vic-
tim's needs, including the rights of the defendant and the good of
society as a whole.
Second, let us be very careful when we talk about what victims
need, and perhaps especially about their perceived need for clo-
sure. The legal system does demand certain kinds of closure, but
they may not track the sorts of therapeutic or spiritual closure vic-
tims seek. Sometimes the legal system may be able to provide a
punishment, or a result, that meets the individual's needs for ven-
geance, forgiveness, closure. Such people are fortunate (at least in
that limited respect) because the burden of individual forgiveness
or vengeance is heavy indeed, and a public, collectivized resolution
at least may remove some of this weight from the victim's shoul-
ders. But the legal system cannot and ought not meet such needs
on a case by case basis.
Legal closure is, at some point, necessary - at some point the
law needs to act definitively.34 But given the terrible stakes in-
volved, an essential part of its closure is that it incorporate notions
of fairness and due process. Given the law's many limitations, it
also ought to incorporate a large measure of humility. It needs
humility about the possibility of error3 5 and also about the impos-
sibility of knowing the secret heart of either the wrongdoer or the
victim.
Closure is too easily transformed, particularly in capital cases,
into an ending that forecloses, too early, the societal obligation not
to put an accused to death until he has a fair chance to show him-
self unworthy of the conviction and sentence. My own view is that
a capital sentence is a sort of closure we are ill equipped to com-
mand, since it reflects our unwarranted claim that we can judge
who is irredeemable, without humanity or value. Just as we might
show more humility before claiming to know what victims need, we
might show more humility in declaring ourselves worthy to judge
not just the sin but the sinner, and to decide who is deserving of
that terrible and irrevocable form of closure.
34. See Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, supra note 28, at 389-90.
35. See Steve Miller & Ken Armstrong, Another Death Row Inmate Cleared, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 19, 2000, at 1 (reporting that Illinois has cleared more death row inmates
[13] than it has executed [12] since it reinstated capital punishment in 1977).
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FORGIVENESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW:
FORGIVENESS THROUGH MEDICINAL
PUNISHMENT
Dennis M. Cariello*
"There is a need for understanding, but not for vengeance, a
need for reparation, but not for retaliation."'
Punishment is the most dramatic manifestation of civil govern-
ment power. Whom and how a society punishes are key political
questions that are indicative of national character. Throughout his-
tory every civilization has struggled with two basic questions:
whom shall we condemn and how shall we forgive?
The notion of forgiveness has ancient roots, finding bases in phi-
losophy,2 literature 3 religion4 and law itself.' Yet, despite this his-
* Presidential Fellow, Association of the Bar of the City of New York; J.D.,
Fordham University School of Law, 1999; B.A. (History), State University of New
York at Stony Brook, 1995.
1. Alexandra Zavis, Panel Faces Truth, Fear and Anger: Apartheid's Past is Con-
fronted, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 2, 1996, at 23 (quoting Justice Minister Dullah Omar of
South Africa who authored of the Reconciliation Bill).
2. See, e.g., Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of
Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 391 (1989) ("Mercy is not a thing opposed to
justice. It is an essential part of it: as necessary in criminal cases, as in civil affairs
equity is to law." (citing 5 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND
BURKE 285 (H. Frowd ed., 1920))); SENECA, On Clemency, in THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY'
OF SENECA, 137, 138 (M. Hadas trans., 1958) ("One man's youth sways me, another's
age; one man I have reprieved for his eminence, another for his insignificance; and
when I found no other ground for pity I have shown charity to myself.").
3. See, e.g., T. HOCCLEVE, THE REGIMENT OF PRINCES 90 (Early English Text
Soc'y Extra Series) (F. Furnivall ed., 1897, reprint 1978):
For your equal, reconciliation; for your enemy,
Allowance of wrong-doing; and for yourself, virtue;
For those in trouble, oppressed with wretched woe,
Mercy indeed, and pity his hardship
As far as you are able, and alleviate his misfortune;
And have compassion for him, so that if your power fails
Intention shall compensate you for your action.
Id. See also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act IV, scene 1
("The quality of mercy is not strain'd, / It droppeth as gentle rain from heaven / Upon
the place beneath: / it is twice blest; / It blesseth him that gives and him that takes
..... ); JOHN MILTON, Paradise Lost, Book X, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 307
(F. Patterson ed., 1931) ("temper ... Justice with Mercie").
4. See, e.g., Romans 3:25 ("God presented him [Christ Jesus] as a sacrifice of
atonement, through faith in his blood. He did this to demonstrate his justice, because
in his forbearance he had left the sins committed beforehand unpunished."); Samuel
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tory many prominent scholars argue that society has no business
forgiving criminals. They argue that forgiveness is the sole prov-
ince of the individuals who have been wronged by the criminal act.
At most, society can only offer mercy in the form of light
sentences.
A. What is Forgiveness?
Forgiveness is the voluntary cancellation of an obligation created
by conduct, whether purposeful or negligent. It is the means by
which a society6 brings wrongdoers back into the community.7
Forgiveness is the basis for a new relationship, one in which a
wrongdoer accepts responsibility for his acts or omissions and
desires to be welcomed back into the community. In turn, society
must recognize the worth of the wrongdoer and that it is better to
include the wrongdoer than banish him from the community.
Whereas forgiveness between persons is often an act of reconcili-
ation fraught with emotions, society's forgiveness is a means to
government's basic function: to make its citizens productive. His-
tory bears this point out. The English Kings, in extending pardons
were seen as bestowing a gift bestowed on the wrongdoer.' A par-
don was "a work of mercy, whereby the king either before attain-
der, sentence or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offence,
punishment, execution, right, title, debt or duty, temporal or eccle-
siastical," 9 "an instrument of equity in the criminal law designed to
promote the general welfare by preventing injustice." 10 Pardons
not only released the offender from punishment, it also renders the
J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look at Repentance, Forgiveness and Atonement in Jewish Law
and Philosophy and American Legal Thought, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1677 (2000)
(tracing the notions of repentance, forgiveness and atonement through Jewish law).
5. See, e.g., EDWARD POWELL, KINGSHIP, LAW AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN THE REIGN OF HENRY V (1989)
6. For the purpose of this essay, society encompasses the governmental unit re-
sponsible for punishing a wrongdoer. Thus, most often, society refers to local govern-
ment units. It can, however, refer to higher levels of government if that is the level
responsible for punishing a particular wrongdoer.
7. For the purposes of this essay, "community" refers to the body governed by
the society that is punishing the wrongdoer.
8. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
169-74 (1988).
9. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
233 (4th ed. London 1669). See also Carla A. Johnson, Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in
the Criminal Law, 10 LAW & PHIL. 109, 112-13 (1991).
10. Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal Policy Analysis of a Gover-
nor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L.
& POL'Y 1, 7-8 (1994).
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offender innocent in the eyes of the law, and welcomed her back
into the community at large.1'
Like forgiveness between individuals, societal forgiveness does
not require that society forget the wrong committed or the conse-
quences of it. For example, only an extraordinary person could
forgive an adulterous spouse and act as nothing had ever hap-
pened. For most people, the forgiving spouse would remember the
sting of the adulterous offense, perhaps be more suspicious of late-
night work sessions and trips with friends, and would otherwise
need time to fully treat the adulterous spouse as if nothing had
occurred. This defensive response is important in the forgiveness-
process. The wrongdoer must work to regain her spouse's trust.
Likewise, by using forgiveness as a means to reintegrate wrong-
doers into the community, it would be unwise to consider that the
wrong act or omission never occurred. Society could make the
community vulnerable to a wrongdoer who lapses into illegal be-
havior. If the society forgot the wrong committed, the community
could not help the wrongdoer avoid the situation or take other
measures to protect itself.
Moreover, in most cases, the penance a wrongdoer must perform
is tailored to that wrong. The adulterous spouse need not prove
her worth by washing cleaner dishes or getting a raise at work. She
must perform acts that help restore the lost trust. Societal forgive-
ness should also take into account the conduct of the repentant
11. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). Pardons are to be distin-
guished from other forms of executive forgiveness, such as clemency and amnesty.
See generally Cozart, Clemency Under the Federal System, 23 FED. PROBATION 3
(1959) (discussing the nature and types of clemency and clemency procedures in the
federal system). Conversely, amnesty, is not connected to forgiveness. Derived from
the Greek word for "forgetfulness," 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 406 (2d ed.
1989), amnesty is generally granted to groups of people when it is beneficial to over-
look a group's bad acts because public welfare is improved. See Burdick v. United
States, 236 U.S. 79, 95 (1915) (explaining the difference between pardon and am-
nesty). Unlike a pardon, however, the underlying crime is, as President Carter noted,
forgotten, not forgiven. See EXEC. ORDER No. 11967, 3 C.F.R. 91 (1978) (directing
the Attorney General to dismiss, with prejudice, indictments against draft evaders);
KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
81-82 (1989) (describing the effect and rationale of President Carter's grant of am-
nesty to those who evade the Vietnam draft). Although this distinction has little legal
value, it is, however, significant in societal terms. But see Knote v. United States, 95
U.S. 149, 152-53 (1877).
It is sometimes said that [amnesty] operates as an extinction of the offence of
which it is object, causing it to be forgotten, so far as public interests are
concerned, whilst [pardon] only operates to remove the penalties of the of-
fence. This distinction is not, however, recognized in our law.
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wrongdoer and exercise wise caution to avoid placing that person
in circumstances that will play to the wrongdoer's weakness or en-
danger others. This serves society's goal to make the wrongdoer a
productive citizen again.
B. How Society Should Forgive
Although forgiveness requires the release of an obligation, it
does not require the wrongdoer to go unpunished. As the Bible
explains, "[i]f your brother sins against you, rebuke him; and if he
repents, forgive him."' 2
This rebuke is important in the forgiveness process; it is the
means by which society can teach the wrongdoer what she did was
wrong. This is, of course, the entire purpose of societal forgive-
ness, reintegrating a wrongdoer back into society and making her
productive again. Thus, the tailoring of the rebuke to the wrongful
act or omission is of critical importance.
Take the case of a child who purposefully breaks the window of a
neighbor while playing with a ball. Most neighbors would ask that
the window be replaced with the money of the child. If the child
did not have the money to pay for the window, the child could then
work it off performing chores for the neighbor. The neighbor for-
gives the child for what was done and, through this punishment,
teaches the child an important lesson about the worth of personal
property. This rebuke, which is part of the forgiveness process, is
termed "medicinal punishment" by Thomas Aquinas.
If the only thing we want is to inflict punishment on the sinner,
then we act altogether unlawfully; but if our primary aim is the
good to be achieved through such punishment - the sinner's cor-
rection, or at least his restraint so that others may enjoy peace
and justice be defended and God honoured - then in the right
circumstances retribution can be lawful .... Fatal sins are sins
deserving eternal death in the future retribution when God de-
livers his unerring judgement; but in this life punishments are
meant to be medicinal. 3
Similarly, after having felt the sting of an offense, society has a
responsibility to act. Yet, society's action must be medicinal in na-
ture to be forgiving: it should tailor punishment in such a way as to
help the wrongdoer avoid committing the crime again. It attempts
12. Luke 17:3-4. Elsewhere, Christ explained, "If we confess our sins, He is faith-
ful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." 1 John
1:9.
13. 1III SUMMA THEOLOGICA 108 (T. McDermott ed.).
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to teach the wrongdoer what was wrong about her act and how to
avoid the situation again. By offering punishment with a desire to
give offenders the opportunity to understand clearly what they
have done wrong, take responsibility for it, and change their course
of action, society can welcome the wrongdoer back into the
community.
C. When Should Society Forgive
Perhaps the toughest question is when society should forgive.
Theoretically, society should forgive all wrongdoers. The practical
realities of human nature and limited resources make it difficult to
do so. Therefore, society should reserve its ability to extend for-
giveness to a few situations.
First, society should forgive only when a wrongdoer is repentant.
As mentioned, forgiveness is a means to bring a willing person
back into the community. A relationship is created between a soci-
ety that recognizes the value of the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer
who wishes to rejoin society and become productive again. If a
wrongdoer does not exhibit remorse for her actions, she would not
benefit from medicinal punishment: she would fail to see the bene-
fit of rejoining a law abiding community and the lesson society tries
to teach, that her action was wrong, would fall on deaf ears.
Secondly, society should forgive only when an appropriate reme-
dial measure can be fashioned. The measure must be sufficiently
tailored to address the wrong committed by the wrongdoer so that
it is remedial. Because of resource limitations, society cannot for-
give every wrongdoer through medicinal punishment. For exam-
ple, it might be extremely difficult to use medicinal punishment on
a murderer: in some cases a punishment may not be able to be
sufficiently tailored to meet the needs of the murderer, because of
the nature of the crime; in others, a punishment could be crafted,
say one that emphasizes the value of life, but there might likely be
a shortage of people who wish to spend the necessary time with
that particular wrongdoer. Thus, society should forgive transgres-
sions when its resources make it most feasible to do so.
Perhaps no wrongdoer is better suited for society's forgiveness
than a one guilty of possessing drugs for personal use. When a
drug user exhibits a desire for help to rid herself of her addiction,
society has an obligation to forgive her through medicinal punish-
ment. Society is in a good position to impose medicinal punish-
ment on the repentant drug user. There are numerous government
programs available to help addicts. By seeking to alter the addict's
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future conduct, society is forgiving the addict - by punishing her
in a way designed to help her. And in turn, society reaps the bene-
fits of the forgiveness it extended - increased productivity from
the former-addict.
FORGIVENESS AS A PROBLEM-SOLVING
TOOL IN THE COURTS:
A BRIEF RESPONSE TO THE PANEL ON
FORGIVENESS IN CRIMINAL LAW
Derek A. Denckla*
I have been invited to draft this response in order to provide an
additional perspective - centered on courts' role in providing for-
giveness in criminal law. Let me begin by responding to the ques-
tion posed to the panel: Can the criminal law make room for
forgiveness? Like everyone on the panel that addressed this ques-
tion, I, too, believe that the answer is a firm "yes." The simplicity
of that question allows for an affirmative answer. What remains to
be explained, however, is how to answer some more pointed ques-
tions on this issue: Is there room for forgiveness in the criminal
courts? If so, how does forgiveness manifest itself there? This re-
sponse seeks to answer these questions generally by exploring the
opportunities for forgiveness provided by "problem solving"
courts.'
Over the past decade, courts, administrators and judges, out of
frustration with the pitfalls of "business as usual," have considered
and tested practices aimed at providing greater effectiveness and
efficiency in the criminal justice system. One such solution has
been to develop court programs and courts address the significant
non-legal problems that arise along with the legal issues in a given
case.2 These "problem-solving" courts include drug courts, corn-
* Fordham University School of Law, J.D. (1997), Columbia University, B.A.
(1991). Mr. Denckla recently joined the Center for Court Innovation (the "Center"),
the independent research and development arm of the New York State Unified Court
System, as a Senior Planner. This response draws upon the work the Center has un-
dertaken to deepen public understanding of problem-solving courts. Formerly, he has
been a Skadden Fellow at the The Legal Aid Society and a Judicial Clerk for the
Honorable Fred I. Parker, who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
1. This response is not intented to provide an extensive or exhaustive essay into
the topic of forgiveness. Rather, this response is a commentary on the panel on for-
giveness in the criminal law from a court-building perspectice that I have gained
through my work and research at the Center. Additional work should be undertaken
to investigate the gaps opened and questions raised herein. See Symposium, The Role
of Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347 (2000).
2. See Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEws-
WEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13.
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munity courts, family treatment courts, mental health courts and
gun courts. All of these courts can use the power and authority of
the judiciary to change the behavior of litigants and even, in some
cases, the behavior of governmental systems. In their various at-
tempts to change the behavior of litigants, many problem-solving
courts have hit upon the strategic use of forgiveness.
I. THE COURTS AS A SOURCE OF FORGIVENESS
At first blush, it may seem that, of the various institutions that
comprise the criminal justice system, the courts would be an un-
likely source of forgiveness. The court's traditional role - through
the person and the office of the judge - is to apply the law in a fair
and impartial manner to the accused at trial and during sentencing
and, in the absence of a jury, make factual findings that will deter-
mine culpability. Based on this description, the court's ability to
impart forgiveness seems limited to showing mercy to a defendent
by exercising discretion and, perhaps, reducing a sentence.
For various political and social reasons, however, courts are be-
ing forced to deal with a whole range of social, psychological and
medical issues that they have never had to face before and with
which they have little or no expertise. For instance, a traditional
court is poorly equipped to help a substance-addicted person ob-
tain treatment.3 Yet the research into drug courts suggests that
courts have something unique to bring to the table when it comes
to successful treatment and accessing other services: coercion.
Without the coercive power of a court and its threat of potential
punishment, social services agencies are usually unable to effec-
tively treat substance-addicted or certain chronically mentally ill
persons. Thus, when someone is accused of committing a crime,
the courts often become the place where the accused's substance
addiction is first identified as a serious problem, ripe for treatment.
H. THE CREATION OF "PROBLEM-SOLVING" COURTS
Sweeping changes in the social structure of society have had a
deep impact on the functioning of the criminal courts, causing
judges to re-think their roles and consider the place of problem-
solving in the criminal justice system. At the same time, the public
(such as the victim's movement) has been calling for the courts to
3. Traditionally, criminal courts are meant to address the legal issues of a case.
Courts are not designed nor are judges trained in treating the medial, social or psy-
chological problems of defendants.
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solve persistent social problems.' Like the prosecutors and defense
attorneys on the panel, judges and court administrators have grown
frustrated with "milling cases," "repeat players" -- defendants who
return to court again-and-again on the same charges - rising
caseloads and new and different types of cases that elude tradi-
tional judicial responses.
Problem-solving courts have not been associated with any partic-
ular philosophy of the law. or jurisprudence. They tend to use
whatever works, borrowing from many new approaches to the law
that have surfaced over the years. This search for new and more
effective approaches to court procedures and practices is motivated
by the desire to make the court system more results-driven and
outcome-oriented. In general, however, problem-solving courts
share the following five characteristics: (1) an expanded scope of
non-legal issues are presented to the court; (2) the use of judicial
authority to solve both legal and non-legal problems that arise
from an individual's case; (3) the consideration of outcomes that go
beyond merely applying the law, such as increased sobriety for ad-
dicts; (4) increased collaboration between government and non-
government partners to help achieve shared goals; and (5) the
modification of traditional rules by casting judges and attorneys in
new roles.
Planners of problem-solving courts - particularly community
courts - appear to have an approach that meshes with planners of
restorative justice programs on many significant levels. In his re-
marks to the panel, David Lerman suggested permitting ap-
proaches in the criminal law that leave room for forgiveness, such
as restorative justice. He went on to define restorative justice as
"viewing crime in its aftermath," which is essentially forward-look-
ing, as opposed to seeking punishment for past wrongs. Lerman
stated that restorative justice "asks a different set of questions
[than traditional criminal justice]: first and foremost, what is the
harm that has been caused; secondly, how do we fix that harm; and
third, who is responsible for that repair?" Similarly, problem-solv-
ing courts are focused on the causes and consequences of criminal
behavior, not just the moment of criminal behavior itself.
4. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
Tics (1998) (setting forth statistics on public frustration with courts); see also John
Greacen, What Standards Should We Use To Judge Our Courts?, 72 JUDICATURE 23
(1988).
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III. FORGIVENESS IN THE "PROBLEM-SOLVING" MODEL
Forgiveness fits into the problem-solving approach in two impor-
tant ways. First, problem-solving courts emphasize treatment and
services in solving the non-legal problems that underlie the legal
difficulties that bring people into court, such as addiction, mental
illness or homelessness. The second way that problem-solving
courts draw on the concept of forgiveness is by creating new vehi-
cles for community residents to participate in the criminal justice
system and its processes.
A. Solving Non-Legal Problems
The example that best demonstrates the way in which problem-
solving courts address a defendant's non-legal problems is found in
the drug courts, created to sentence addicted defendants to long-
term, judicially-supervised drug treatment instead of incarceration.
The first "drug court" began in Dade County, Florida in 1989. The
results of the Dade County experiment have been provocative. A
study by the National Institute of Justice revealed that Dade
County drug court defendants had fewer re-arrests than compara-
ble non-drug court defendants.5 Subsequent studies have shown
that retention rates for court-ordered treatment are much greater
than the retention rates for treatment clients in general.6 Following
Dade County's example, a number of drug courts and other spe-
cialized courts have arisen that aim to combine counseling, treat-
ment and social services as alternatives to incarceration with
defendant accountability and compliance monitoring.7
In drug courts, compliance with a treatment regime is closely
monitored by the drug court judge, who responds to progress or
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, ASSESSING THE
IMPACT OF DADE COUNTY'S FELONY DRUG COURT, Executive Summary (1993).
6. For an overview of the research on drug courts, see Steven Belenko, Research
on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE REVIEW
(Summer 1998).
7. Currently, 444 drug court programs are operating in 46 states. In addition, 277
new drug courts are in the planning stages. See Office of Justice Programs Drug
Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project at American University, Sum-
mary of Drug Court Activity by State & County, <http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/jus-
tice/DRCTCHARl.htm> (last modified January 10, 2000); Telephone Interview with
Caroline Cooper, Office of Justice Programs Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical
Assistance Project at American University (February 2, 2000). For a general descrip-
tion of drug courts, see OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DRUG COURT CLEARING-
HOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, LOOKING
AT A DECADE OF DRUG COURTS 3 (1999). The Department of Justice has funded
many of these drug court programs.
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failure with a system of graduated rewards and sanctions. The type
of forgiveness that drug courts offer is not unconditional. Forgive-
ness is offered in return for the accused accepting responsibility for
his or her criminal behavior and taking concrete and successful
steps to address underlying problems that may have caused that
behavior. Thus, problem-solving courts couple the "stick" of pun-
ishment with the "carrot" of assistance and forgiveness.
B. Community Involvement
The creation of ways for community residents to participate in
the criminal justice system and its processes implicitly honors and
acknowledges the harm done to neighborhoods and their residents
by substance abuse and chronic low-level offending. The best ex-
ample of this approach to forgiveness may be found in community
courts. In 1993, the first community court in the United States was
launched in New York City - the Midtown Community Court.8
The Midtown Court targets misdemeanor quality-of-life crimes
committed in and around Times Square.9 Offenders are sentenced
to perform community restitution by performing such acts as
sweeping the streets, painting over graffiti, or cleaning local parks
in an effort to pay back the community they had harmed through
their criminal behavior.10 The Court also links offenders to on-site
social services, including health care, drug treatment and job train-
ing. Further, the Court has tested a variety of new mechanisms for
engaging the local community in the criminal justice process, in-
cluding advisory boards, community mediation, victim-offender im-
pact panels and townhall meetings.
The design of the Midtown Community Court reflects the belief
that there is no such thing as "victimless" crime. The Court
acknoweldges that communities can be victimized just as individu-
als can. The planners of the court consulted community residents
and businesses. These consultations revealed that members of the
community were upset by the criminal behavior in their neighbor-
hood. They wanted restoration. The community also saw, how-
ever, that those engaged in criminal behavior needed help to
change their ways. In effect, the community advocated for a court
8. Many of the current officers of the Center helped New York State Unified
Court and the Midtown Community Court.
9. Shoplifting, prostitution and subway fare evasions and graffiti were the main
categories of quality of life crimes.
10. See John Feinblatt et al., Neighborhood Justice at the Midtown Community
Court, in CRIME AND PLACE: PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1997 CONFERENCE ON CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, National Institute of Justice (1998).
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structured, in part, around forgiveness - a court that combined
punishment and help together.
An evaluation by the National Center for State Courts found
that Midtown had helped speed case processing, improve compli-
ance with alternative sanctions and reduce local crime. 1 In its
wake have come nine replications; an additional two dozen com-
munity courts are in the works.'
IV. IMPACT OF FORGIVENESS IN PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Essentially, notions of forgiveness in courts arise from a desire to
reach more durable and constructive results in criminal justice.
Generally, forgiveness in the courts is found in the increasing em-
phasis on using the crisis of arrest as an opportunity to re-connect
the accused to society and vice versa. Many judges have been
searching to insert forgiveness into the criminal justice system in an
effort to engage the accused and the community in a healing pro-
cess that may be more effective in stemming future crime than
merely putting someone behind bars. Thus, re-connecting the ac-
cused with the community may reduce the risk of recidivism. Fur-
thermore, forgiveness is a central element present when a judge
announces a sentence that restores the victims to their pre-crime
state, mandates community service or engages the accused in a dis-
cussion of the impact of his or her crimes on society and the
victims.
Court-based programs and procedures that emphasize forgive-
ness have two primary positive impacts. First, victims are granted
some type of power to forgive the accused, giving them a pivotal
role to play in shaping criminal justice. This new role can be seen
in the growth of victim-offender reconciliation panels. By exten-
sion, when society is seen as a victim of every crime through the
proxy of the government, then society also has the collective power
to forgive. The second impact is that the accused is viewed as hav-
ing the potential to be forgiven by the victim and society. Thus,
forgiveness elevates the accused in the eyes of society, deeming
him or her worthy of forgiveness. This powerful shift in perspec-
tive allows for government to investigate the accused as a whole
person with a past history and a potential future, rather than nar-
H1. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLE-
MENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (1997).
12. See Community Courts (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http://www.communitycourts.
org>.
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rowly conceiving of the accused as a criminal who only exists in the
moment of criminal behavior.
Viewing the accused as someone who can be "treated" is more
than just semantic. While the provision of treatment may be seen
as a form of punishment because a person is detained in a treat-
ment facility and faces sanctions for leaving, treatment is also an
act of sympathy, a gesture of forgiveness. Treatment sends a pow-
erful message to the accused that says: "We forgive you for com-
mitting your crimes because we understand that you committed
those crimes under the influence of circumstances beyond your
control. If you agree to complete treatment, we will forgive you
for your crimes in whole or in part. If you refuse treatment or fail
to complete it, we will punish you for your crimes." Providing
treatment acknowledges that the accused is capable of change. So-
ciety's positive investment in forgiving the crimes of addicted de-
fendants arises from the defendant's success in completing
treatment.
CONCLUSION
For courts and, by extension, for the whole criminal justice sys-
tem, forgiveness may not be an end unto itself. Forgiveness is in-
strumental for courts attempting to have more effective and lasting
results by addressing the non-legal causes and consequences of
crime, rather than merely sentencing based on the crime itself.
Bringing elements of forgiveness into the practices and procedures
of criminal courts has produced some interesting and provocative
results. For instance, the rise of the problem-solving courts, which
use forgiveness as one of a number of new tools to address criminal
behavior more effectively, suggests that the place of forgiveness in
criminal law has been established and is ripe for further academic
study and practical experimentation.
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FORGIVENESS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: THE MEETING OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT AND
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Robert D. Enright*
Bruce A. Kittle**
In an age of increasing specialization, it is rare for psychologists
and lawyers to mutually influence each other's work. Nevertheless,
over the past decade, the Department of Educational Psychology
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Restorative Justice
Project at the Law School united to discuss the implications of for-
giveness in effecting change in the legal system.' That dialogue
continues today, with this Essay representing some of the fruit of
that labor.
This Essay begins by presenting a brief overview of the early
work in the Department of Educational Psychology so that the
reader may become firmly grounded in the meaning of forgiveness.
Next, this Essay presents the mediation of a Victim Offender Con-
ference ("VOC") as an illustration of a case involving forgiveness.
Finally, in light of the model developed in Educational Psychology,
this Essay draws some general implications for forgiveness within
restorative justice.
The Early Work in Educational Psychology
In 1985, the Department of Educational Psychology at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison began holding weekly meetings to
discuss issues about forgiveness. For instance, they examined the
meaning of person-to-person forgiveness; the ways in which people
forgive; and the consequences that result when people forgive. To
date, the Department continues to hold these informal seminars.
* Robert D. Enright is a professor in the Department of Educational Psychol-
ogy, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
** Bruce A. Kittle is the Director of the Restorative Justice Project, University of
Wisconsin Law School.
1. See, e.g., WALTER DICKEY, FORGIVENESS AND CRIME: THE POSSIBILITIES OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, in ROBERT D. ENRIGHT & JOANNA NORTH, EXPLORING FOR-
GIVENESS (1998); see also Bruce A. Kittle, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System:
Necessary Element or Impossible Dream?, WORLD OF FORGIVENESS NEWSLETTER 2,
3-11 (International Forgiveness Institute, Madison, WI 1999).
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At that time, a body of literature was just emerging on the con-
struct of forgiveness in psychology and related disciplines. For ex-
ample, Lewis Smedes had recently published his seminal work for
the general public, a book that has since become a modern classic
and has helped many people hurt by injustice.2 D. and M. Linn
also released an influential book in which they based their model
of forgiveness on Kubler-Ross' stages of death and dying.3 Beyond
that, the published literature contained case studies of forgiveness
within therapy and reflections from psychiatrists and counselors.4
Fitzgibbons' treatise was a year away, whereas Hope's essay was
two years from publication.' And, from a religious perspective,
there existed Augsburger's, Calian's and Donnelley's reflections.6
However, there were still no published scientific works devoted to
forgiveness.
The goal then, as now, was to be as accurate as possible in for-
mulating a definition of forgiveness and a model of how people
could go about forgiving. We also sought to avoid the traps of de-
fining the word in our own idiosyncratic way and of reductionism
in model building in which theorists commit to a few processes or
one major mechanism in describing forgiveness. Finally, after
years of study, there exists a concise definition and model.
What is Person-to-Person Forgiveness?
Following North's ideas, we define forgiving as follows:
People, upon rationally determining that they have been un-
fairly treated, forgive when they willfully abandon resentment
and related responses (to which they have a right), and en-
deavor to respond to the wrongdoer based on the moral princi-
2. See LEWIS SMEDES, FORGIVE AND FORGET: HEALING THE HURTS WE DON'T
DESERVE (1984).
3. See D. LINN & M. LINN, HEALING LIFE'S HURTS: HEALING MEMORIES
THROUGH THE FIVE STAGES OF FORGIVENESS (1978).
4. See R. Hunter, Forgiveness, Retaliation, and Paranoid Reactions, CANADIAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N J., 23, 167-73 (1978); M. Kaufman, The Courage to Forgive, Is-
RAELI J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCIENCES, 21, 177-87 (1984); H. Close, Forgiveness
and Responsibility: A Case Study, PASTORAL PSYCHOL. 21, 18-25 (1970).
5. See Richard Fitzgibbons, The Cognitive and Emotional Uses of Forgiveness, in
The Treatment of Anger, PSYCHOTHERAPY 23, 629-33 (1986); D. Hope, The Healing
Paradox of Forgiveness, PSYCHOTHERAPY 24, 240-44 (1987).
6. See D. AUGSBURGER, THE FREEDOM To FORGIVE (1970); C. Calian, Christian
Faith as Forgiveness, THEOLOGY TODAY 37, 439-33 (1981); D. DONNELLEY, PUTTING
FORGIVENESS INTO PRACTICE (1982); see also D. Droll, Forgiveness: Theory and Re-
search (Dissertation Abstracts International-B, 45, 2732 (1985); Mary Trainer, For-
giveness: Intrinsic, Role-Expected, Expedient, in the Context of Divorce (Dissertation
Abstracts International-B, 45, 1325 1984).
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pie of beneficence, which may include compassion,
unconditional worth, generosity, and moral love (to which the
wrongdoer, by nature of the hurtful act(s), has no right).7
This definition is consistent with ancient views in Hebrew, Chris-
tian, Islamic and Buddhist traditions. It also conforms with mod-
ern philosophical writings on the subject.8
We believe that forgiveness is a choice. Although certain groups
see it as an obligation, one has to exercise free will in order to
choose to forgive. We think that, in order to truly forgive, a person
must understand the meaning of forgiveness and its moral import,
and then willingly choose to make forgiveness a part of his life.
According to this definition, forgiveness is a moral response, and
so it involves more than simply ceasing to be angry or accepting
what happened. Forgiveness is also not the same as condoning,
forgetting or reconciling. When a person condones certain behav-
ior, he realizes that the offender may have had an excuse for his
actions. Conversely, when a person forgives, he clearly labels the
offender's behavior as morally wrong, but accepts the person as
having inherent worth despite the offense. Furthermore, when a
person forgives, he offers what he can to the offender, such as com-
passion. With reconciliation, however, both parties must do their
part to cure the situation, especially the offender who must take
steps to re-establish trust. Therefore, it is possible to forgive with-
out reconciling.
In a 1991 chapter, we address the writings that have been critical
of forgiveness as weak or even immoral. We refer the reader to
that chapter for our response.9
How Do People Forgive?
The phase model of forgiveness is our primary model for helping
people forgive. It is a prescriptive rather than descriptive approach
in that it should help unjustly treated people to forgive, if they
choose. After reviewing our ideas with hundreds of people
through informal discussions, we revised and refined the model un-
til we determined that we had captured the true essence of the for-
7. Joanna North, Wrongdoing and Forgiveness, PHIL. 62, 499-508 (1987).
8. For discussion of both ancient religious and modern philosophical views, see,
e.g., ROBERT ENRIGHT & RICHARD FITZGIBBONS, HELPING CLIENTS FORGIVE: AN
EMPIRICAL GUIDE FOR RESOLVING ANGER AND RESTORING HOPE (forthcoming in
2000).
9. ROBERT ENRIGHT & THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT STUDY GROUP, THE
MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORGIVENESS (W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz eds., 1991);
HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 123-52 (1991).
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giveness process. We then put the model to a scientific test:
assessing validity of the model for effecting forgiveness and psycho-
logical improvement in those going through our programs. The
model has been found to be quite helpful to clients. 10 Additionally,
in a study outside our own lab, Denton and Martin asked over 100
clinical social workers their opinion about the way forgiveness
therapy usually proceeds, and the responses supported the process
model as we describe it." We continue to discuss the model with
hundreds of people each year, and make subtle refinements.
The model has four phases that form a development progression.
These phases - uncovering, decision, work and deepening - each
have individual differences within them. Within each phase there
are a series of units most people seem to pass through, the details
of which are in Table 1. However, not everyone goes through the
processes in the same way or at the same speed. The following is a
brief overview of the four phases.
TABLE 1
Processes Involved in Forgiving
UNCOVERING PHASE
1. Examination of psychological defenses and the issues
involved.
2. Confrontation of anger; the point is to release, not harbor,
the anger.
3. Admittance of shame, when this is appropriate.
4. Awareness of depleted emotional energy.
5. Awareness of cognitive rehearsal of the offense.
6. Insight that the injured party may be comparing self with
the injurer.
7. Realization that oneself may be permanently and adversely
changed by the injury.
8. Insight into a possibly altered "just world" view.
10. See, e.g., Radhi Al-Mabuk et al., Forgiveness Education with Parentally Love-
Deprived College Students, J. MORAL EDUC. 24, 427-44 (1995); Catherine Coyle &
Robert Enright, Forgiveness Intervention with Post-Abortion Men, J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 65, 1042-46 (1997); Suzanne Freedman & Robert Enright, For-
giveness as an Intervention Goal with Incest Survivors, J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL., 64, 983-92 (1996); John Hebl & Robert Enright, Forgiveness as a Psycho-
therapeutic Goal with Elderly Females, PSYCHOTHERAPY 30, 658-67 (1993); Carole Os-
terndorf et al., Educational Programs on Forgiveness: Children and Adults, Presented
at the meeting of the Association for Moral Education (Nov. 1999).
11. R. Denton, & M. Martin, Defining Forgiveness: An Empirical Exploration of
Process and Role, AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 26, 281-92 (1998).
1624
2000] FORGIVENESS IN PSYCHOLOGY.AND LAW 1625
DECISION PHASE
9. A change of heart/conversion/new insights that old resolu-
tion strategies are not working.
10. Willingness to consider forgiveness as an option.
11. Commitment to forgive the offender.
WORK PHASE
12. Reframing, through role-taking, who the wrongdoer is by
viewing him or her in context.
13. Empathy and compassion toward the offender.
14. Bearing/accepting the pain.
15. Giving a moral gift to the offender.
DEEPENING PHASE
16. Finding meaning for self and others in the suffering and in
the forgiveness process.
17. Realization that self has needed others' forgiveness in the
past.
18. Insight that one is not alone (universality, support).
19. Realization that self may have a new purpose in life be-
cause of the injury.
20. Awareness of decreased negative affect and, perhaps, in-
creased positive affect, if this begins to emerge, toward the in-
jurer; awareness of internal, emotional release. 12
Uncovering Phase
The uncovering phase describes a person's insight about whether
the injustice, and subsequent injury, has compromised his life. This
can be an emotionally painful time. Yet, if the person concludes
that he is suffering emotionally because of another's injustice, this
can serve as a motivator to change and to think about and try
forgiveness.
This phase is separated into eight units. Unit 1 is a preforgive-
ness state of denial, where the person does not acknowledge the
depth of his hurt or anger. Unit 2 involves a major step forward
because the person acknowledges the injustice and responds with
anger or related emotions. Sometimes, a forgiving person exper-
iences guilt, shame or humiliation (unit 3), which deepens emo-
12. Please note that this table is an extension of Enright and the Human Develop-
ment Study Group. See ENRIGHT & THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT STUDY GROUP,
supra note 9.
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tional pain. A person at this point can also feel emotionally
drained (unit 4) and preoccupied with the problem (unit 5).
If a person, when comparing self and offender, concludes that
the other is now considerably better off, anger may deepen (unit
6). At times, a person realizes he or she is permanently changed,
as we will see in the case to follow, which further intensifies nega-
tive emotions (unit 7). All of this emotional pain can slowly lead a
person to adopt a pessimistic philosophy of life, thinking that jus-
tice happens to others, not to oneself (unit 8).
Decision Phase
The decision phase is a time for the person to think about what
forgiveness is and is not. A decision to forgive is a cognitive pro-
cess, not one in which forgiveness is completed. The person must
distinguish a commitment to forgive and all that is involved in the
process. Otherwise, upon committing to forgive, the person may
conclude that most of the work is over where contrarily it is only
beginning.
As the person begins to understand all of the anger, hurt, and
frustration he has been harboring, the person may conclude that
past attempts to deal with the injustice are ineffective, leading to an
openness to new approaches (unit 9). As the person considers the
possibility of forgiveness (unit 10), he may decide to abandon re-
venge and try to work on forgiving (unit 11).
Work Phase
During the work phase, the person begins to understand that the
offender is more than the offense (or offenses) committed. The
focus shifts from self, where most of the attention was centered in
the Uncovering Phase, to the offender, with an emphasis on under-
standing, empathy and mercy toward him.
The person starts with insight and cognitive exercises because, as
Fitzgibbons realized, it is often easier to understand an offender
than it is to feel empathy or compassion for him (unit 12). The
point is to help the forgiver to gain a broader perspective on the
offender: he is more than this one act of unfairness. Following in-
sight, emotional transformations toward the offender may emerge,
including both empathy and compassion (unit 13). In our view, this
tandem of thinking anew about an offender and then feeling anew
are part of a developmental sequence. First cognition, then affect
seems to be the typical sequence. The key is that the participant is
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seeing the offender in new ways and may become ready to respond
in new ways.
Acceptance or absorption of the pain (unit 14) is a central point
in learning to forgive and involves committing oneself not to pass
on one's emotional pain to others, including the offender. Unit 14
implies the gift-like quality of forgiveness as the forgiver stops a
possible cycle of revenge that otherwise may harm others, includ-
ing one's children, co-workers, and the offender. Unit 15 empha-
sizes this gift-like sense even more as the forgiver considers a way
to actually give a gift to the offender. This might include a demon-
stration of kindness or respect and need not be a tangible present,
wrapped and delivered. For example, one person, in giving a gift to
her deceased father who abused her years before, brought her chil-
dren to his grave, preserving her father's good name in the family.
Deepening Phase
Insights about an offender often stimulate other thoughts: Is
there any sense in all of the pain I endured (unit 16)? Have I
needed others' forgiveness in the past (unit 17)? What was it like
for me when I was forgiven? What is my best source of support as
I do the work of forgiveness (unit 18)? Am I motivated to interact
in new ways with the offender and with people in general (unit 19)?
The answers may lead to a recycling through the other phases, this
time in a deeper, more insightful way. Forgiving is a moving target.
As people learn to forgive, they may choose to appropriate that
learning toward even deeper forgiveness, experiencing emotional
relief (unit 20) and even paving the way for reconciliation. Later,
they may begin to generalize the learning to new situations and
people.13
We consider the phases to be developmental in that the uncover-
ing phase usually occurs first and is followed by the decision, work
and deepening phases, in that order. This is not a rigid, step-wise
model in that people must start with uncovering and proceed in
order to the end. It is possible, for example, for someone to feel
empathy for an offender (in the work phase) that sparks an interest
in exploring the details of the injustice and subsequent emotional
hurt in the uncovering phase.
13. We also have described the process of seeking forgiveness from others. See
ROBERT ENRIGHT, FORGIVENESS IS A CHOICE (forthcoming in 2000).
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What Are the Consequences When People Forgive?
The initial five educational interventions were done with a wide
variety of samples: late adolescents hurt by an emotionally distant
parent; adult women who were the victims of incest; men hurt by
an abortion decision of a partner; elderly hurt in a variety of ways
by others; and adult children of alcoholics. 14 In most cases, we
found that those who forgave reduced in anger, anxiety and some-
times in depression, and increased in self-esteem and hope. We
would like to expand our choice of the variables we study to in-
clude the effect of a person's forgiving on the offender and even on
entire families. We have yet to see even one case in which a person
became measurably worse in an emotional sense when freely
choosing to forgive in our programs within Educational
Psychology.
Examination of a Case From a Victim Offender Conference
Walter Dickey describes the case of a man who robbed a church
in Milwaukee. 5 In arranging for a conference between the man
convicted of the crime, Mr. Singleton, and the pastor of the church,
Reverend Davis, Dickey adhered to the ideas behind restorative
justice as explicated by Umbreit:16 1) Criminal behavior is seen
first as a conflict between people, and second between the state
and the law-breaker; 2) The criminal's accountability for the crime
is of greater importance than his punishment; 3) The victim's needs
as a result of the crime must be taken into account; and 4) The
victim and offender engage in constructive dialogue and problem-
solving to restore the losses to individuals and community.
After much preparation for both parties, Mr. Singleton and Rev.
Davis expressed an interest in meeting together, with Dickey as the
mediator. A key to the success of this particular project centered
on reframing, in which the pastor could see the offender in a larger
context than the burglary itself. Mr. Singleton, careful not to make
excuses for his behavior, explained his involvement with drugs
prior to committing the burglary. Also, he had not realized that the
building was a church, a reasonable statement given that the build-
ing is a former firehouse that was being renovated at the time of
the crime.
14. See supra note 10.
15. See DICKEY, supra note 1.
16. MARK UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER (1994).
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Mr. Singleton further explained that his father was an assistant
pastor of a church, which deepened his remorse and need for for-
giveness. In fact, in consulting with his father the day after the
burglary, he decided to turn himself into the authorities. He con-
cluded by apologizing to Rev. Davis for his actions.
Rev. Davis seemed to have compassion for Mr. Singleton after
understanding his situation in greater depth. He acknowledged a
burglar's failure to see the building as a church. He accepted the
apology but explained to Mr. Singleton how the incident affected
his congregation. Recently, in another church in Milwaukee, there
had been a shooting. That incident, coupled with their own church
being burglarized, led to many parishioners feeling unsafe while in
church.
Mr. Singleton offered to address the congregation in attempt to
reduce fear, but Rev. Davis thought this was unnecessary. The of-
fender then offered to do voluntary service around the church
grounds in reparation for his actions. Again, the pastor thought
this was unnecessary because the stolen goods were returned. The
pastor's statements were intended to show mercy on him. Because
helping around the church seemed so important to Mr. Singleton as
a way of making amends, however, Rev. Davis ultimately accepted
his offer. Together they agreed on 100 hours of service.
At the end of the meeting, Mr. Singleton once again expressed
remorse over what he did. The pastor told him that he saw genuine
sorrow and that as far as he was concerned, the matter was settled.
Rev. Davis wished him well in the future and stated that good re-
sults often come when we are placed in difficult situations. Mr.
Singleton agreed with this.
The meeting was deemed a success by both parties. Mr. Single-
ton unburdened himself of much guilt and made plans for paying
back the Church through service. Rev. Davis was able to show un-
derstanding, mercy, and forgiveness as well as accept the offender's
offer to restore justice. Both men seemed to develop a mutual re-
spect as reconciliation occurred.
CONCLUSION
Not all attempts at restorative justice work out as well. Achiev-
ing both forgiveness and justice can be involved and complicated.
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Therefore, this Essay proposes seven points to consider in the
future:17
Forgiveness, like justice, is a moral concept. It is not a technique
or strategy devoid of the intent to do good. Instead, forgiveness is
a merciful act of giving a gift to someone who does not necessarily
deserve it. In other words, the focus when someone forgives is
predominantly on the other person, not on oneself. It is important
that the victim have a clear understanding of what is being offered
in forgiveness.
A mediator should be careful to assess the intent of the forgiver.
Is forgiveness being offered out of a sense of pressure to do so?
Does the victim forgive because the mediator has created subtle
expectations that it occur? Does the victim feel any fear in with-
holding forgiveness? Genuine forgiveness is never forced. It can
take time and is the choice of the one offended. Of course, there is
nothing wrong with discussing the potentially positive aspects of
forgiveness with a client, but ultimately this is up to him or her.
The person has a free will to give the gift, refrain altogether, or
wait. A victim who is not ready to forgive now may be ready in the
future. Common sense and a concern for the victim can be guides
regarding how to approach him or her about this delicate matter of
forgiveness.
Asking for or receiving forgiveness also is a moral act, not a self-
serving act to reduce one's own sentence or receive some advan-
tage. Advantage may come, but this should not be the primary
motivation. A mediator walks a fine line here. Perhaps a key to
genuine acts of seeking forgiveness concern remorse. How genu-
inely remorseful does the offender seem to be? Does the person
apologize? Does the apology seem sincere? Does the victim think
it is sincere?
A mediator needs to carefully assess the readiness of both victim
and offender to meet, especially for the purpose of discussing the
delicate matter of forgiveness. An offender may be quite remorse-
ful and ready to unburden the sense of guilt, whereas the victim is
still afraid and apprehensive to meet. On the other hand, a victim
may be eager to hear why the offender committed the act, whereas
the offender may be too angry or embarrassed to meet. The con-
17. These points are not intended to be a detailed discussion of the process of
Victim Offender Conferencing. Rather, they are concerned only with the idea of for-
giveness as a part of the conference. Details on already-established issues and ethical
guidelines for such conferences can be obtained from the Victim Offender Mediation
Association Web site at <http://www.voma.org>.
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ference must await each party's willingness and readiness to discuss
the issue together. Sometimes it takes years of preparation before
both sides are ready to meet, whether or not forgiveness is even
discussed.
Forgiving, receiving forgiveness and reconciliation may not oc-
cur. The process of forgiveness takes time. If a conference is not
as productive as hoped, another meeting may be possible. The me-
diator, of course, must avoid the expectation that such conferences
are part of therapy or other services that the mediator is not
trained to provide..
Forgiveness is not a substitute for justice. If an offender apolo-
gizes and if a victim accepts that apology through forgiving, the
offender still has a debt to pay, whether to the victim, to the state,
or both. Rev. Davis' acceptance of Mr. Singleton's offer of 100
hours of service is one example of how forgiveness and justice can
exist along side each other.
Certain "ingredients" seem particularly important in conferences
where forgiveness is one of the goals. One is reframing, in which
the victim sees the offender in a broader context than the offense.
Hearing the offender's story of upbringing and the circumstances
surrounding the crime can go far in helping the victim see a human
being across the table. Another is compassion, or a willingness to
suffer along with the offender, given his difficult circumstances. On
the seeking forgiveness side of this issue, a sincere apology and a
willingness to make amends seem particularly important.
Forgiveness deserves its place alongside the quest for fairness in
this new model of victim and offender discussion. The addition of
forgiveness into the legal process might change how we think about
and serve justice. Perhaps forgiveness may be one avenue of hu-
manizing the quest for justice.
As
a M/
ET
MERCIFUL DAMAGES:
SOME REMARKS ON FORGIVENESS,
MERCY AND TORT LAW
Neal R. Feigenson*
I want to explore the place, if any, of forgiveness and mercy in
tort law, using empirical psychological research where relevant to
shed some light on the topic. I first describe a number of misgiv-
ings about encouraging forgiveness or mercy as part of the substan-
tive or procedural law of torts. I then suggest a concept, merciful
damages, that may allow some of the benefits of forgiveness and
mercy while avoiding or at least mitigating some of the concerns.
I have benefited greatly from what Jeffrie Murphy and Jean
Hampton have to say about forgiveness and mercy in their book,'
especially Professor Murphy's first and last chapters, and I take
some of his ideas as my points of departure. Murphy carefully dis-
tinguishes forgiveness, which involves a change in feelings toward
the transgressor (specifically, to overcome resentment for the right
reasons), from mercy, which involves an act toward the transgres-
sor (specifically, to relieve the transgressor of some or all of what
would otherwise be his or her just deserts). 2 Moreover, only a vic-
tim of wrongdoing is in a position to forgive the wrongdoer, while
only a decision maker with authority to impose on the wrongdoer
certain legal but harsh consequences is in a position to be
merciful.
Two consequences follow. First, forgiveness is neither necessary
nor sufficient for mercy. Second, "[t]he area of resentment and
forgiveness is individual and personal in a way that legal guilt and
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. I am grateful to Eliza-
beth Malang and the other members of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for organiz-
ing the Symposium and inviting me to participate; to my colleagues Greg Loken and
Linda Meyer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay; and to
Daniel Shuman for sharing with me a prepublication draft of his essay, The Role of
Apology in Tort Law, in 83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000). See infra notes 51-53 and accom-
panying text (describing Shuman's proposal that fact finders be allowed to take a
tortfeasor's apology into account in reducing noneconomic damages and comparison
of that proposal with merciful damages).
1. See JEFFRIE C. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
(1988).
2. See id. at 20-21, 33-34.
3. See id.
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responsibility are not."'4 This is not very promising for an applica-
tion of forgiveness to tort law as a system of substantive and proce-
dural rules. Whether a tort victim, moved by compassion, decides
to forgive the tortfeasor after fully litigating his or her case would
seem not to concern the law (or society at large) directly. Should a
victim be moved to settle with a tortfeasor and thus waive the right
to seek the full compensation to which he or she might be legally
entitled to - that is, to be merciful - would also seem to be with-
out much significance for tort law. In the aggregate, however, such
decisions may affect both the number and sorts of cases that re-
main in the formal adjudicatory system.'
Murphy suggests that mercy, as the "legal analogue" of forgive-
ness,6 may be morally justified within a just legal system. If mercy
on the part of a state decision maker is not simply an unjustified
departure from what the law requires, there must be good reasons
for the decision maker to be merciful. If such reasons exist, how-
ever, it seems that the decision maker has a duty to decide merci-
fully. Mercy becomes a matter of what the person being judged
deserves, and hence mercy is subsumed within justice and is not an
autonomous virtue.7 Murphy's way out of this conundrum is to re-
fer to a private law model in which the victim of the offense has the
right, but not the duty, to forgo imposing on the offender the pen-
alty that justice makes available.8 And if we think of those private
victims as delegating to the appropriate state decision maker their
right to forgo justice, there is no conflict between the state's obliga-
tion to mete out just deserts to criminal offenders and its occasional
exercise of mercy.9
This line of reasoning may help (at least in theory) to explain the
role of mercy in criminal law, but it does not appear to be as useful
when applied to civil litigation. By choosing to sue instead of set-
tle, the victim of a tort implicitly (or explicitly) refuses to waive his
4. Id. at 33.
5. The role of forgiveness in negotiation, mediation and the like is an interesting
topic but it is beyond the scope of this essay. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohen, Apology and
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1447 (2000) (discussing research on the potential benefits of apology in avoiding liti-
gation); see also Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1165 (1997).
6. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 34.
7. The argument is more complicated than this; for instance, mercy can be sup-
ported on consequentialist grounds, but in that case, justice is overridden by utility as
a ground for decision. See id. at 172-73.
8. See id. at 175-76.
9. See id. at 177-80.
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or her right to obtain full compensation from the tortfeasor. It
seems odd, then, to posit that the state has been delegated any
waiver such that the state's exercise of mercy in civil adjudication
may be consistent with justice.
Compassion, Mercy and Legal Judgment10
Let us assume, nevertheless, that state decision makers (judges
and/or juries) in tort cases may, consistently with justice, decide
mercifully. Let us also assume that, although forgiveness is neither
necessary nor sufficient for mercy, the (private) feeling that drives
forgiveness - compassion or sympathy" (and love) - may moti-
vate the (public) act, and therefore, that the feeling may have some
significance for law. 2
Is compassionate or sympathetic decision making a good thing?
Theoretical arguments that it is are (mostly) familiar. It has been
said that "the ultimate function of sympathy is to provide[ ] a vital
sense of commonality or connection among individuals, dis-
rupt[ing] ... the trend toward what will eventually be isolation and
death.' 3 Philosophers, similarly, have long characterized sympa-
thy as one of the "moral sentiments," crucial to the maintenance of
peaceful co-existence in society.14 Compassion contributes to
moral judgment because it promotes a concern for the welfare of
others that is fundamental to many moral systems. It can be ar-
gued that sympathetic decision making may lead to more demo-
cratic and just results insofar as it helps correct for the law's
relative lack of attention to those traditionally disadvantaged in so-
ciety, thus tending to "level the playing field" of justice. 15 Finally,
the process of compassionate decision making is democratically in-
clusive because it incorporates into formal legal decision making,
10. The arguments and discussions of supporting research in this section are
adapted from a previously published article. See Neal Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal
Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997).
11. A basic definition of compassion or sympathy (I treat the two terms as synony-
mous) is a heightened awareness of the suffering of another and the urge to alleviate
that suffering. Compassion, like most if not all emotions, thus combines cognitive,
affective and action-oriented features: the awareness of the other's suffering is both
thought and felt and is accompanied by the desire to do something about it. Sympa-
thy or compassion involves the ability to imagine oneself in the sufferer's predicament
and, in some sense, to feel the other's suffering.
12. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 34, 176.
13. Feigenson, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting LAUREN WUPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SYMPATHY 68, 177 (1991)).
14. See id.
15. Id.
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with its traditionally male model of objective rationality, empathic
modes of moral reasoning associated with women.
What does empirical psychology, and in particular the psychol-
ogy of the emotions, have to say about the relationship between
compassion or sympathy and legal decision making? Three bene-
fits have been identified. Compassion in legal judgment may be
desirable because it enables decision makers to better understand
the situations they judge; "by taking the perspectives of all parties
involved, judges better appreciate the human meanings of those
situations.' 1 6 Moreover, compassion is a natural part of human life
whose absence or repression would impair decision making. Re-
search on the effects of mood on judgment suggests that compas-
sion may enhance legal decision making by leading to more careful
and deliberate information processing.
The research also tells us, however, that compassion is likely to
lead to decisions that are unduly subjective and biased, contrary to
many norms of good decision making. 17 Because compassion in-
volves taking the perspective of the other person, the target of the
compassion, compassionate decisions are likely to be highly subjec-
tive (in a sense that cannot be ascribed to other emotional judg-
ments). In one study, for instance, participants who were
instructed to take the perspective of a target person attributed to
the target a greater number of characteristics they believed to be
true of themselves than did participants not instructed to take the
perspective of the target.' 8 Moreover, the researchers found no
significant difference between the responses of participants in-
structed to imagine what they would think and feel if they were in
the target person's situation and those instructed to imagine what
the target person was thinking and feeling. This further indicated
that decision makers instructed to empathize have a hard time dis-
tinguishing self from other.' 9 The consequence is that decision
makers may confusedly decide the case before them on the basis of
information about themselves instead of the parties.2 0 In a legal
system in which similar cases may be presented to any of several
decision makers (different juries, different judges in same district),
this subjectivity promises to decrease consistency (or interdecision-
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 33-34.
19. See id. at 33.
20. This sense of subjectivity in judgment is, in part, what the rule against "Golden
Rule" arguments is designed to avoid. See id. at 14-15.
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maker reliability, to use the technical term), undermining the basic
justice goal of treating like cases alike.
Compassion is also likely to bias legal decision making. For one
thing, sympathetic or compassionate decision making is prone to
diverge from the widely accepted ideal of impartial justice.2 1 Re-
search confirms this conflict between sympathy and impartial jus-
tice.22 Participants in two experiments were faced with either the
task of allocating relatively desirable or undesirable work assign-
ments to employees or with the task of allocating scarce resources
among deserving candidates. 23 In the first experiment, (proce-
dural) justice dictated allocating the jobs by a random procedure;
in the second, (distributive) justice dictated allocation according to
need.24
In each experiment, participants who were instructed to imagine
how the employee or potential recipient felt about the situation
were more likely to allocate the better job or the scarce resource to
the target person than justice principles required - and the partici-
pants themselves acknowledged that their choices were less fair.
Additional unfair bias results both from the ways compassion is
aroused (i.e., the psychological "inputs" that influence the intensity
of sympathy) and from how compassion affects social judgments
(the psychological "outputs" resulting from the influence of sympa-
thy).2 6 Consider compassion's inputs. A basic function of all emo-
tions is to redirect the attention of the person experiencing the
emotion. This function seems perfectly consistent with one major
benefit of sympathy in legal judgment: it calls our attention to fea-
tures of the case that are worth noticing and valuing. The redirec-
tion of attention and emphasis by emotion works well when the
intensity of the feeling matches the urgency of the situation. Re-
search shows, for instance, that levels of sympathy for an accident
victim (and, hence, the urge to relieve the victim's suffering) do
correspond, to some extent, to the severity of the victim's suffer-
ing.27 But the intensity of a judge's or juror's emotional response
to a case may not match its legal urgency. The ways in which sym-
pathy is generated suggest that compassionate decision making is
likely to be unfairly biased because the factors that cause sympathy
21. See Feigenson, supra note 10, at 49.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 49.
25. See id. at 49-50.
26. See id. at 50.
27. See id.
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do not correspond or are even irrelevant to the factors on which
just decisions should be based. Any of three factors affecting the
intensity of sympathy may be involved.
First, sympathy is subject to a salience bias. "Empathy and sym-
pathy depend most on the sights and sounds of the person in
pain."28 An empathy-based morality, as psychologist Martin Hoff-
man has argued, is therefore too prone to be biased by the salience
and source of the stimulus.29 "A cry of pain may arouse more em-
pathic distress than a facial grimace; a friend's or relative's cry
more than a stranger's "3.... ,0 In general, the more salient the
stimulus, the stronger the affective reaction. Yet the salience of a
party's suffering at trial may be affected as much by the lawyers'
talents in eliciting and evoking that suffering as by its true extent,
in which case the intensity of emotional response would not relia-
bly signal the appropriateness of that response.
Research also shows that compassion is more readily aroused the
greater the similarity between observer and sufferer. The more
similar to the sufferer the observer believes herself to be, the more
readily and fully she can imagine what the sufferer's world looks
and feels like. Relatedly, the intensity of sympathy may be influ-
enced by how much the perceiver likes the sufferer. But no accept-
able legal or moral theory makes the similarity of the decision
maker to the litigant or the likeability of the litigant relevant to the
substantive justice of the outcome.
Compassion, like other emotional reactions, also tends to be
more intense the more unexpected the event giving rise to the emo-
tion. Research shows that observers tend to feel greater sympathy
for the victim of an accident (or a crime) that occurs under excep-
tional circumstances. But the unexpectedness or perceived abnor-
mality of an instance of suffering is not at all an accurate heuristic
for whether a legal decision maker should mercifully seek to allevi-
ate that suffering. Legal scholar Richard Delgado has eloquently
explained how sympathy is liable, for exactly this reason, to ignore
the most pervasive suffering: the more entrenched the poor be-
come in their poverty, the more others become accustomed to the
presence of the extremely poor, and the less sympathetic they are
likely to be.3'
28. Feigenson, supra note 10, at 50.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 55.
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Finally, consider compassion's outputs. Research on affect and
social judgment also indicates that compassion may lead decision
makers to perceive and weigh the evidence in a biased fashion.32
This research shows generally that emotional feelings influence
which facts decision makers will attend to, how much time they will
spend poring over them, and how they will interpret and categorize
them.33 Decision makers' feelings in response to what they first
learn about the case will affect their further perception and evalua-
tion of the case, because they learn the evidence over a period of
time and cannot withhold their judgments until all the evidence is
in. And in the case of compassion or sympathy, the perspective-
taking slants the observer's judgment in favor of the target of the
emotion.34
These biases in compassionate legal judgment would not alone
make compassion in tort law suspect, if the biases were those we
would accept on moral grounds. Unfortunately, they are not. Fa-
voritism based on the relative salience of the target person's suffer-
ing, the similarity of target to observer, the likeability of the target
and the unexpectedness of the suffering bear no necessary connec-
tion to any coherent conception of fair decision making. The bi-
ases that compassion introduces to factual perception and
interpretation only compound the problem. So to the extent that
compassion motivates forgiveness and hence mercy, merciful tort
decisions run a considerable risk of being biased and unfair./
Professor Murphy observes that mercy poses what he calls equal
protection problems. If there is a good reason to be merciful to
A, then it must be (partly) because of some characteristic that A
possesses. All things being equal, if B shares that characteristic,
doesn't B, then, deserve equivalent mercy? But "deserve mercy" is
an oxymoron. And if the giving of mercy remains optional, so that
there is no paradox in not requiring mercy for B while continuing
to recognize the characteristic as a good reason for mercy, the une-
qual treatment of A and B persists. If this is a bothersome feature
32. See id. at 57-59.
33. See id.
34. I noted earlier that this perspective-taking makes judgment more subjective
because it leads the observer to ascribe more of his or her own features to the target
of observation. Relevant here is that this subjectivizing takes a particular direction:
participants tend to attribute to the target person positive traits they attribute to
themselves rather than neutral or negative ones. Thus, compassionate decision mak-
ers (unsurprisingly) tend to view the evidence favorably to the object of their
compassion.
35. See HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 180-81.
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with regard to the good reasons for being merciful, then it should
trouble us all the more when unequal treatment results from less
defensible features of compassion and mercy.
Merciful Damages
Despite these misgivings, perhaps compassionate mercy could
have a place in tort law, one that recognizes at least some of the
virtues of forgiveness without being vitiated by (all of) the forego-
ing concerns. Consider that tort law (albeit to the chagrin of some)
accommodates retributive emotions when it allows punitive dam-
ages to be assessed against defendants whose conduct is deter-
mined to be especially egregious or outrageous. Perhaps the law
should also make room for forgiveness and mercy by allowing what
I will call merciful damages. Merciful damages would reduce the
extent of a culpable tort defendant's liability when the decision
maker (properly) decides to be merciful toward the defendant.
They would be determined in a separate damages phase of a bifur-
cated civil proceeding, after the liability decision. In the remainder
of this essay I will briefly outline the when, how and why of
merciful damages.
When. To determine when merciful damages would be war-
ranted, let us turn to Professor Murphy's analysis of (private) for-
giveness. Murphy argues that a victim ought to forgive wrongdoing
in any number of situations in which it is possible to distinguish the
immoral act from the immoral agent and thus to square forgiveness
with self-respect and respect for the law.36 Where the wrongdoer
has separated himself from his act, we can "join the wrongdoer in
condemning the very act from which he now stands emotionally
separated '37 without continuing to resent the person who commit-
ted the act. Forgiveness is morally appropriate where the wrong-
doer (1) has repented or had a change of heart; (2) meant well or
had good motives; (3) has suffered enough (for morally cognizable
reasons); or (4) has undergone humiliation (for instance, through
an apology ritual); and it is also appropriate (5) for old times' sake,
out of recognition of the wrongdoer's personhood before the
offense.38
Will any of these situations justify merciful decision making in
the legal sphere? Some may. Repentance, sufficient suffering or
36. See id. at 24-25.
37. Id. at 25.
38. See id. at 24. I do not address Murphy's argument that forgiveness may also
sometimes be morally required. See id. at 29-32.
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sincere apology by the tort defendant would seem to warrant a
merciful response by a public decision maker just as they would
support forgiveness by the private victim. Meaning well or having
good motives could properly evoke mercy toward the would-be
Good Samaritan whose carelessness leaves the victim worse off.3
9
But there are difficulties. As a practical matter, many defendants
who repent or apologize between tort and trial would presumably
manifest that change of heart by settling the lawsuit, so there
would not be much occasion for judge or jury to exercise mercy on
those grounds.4" Nor would forgiving for old times' sake find much
purchase in many tort suits because of the lack of any prior (and
potentially continuing) relationship between plaintiff and
defendant.
Another ground for being merciful, however, may be peculiarly
applicable to certain tort cases, and allows the tort decision maker
to implement the same principle that Murphy's criteria share: war-
ranting forgiveness by separating the sinner from the sin.4 It
should also tend to avoid the undesirable bias introduced by the
personal emotional feelings that often drive forgiveness.42 When
jurors determine responsibility for harm, they tend to think
(among other things) that bad outcomes must be due to bad peo-
ple, and that the worse the outcome, the worse the cause.43 The
first is an extension of what psychologists call the correspondence
bias or the fundamental attribution error: people act the way they
do primarily because of the kinds of people they are rather than
the kinds of situations in which they find themselves." The second
is an instance of what is known as thinking by representativeness:
the sample resembles the universe from which it is drawn, the
cause resembles the consequence it engenders. 45 The net effect of
39. Experimental research shows that mock jurors take the actor's good motives
into account in making punishment decisions in euthanasia cases when they interpret
jury instructions as allowing them to do so. See Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury
Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985).
40. That some apologizing defendants will not settle is presumed by Shuman's
proposal that factfinders be permitted to reduce a tort plaintiff's noneconomic dam-
ages in recognition of the defendant's apology. See Daniel Shuman, The Role of
Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000).
41. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1.
42. This ground is not necessary for an award of merciful damages; I am not sure
whether it should alone be sufficient for them.
43. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK
ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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these habits of thought is to conflate actor with outcome, sinner
with sin.46
Sometimes this kind of thinking is especially inapt.47 Sometimes
the harm a defendant has caused the plaintiff is far out of propor-
tion to the riskiness of his or her conduct, to the blameworthiness
of the conduct ex ante. Indeed, many accidents are caused by mere
inadvertence or impulse rather than intentional or even reckless
disregard of the safety of others. The consequences of inattention,
however, can be enormous: death or severe injury. In such cases it
seems especially incorrect (albeit particularly tempting48) to iden-
tify bad outcomes with bad character. It is not so much that the
tortfeasor has distanced himself or herself from his or her violation
of the norm of reasonable care (for instance, by confession and
apology) as that the circumstances show no great disrespect for the
norm in the first place. Now as long as the defendant's conduct
was sufficiently risky to reach the threshold of being considered
negligent, the law entitles - commands - the decision maker to
hold the defendant liable for the full extent of the injuries thus
caused. When full liability is dictated by rule yet grossly dispropor-
tionate to just deserts, mercy would allow the decision maker to
temper justice and decline to assess the (marginally blameworthy)
actor with all of the (overwhelmingly negative) consequences of
the act.
Thus, in awarding merciful damages, the decision maker in effect
says to this sort of defendant: We recognize that you did wrong
(acted negligently) and caused harm to the plaintiff. The magni-
tude of the harm, however, is so much greater than that the con-
duct probably risked that to say "the harm belongs to you" would
impose unjustified suffering on you - no less unjustified (insofar
as actual harm exceeds probable harm) than it would be to permit
the plaintiff to bear that harm. Compassion is the appropriate re-
46. For a detailed discussion of these and other habits of common sense legal deci-
sion-making, see FEIGENSON, supra note 43.
47. See Shuman, supra note 40.
48. When jurors are confronted with the task of assigning liability that seems dis-
proportionate to blameworthiness, they may be prone to restore proportionality, a
hallmark of common sense justice, by resorting to blaming habits that convert mere
inadvertence into (greater) culpability. Thus the cause will seem to resemble the ef-
fect, and the punishment will seem to match the offense. Melodramatic thinking, in
which bad outcomes like accidents are traced to the bad conduct of bad guys, is the
jury's way of doing this. (And mercy tempers the consequences of juries' tendency to
use melodramatic thinking to magnify the egregiousness of a tort defendant's
conduct.)
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sponse to the perception of unjustified suffering, and compassion
motivates mercy. 9
Think of merciful damages on this ground as a way to fine-tune
Holmes's insight that liability attaches to the moral quality of
(risky) action and not to action per se.50 One who inadvertently
causes serious harm or injures through conduct that falls slightly
short of the community's expectations has indeed behaved in a
blameworthy fashion - but not in a very blameworthy fashion.
Harm in excess of culpability is just bad luck, not truly indicative of
the blameworthiness of the actor as a person. Damages, however,
must be paid by people, not their acts; in a third-party liability re-
gime there is no practical way to disentangle the two even if moral-
ity suggests they should be distinguished. Merciful damages would
allow decision makers to recognize the difference between the na-
ture of the act and the nature of the actor when the difference is
plain.
The idea of merciful damages is not entirely unanticipated in the
law. In his recent article, Daniel Shuman points out that many
states permit the fact finder to consider the defendant's public
apology in mitigation of damages for defamation.-1 Shuman him-
self recommends extending this concept to allow the fact finder to
reduce the plaintiff's intangible or noneconomic losses by recogniz-
ing the defendant's apology in any kind of case.52 Merciful dam-
ages goes still further by permitting a reduction in the defendant's
liability whenever mercy is warranted. 3
49. This kind of case should be distinguished from those in which tort law entirely
relieves the defendant of responsibility on the ground that the (extensive) damages
were unforeseeable. Forgiveness and mercy do not negate responsibility but rather
(some of) what would otherwise be its consequences. Cf. Joanna North, The "Ideal"
of Forgiveness: A Philosopher's Exploration, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 15, 17-18
(Robert D. Enright & Joanna North, eds., 1998). Consider, for instance, Petition of
Kinsman Transit Company, 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). To simplify the facts, a ship-
owner negligently secured one of its boats to a dock, so that it was knocked loose by
floating ice and crashed into a drawbridge that the city had negligently failed to raise.
Ship and bridge dammed the flow of ice, causing widespread flooding. The court held
both shipowner and city liable, rejecting their argument that their carelessness could
not be considered the proximate cause of such vast damages and reasoning that the
harm they caused was exactly the sort that should have been anticipated given their
negligence, only greater. Had the defendant's carelessness been less pronounced (and
perhaps also had the defendants met one or more of Murphy's five criteria), this could
have been a proper case for liability followed by mercy.
50. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 76-77 (1881/1963).
51. See Shuman, supra note 40.
52. See id.
53. Shuman's recommendation resembles the merciful damages proposed in this
paper in that it would apply to any kind of tort case, and would be decided by the fact
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How. A few comments on the administration of merciful dam-
ages are in order. Relegating the merciful decision to a later,
"damages phase" of trial, as I suggested earlier, promises some ad-
vantages. First, exercising mercy with regard to damages instead of
liability would be more consistent with Murphy's conception of for-
giveness as distinct from excuse, justification, or any other mitiga-
tion of responsibility. Forgiveness (and resentment) pertain to
wrongdoing that is neither excused nor justified; one who forgives
recognizes the wrongdoer's responsibility but then treats the
wrongdoer less harshly than he or she has a right to do." In the
proposed scheme, the defendant's responsibility would first be de-
cided in a liability phase of trial. Only the legally responsible de-
fendant is subject to damages, and only such a defendant, whose
responsibility has been recognized, could benefit, in a second phase
of trial, from a merciful reduction in damages.55
Second, while the objections to the use of compassion in legal
decision making discussed earlier would still apply to the decision
whether to award mercifuls, at least some would apply with less
force. Because forgiveness and mercy address the tortfeasor and
not the tort, the sinner and not the sin,56 more legally irrelevant
information about the defendant would come before the decision
maker, and the subjectivity and bias inherent in compassionate
judging would continue to be a risk. If damages are determined
after liability, however, compassion would not skew the basic liabil-
ity judgment. Compassion would be no more likely to exonerate
the defendant than it is now. The risk of unequal treatment of sim-
ilarly situated defendants would remain, but would at least be con-
fined to the damage award. In short, just as information not
relevant to a capital defendant's guilt or innocence may be admit-
ted into evidence in the penalty phase so that the decision makers
may reach a morally superior sentence, so a damages phase in
finder on a case-by-case basis. Merciful damages differ from Shuman's proposal,
however, in a couple of important respects. First, as noted in the text, merciful dam-
ages may be warranted for reasons other than the defendant's apology. Second, an
award of mercifuls would not reduce the plaintiff's recovery. See supra notes 49-52
and accompanying text.
54. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 20.
55. Merciful damages are thus distinguished from the sense in which the general
tort rule of negligence can itself be described as "forgiving" (by comparison with strict
liability), because the application of the more lenient negligence rule (where it makes
a difference) results in a decision of no liability in the first place - which is not what
Murphy and others mean by forgiveness. See supra note 49 (contrasting merciful
damages with proximate cause limitations on legal responsibility).
56. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 24-25.
1644
MERCIFUL DAMAGES
which mercifuls are possible would admit otherwise extraneous
party information in order that the court decide on a morally supe-
rior award.57
An obvious objection to this proposal, even conceding that the
defendant who (carelessly) causes harm far out of proportion to his
blameworthiness may be a proper target of compassion, is the tort
law precept that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer a
loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it."58 Merciful
damages would hardly be morally appropriate if they resulted in
undercompensating a blameless and deserving victim - especially
given experimental59 and jury verdict6° research showing that tort
jurors may already be prone to anti-plaintiff bias in awarding com-
pensatory damages. To address this concern, the state could estab-
lish a fund from punitive damages paid to the state instead of
directly to the plaintiff (as some states already mandate 61) and use
that fund to make up shortfalls from full compensation created by
mercifuls. These shortfalls are almost certain to be smaller on av-
erage than the funds generated by the average punitive award, be-
cause punitives can range up to many times compensatory
damages, whereas mercifuls cannot exceed compensatory damages.
Moreover, assuming that mercifuls are confined to unusual cases,
such as those in which harm appears greatly to exceed culpability,
they should be awarded only exceptionally - perhaps something
57. This would not entirely avoid evidentiary problems. Federal Rule of Evidence
408, for instance, makes evidence of a defendant's apology inadmissible if made dur-
ing compromise negotiations, and some states make a defendant's "benevolent ges-
tures" inadmissible. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (1999). As Shuman
points out, there is at least a tension between the therapeutic value of apology for the
victim, which is generally highest when the apology is prompt, and the evidentiary
rules that protect only those apologies madb during settlement talks. See Shuman,
supra note 40.
58. Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927).
59. Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on At-
tributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 597 (1997); Doug Zickafoose & Brian Bornstein, Double Dis-
counting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 577 (1999).
60. See James Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEG. STUD.
751, 752 (1985).
61. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1999). See generally Sonia
Larsen, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring that
Percentage of Punitive Damage Awards be Paid Directly to State or Court-Adminis-
tered Fund, 16 A.L.R. FED. 129 (1993).
2000] 1645
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
in the range of the 5% or so of cases in which punitives are now
awarded,62 so that the fund should not readily be exhausted.63
Why. Let me conclude by suggesting why merciful damages, if
the idea can survive the criticisms raised earlier, might be a good
thing. There is, first of all, a pleasing moral symmetry in permitting
tort decision makers to judge mercifully. Just as punitive damages
empower decision makers to give vent to anger and outrage at ma-
licious conduct that results in relatively minor damage, so merciful
damages would empower them to relieve defendants who have
merely been careless of some of the overwhelming consequences of
their behavior - behavior in which any of us could easily imagine
ourselves engaging.
Forgiveness and mercy may also be therapeutic for the
tortfeasor. Without mercy inspired by forgiveness, the likelihood is
greater that an individual defendant will return again and again,
even obsessively, to the memory of the transgression, which will
continue to define his current existence as the linchpin of his self-
narrative.64 Forgiveness and mercy exercise a kind of social influ-
ence on the tortfeasor, through which society tells him or her, "You
62. See generally Michael Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data
and Further Inquiry, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 15.
63. Jury research suggests another reason why being merciful to tortfeasors in the
way my proposal permits may be unjust to their victims. Experiments varying trial
format show that plaintiffs win less often in bifurcated trials than they do in unitary
trials (although when they win, they receive larger awards). See Irwin Horowitz &
Kenneth Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex
Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990). This may very well be because the
sympathy for victims evoked by proof of damages sometimes inclines jurors in unitary
trials to decide for the victims on the question of liability. Yet it would hardly seem
fair to make room for leniency toward injurers at the expense of depriving some
(otherwise deserving) victims of any recovery at all.
It could be argued, on the other hand, that juries, recognizing the availability of
mercifuls, could inflate their compensatbry damages awards, confident that the incre-
ment would be assessed to the fund, not to the defendant. Appropriate jury instruc-
tions permitting mercifuls only in exceptional cases could address this concern.
Another, procedural objection to the proposal is that every case would have to be
bifurcated, because it most likely could not be determined in advance which cases
would be strong enough candidates for a possible award of mercifuls. Currently only
unusually complex cases tend not to be tried in unitary proceedings. This would
somewhat simplify trials in which defendants are ultimately found not liable (by elimi-
nating proof of damages), but would lengthen proceedings in the slight majority of
cases in which defendants are found liable. Note that Shuman also recommends bi-
furcated proceedings. See Shuman, supra note 40.
64. See JEFFERSON A. SINGER & PETER SALOVEY, THE REMEMBERED SELF 42
(1993); cf. E.D. Scobie & G.E.W. Scobie, Damaging Events: The Perceived Need for
Forgiveness, 28 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 373, 395 (1998).
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are not that act of negligence. It's okay to tell a new story about
yourself. 65
The value of merciful damages for the tort victim is another mat-
ter. Forgiveness, which as we have seen may inspire mercy, has
often been proclaimed as therapeutic for the victim because it
reduces the anxiety and stress associated with continuing anger and
resentment.66 (It may be observed that these positive health effects
of forgiveness are based largely on anecdotal experience and
clinical observation, and some researchers have pointed to a lack of
quantitative empirical support for such claims.67) Perhaps more
importantly from the victim's perspective, mercy may be valuable
because, as Professor Murphy writes of forgiveness, it reflects
moral humility, the victim's recognition that he or she, too, could
offend and desire forgiveness, and would want to live in a world in
which that forgiveness would be forthcoming.68 Murphy also lauds
the victim who, acting out of (appropriate) compassion, mercifully
waives his or her right to enforce a legal obligation, because the
"disposition to mercy" helps to reign in the "narrow and self-in-
volved tendenc[y]" always to stand on our rights.69
But how can these benefits accrue to the tort victim when it is
the legal decision maker who may award mercifuls? Indeed, what
can be good about an act of mercy by the community toward a
tortfeasor to whom the victim himself or herself, by proceeding to
trial, has chosen not to be merciful? It is this: the public exercise
of forgiveness and mercy is more impressive and more meaningful
than the merely private. Only through lawful, public acts can the
65. Cf HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 237 (1958).
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have
done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed
from which we would never recover; we would remain the victims of its con-
sequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic
formula to break the spell.
Id. Later Arendt expands the point:
[F]orgiveness may be the necessary corrective for the inevitable damages
resulting from action .... [T]respassing [as opposed to 'crime and willed
evil'] is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action's con-
stant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it
needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by
constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly.
Id. at 239-40.
66. See, e.g., Richard Fitzgibbons, Anger and the Healing Power of Forgiveness: A
Psychiatrist's View, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 63 (Robert D. Enright & Joanna
North, eds., 1998).
67. Scobie & Scobie, supra note 64, at 376.
68. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 32.
69. Id. at 176.
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community affirm that as a community it displays the virtues of
moral humility and not always standing on its rights. And because
it acts through a public, lawful process, the community can be more
confident that its mercy is morally appropriate, because it is not
due to the victim's insufficient self-respect or insufficient respect
for the rule or norm the defendant has violated. If we may pre-
sume that the tort victim who forgoes mercy by not settling (even
after receiving the defendant's apology and, let us say, reasonable
settlement offer) cedes to the community (represented by judge
and jury) the right to determine satisfactory compensation, then
the community may properly grant mercy even where the victim
has not, thereby expressing its contrary view that mercy is war-
ranted. It may even be that the victim will be led by the commu-
nity's merciful example to become more forgiving (and thus to
obtain the benefits that supposedly accrue therefrom).7"
Finally, merciful decision making may be valuable because it ad-
dresses not just the tortfeasor, the victim, and the relationship be-
tween them, but also the relationship of both tortfeasor and victim
to the community.7 Forgiveness and mercy help to reintegrate the
defendant into the community, reducing the debilitating social con-
sequences of disconnectedness.72 A priest and former police chief
writes that the best way for a police department to respond to a big
public mistake (e.g., the beating of Rodney King) may be to apolo-
gize and seek forgiveness, 73 and that forgiveness promises to bene-
fit both the police and the public by alleviating their mutual sense
of alienation and antagonism. It is not inconceivable that an analo-
gous reduction in the alienation pervasive in consumerist society
would ensue if corporate defendants were given an incentive to
elicit forgiveness and mercy instead of treating victims of their
70. Another divergence between the community's exercise of mercy and the tort
victim's is that a jury might more readily be merciful with someone else's money.
Making up merciful reductions in the victim's damages out of state funds, as proposed
earlier, only partly responds to this objection, because even though the plaintiff will
not be undercompensated as long as the compensation fund is solvent, jurors may still
be too merciful too often for the solvency of the fund.
71. See Walter J. Dickey, Forgiveness and Crime: The Possibilities of Restorative
Justice, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 106, 107 (Robert D. Enright & Joanna North,
eds., 1998).
72. For a thorough discussion of restorative justice based on apology and repara-
tions by the criminal offender, emphasizing the value of reintegration into the com-
munity, see Gordon Bazemore, Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption:
Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 768 (1998).
73. See David Couper, Forgiveness in the Community: Views from an Episcopal
Priest and Former Chief of Police, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 121, 126-27 (Robert
D. Enright & Joanna North, eds., 1998).
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products as quantifiable variables in calculations of expected acci-
dent costs. 74 Note also that giving defendants an incentive to apol-
ogize could also increase the number of settlements and reduce the
number and cost of antagonistic, divisive lawsuits.75 And the in-
centive seems real: what little empirical research there is indicates
that confessing one's blameworthy actions does indeed reduce ob-
servers' anger toward the actor and increases their inclination to
forgive.76 So tort defendants would have reason to believe that
contrition may pay off in the form of the enhanced prospect of
mercifuls, as well as a better relationship with the community.
CONCLUSION
Six centuries ago, the lawyer for a man whose servant properly
set a fire but then carelessly tended it, so that it spread to the plain-
tiff's house and burned it, argued that his client "will be undone
and impoverished all his days if this action is maintained against
him; for then twenty other such suits will be brought against him
for the same matter. ' 77 The judge responded: "What is that to us?
74. It may be relevant to note that, judging by the size of punitive damage awards,
jurors seem to get angriest at corporate defendants who they believe to have
subordinated consumer safety to cost-benefit calculations. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gen-
eral Motors, No. BC 116-926 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 9, 1999), in which a jury awarded
burn victims of exploding gas tanks $107 million in compensatory damages and over
$4.8 billion in punitive damages. (The trial judge later remitted the award to approxi-
mately $1 billion, and the defendants are appealing the decision. See 43 JURY VER-
DICT WEEKLY 39 (Ca.).
75. See Cohen, supra note 5.
76. Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 281 (1991). In another experiment, a little boy who transgressed
(by helping a confederate trip a little girl) was perceived to be less aggressive and less
deserving of punishment when he expressed remorse after the incident than when he
expressed pleasure in what he had done. See Gary S. Schwartz et al., The Effects of
Post- Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, and Level
of Punishment, 17 BRIT. J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293 (1978). In addition, two
studies show that children blame and punish transgressors less when the actor apolo-
gizes. See Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies,
43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R.
Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor's Apology,
Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 353 (1989). Research on victims'
responses also indicates that the offenders' apologies improve victims' impressions of
the offenders and reduce victims' tendency to be aggressive toward the offenders. See
Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Ap-
praisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1989).
However, as Shuman emphasizes, these effects have not been shown for serious
harms, so the incentives in at least some instances warranting merciful damages (those
in which harm greatly exceeds culpability) are in question. See Shuman, supra note
40.
77. Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, f. 18, pl. 6 (1401).
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It is better that he should be utterly undone than that the law be
changed for him"'78 Who today is not taken aback (at the very
least) by this response? If it would be an improvement in the mo-
rality of our tort law to allow for exceptional acts of mercy, then
perhaps merciful damages would be a good way to do it.
78. Id.
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RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND
THE PROSECUTOR
Frederick W. Gay*
INTRODUCTION
The dream of courtroom battle leads many young lawyers to the
door of the prosecutor's office. Seeking to test newly acquired liti-
gation skills against more seasoned opponents, the recent law
school graduate relishes the opportunity to wear the white hat in a
classic confrontation of good versus evil. It is this "us versus them"
mentality that permeates the traditional prosecutor's office.
What the young prosecutor soon finds, however, is an active
caseload of 200-300 cases in which the facts of today's new cases
blur with those of yesterday's and last week's. For every trial on
the misdemeanor docket there are ninety-nine other cases that the
prosecutor must handle by way of initial appearance, arraignment,
pre-trial conference and guilty plea.
Overcrowded prisons, jails and community corrections facilities
force the young prosecutor to realize that not every "bad guy" is
going to do the time deserved. This "injustice" begins to gnaw at
his core beliefs. He begins to see himself trapped in the endless
paper chase that he swore he would never be party to. He fields
endless calls from defense attorneys who seem to have only one
"wrongfully accused, innocent" client. He covers for every other
prosecutor in the office on a moment's notice because prosecutors
are said to be "fungible." He sits quietly by as countless victims air
their complaints about insensitive cops, defendants getting away
with murder, prosecutors too busy to return phone calls, unfeeling
judges and the failed "system." Our young prosecutor whose only
goal was to save the world soon finds himself daydreaming about
packing his bags and going over to the "dark side" of private prac-
tice and the billable hour.
It is within this context that the emerging concept of restorative
justice may have a chance of taking root in the prosecutor's office.
* Bureau Chief, Polk County Attorney's Office 1991-Present; Created and im-
plemented the following programs: Restorative Justice Center, Victim Offender Rec-
onciliation Program, Youthful Offender Program, Structured Fine Program, Informal
Probation Program, Unemployment Fraud Program, Jail Court Docket, Bad Check
Restitution Program, Welfare Fraud Program, Truancy Court Program, OWl First
Program.
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There are many prosecutors now beginning to realize that the pros-
ecutor's office is a key player in the management of the criminal
justice system. Governmental funding sources are requiring prose-
cutors to accept responsibility for their actions. The prosecutor
must now be an active participant in pre-trial detention decisions
that impact jail overcrowding and in post guilty plea/trial sentenc-
ing recommendations that impact general system overcrowding.
Some prosecutors now recognize that they are the gatekeepers
of the system. Their charging decisions, pre-trial detention posi-
tions and sentence recommendations go a long way in deciding
which defendants flow to what level of supervision and/or incarcer-
ation. Once the prosecutor accepts his role as gatekeeper, it is a
short jump to the paradigm shift from the "trail 'em, nail 'em, jail)em" mentality that pervades the traditional criminal justice sys-
tem, to the restorative justice mind set that considers every case in
light of what outcome best addresses the needs of the victim, com-
munity and offender. The restorative justice concept provides an-
other path to pursue, one that addresses public safety demands
while meeting the needs of the victim and the community far better
than the traditional system. This approach is more personal and
involves both victim and community. It is more focused on repara-
tion, restitution and accountability with less emphasis on punish-
ment alone. Restorative justice is much more concerned about
remedying harms than exacting punishment.
I. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN POLK COUNTY
The Polk County Attorney's Office in Des Moines, Iowa, pres-
ently operates several programs that are restorative in nature.
However, the office did not embrace the concept of restorative jus-
tice at any specific point in time. Rather, the recognition that re-
storative justice principles have a place in the way prosecutors
participate in the delivery of justice has evolved slowly over the
past decade, with the building blocks of a restorative justice prac-
tice being laid in a somewhat haphazard fashion.
A. Victim Offender Reconciliation
In 1978, the Polk County Attorney's Office established the Polk
County Neighborhood Mediation Center (the "Center") as a site
where the resolution of relatively minor disputes could occur
outside the formal legal process. From 1978 through 1990, the
Center, contracting with trained mediators, handled hundreds of
cases annually. Most of these cases would otherwise have worked
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their way to Small Claims' Court or the Simple Misdemeanor
Court.
In 1991, the Polk County Attorney's Office made the decision to
institute a Victim Offender Reconciliation Program ("VORP"),
loosely modeled after a community-based program in Elkhart, In-
diana. The initial cases for this program involved unemployment
fraud in which offenders had illegally received benefits. Defend-
ants were given the opportunity to have a felony fraud charge re-
duced to a non-felony after successful completion of a victim
offender mediation in which the offender met a state fraud investi-
gator and reached a facilitated agreement concerning the restitu-
tion amount and a reasonable payment plan.
It soon became apparent that program referrals could be made
in other types of criminal cases in which there was a real victim.
Prosecutors began referring a variety of non-felony offenses to the
program (assaults, thefts, harassments, criminal mischiefs, etc.). In
almost all cases, the referrals were prior to guilty plea. Agree-
ments stated that if defendants participated in good faith in a
VORP, the state would either reduce the pending charge or recom-
mend a more favorable disposition to the court at the time of sen-
tencing. It became apparent that most offenders and victims were
willing to participate in a VORP. Victims routinely reported in
post-meeting victim impact statements that their victim-offender
meetings allowed them to get answers from offenders about the
crime. They also reported that the mediations allowed them to ob-
tain closure in a way not otherwise possible.
Since the inception of the VORP in Polk County over eight years
ago, more than 5000 victim offender mediations have been held.
Agreements have been reached in more than ninety percent of the
cases handled. There are nearly as many felony as non-felony of-
fenses referred to the program with burglaries, robberies, thefts
and forgeries the most common. A number of murder, vehicular
homicide, kidnapping and sexual assault cases have been handled
as well.
While referrals during the first two years of the VORP were ex-
clusively from the Criminal Division of the Polk County Attorney's
Office, the criminal court in Polk County now routinely orders de-
fendants to participate in the program. In nearly all felony cases in
which there is a crime involving a victim, the presiding judge orders
the offender to meet with the victim (if the victim is willing) follow-
ing the guilty plea and prior to sentencing. The purpose of the
meeting is three-fold: (1) to allow the victim and the offender to
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talk about the impact of the crime on the victim; (2) to allow the
offender the opportunity to apologize; and, if needed, (3) to reach
an agreement on a plan of restitution. If an agreement is reached,
it is presented to the court at the time of sentencing. In misde-
meanor cases where the guilty plea and sentencing almost always
occur at the same time, the victim offender meeting is ordered as a
condition of the defendant's probation.
The criminal court judges in Polk County recognize that the op-
portunity to participate in a victim offender meeting is an impor-
tant need of crime victims. In a 1997 telephone survey by Polk
County Attorney staff of victims who had participated in the pro-
gram, ninety-six percent stated they would choose the program
again, ninety-six percent stated they would recommend the pro-
gram to other victims and eighty-six percent found meeting their
offender to be helpful. Of offenders surveyed, eighty-eight percent
reported they had apologized to the victim and sixty-two percent
stated they felt the victim had a higher opinion of them as a result
of the mediation.
More important than the numbers and the statistics is the fact
that the VORP process allows victims and offenders to meet in the
aftermath of a crime in a way that, until now, has not been possi-
ble. Our adversarial system of justice, while necessary to protect
the rights of defendants, insulates both the victim and the defend-
ant from the very real human contact that is often necessary. It is
becoming increasingly apparent that victims have questions that
only defendants can answer. Victims need to express to defendants
the grief, fear, anger, and rage experienced as a result of the crime;
they need to hear expressions of remorse and apology from offend-
ers. In addition, many offenders do have remorse and want to
apologize for their hurtful actions. Many offenders want to some-
how make right their wrongs.
While every VORP is an not unqualified success, the over-
whelming majority are.
Without the VORP process, a rabbi and members of his syna-
gogue would not have met with two young neo-Nazis who had des-
ecrated their place of worship with Nazi style graffiti. An
agreement would not have been reached requiring direct service to
the temple and completion of a high school level Jewish history
course. A transformation would not have taken place that allowed
both victims and offenders to shed their labels and, ultimately, con-
sider each to be their friends.
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Without the VORP process, a young woman, sexually abused as
a child, would not have obtained the closure that counseling and
therapy could not provide.
Without the VORP process, a young man who nearly died as the
result of knife wounds suffered in an unprovoked attack would not
have met with his assailants, found out why he had been targeted,
and been allowed to tell them how the attack had cut short a prom-
ising baseball career.
Without the VORP process, the daughter of a woman killed by a
drunk driver would not have met with the driver. She would not
have learned that, in the minutes after her mother's death, the
driver had a vision of the deceased entering his vehicle to comfort
him and tell him that it would be alright. The driver would not
have learned that the daughter had a similar vision of her mother's
actions as she drove to the scene of the accident.
B. Youthful Offender Program
While Victim Offender Reconciliation may well be the most rec-
ognizable manifestation of the core principles of restorative justice,
other initiatives can also embody these principles. A second re-
storative justice program initiated by the Polk County Attorney's
Office is the Youthful Offender Pre-Trial Intervention Program
("YOP"). The YOP was started in July, 1992 in response to the
increasing number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders
waived from juvenile to adult court on felony charges. The pro-
gram's goal has been to provide first-time felons ages sixteen to
twenty-one with services not available in the adult correctional
system.
Offenders offered admission into the program are given the op-
portunity to plead guilty to a non-felony charge and, in most cases,
receive a deferred judgment. To obtain this disposition, offenders
are released on a pre-trial status to the YOP and must complete all
program requirements before being allowed to plead guilty to the
non-felony target charge.
The YOP draws upon a variety of community-wide resources to
provide a holistic approach to rehabilitation of youthful offenders.
Partners in the program are the Polk County Attorney's Office, the
Fifth Judicial District Department of Corrections, Employee and
Family Resources and others. The program is designed as a sen-
tencing alternative, diverting targeted offenders from prison
sentences or ineffective probation sentences by providing program-
ming in the areas of education, substance abuse, attitudinal/behav-
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ior change and job training. Incarceration is recommended only
for those offenders who do not complete the YOP. Approximately
seventy-five percent of offenders complete the YOP and are placed
on formal probation following a guilty plea to the agreed upon
non-felony charge. Offenders who fail to complete the YOP are
prosecuted for the initial offense(s).
H. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE REFERS TO JUSTICE PROCESSES
Restorative justice involves not only just results for all concerned
but also just processes. The traditional criminal justice system is
cumbersome, to say the least. Repeated court appearances for of-
fenders and victims alike, leave many caught in its web frustrated
and disillusioned. In the past few years, the Polk County Attor-
ney's Office has begun to recognize that the prosecutor plays a key
role in assuring that the criminal justice system is an efficient one
that makes the best use of scarce resources. Toward this end, the
office has implemented several programs based on restorative jus-
tice principles that seek to streamline the process and ease system
pressure at various levels.
A. Structured Fine Program
With the assistance of federal dollars, a pilot Structured Fine
Program (Day Fine Program) was started in January, 1992. Oper-
ating on the premise that fines should be based on the level of the
crime and the offender's ability to pay, staff was devoted to compu-
tation and collection of these fines. In less than four years, Polk
County witnessed a 250 percent increase in both the collection rate
and the dollars collected from fines. This occurred at the same
time that the average fine for non-felony offenses decreased con-
siderably as the result of lower fines assessed to those least able to
pay. State legislation enabling this pilot program lapsed in 1996.
However, efforts are underway to push for new legislation that
would allow for the continuation of the program.
B. Welfare Fraud Program
A Welfare Fraud Prosecution Program was initiated in the sum-
mer of 1998 to streamline the prosecution process, decrease the
burden on the court system and on the Department of Corrections,
involve the local community, and educate offenders so that recidi-
vism is reduced.
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Offenders are offered admission into the program by letters sent
by the Polk County Attorney's Office advising them that a referral
for felony prosecution had been received from the State of Iowa
but that they can earn the opportunity to plead guilty to a misde-
meanor if they attend a meeting at the Polk County Attorney's Of-
fice, enter into a plan of restitution, and attend a day-long class
designed to teach skills in the areas of budgeting, credit issues,
stress management and job seeking. They are also advised that
they can meet with representatives from Polk County Legal Aid
prior to the county attorney meeting. This process of notifying of-
fenders by letter significantly impacts the prosecution process.
Most offenders charged with a felony are arrested, booked, jailed,
required to post a bond and make an average of five court appear-
ances. The process utilized in this program requires appearance at
one group meeting and the day-long class. There is no initial ap-
pearance, bond review, preliminary hearing, formal arraignment,
pre-trial conference or discovery. In fact, there is no appearance at
the courthouse at all, as the guilty plea is taken by a judge at the
site of the required class. There is no law enforcement expense
that would normally result from an investigation, arrest, booking
and incarceration. There is no expense incurred by the Depart-
ment of Corrections as none of these offenders are placed on su-
pervised probation.
Finally, the community is involved in this program in two ways.
First, volunteers provide the programming for the class that each
offender must attend. Second, the class is hosted by a local church
and participating area churches provide, at no charge to the of-
fender, the noon meal that is served to the offenders. The volun-
teers and the offenders eat lunch together.
From September 1, 1998 through October 30, 1999, 114 offenders
successfully completed the program, returned to court, entered
guilty pleas to a misdemeanor and received either a deferred judg-
ment or suspended sentence. All offenders were placed on an un-
supervised probation with the requirement that they abide by their
restitution plans and pay court costs. The total amount of restitu-
tion agreed to and ordered in the 114 cases was $385,536.
C. Truancy Court Program
Initiated in the fall of 1997, the Truancy Court Program, is a joint
effort of the Polk County Attorney's Office, the Des Moines Public
Schools, and the Polk County District Court. This program at-
tempts to reach the parents of truant elementary school children
2000] 1657
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
before the filing of formal charges. Letters are sent to parents of
truant students inviting the parents to attend a voluntary session of
Truancy Court. After meeting with a District Court Judge, the par-
ents meet with staff from the Polk County Attorney's Office and
sign up for mediation sessions with school social workers. The ses-
sions are facilitated by mediators from the Polk County Attorney's
Office Restorative Justice Center.
During the 1997-98 school year, thirteen elementary schools par-
ticipated in the Program with referrals limited to students from the
first, second and third grades. Schools reported that the students in
the program averaged a sixty-five percent reduction in truancy
days over the course of the school year. As a result of the first year
success, the Program was expanded to all forty four elementary
schools for the 1998-1999 school year. Preliminary figures indicate
a greater than fifty percent reduction in truancy days for the 1998-
1999 school year. Because of its success, the program was ex-
panded to students in first though fifth grade for the 1999-2000.
Plans are underway to further expand the program to include sixth
through eighth grades for the 2000-2001 school year.
D. Bad Check Restitution Program
Initiated in January, 1999, the Polk County Attorney Bad Check
Restitution Program aids individuals and businesses victimized by
bad check losses and provides bad check writers with an educa-
tional opportunity designed to curtail their bad check writing hab-
its. The goals of the program are to increase the accountability of
bad check writers and recover losses for businesses, without in-
creasing the administrative burden on the court system. It is of-
fered at no cost to businesses or taxpayers and is funded through
fees paid by the bad check writers.
To satisfy the requirements of the Program, and to avoid crimi-
nal prosecution, the bad check writer must pay full restitution to
the victim and attend an eight-hour intervention class. The class is
an integral part of the Program's success in reducing the number of
non-sufficient funds checks in Polk County. It is designed to have
offenders take responsibility for their actions and to help them rec-
ognize problems that might contribute to their bad check writing
practices.
E. Drug Court Program
The Polk County Drug Court is aimed at those in the community
who are addicted to a controlled substance and engage in criminal
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behavior. Drug Court is a collaboration between the Polk County
Attorney's Office, the Fifth Judicial District Dept. of Corrections,
the Public Defender's Office, Employee and Family Resources and
the judiciary. Drug Court is designed to meet the needs of both
pre-plea and post-plea offenders. At any given time, approxi-
mately forty to fifty clients are under the supervision of Drug
Court.
The Court is driven by intensive treatment and supervision of
the client. All clients are expected to honestly and accurately re-
port their progress since the last contact with any staff member.
Weekly staff meetings are held to discuss problems with the clients.
Drug Court requires the offender to attend Court as frequently as
weekly, but no less than once a month. Random drug screens are
required. The Drug Court Program has four phases with each
phase lasting approximately three months. An offender entering
the Program is placed in phase one which involves the most intense
monitoring and contact. As the offender moves through the Pro-
gram, the level of monitoring diminishes unless the offender's be-
havior suggests that a return to more intense monitoring is needed.
In that event, the offender may be returned to an earlier phase of
the Program. As the judge is a member of the team, all proceed-
ings and processes are overseen by the judiciary. The Court en-
courages clients who are successful by providing donated passes to
sporting events, certificates, and phase changes. Sanctions may in-
volve increased level of treatment, increased supervision, and brief
periods of detention in the county jail.
If the offender enters the Court prior to guilty plea, the offender
must sign a plea agreement setting forth all terms and conditions of
the program, including any fees and expectations. A target charge
and sentence is outlined in the agreement as well. Upon comple-
tion of the program, the defendant enters a plea of guilty to the
target charge and is required to fulfill any additional probation re-
quirements. Offenders who fail to complete the program will be
prosecuted for the offense with which they were initially charged.
If the offender enters the Court as part of a diverted sentence or
probation, the offender must complete the remaining sentence
under general probation. Since its inception, more than forty of-
fenders have graduated with only two former clients receiving new
criminal charges since their Drug Court graduation.
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F. Jail Court
A Jail Court has been created in the Polk County Jail to help
alleviate jail overcrowding. The county attorney's office has as-
signed a full-time prosecutor and a full-time legal assistant to staff
the jail courtroom. In addition, a second prosecutor is assigned to
handle only felony cases of incarcerated pre-trial defendants. Non-
felony cases are placed on a fast track with formal arraignment oc-
curring ten to twelve days following arrest rather than the tradi-
tional thirty-five to forty days. The staff assigned to this docket
works closely with the judge, public defender, probation officer,
substance abuse specialist, and jail review specialist assigned to the
jail courtroom. A third full-time prosecutor staffs the county's
three extended pre-trial release programs, i.e., Drug Court, Inten-
sive Supervision Pre-Trial Release, and the Youthful Offender Pro-
gram. The ultimate goal of this team is to expedite case processing
without sacrificing community safety.
I. BLUEPRINT NEEDED
The Polk County Attorney's Office believes it has made progress
in addressing victim, community and offender needs in the face of
fiscal limitations. However, the office acknowledges that changes
in office policy and procedure that have attempted to implement
restorative justice concepts have been somewhat piecemeal. While
a vague restorative justice vision has guided certain aspects of the
office over the past few years, there is no blueprint for what a com-
prehensive restorative justice system would look like or how it
would operate within the county. Assuming that the prosecutor is
at the most critical juncture of the system, it may well be that most
of the necessary pieces are present in the county to move to the
next level.
Perhaps most critical is the existence of an experienced and well-
staffed mediation center. Clearly, the foundation of restorative jus-
tice is victim-offender mediation in its various forms. If justice can
best be realized when victims and offenders are able to meet in a
controlled setting, with the assistance of trained facilitators, then
access to justice for large numbers of victims can occur only where
a system-based Victim Offender Reconciliation Program exists.
Polk County has this along with a judiciary that is growing more
comfortable with restorative justice concepts. Finally, the county
has a prosecutor's office willing to accept responsibility as the gate-
keeper of the system. The county attorney's office has demon-
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strated the ability to take control of large numbers of criminal
cases and work toward fashioning dispositions consistent with re-
storative justice principles.
The next step is to design a case flow approach that identifies
those cases which are appropriate for a restorative justice disposi-
tion. A central intake unit, operating under established guidelines
and having access to police reports, criminal history information
and a victim interview, would direct cases in one of two directions:
a restorative justice route or a traditional route.
The cases taking the traditional route would generally be the
most serious, i.e., murder, kidnap, sexual assault, and cases in
which defendants have lengthy criminal histories. Those taking the
restorative justice route would be all others.
Defendants who have cases appropriate for a restorative justice
disposition would be contacted within the first two weeks of their
arrest and offered an opportunity to meet with the victim of their
crime. These defendants would also be provided information
about a variety of community resources that might suit the defend-
ants' needs. If the defendant is willing to meet with the victim, the
victim is contacted to determine if a victim offender mediation is
agreeable. Cases where the defendant does not respond or cases in
which the victim does not want to meet with the defendant, are
prosecuted in the traditional manner.
In those cases in which a victim offender mediation is held, the
parties would be encouraged to reach agreements consistent with
both the victims' and the offenders' needs. Victims and offenders
participating in these mediations would be given considerable dis-
cretion to fashion agreements within a range established by the
prosecuting attorney. In most cases, agreements would be struc-
tured so that the offender would have to complete all requirements
of the agreement prior to receiving a charge reduction or a
favorable sentencing recommendation from the prosecuting attor-
ney. This approach would ensure a higher compliance rate and
would reduce probation violations, as most conditions of probation
would be completed prior to sentencing.
This two-track system does not initially appear to apply to so-
called "victimless crimes" such as prostitution, drug offenses, and
drunk driving. However, in Polk County, representatives of neigh-
borhood associations have participated in several victim offender
mediations involving solicitors and prostitutes arrested in desig-
nated areas. Victim offender mediations with drug defendants
have taken place in the presence of middle school students with
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favorable results for both defendants and students. First offense
drunk drivers in Polk County are required to attend a weekend
drunk driver education program where, among other things, they
meet with panels comprised of victims who have been injured by a
drunk driver or who have lost loved ones to a drunk driver.
If restorative justice is to move from being a mere concept to an
integrated systemic approach, prosecutors must step forward. The
prosecutor's office must honestly assess, in the light of restorative
justice concepts, those beliefs that drive case dispositions. As gate-
keeper of the system, the prosecutor's office must then scrutinize
its own systems and determine where restorative justice concepts
can be implemented. Finally, the prosecutor must involve system
players, victims, and community representatives in a dialogue that
invites them to help fashion an approach to justice that restores
equity and makes things right for all concerned.
FORGIVENESS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: IF IT BELONGS, THEN
WHY IS IT SO HARD TO FIND?
David M. Lerman*
In this essay, I advocate the role of forgiveness within the crimi-
nal justice system, particularly from a prosecutor's perspective. I
explore briefly what it can look like and finally, discuss some im-
pediments to its increased presence and the leadership needed to
allow it to develop within the system.
I. Is FORGIVENESS POSSIBLE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM?
Forgiveness can and should exist within the criminal justice sys-
tem. Clearly, forgiveness in the context of this system cannot mean
simply letting offenders off the hook without being held accounta-
ble for their actions. Rather, forgiveness can be seen as part of the
healing process for crime victims. Robert Enright provides a help-
ful definition of forgiveness as the "willingness to abandon one's
right to resentment, negative judgement, and indifferent behavior
toward one who unjustly injures us. . ."I The focus of forgiveness
as a benefit to the victim, the potential giver of forgiveness, has
been well framed by Joanna North: "What is annulled in the act of
forgiveness is not the crime itself but the distorting effect that this
* David M. Lerman has been an Assistant District Attorney for Milwaukee
County since 1988. He received his J.D. from the University of Wisconsin Law School
and an M.A. in Industrial Relations from the University of Wisconsin in 1984. Mr.
Lerman has practiced law in Israel. He chairs the Milwaukee County Task Force on
Restorative Justice. He has presented papers on restorative justice at national confer-
ences and for the State Bar of Wisconsin and has had articles published on general
restorative justice issues, as well as the nexus between Jewish law and restorative jus-
tice. He served on the State Bar of Wisconsin Commission on Violence and the Jus-
tice System and Wisconsin's Special Legislative Committee on Faith Based
Approaches to Crime Prevention. He is also a member of the Legal Task Force of the
Foundation for Ethics and Meaning. David lives in Milwaukee with his wife and three
daughters.
1. Robert D. Enright, The Psychology of Interpersonal Forgiveness. Paper
presented at National Conference on Forgiveness, Madison, WI (1995), quoted in
Walter Dickey, Forgiveness and Crime: The Possibilities of Restorative Justice, Ex-
PLORING FORGIVENESS (Robert D. Enright & Joanna North eds., 1998).
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wrong has upon one's relations with the wrongdoer and perhaps
with others."2
There are many victims of crime, not just the immediate victims,
as in an armed robbery or assault. In the absence of an actual vic-
tim, the community immediately affected by a crime, such as a
neighborhood infested with drug sales or streetwalkers, may take
on the communal role of being able to "give" forgiveness.
The criminal justice system has the wrong focus. Its major inter-
est lies in incarcerating someone convicted of a particular crime.
The system does not adequately deal with a major consequence of
crime: the destruction of trust between people that results from
crime. Crime can lead to a generalized fear by community mem-
bers that they are going to be hurt, assaulted or "ripped off." As
people become fearful, they become more isolated and discon-
nected from one another. This feeling contributes to the weaken-
ing of bonds that weave a community together. Without strong
communities, there is less informal social control, which is the
strongest and healthiest way to prevent crime. The ripple effects of
crime are numerous. People lose the capacity to resolve disputes
on their own. They choose to rely upon the "professionals", and
place a call for emergency assistance. They become more fearful of
the other and, without the opportunity to engage in a proactive
healing process, they might remain bitter and fearful.3
II. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AS A HARBINGER. OF FORGIVENESS
Restorative justice as a framework for dealing with crime and its
aftermath offers great possibilities for changing the focus of crimi-
nal justice from simply incarcerating wrongdoers to focusing on the
needs of victims, on repairing communities and on holding offend-
ers accountable in meaningful ways. Such a focus would naturally
allow for the possibility of real healing for those immediately af-
fected by the crime - victim, offender and immediate community.
One abbreviated definition of restorative justice focuses on the ba-
sic inquiries pursued by the traditional justice system as opposed to
a restorative approach. If the traditional system seeks answers to:
2. Joanna North, Wrongdoing and Forgiveness, 62 PHILOSOPHY 409, 500 (1987).
3. See David Lerman, Legal Ethics: Restoring Justice, 14 TIKKUN 5, 13-15 (1999).
4. For an in-depth review of Restorative Justice principles, see HOWARD ZEHR,
CHANGING LENSES (1990); see also Restorative Justice Institute (visited Mar. 23,
2000) <http://www.rji.org>; Center for Restorative Justice and Peacemaking, Univer-
sity of Minnesota (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp>; Victim-Of-
fender Mediation Association (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.voma.org>.
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1) Who did the act?; 2) What rule/law was violated?; and 3) How
should that person be punished?; then the restorative approach
seeks answers to: 1) What is the harm done by an act?; 2) What
needs to be done to correct the harm?; and 3) Who is responsible
for that? Restorative justice is predicated upon a set of core princi-
ples. These include:
1. Crime is an offense against human relationships.
2. Victims and the community are central to justice processes.
3. The first priority of justice processes is to assist victims.
4. The second priority is to restore the community to the de-
gree possible.
5. The offender has personal responsibility to victims and to
the community for crimes committed.
6. Stakeholders share responsibilities for restorative justice
through partnerships for action.
7. The offender should develop improved competency and un-
derstanding as a result of the restorative justice experience. 5
One of the mainstays of restorative justice is processes wherein
victims and affected community members meet in a safe setting
with the offender. These meetings, commonly called victim-of-
fender conferencing or dialogue, include three stages: 1) a discus-
sion of the facts of the case; 2) a discussion of the impact of the act
upon the parties; and 3) a discussion of what needs to be done to
repair the harm.6 These conferences allow a victim or community
member to ask questions that they need answered in order to begin
to clear up the "distorting effect" the crime has had on their lives.
Thus, this process sets up the possibility for the victim to gather
information and personally assess the offender in order to forgive
him/her. Nevertheless, forgiveness does not mean letting an of-
fender off the hook. Punishment in the form of incarceration may
still occur; being held accountable in other ways that more actively
repair the harm committed are also established. Sitting across
from someone you have victimized is often more difficult than fac-
ing a judge for fifteen minutes during sentencing. I have observed
one young offender who said outright that he could not and would
not even look at his victims sitting across the table.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND IMPLEMENTATION (July 1998).
6. See generally Bruce A. Kittle, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: Nec-
essary Element or Impossible Dream?, 2 THE WORLD OF FORGIVENESS 3-11; see also
Web sites cited supra note 4.
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The types of cases and healing achieved through conferencing
are vast, ranging from homicides to employee thefts to vandalism.
Conferencing may occur at any point during the life of a case,
whether pre-charging, pre-plea or post-disposition. The notion of
reaching forgiveness should absolutely never be foisted upon a vic-
tim as a reason to participate in a dialog. Clearly, some victims will
have great anger, and will not be able to think in terms of forgive-
ness. However, simply allowing for the opportunity to engage in
the very personal informal process is a humanization of the justice
process.
For example, in rural Wisconsin two young men sought to steal a
car from a home they thought was empty. When the middle-aged
woman of the house came outside to investigate, they brutally at-
tacked her and left her for dead. The woman survived, but she
faces severe physical limitations because of the attack. The young
men were caught, convicted and sentenced to long prison terms.
Two and one-half years later the victim began a series of confer-
ences with one of the offenders. The first face-to-face meeting with
her offender was important for her. Meeting her attacker, speak-
ing with him and hearing his fears allowed her to forgive him so
that she could move on with her life. She also clearly stated that
she hoped he never left prison, because he needed to be there for
the safety of the community.
At the other end of the spectrum is the case of K.T., an eighteen-
year-old cashier awaiting entry to college. Her older brother is in
prison, her mother has a cocaine habit and her younger siblings at
home sometimes suffer because their mother disappears for days.
During one of these disappearances, K.T., who was fed up, and
tempted by the cash at her fingertips, manipulated the "no sale"
key on the cash register in a way she thought would hide her thiev-
ery. She was caught and confessed to prior incidents totaling just
over $1000. Prior to conviction, a conference was held with two
representatives of the store. K.T. was tearful while listening to the
human resources manager who had hired her describe the loss of
trust. This manager, however, spoke of forgiveness after hearing
the details of K.T.'s life and her expressions of remorse during the
conference. Eventually, the store representatives suggested that K.
T. return to the store to speak at new employee orientation ses-
sions. She spoke at six sessions for her former employer, thus do-
ing more to "earn" the forgiveness than simply saying "I'm sorry."
She also developed greater competencies through this forward-
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looking approach to justice, which took into account the needs of
the victim. Her case was ultimately dismissed.
These two cases represent ways in which forgiveness can be es-
tablished from within the criminal justice system. In one case,
there was still traditional punishment for a particularly brutal of-
fense. Yet, a humanizing process also occurred that benefited the
parties. In the other case, the offender clearly left the justice pro-
cess with a greater understanding of the wrong she had committed
because of the ability to speak with the store representatives in a
less formal setting. She also had the opportunity to develop
greater competencies through the justice process that will benefit
her in the future. Finally, she was not convicted, which may anger
some traditionalists; however, justice was done and the parties
were satisfied with the resolution.
If forgiveness, as evidenced by these restorative justice
processes, is so beneficial, why are not more communities engaging
in restorative processes?
LU. IMPEDIMENTS
A. Culture of Prosecutors
Prosecutors are the hub of the criminal justice system. Our
charging decisions determine what, if any, exposure an offender
faces and our recommendations in plea negotiations usually deter-
mine whether a defendant will plead or litigate. As more legisla-
tures pass determinant sentencing structures or stricter sentencing
guidelines, our discretion ultimately determines the posture of a
case.
Meanwhile, the general crime control philosophy across the
country is to "get tough." One commentator has termed the cur-
rent orientation, which includes three strikes laws and generally
harsher punishment, as "penal harm."'7 And clearly, prosecutors
are a major force in the operation of the penal harm orientation.
Thus, if any transformation of the criminal justice system towards
allowing space for forgiveness is to occur, prosecutors are in a posi-
tion to either assist or stymie that transformation.
What does a prosecutor rely on for guidance in developing poli-
cies on issuance or resolution of cases? Why should a prosecutor
be concerned about forgiveness? This all boils down to providing a
service to victims and doing justice.
7. See T. CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN PENOLOGY (1994), quoted in S. Levrant et
al., Reconsidering Restorative Justice, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 3-27 (1999).
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Every prosecutor's office operates under its own set of policy
guidelines. However, the National District Attorneys Association
has promulgated a set of National Prosecution Standards that are
instructive.8 Standard 1.1 holds that "the primary responsibility of
prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished." 9 The focus is
justice, not vengeance, or even punishment. Justice is a far broader
concept, and must take the overall needs of society into account.
Indeed, standard 1.3 states: "the prosecutor should at all times be
zealous in the need to protect the rights of individuals, but must
place the rights of society in a paramount position in exercising
prosecutorial discretion in individual cases and in the approach to
the larger issues of improving the law and making the law conform
to the needs of society."'" The commentary states that a "prosecu-
tor must seek justice. In doing so there is a need to balance the
interests of all members of society, but when the balance cannot be
struck in an individual case, the interest of society is paramount for
the prosecutor."'"
This should be seen as a resounding endorsement of the basic
restorative justice principles enunciated above and a license to
move away from the penal harm orientation currently in vogue.
The restorative justice paradigm focuses on the broad interest of
society, both long and short term, not simply the narrow perspec-
tive of locking up wrongdoers. For example, attending to the needs
of victims in a meaningful way clearly is in the interest of society.
Allowing victims of crime to continue to suffer from trauma in-
duced by crime is counter-productive. The trauma suffered by vic-
tims can have devastating impact on personal lives, with a
corresponding effect on work, family and relationships. Victims'
needs might include ensuring that the offender is locked up for a
period of time, ensuring that the offender receives drug/alcohol
treatment and stays away from the victim, ensuring that the of-
fender can make a decent wage to support children, creating the
space necessary for the victim to receive some answers about the
reasons behind the offense, and the space for the offender to learn
about the real human consequences of his/her act.
The penal harm orientation fails to confront an outcome of
crime - namely the distrust generated between people. Society
8. See NATIONAL DISTRICr ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS (1991).
9. Id. at Standard 1.1.
10. Id. at Standard 1.3.
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
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has an interest in being as whole, wholesome and healthy as
possible.
While restorative justice as a framework is slowly finding its way
into the criminal justice lexicon of prosecutors' offices, victim-of-
fender conferencing/dialog has already received the endorsement
of the American Bar Association House of Delegates. In August
1994, the ABA passed a recommendation that reads: "BE IT RE-
SOLVED, that the American Bar Association urges federal, state,
territorial, and local governments to incorporate publicly or pri-
vately operated victim-offender mediation/dialogue programs into
their criminal justice processes." The ABA went on to attach a list
of guidelines for programs.
The significance of this is that one of the pre-eminent U.S. attor-
ney organizations has recognized the validity and importance of a
process that allows for the opportunity for healing to occur. For-
giveness may or may not follow after a victim-offender dialogue,
but providing the opportunity is truly serving the needs of society.
So, if the National Prosecution Standards inherently support re-
storative justice practices, and the ABA has explicitly supported
the process of victim-offender dialog, what are the impediments?
Why are prosecutors moving slowly in adopting this particular pro-
cess, whether in house, or housed in a non-profit agency, or the
broader framework of restorative justice?
Many young lawyers relish the notion of working in a prosecu-
tor's office to gain valuable litigation experience. What is even bet-
ter is that during the learning process, the young lawyer is "the
knight in shining armor", the "good guy" in court. After all, no-
body would need to be in court if the "bad" guy had not committed
some offense. Prosecutors care deeply about engaging in the work
of justice, but the overwhelming caseloads in most offices lead to a
mantra of sorts, with one set of facts blending into the next. The
cases become less about the real human stories behind them then
about processing cases, getting through the day, placating a judge,
or impressing a superior in order to achieve a coveted
advancement.
Prosecutor culture also can advance the notion that all offenders
are bad people, and need to be prosecuted zealously, regardless of
the human side or equities in a case. One former prosecutor has
written of a culture of "zealous advocacy" in which she dispensed
shark candy to fellow prosecutors, and proudly displayed a poster
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of Eliot Ness campaigning against Al Capone on her wall.12 One
prosecutor interviewed for the book, D.A.: Prosecutors in Their
Own Words, stated, "Prosecutors turn into sharks. Sharks are eat-
ing machines."13 Another stated:
You get a mind-set that everybody's bad, everybody's guilty, and
everything is wrong. Everyone is a liar. Everybody is corrupt.
Law does that you anyway, but it's worse as a prosecutor. You
essentially become the wrong side of the public conscience. At
one point I didn't care who went to jail, because everybody was
guilty of something. It was just a matter of wining. I just had to
win. A lot of prosecutors are into that.' 4
I heard of a prosecutor who refused to allow a victim-offender
conference prior to sentencing because s/he was interested in hav-
ing a "rabid" victim appear at the sentencing hearing. This prose-
cutor was obviously convinced that the victim would in some way
'forgive' the offender, and therefore not speak as forcefully for
lengthy incarceration. In light of the NDAA Standards cited
above, is this truly seeking justice?
Prosecutors sometimes fall into a work cadence or culture that
does not comfortably allow for personal contact with crime victims.
Yet, the public increasingly desires that contact. Ninety-two per-
cent of respondents in one survey wanted this service; however,
only forty percent believed the service was actually provided.
Meanwhile, thirty-seven percent of victims whose case actually
went to trial and spoke with the prosecutor actually felt that the
prosecutor took their opinions into account.' 5
I don't intend to disparage the hard work that prosecutors en-
gage in. I only seek to advance an approach to justice that is more
encompassing of the vast array of human experience. Many col-
leagues question the viability of restorative justice programming;
some even mock it. But restorative justice practices and principles
would gain a stronger foothold if, at minimum, prosecutors were
able to consider and accept the possibility for a victim or commu-
nity to forgive a wrong committed, and in so doing, focus on the
future of the victim, offender and community.
12. See Mary Ellen Reimund, Off to See the Wizard: A Prosecutor's Metamorpho-
sis (1999) (on file with author).
13. M. BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS (1999), cited in
Reimund, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS/EASTERN REGIONAL CONF., WHAT Do WE
WANT (AND WHAT ARE WE GETTING) FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? figs.
20, 23 (1999) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS].
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B. Media Influence
Our culture is driven by images from the media. The depiction
of law enforcement on television has affected how it is perceived in
society. For example, the early television show the Lone Ranger
portrayed law enforcement as omnipotent and capable of solving
all disputes with swift justice. In that show, a "professional" would
ride into town on a white horse to enforce the (good) code of the
west. The show portrayed the townspeople as inevitably confused
and helpless without his assistance. The Lone Ranger provides a
poor example of how law enforcement should protect society. The
townspeople rely upon him to enforce his belief of right or wrong
without input from the community. This approach neglects conflict
resolution skills.
Another example is the former television show Dragnet. In
Dragnet, the detective is not concerned with the emotional reac-
tion to crime but rather focuses on "Just the facts, ma'am, just the
facts." The detective knows what his job is, what his notion of jus-
tice demands: just the facts.
This parable has contributed to victims feeling embarrassed by
their victimization. A truly loving and caring society would instead
reach out to victims in pain to assist them. In recent decades there
has been great advances in this area. For example, the establish-
ment of victim/witness units within District Attorney's offices has
helped provide services for victims.
Recent television faire, such as Law and Order, explore more
plausible and realistic scenarios. That is a step forward for dissemi-
nating realistic information about the system. Nevertheless, the
traditional paradigm of the District Attorney as an expert is still
present. A recent episode of "The Practice" showed two overzeal-
ous prosecutors re-enforcing each other's opinions that they alone
are society's last resort in fighting a "tidal wave" of crime. They
are the "good guys" who don't get enough credit for the job they
do, even though without them society would degenerate into total
chaos. 16
The media generally has a sensationalistic approach to reporting
crime. While every type of violent and non-violent crime has de-
creased during the 1990s,17 the media has not altered its approach
to reporting fear-generating crime. As a result, the public per-
16. See The Practice (T.V. broadcast on ABC, Feb. 13, 2000).
17. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SUR-
VEY, Criminal Victimization 1998, July 1999, fig. 1, at 2.
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ceives danger on the streets. A 1999 survey conducted for the
Council of State Governments/Easter Regional Conference reveals
that forty-nine percent of the population feels "not as safe now" as
compared with fifteen years ago.18 Only fifteen percent feel "safer
now."
19
C. Elections
When politicians seeking elected office get around to discussing
crime, there is often a race to declare which candidate is "tougher"
on crime. Recent local ads have conveyed a "tough on crime"
message in thirty second sound or image bites by discussing the
number of people sent to prison, by showing the jail house doors
clanging shut, or by campaigning to end the "coddling" of
prisoners.
Surprisingly, it appears that the general public is not necessarily
punitive minded in many typical criminal scenarios. Fifty-nine per-
cent of people polled believe that the most important outcome for
a burglar who stole to support a drug habit is not to be incarcer-
ated, compared with thirty-eight percent who believe that incarcer-
ation is most important. Instead of incarceration, the three most
desired outcomes were drug treatment, restitution, and strict su-
pervision on probation. Only fifty-four percent believe that the
most important outcome for a non-addicted drug user selling illegal
drugs for profit is incarceration.2 ° Yet, politicians keep ratcheting
up accountability in the form of tougher laws, and longer prison
sentences in the belief that this is both effective and what the pub-
lic wants. With this as the pre-dominant criminal legal culture, it is
difficult to discuss changes that at first sight, without a deeper un-
derstanding of what the processes and desired outcomes are really
about, appear to be "soft."
D. Lack of Input from the Faith Community
Clearly, religion and governmental affairs are not to be mixed.
But, that does not mean that the values which people of faith -
whether that faith is organized religion, or some other value-based
belief system - hold dear and by which they live their daily lives
should not become a part of their decision making process in their
work lives. Without such moral or spiritual guidance, our daily
lives would be guided solely by the materialistic drive so evident in
18. See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra note 15, at fig. 5.
19. Id.
20. See id. at figs. 30, 34.
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today's popular culture. Nonetheless, there seems to be a fear of
any outward mixing of faith values with the daily fare of the legal
and business world.
Some of this fear is clearly warranted. There are many people of
faith who cannot fathom the possibility of divergent views on issues
of faith. Zealous exclusivism of any particular religion - the type
which exclaims that it and only it are the true path to virtue, good
life, peace, etc. - is dangerous and fails to account for the great
diversity of cultures and religious belief in the United States.
I am not a student of faith other than my own; but I do under-
stand that each religion with which I have a passing familiarity has
something to say about repentance, forgiveness, and redemption.
Combined with this is a belief in the fundamental value of each
human life. Judaism holds dear the value of each human life, such
that the Talmud states: If you save one life, it is as if you have
saved a universe. Kay Pranis, the Restorative Justice Planner for
the Minnesota Department of Corrections states succinctly that,
"there is an enormous gap between what we teach in our churches,
mosques, temples and synagogues and what we practice in daily
personal and political life about the possibilities of forgiveness and
redemption and about the fundamental dignity of all human life."2 1
Many lawyers, law enforcement personnel, and system officials
participate actively in their faith communities. How do they each
transfer the teachings of their individual faiths into their daily work
lives? How do the teachings about the possibilities of redemption,
forgiveness and the value of human life play out within the criminal
justice system?
Jewish law and tradition offer an appropriate example. Repen-
tance and prayer on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) only
atone for sins between people and the Almighty. Wrongs between
people (i.e. when someone injures, curses, or steals from someone
else) will never be forgiven until the wrongdoer makes the injured
party whole. The injured party must be appeased. Appeasement
means asking for forgiveness and assuaging the emotional discom-
fort caused by the original act.22 Jewish tradition urges a victim to
be receptive to a wrongdoer's overtures.2 3 While forcing a victim
21. K. Pranis, From Vision to Action: Some Principles of Restorative Justice,
CHURCH & SOCIETY, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 32.
22. See Maimonides, Laws of Teshuva 2:9. See generally David Lerman, Restora-
tive Justice and Jewish Law, 2 FULL CIRCLE 2 (Apr. 1998).
23. Midrash Tanhuma, VAYERA 52a. See also Samuel J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look
at Repentance, Forgiveness and Atonement in Jewish Law and Philosophy and Ameri-
can Legal Thought, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1677 (2000).
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to forgive is absolutely the last thing that should ever be foisted
upon any victim, Jewish Law does not recognize any particular pro-
cess or time frame within which the forgiveness should occur.
Milwaukee's Task Force on Restorative Justice is a nineteen-
member body created by the county board of supervisors in con-
junction with the District Attorney's office. The task force is
charged with the duty to educate the community and develop re-
storative justice programming. This body enjoys the active partici-
pation of representatives from the Interfaith Conference of
Greater Milwaukee. Members of the Task Force have made
presentations at various places of worship throughout Milwaukee
County to discuss restorative justice concepts. Faith community
members have been urged to seek restorative processes when they
are victims of crime. A recent case in which a victim-offender com-
munity conference occurred involved a young man who stole a
credit card number from someone's coat pocket while both were in
church. The conference was held in the church basement. The
young man could have easily been prosecuted in the traditional
system. Instead, he will spend time serving meals at a meal site,
and he will make complete restitution.
The concept of forgiveness within the criminal justice system will
be better accepted with increased dialog between professionals
who work in the system and the faith community. Whether the
overtures come from within the system, as it did originally in Mil-
waukee, or from the faith community is not crucial. All that needs
to occur is that a dialog begin. Nationally, several faith communi-
ties have made restorative justice and the criminal justice system a
priority. There is a growing body of material with which to assist
this dialog.
E. Leadership
Ultimately, transformation of the criminal justice system will re-
quire strong, courageous leadership from within. I don't believe
that any movement from the outside will be strong enough to force
a change from our current policies and culture. It is too easy for
elected officials, politicians, legislators, and judges to rely upon the
notion of "do the crime, do the time" and such policies have led to
the sharp rise in prison building "get tough" legislation which fo-
cuses solely on punishment in the form of incarceration.
To assist prosecutors willing to explore restorative justice princi-
ples and practices, there is a growing body of scholarship that
reveals the efficacy of restorative justice principles, both for "soft"
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outcomes, such as perceptions of fairness and client satisfaction as
well as "hard" outcomes, such as recidivism. One study showed a
thirty-two percent reduction in recidivism over one year for a
group of juvenile participants in a victim-offender conferencing
program.24
Several prosecutors across the country have assumed leadership
roles in this area. Prosecutors in places such as Austin, Texas, Port-
land, Oregon, Des Moines, Iowa, Denver, Colorado, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania have begun to explore
the concepts of restorative justice - and thus, the role of forgive-
ness within the criminal justice system. Some of these jurisdictions
have strong programs adopting restorative justice principles in
place; others are beginning to explore options. These courageous
prosecutors deserve continued support from members of their
communities who recognize the value of a restorative approach to
criminal justice.
The concept of community prosecution is one that has received
greater attention within prosecution circles, and has enjoyed
greater levels of support from the Department of Justice. This is a
promising development. While a community prosecution program
is not automatically restorative in nature, it should, if engaged in
with the real goal of interacting meaningfully with the target com-
munity, become restorative.
CONCLUSION
Forgiveness has a place in the criminal law. The principles of
restorative justice provide a theoretical and programmatic back-
ground for forgiveness to become a part of the lexicon of the
United States criminal justice system. The impediments that exist
are surmountable, but only if people of vision explore alliances that
cut across traditional professional boundaries. Prosecutors have a
heightened role in any move towards a system more open to for-
giveness and a willingness to look forward from a criminal act.
Several urban communities have begun to take the steps towards
such transformation. For the sake of healthy communities, this
journey should be joined by other communities.
24. W. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation Reduces Recidi-
vism, 5 VOMA CONNECrIONS (Summer 1999) (containing references to numerous
other studies which measure some aspect of victim-offender dialog programs).
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TESHUVA: A LOOK AT REPENTANCE,
FORGIVENESS AND ATONEMENT IN
JEWISH LAW AND PHILOSOPHY AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Samuel J. Levine*
INTRODUCTION
In his contribution to a recent UCLA Law Review symposium,'
Professor Stephen Garvey introduces and develops the possibility
of viewing "punishment as atonement."' 2 Garvey describes an
"ideal community" in which punishment serves as "a form of secu-
lar penance aimed at the expiation of the wrongdoer's guilt and his
reconciliation with the victim and the community."'3 Recognizing
that the concept of atonement "sounds religious," Garvey insists
and sets out to demonstrate that "atonement makes perfectly good
sense independent of religion. '" 4 Nevertheless, Garvey acknowl-
edges that "religion is one place where you'll find atonement's
roots" and identifies St. Anselm's eleventh century work as an
early example of a theological discussion of atonement.5 In further
discussions of "theological atonement," Garvey cites not only
* Law Clerk to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York; former Assistant Legal Writing Professor &
Lecturer in Jewish Law, St. John's University School of Law; LL.M. 1996, Columbia
University; Ordination 1996, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1994, Fordham University; B.A.
1990, Yeshiva University.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Hebrew were made by the author. As a
result, the Fordham Urban Law Journal takes no responsibility for the author's inter-
pretation of Hebrew materials and the propositions those works support.
This Essay was submitted in connection with the Symposium, The Role of Forgive-
ness in the Law, held at Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 2000. 1
thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their interest in the subject
of the Essay and Fraida Liba and Yehudah Tzvi for their encouragement.
1. See Symposium, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719 (1999).
2. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801
(1999).
3. See id. at 1802. A similar approach has been proposed by a federal judge who
"hypothesize[s] that in certain cases it would be beneficial to society if... we were to
permit certain of them who are sincerely sorry to repent, atone for their crimes, and
to seek, with the potential for earning, an official forgiveness - a 'fresh start."' Rich-
ard Lowell Nygaard, On the Role of Forgiveness in Criminal Sentencing, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 980, 983 (1997).
4. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1803.
5. Id. at 1802-03 (citing ST. ANSELM, CUR DEUS HOMO, in SAINT ANSELM: BA-
SIC WRITINGS 171 (S.N. Deane trans., 2d ed. 1962)).
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Christian sources but also, briefly, Jewish sources, which he traces
to the biblical book of Leviticus.6
Garvey posits that his analysis of theological atonement "shed[s]
some light on the problem of punishment in our secular world."7
According to Garvey, parallel to theological accounts of atone-
ment, which "depend critically on treating God as the object of the
sinner's identification," a secular account of atonement "take[s] the
object of identification not to be God, but one's community and its
members."'8 Thus, having largely dispensed with the need to distin-
guish, for analytical purposes, between theological and secular ap-
proaches, Garvey relies on sources based in various forms of moral
philosophy to develop an extensive description of the "process of
atonement. "9
The aim of this Essay is to carry forward Professor Garvey's pro-
ject through a more detailed exploration of the concept of
teshuva1° in Jewish law and philosophy. The principle of teshuva is
6. See id. at 1807-08 (citing Leviticus 16:1-34).
7. Id. at 1810.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 1813-29.
10. Though often translated as "repentance," see, e.g., PINCHAS H. PELI,
SOLOVErrCHIK ON REPENTANCE (1984) (translating the Hebrew title "Al Ha-
teshuva"), the Hebrew term "teshuva" is a derivation of the Hebrew root for re-
turning, highlighting the purpose and dynamics of teshuva. Teshuva affords humans a
process through which they are able to renounce and repair the improper actions that
have led them astray, returning to God and to their own true selves by following the
path that God has set down. Cf. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1816 (writing that an apol-
ogy "distances and disassociates the true self from the guilt-tainted self"); MAIMONI-
DES, MISHNE TORAH [CODE OF LAW], Laws of Teshuva 2:4 (documenting the practice
of changing one's name after undergoing the process of teshuva, to demonstrate that
"I am someone else, not the person who committed the wrongful act").
Indeed, a number of foundational biblical verses describing the imperative for
atonement speak of "returning" to God. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:30, 30:2, 30:10; Ho-
sea 14:2. This verse from Hosea, which begins with the Hebrew word "shuva," or
"return," opens a section from the writings of the Hebrew prophets that is read pub-
licly on the Sabbath during the period of teshuva, observed between the holidays of
Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur. This Sabbath is commonly known, alternately, as
either the Sabbath of "shuva" or the Sabbath of "teshuva." That these terms are used
interchangeably to label this Sabbath further demonstrates that these words not only
share a common root, but, in the context of atonement, also connote a very similar
concept.
As Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik explained, although a human cannot actually harm
God, the commission of a wrongdoing creates a distance between a person and God.
See PELI, supra, at 85 (citing MAIMONIDES, supra, Laws of Teshuva 7:7 (quoting Isaiah
59:2)). Maimonides movingly describes the transformative power of teshuva, through
which the person who "yesterday was distant from God... today clings to God." See
MAIMONIDES, supra, Laws of Teshuva 7:7. It is through teshuva, then, that the indi-
vidual can both "return" to God and "return" to the self who does not carry the
burden of sin.
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fundamental to Jewish law and philosophy.'1 Jewish law views it as
apparent that human beings are, by their very nature, fallible and
incapable of avoiding all sin, 12 and thus through the possibility -
indeed the obligation 13 - of teshuva, God provides humans a
means of achieving atonement for wrongdoings. 4
The complete process of teshuva thus involves not only repentance and remorse,
but a more complete achievement of forgiveness and atonement. For the purposes of
this comparative study, the more limited concept of charata - or remorse - is
equated with Garvey's use of the term "repentance," compare MAIMONIDES, supra,
Laws of Teshuva 2:2, with Garvey, supra note 2, at 1814, while teshuva is used to refer
to the broader process of atonement. Cf ADIN STEINSALTZ, TESHUVAH 3 (Michael
Swirsky ed. & trans., 1996).
Broadly defined, teshuva is more than just repentance from sin; it is a spiri-
tual reawakening, a desire to strengthen the connection between oneself and
the Sacred .... [A]t the root of the notion of teshuva lies the concept of
return (shivah)-return, not only to the past.., but to the Divine source of
all being.
Id. See also Nygaard, supra note 3, at 985 n.17 (stating that "metanoia," though
"[u]sually translated as 'repentance,' ... actually means something richer [,] closer to
'whole change' or 'new state' of mind, indicating a wholly new direction").
The word "teshuva," transliterated from the Hebrew, appears in English works in a
variety of other forms as well, including teshuvah, t'shuvah and t'shuva. In the interest
of consistency, I have altered the spelling in some quotations to conform with a uni-
form transliteration of "teshuva." In the interest of faithfulness to the original works,
however, I have not altered the spellings of the titles of the works cited.
11. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 3 ("Teshuva occupies a central place in Ju-
daism . . ."). See also generally 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH
THOUGHT ch. 15 (Abraham Sutton ed., 1992).
12. See 1 Kings 8:46; Ecclesiastes 7:20; Psalms 103:3. For a discussion of moral
vulnerability and susceptibility to temptations of evil in the human condition, see
ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, REFLECTIONS OF THE RAV: LESSONS IN JEWISH THOUGHT 44-
50 (1979) (adapted from lectures of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik). Cf Garvey supra
note 2, at 1811 (quoting P.S. GREENSPAN, PRACTICAL GUILT: MORAL DILEMMAS,
EMOTIONS, AND SOCIAL NORMS 133 (1995)) (describing a "morality built on a view of
human nature as imperfect but improvable").
13. For discussions of whether teshuva is considered a Biblical commandment and
of its precise mode of performance, see KAPLAN, supra note 11, at 205 n.5; PELI, supra
note 10, at 67-76.
Even if teshuva is not technically counted as one of the 613 commandments enu-
merated in the Torah, it is clearly an obligation incumbent upon an individual who
sins. See PELI, supra. For a discussion of the concept, identification and derivation of
unenumerated Biblical obligations, see Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitu-
tional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary Study in Compar-
ative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMM. 511 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 30:2-3; Isaiah 1:18;43:25, 44:22. See also STEINSALTZ,
supra note 10, at 3-4 ("All forms of teshuva, however diverse and complex, have a
common core: the belief that human beings have it in their power to effect inward
change.").
The opportunity for teshuva is often portrayed in Jewish thought as a manifestation
of Divine beneficence that allows those who have violated God's laws to return to the
proper path and atone for wrongdoing. See, e.g., BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, DUTIES OF
THE HEART, Introduction to Section 7; RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, SHA'AREI
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Though the verses in Leviticus cited by Garvey represent an early
depiction of the mechanics and purposes of atonement in Jewish
law, teshuva has occupied a central place in Jewish thought, from
the Bible and the Talmud to the legal and philosophical writings of
medieval and modern scholars.' 5 These sources portray a complex
process consisting of several steps required of the penitent individ-
ual, a process strikingly similar to that which Garvey describes.
This Essay looks to further develop some of Garvey's ideas by
closely analyzing teshuva, which stands as an illuminating concep-
tual analog to Garvey's depiction of secular atonement.' 6
TESHUVA 1:1; RABBENU NIssIM GERONDI (RAN), DERASHOT HARAN 98-99, 107
(Leon A. Feldman ed., 1973); STEINSALTZ, supra, at 4.
According to the Talmudic sages, this possibility of altering reality after the
fact, which is one of the mysteries of all being, was created before the world
itself. Before the laws of nature came into existence ... a principle even
more fundamental and more exalted was proclaimed: that change-
teshuva-is possible.
STEINSALTZ, supra, at 4.
15. For discussions in English of the history, sources, development and methodol-
ogy of the Jewish legal system, see IRVING A. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL LAW AND
RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 307-313
(1993); MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 228-39, 281-
399 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994); Menachem Elon, The Legal
System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (1985); DAVID M. FELDMAN,
BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW: MARITAL RELATIONS, CONTRACEPTION AND
ABORTION 3-18 (1968); AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW: FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH CIVIL LAW 289-304
(1991); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory:
Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 447-77 (1997).
16. A substantial body of literature has developed debating the efficacy of relying
on religious sources to analyze and apply secular concepts in the American legal sys-
tem. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); KENT GREENAWALT,
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION
IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); MICHAEL J.
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTEN-
NIAL ESSAY (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democ-
racy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998); Symposium, Law
and Morality, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1984); Symposium, Reli-
gion and the Judicial Process: Legal, Ethical, and Empirical Dimensions, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 177 (1998); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Soci-
ety, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 (1993); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in
the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993).
A less extensive but similar debate has focused on the application of Jewish legal
theory to American law. Compare Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish
Law and its Application to the American Legal System, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1037-
38 n.2 (1998) (citing, as examples of scholarship endorsing such application, David R.
Dow, Constitutional Midrash: The Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's Problem, 29
Hous. L. REV. 543, 544 (1992); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale M. Rosenberg, Guilt:
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THE PROCESS OF ATONEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The process of atonement that Garvey proposes places separate
obligations on the wrongdoer and the victim. The initial burden,
understandably, falls on the wrongdoer, who must engage in "expi-
ation,"'1 7 a moral journey consisting of the four steps of "repen-
tance, apology, reparation and penance."' 8 After the wrongdoer
Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRal of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 614-19 (1991)),
with id. at 1038 n.3 (citing, as examples of scholarship expressing a more cautious
approach, Steven F. Friedell, Book Review: Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish
Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 909, 919 (1993); Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the
Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory,
106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 893-94 (1993)).
Regardless of the different stances taken in these debates, the application of Jewish
law appears appropriate here, given Garvey's own acknowledgment of religion and
Jewish law as early sources for the concept of atonement, see supra text accompanying
notes 5-6, as well as Garvey's willingness largely to dispense with distinctions between
the secular and the religious in discussing the process of atonement. See supra text
accompanying notes 7-9.
17. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1813.
18. Id. Before describing the steps that comprise the process of secular atone-
ment, Garvey establishes that, as a prerequisite to undertaking the process, a wrong-
doer must first experience "guilt." See id. at 1810. A person who commits a wrong,
according to Garvey, "acquires guilt" or "becomes tainted." Id. Indeed, he writes,
"feeling guilt is the appropriate-the virtuous or morally decent-response to one's
wrongdoing." Id. at 1810-11. It is the sense of "being 'tainted,' or more ominously
'disfigured' or 'polluted,"' id. at 1810, that, ideally, leads to engagement in the path of
atonement as a means of removing the taint. See id. at 1810-13.
For discussions of the importance of feeling guilt or shame in order to facilitate
teshuva, see, e.g., Ezekiel 18:61-63; Ezra 9:6; RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note
14, ch. 1, at 21-22.
It should be noted that one of the caveats inherent to a comparative study of legal
systems composed in different languages involves inevitable ambiguities in syntax.
See supra note 10, discussing the translation of "teshuva." Thus, for example, while
Garvey emphasizes a distinction between "guilt," which he sees as a positive reaction
to wrongdoing, and "shame," which he sees as unproductive and unlikely to result in
atonement, see Garvey, supra, at 1811-13, the Hebrew terms for these concepts carry
no such contrasting connotations. Indeed, one contemporary scholar of Jewish law,
relying on Hebrew primary sources but writing in English, expresses concerns similar
to those of Garvey despite using terminology that would appear to contradict Gar-
vey's assertions. According to Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan, one who repents "should experi-
ence deep shame" but "should not sink into depression.., knowing how ready God is
to forgive.. . ." See KAPLAN, supra note 11, ch. 15, at 18-19. Cf. STEINSALTZ, supra
note 10, at 6.
[G]enuine regret for one's misdeeds and recognition of one's failings do not
necessarily lead to the desired outcome ... instead, they can cause a deepen-
ing sense of despair and a fatalistic resignation. Rather than promoting posi-
tive changes, such despondency, regarded in our tradition as one of the most
serious afflictions of the soul, can cause one to sink even further.
Thus remorse ... must be accompanied by something else: belief in the pos-
sibility of change. In this sense, the principle of teshuva - that no matter
what the starting point ... penitence is possible - is itself and important
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
has completed this journey, the victim is then obligated to forgive
the wrongdoer, thus completing the process of atonement through
a "reconciliation of the wrongdoer and the wronged."' 19 This Essay
likens Garvey's system of atonement to the process of teshuva,
comparing the obligations placed on both parties and the requisite
methodology for achieving true atonement.
I. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE WRONGDOER
In Jewish thought, the process of teshuva20 is often described
broadly in four stages, similar to Garvey's process.21 Although the
precise enumeration and identification of these stages varies
among scholars, 22 the general formulation of the process of teshuva
contains essentially the same elements listed by Garvey:23 remorse,
resolution not to repeat the wrongdoing, confession and changing
one's ways.24 The similarity in the general conceptual frameworks
source of reawakening and hope .... [K]nowing that there is no irredeema-
ble situation [ ] can itself serve as a goad to teshuva.
Id. at 6-7. "[W]e focus on our blemishes and faults, not in order to wallow in guilt, but
to use our flaws for leverage in the effort to progress .... Evil deeds, once recognized,
become a constant goad and encouragement to reform." Id. at 56.
19. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1813.
20. Scholars have emphasized that teshuva is a complex and often difficult process,
akin to a spiritual journey. See PELI, supra note 10, at 89 (comparing process of
teshuva to a journey along the circumference of a circle, in the course of which it may
be difficult to realize that the path ultimately leads to the desired objective); STEIN-
SALTZ, supra note 10, at 7 (comparing one who engages in teshuva to "a person on a
journey who at some point decides to change direction" and stating that "the new
path, like the one abandoned, is long and arduous").
21. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
22. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 4.
Many books and articles have been written about teshuva, providing detailed
analyses of the various stages of the process form start to finish. Yet, for all
this elaboration, a few fundamental principles underlie all forms and levels
of teshuva .... In fact, two essentials are found in every kind of teshuva: the
renunciation of a regretted past and the adoption of a better path to be fol-
lowed henceforth.
Id.
23. Scholars also list these elements in various orders, many of which differ some-
what from the order described by Garvey. For the purposes of this comparative
study, Garvey's order has been adopted as a general framework. Indeed, Garvey's
own list is a compilation based on the enumerations of different theorists. Compare
Garvey, supra note 2, at 1804 n.4 (stating that "[a]tonement involves four components
- repentance, apology, reparation, and ...penance (though not all of these are
always required)" (quoting RICHARD SWINBURNE, RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT
81 (1989))), with id. (listing "perception of wrongdoing, guilt, and repentance" (quot-
ing JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IM-
PORTANCE 272 (1986))).
24. See KAPLAN, supra note 11, at 209; id. at n.37-40. These elements are, indeed,
quite similar to those articulated by Garvey. Thus, attention should be paid to the
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of Garvey's process of secular atonement and the process of
teshuva may allow for meaningful comparisons and contrasts of the
two systems.
A. Repentance
Garvey relies on a definition of "repentance" as
the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one's wrongful
and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one's
character that generated the actions, the resolve to do one's best
to extirpate those aspects of one's character, and the resolve to
atone or make amends for the [wrong and] harm that one has
done.25
Garvey thus sees repentance as a crucial first step in removing the
taint of wrongdoing because it is "active," leading "[t]he repentant
self [to] focus[ ] on the wrongdoing that produced the stain in the
first place and on what the self can now do about it."26
In Jewish law and philosophy, remorse for a wrong, coupled with
the resolution not to repeat the wrongdoing, is likewise essential to
any possibility of atonement. In particular, as Maimonides writes
in his Code of Law, these elements of repentance are prerequisites
to effective confession.27 Words of apology that are not accompa-
similarity in substance rather than to the slight difference in terminology, as the terms
used for the elements in Jewish thought are translations of the original works. See
discussions supra notes 10, 18.
Because the Bible serves as the fundamental source of Jewish law and philosophy,
many of the medieval scholars who discuss the process of teshuva cite various Biblical
sources for the different stages of teshuva.
For example, verses cited as sources for the step of remorse include Hosea 14:2,
cited in SA'ADIA GAON, EMUNOTH V'DEOTH 5:5; Jeremiah 8:6, cited in RABBENU
YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 10; Jeremiah 31:18, cited in MAIMONIDES,
supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:2; Joel 2:14, cited in BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, supra
note 14, ch. 7, at 4.
Sources cited for the requirement to resolve not to repeat the wrongdoing include
Hosea 14:4, cited in SA'ADIA GAON, supra; Isaiah 55:7, cited in RABBENU YONAH
GERONDI, supra, ch. 1, at 11, MAIMONIDES, supra; Job 34:32, cited in BACHYA IBN
PAQUDA, supra.
Confession is included as part of the process of teshuva in such Biblical sources as
Hosea 14:3, cited in SA'ADIA GAON, supra; Leviticus 5:5, cited in RABBENU YONAH
GERONDI, supra, ch. 1, at 40; Numbers 5:6-7, cited in MAIMONIDES, supra, 1:1; Prov-
erbs 28:13, cited in BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, supra.
Finally, the need to change one's ways is derived from such sources as Hosea 14:2,
cited in SA'ADIA GAON, supra; Isaiah 55:7, cited in RABBENU YONAH GERONDI,
supra, ch. 1, at 11, MAIMONIDES, supra, 2:2, BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, supra.
25. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1814 (quoting Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punish-
ment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 143, 147 (1997)).
26. Id. at 1815.
27. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:3.
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nied by sincere feelings of regret and resolve to change remain
empty, bereft of the crucial element that lends them meaning. 8
Citing a powerful analogy from the Talmud, Maimonides empha-
sizes the futility of an attempted confession that lacks the proper
intent.19 The analogy compares such a confession to an immersion
for ritual purity undertaken while the impure individual continues
to grasp onto the very object that rendered the individual ritually
impure. 30 Just as it is impossible for ritual purification to take ef-
fect until the individual casts away the impure object, it is incon-
ceivable that the purifying effects of confession will set in before
the improper acts have been cast aside through regret and resolve
for the future.3'
In addition to its value as an illustration of some of the underly-
ing principles of teshuva, the analogy to the laws of ritual purity
underlines the legal nature of teshuva in Jewish thought. Indeed,
since the times of Maimonides, scholars of Jewish law have used
Maimonides' Laws of Teshuva, incorporated as a section in his
Code of Law, as a springboard for extensive legal discussions of the
concept of teshuva.32 Among the works of contemporary scholars,
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's discourses are perhaps the most no-
table example of careful and technical legal analysis of teshuva
through an exposition on Maimonides' Code of Law. 33
Rabbi Soloveitchik posits that according to Maimonides, the role
of resolve for the future in the process of teshuva depends on the
specific nature of the individual's teshuva. Rabbi Soloveitchik ob-
serves that, in Chapter 1 of Laws of Teshuva, Maimonides lists re-
28. Cf. Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native Ameri-
can Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 381 (1998) ("It's
difficult to take seriously an apology that is not coupled with atonement." (citation
omitted)); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009, 1017 (1999) ("For an apology to comfort the injured party, it must be sincere, or
at least perceived to be sincere .... [W]hen an apology is given too cavalierly, the
listener may question its meaning."); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in
Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1177-78 (1997) ("Like other important rituals, an
apology is worthless unless the required gestures are filled with meaning. Apologies
are speech-acts .... ").
29. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:3 (citing TALMUD BAVLI,
Ta'anith 16a).
30. See id.
31. Cf. SWINBURNE, supra note 23, at 82, cited in Garvey, supra note 2, at 1814
n.47 ("Repentance also involves a resolve to amend - you cannot repent of a past act
if you intend to do a similar act at the next available opportunity.").
32. See, e.g., PELI, supra note 10.
33. A portion of these discourses have been collected in PELI, supra note 10.
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morse prior to resolution for the future, while in Chapter 2, the
order of these two elements is reversed.34
Asserting that there is no contradiction between the two descrip-
tions, Rabbi Soloveitchik instead suggests that in Chapter 1, Mai-
monides refers to teshuva that is motivated by emotion, resulting
from the wrongdoer's spontaneous inner feelings of shame, which
instinctively lead to remorse. In such a scenario, he explains, it is
the individual's sense of utter remorse that automatically brings
about the resolve never to commit the same wrongs.36 Chapter 2,
according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, describes an individual who has
arrived at teshuva on an intellectual level, who understands the im-
propriety and negative effects of sinful behavior and therefore re-
solves not to engage in such behavior in the future.37 In such a
case, the individual does not immediately experience passionate
feelings of remorse; rather, remorse will grow out of the individ-
ual's continued determination not to repeat the wrongful actions in
the future.38
Thus, the first step in both Garvey's process of atonement -
repentance - and in the path of teshuva - remorse and resolution
not to repeat the wrongdoing - incorporate elements of emotional
commitment and future resolve, which must be met before contin-
uing on the road to atonement.
B. Apology
The next stage Garvey sees in the process of atonement, "confes-
sion," serves as "the wrongdoer's public expression of his repen-
tance, whereby he openly acknowledges his wrongdoing and
simultaneously disowns it."39 Alluding again to the theological
roots of the concept of atonement, Garvey refers to an apology as a
"secular ritual of expiation.""n Such expiation is achieved through
34. See id. at 188 (citing MAIMONnDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 1:1, 2:2).
35. See id. at 200.
36. See id. at 200-01.
37. See id. at 202-03.
38. See id. at 204; cf STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 5.
The recognition of the need [for teshuva] comes about in different ways.
Sometimes one is overcome by a sense of sinfulness, of blemish, of defile-
ment, which resulted in a powerful desire for escape and purification. But
the desire [for teshuva] can also take more subtle forms, feelings of imperfec-
tion or unrealized potential, which spur a search for something better.
Id.
39. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1815.
40. Id. (quoting NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY
AND RECONCILIATION at viii (1991)).
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the profound willingness of the self to "accept[] responsibility for
its wrongdoing but at the same time disavow[ ] the wrong. "41 In
short, an apology "embraces" guilt and then "expels" it.42
Vidui - confession, or apology - likewise serves an indispensa-
ble function in the process of teshuva. Through vidui, the individ-
ual unequivocally accepts responsibility for wrongdoing, at the
same time displaying an outward expression of remorse and a will-
ingness to make amends for the wrong.43 Maimonides delineates
the essential elements of vidui, which include: language demon-
strating a clear admission of having committed a wrong against an-
other; precise articulation of the wrong; a statement of strong
remorse; and a declaration of a desire not to repeat the wrong.44
In his more detailed description of vidui, Maimonides, who is
known for precision and economy of language,45 repeatedly em-
phasizes the importance of verbalizing the feelings of remorse and
resolve.46 In addition, Maimonides cites Talmudic sources that
praise an individual who recites an extended form of vidui by ex-
panding on the more basic elements of confession and apology.47
Building on Maimonides' discussions, Rabbi Soloveitchik offers
an important psychological insight to explain the power and signifi-
41. Id. at 1816.
42. Id.
43. Through an analogy to medical ailments, the medieval legal authority Rab-
benu Nissim Gerondi (Ran) illustrates the significance of open admission of wrongdo-
ing in the process of teshuva. Ran observes that a doctor cannot heal an individual
suffering from a physical malady unless the patient reveals the illness fully to the
doctor. Similarly, to be healed of the spiritual ailments that accompany wrongful acts,
an individual must acknowledge and identify the wrongdoing, to the self and to God,
so that the process of teshuva can begin. See RAN, supra note 14, at 149-50 (citing
Hosea 7:1). See also RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 2, at 8 (employ-
ing a similar analogy).
Fundamental sources of Jewish law and philosophy have often used an analogy to
physical health to help illuminate the notion of the spiritual ailments connected to
wrongdoing and, conversely, the healing that accompanies teshuva. See, e.g., BACHYA
IBN PAQUDA, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 1 (citing Jeremiah 31:29); MAIMONIDES, supra
note 10, Laws of De'oth, chs. 2,4; MAIMONIDES, INTRODUCTION TO COMMENTARY ON
THE MISHNA, Introduction to Pirke Avoth; PELI, supra note 10, at 146-50 (citing
Psalms 103:2-4; Isaiah 6:10; 57:19); RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 2,
at 3 (citing Isaiah 33:24; Psalms 41:5); id. ch. 4, at 1 (citing Isaiah 6:10; Psalms 41:5);
RAN, supra note 14, at 99-100; id. at 107 (citing Hosea 14:5; Ezekiel 18:27-28; TALMUD
BAVLI, Yoma 86a-86b).
44. See RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 1; see also generally
KAPLAN, supra note 11, ch. 16.
45. See ISADORE TWERSKY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES
(MISHNEH TORAH) 97 (1980).
46. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 1:1, 2:2, 2:9.
47. See id. at 1:1.
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cance of verbal vidui. Rabbi Soloveitchik notes that human nature
sometimes leads a person, consciously or otherwise, to refuse to
accept the reality of certain unfavorable facts. 48 Among the mech-
anisms a person may employ in the attempt to deny an unfortunate
reality, he observes, is to avoid verbally expressing the unpleasant
truth. 9 Perhaps one of the most difficult truths that a person must
face involves the acknowledgment of having committed a wrongful
act.50 Through the verbal expression of vidui, then, rather than
continuing to evade responsibility by deluding others and possibly
one's self as well, the individual admits to the truth of the wrongdo-
ing, thereby facilitating the process of teshuva.5
48. See PELI, supra note 10, at 93.
49. See id.
50. See CHAIM SHMtJLEVITZ, SICHOTH MUSSAR 74-76 (1980) (citing numerous
sources in Jewish thought describing the tendency of an individual to justify wrongful
acts and the importance of overcoming such an inclination). Cf. TALMUD BAVLI,
Avoth ch. 5, at 9 (listing qualities that indicate wisdom, including willingness "to admit
error," can be interpreted literally as "to admit truth").
51. See PELI, supra note 10, at 93-96. Cf Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty,
and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 480
(1983).
Genuine repentance as well as such states as contrition, remorse, the feeling
of guilt, and the desire for atonement, all require some sense of continuity
with the past and self-identity with an earlier wrongdoer. The essence of
these states is the deliberate taking of responsibility for an earlier doing. To
deny one's identity with the wrongdoer is to evade or deny responsibility for
his crimes, quite another thing form repentance.
Id.; Theresa Klosterman, Note, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission
in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 838-39 (1998)
(stating that, on a societal level, "[d]etermining the truth about human rights viola-
tions is crucial" and that "officially sanctioned ... acknowledgment is important be-
cause, in many religious and ethical traditions, it is a prerequisite to societal
forgiveness and atonement."); Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, When Si-
lence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 67 (1999) ("The 'confession' can be the catalyst for new behavior.
In fact, repentance and accountability for the evil in which the penitent participated
may ameliorate or end past wrongs."); STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 5-6.
The great obstacle in the way of teshuva... is self-satisfaction .... This great
stumbling block has been referred to by one sage as "obtuseness of the
heart." Obtuseness of the mind is easily recognized as an impairment of
cognitive functioning; that of the heart is more insidious, a condition of
blocked moral and emotional awareness. Without this prodding awareness,
however slight, without some feeling of inadequacy, no amount of intellec-
tual sagacity can change a person's behavior .... The initial perception and
awakening is, in effect, the first and most inclusive "confession." When a
vague feeling of discomfort turns to clear recognition that something is
wrong, and when that recognition is expressed in words spoken either to
oneself, to God, or to another person, the first step in the process of
[teshuva] has been taken, the part that relates to one's previous life and
character.
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Thus the second stages of both Garvey's process and of teshuva
require a public expression and acceptance of the wrongdoer's re-
sponsibility for the bad act, and an overt articulation of regret and
repudiation of the wrong.
C. Reparation and penance
In Garvey's depiction of the process of atonement, it is incum-
bent upon the wrongdoer, after feeling remorse and, through apol-
ogy, verbally expressing such feelings, to "make amends. '52
Garvey suggests that most crimes result in both harm and a moral
wrong; therefore, according to Garvey, the remedy for a wrongdo-
ing consists of two corresponding actions, reparation and pen-
ance.5 3  Because reparation, in the form of restitution or
compensation, "makes amends for the harm the wrongdoer does,
but not for the wrong he has done," Garvey explains, in addition to
making reparations, "the wrongdoer must submit to penance. '54
Thus, Garvey refers to penance as "the final, critical piece of the
expiation half of the atonement process. '55
Id.; Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strat-
egy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1584 (1998) (docu-
menting that a capital defendant's "acceptance of responsibility truly does influence
the jury's decision making" and that "a defendant's verbal acknowledgment of his
killing would increase the likelihood of receiving a life sentence").
This explanation of the importance of verbal vidui would further appear to be the
rationale behind the principle, which Maimonides again cites from the Talmud, that a
person should engage in public vidui as an effective step in the process of teshuva.
See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:5.
Criticizing those who view public apologies as merely "shaming penalties," Garvey
cautions us not to "forget that the offender is not only being exposed and shamed,
he's also making an apology. Indeed, as far as atonement goes, treating an apology as
nothing more than a chance to cause shame misses the point." See Garvey, supra note
2, at 1816 (emphasis in original).
For descriptive and normative discussions of the use of apology in the American
law, see, e.g., id.; Cohen, supra note 28; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanc-
tions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Steven Keeva, Does Law Mean Never
Having to Say You're Sorry?, A.B.A. J., December 1999, at 64; Levi, supra note 28;
Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rossett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the United States, 20 L. & Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986).
52. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1816, 1818. Cf Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note
51, at 67 (emphasizing that "[t]rue repentance does not deal with feeling, but with
action-changing one's behavior, reversing direction"); Reverend Katherine Hancock
Ragsdale, The Role of Religious Institutions in Responding to the Domestic Violence
Crisis, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1149, 1168 (1995).
53. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1816-27.
54. Id. at 1818.
55. Id. at 1819.
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Garvey defines penance as "a self-imposed punishment, i.e., self-
imposed hardship or suffering, which completes the process of ex-
piation and finally rids the wrongdoer of his guilt. '56 Penance
plays a unique role in Garvey's view of atonement, which "insists
that punishment should do more: It should restore the offender to
full standing in the community."57 To explore the potent question
of "[h]ow suffering manage[s] to effect this restoration," Garvey
mandates the need "to shift perspectives. '15 Specifically, Garvey's
approach requires us "to look at punishment not from the victim's
perspective, but from the wrongdoer's."59  This simple yet
profound suggestion recognizes that often a wrongdoer "will feel
smaller than before" and "will experience anger and resentment
toward himself." 60 Significantly, Garvey explains, "the wrongdoer
cannot restore his own moral standing unless he submits to
punishment."61
Regarding penance, Rabbi Soloveitchik's discourses on teshuva
again provide a helpful complement to Garvey's thoughts. Like
Garvey, Rabbi Soloveitchik establishes a framework for analyzing
the concept of penance based on the premise that the commission
of a wrong results in two interrelated but distinct consequences.
He explains that, on one level, in relation to the victim, a wrongful
act produces liability on the part of the offender.62 Similar to Gar-
vey, Rabbi Soloveitchik posits that to counteract this culpability,
the individual must engage in reparation, through the payment of
restitution or compensation.63 Thus, one kind of teshuva effects
kappara, a form of forgiveness or acquittal from wrongdoing.64 An
individual who undertakes this kind of teshuva both literally and
metaphorically pays a debt owed to another and is thereby re-
leased from further liability.65 Indeed, Rabbi Soloveitchik notes an
etymological link that underscores the corresponding conceptual
similarity between reparation and this form of forgiveness: kappara
derives from the same root as kofer, the Hebrew term for payment
of an obligation.66
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1822.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1823.
61. Id.
62. See PELI, supra note 10, at 49-50.
63. See id. at 50-51.
64. See id. at 51.
65. See id.
66. See id.
20001 1689
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Yet, this form of teshuva does not adequately amend for the sec-
ond result that Rabbi Soloveitchik attributes to the commission of
a wrongful act. Employing an approach that anticipates Garvey's,
and relying on various sources of Jewish thought,67  Rabbi
Soloveitchik examines the effect of wrongdoing on the individual
who has committed the improper act. Specifically, he acknowl-
edges the spiritual defilement caused by the impurity of sin.68 To
return from such spiritual defilement, Rabbi Soloveitchik explains,
the individual must do more than merely pay the victim any obliga-
tion arising out of the wrongdoing.69 As in Garvey's system, in the
final stages of teshuva, Jewish law demands not only reparation,
but, more importantly, penance, in the form of fundamental
change in the individual's mode of behavior.7 °
To erase fully the taint of the wrongdoing and thus to obtain a
restored place in the community, an individual must engage in
what Rabbi Soloveitchik terms teshuva of tahara (repentance of
purification), a more extensive form of spiritual purification or ex-
piation.7 ' Like penance, teshuva of tahara requires that a person
undertake self-imposed forms of hardship, ones that relate to and
address directly the particular nature of the act committed.72
67. Rabbi Soloveitchik bases his approach on an idea he finds expressed in Bibli-
cal sources as well as in both legal and narrative strands of the Talmud, the halacha
and the aggada. See id. at 51-55. For a discussion of halacha and aggada in Jewish
thought, see Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover's "No-
mos and Narrative," 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465.
68. See PELI, supra note 10, at 51. In addition to its powerful philosophical impli-
cations, the notion of a change that takes place in the wrongdoer's personality is ex-
pressed in a technical legal sense as well. The Talmud documents Jewish law's
acknowledgment of this change in spiritual status through the disqualification as cred-
ible witnesses of those individuals who have not reformed from their improper ways.
See id. at 55-56 (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin).
69. Cf MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 1:1 (emphasizing that a per-
son who damages another does not achieve atonement merely through the payment
of restitution or compensation).
70. See id. at 2:2 to 2:4.
71. See PELI, supra note 10, at 51-52.
72. For example, the Talmud discusses the acts of penance required of a usurer,
who, as a result of violating the laws of the Torah, has been disqualified as a credible
witness. The Talmud instructs that the usurer must destroy all credit slips and refuse
to lend money on interest under any circumstances, even when it may be legally per-
missible to do so. See PELI, supra note 10, at 56 (quoting TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin
25b). Thus, teshuva of tahara requires, for the purposes of restoring spiritual purity
and the resulting testimonial credibility, acts that demonstrate a renouncement even
of the conditions that led to the improper past behavior. See id. Cf MAIMONIDES,
supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:4 (describing such practices as "distancing one's self
far from the means of wrongdoing, changing one's name to demonstrate that 'I am
not the same who committed those acts,' changing all of one's ways toward the good
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Through teshuva of tahara, then, an individual truly regains and
returns to the state of undefiled spirituality lost as a consequence
of the wrongdoing.73
HI. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE WRONGED: RECONCILIATION
Once the wrongdoer has successfully completed expiation and
the guilt has thereby been removed, Garvey writes, it is then time
for the victim to complete the process of atonement through for-
giveness.74 According to Garvey, forgiveness "achieves the recon-
ciliation of wrongdoer and wronged. ' 75  Specifically, Garvey
suggests, just as expiation "enables an offender to purge the taint
of guilt," expiation coupled with forgiveness "enables the victim to
overcome his resentment. 76
Discussing the mechanics of forgiveness, Garvey argues that
although
[a] victim may permissibly extend forgiveness to a wrongdoer
who has done nothing but repent ... a victim may also legiti-
mately withhold forgiveness until the wrongdoer has paid his
debt in full, i.e., until the wrongdoer has not only repented but
also apologized, made reparations, and endured his penance.
Indeed, forgiveness may take some time in coming.77
Ultimately, however, Garvey considers forgiveness "one of th[e
victim's] responsibilities. '7 8 Indeed, Garvey finds that "[i]t reflects
a moral failure.., for victims to withhold forgiveness unreasonably
and proper path, and exiling one's self"); RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14,
ch. 1, at 35.
73. See PELI, supra note 10, at 55-56. The medieval scholar Rabbenu Yonah Ger-
ondi elaborates on the biblical analogy of cleaning a stained garment to describe dif-
ferent modes and levels of teshuva and their effectiveness in removing the spiritual
taint of wrongful acts. See RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 9
(citing Jeremiah 4:14; Psalms 51:4). Specifically, he points to the difference between a
superficial washing of a garment, which may remove dirt, and a more thorough clean-
ing, which will restore the garment's original color and brightness. See id. Cf RAN,
supra note 14, at 108 (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 86b) (describing different types of
teshuva and corresponding levels of expiation); STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 53
("Teshuva has two essential phases: a leap of disengagement from the past, and a
lengthier, more arduous process of rectification. The first phase is one of destruction,
the second of reconstruction."). See generally KAPLAN, supra note 11, ch. 17.
74. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1813.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1828. Cf Nygaard, supra note 3, at 984 ("Forgiveness looks evil in
the eye, condemns it, but still permits one who meets the forgiver's criteria, to start
anew.").
77. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1828 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 1827. Cf. Levi, supra note 28, at 1178 (stating that the "effectiveness [of
an apology] in reconciliation depends not only on the speaker but also on the partici-
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from offenders who have done all they can do to expiate their
guilt.""
A similar approach to the dynamics of forgiveness is found in
Jewish thought. Discussing the obligations owed to the victim,
Maimonides explains that teshuva in the form of reparations is not
sufficient, but that the wrongdoer must repeatedly appease the vic-
tim and ask for forgiveness. 80 The responsibility on the wrongdoer
is such that, if the victim initially refuses the request, the wrong-
doer must continue to make a number of attempts to obtain
forgiveness.81
Nevertheless, once the wrongdoer has repeatedly demonstrated
a sincere hope for reconciliation, parallel to Garvey's approach,
Jewish law places the burden on the victim to grant forgiveness. In
the powerful formulation of Maimonides, if the victim continuously
denies forgiveness, the wrongdoer is released from further action,
as the victim is then deemed to be the sinner. 82 Indeed, Maimoni-
des emphasizes the responsibility incumbent on the victim, writing
that it is improper for a person to withhold forgiveness; instead, a
victim should be receptive to the wrongdoer's genuine attempts at
reconciliation and atonement.83
CONCLUSION
Despite the prominent position it has held for millennia in reli-
gious and moral thinking, the atonement model is relatively new to
pation of an injured party. Absent the eventual complicity of the injured party, the
apologizer's words are just talk.").
79. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1828. Cf Cohen supra note 28, at 1021 (citing psycho-
logical evidence finding that "an injured party ... who fails to forgive after receiving
an apology [ ] may suffer the corrosive effects of storing anger"); Levi, supra note 26,
at 1178 ("By apologizing, the offender acknowledges her diminutive moral stature
and asks for restorative forgiveness. She also acknowledges the existence and impor-
tance (to both parties) of the moral register itself. When the apologizee gestures to
acknowledge that meaning, he closes the circle of performance, thus establishing a
new moral equilibrium."); Nygaard, supra note 3, at 1012.
For the offender who is sincerely repentant; feels shame for his act; who has
recaptured compassion for the feelings of others; realizes the pain he has
caused; and, who truly desires to turn a new leaf and be reconciled with
society; the system must determine how it can facilitate that desire, not frus-
trate it out of ignorance or misguided notions.
Id.
80. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:9; RABBENU YONAH GER-
ONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 44.
81. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:9; RABBENU YONAH GER-
ONDI, supra note 14, ch. 4, at 19.
82. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:9.
83. See id. at 2:10.
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American legal theory. Professor Garvey's attempt to offer a sys-
tematic depiction and analysis of the process of atonement and its
possible relevance to American law appears to represent the most
extensive such effort to date.
As Garvey himself concedes, any application of a theory of
atonement to the American legal system will encounter a number
of problems and objections. For example, he acknowledges that
"[i]f in the end you remain convinced that the ideal of community
on which I base my account of atonement is indeed dangerous or
irretrievable, then you will ... be forced to turn elsewhere for your
understanding of punishment."'  These difficulties only increase
when the analysis relates the concept of teshuva from Jewish law
and philosophy to American law.85 Nevertheless, Garvey's attempt
is successful, for reasons that would appear to apply to theories of
teshuva as well.
First, Garvey emphasizes that his "immediate aim is normative,
not practical," and, therefore, "the discussion proceeds at a high
level of abstraction" rather than "develop[ing] any concrete pro-
posals for institutional or doctrinal reform."86 Second, Garvey ex-
plains that a new model is necessary based on his conclusion that
"the prevailing models of punishment ... deterrence[,] retributiv-
ism[,] restorativism and libertarianism ... fall short. '87 Finally, as
Professor David Dolinko noted in introducing the symposium in
which Garvey participated, Garvey's proposal offers a fresh per-
spective at a time when "[c]riminal punishment is an institution
that is large, growing, and quite possibly mutating into new and
surprising forms."88 Ultimately, it is perhaps ironic that, in provid-
ing a new theory of punishment for American legal thought to con-
sider in a future millennium, Garvey has in fact looked back to
theories of atonement and teshuva that have spanned millennia of
the past. The path to teshuva may indeed provide insight in formu-
lating a new perspective on the notions of punishment underlying
American law.
84. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1803.
85. Indeed, in the past I have expressed my own doubts about attempts to derive
practical lessons for the application of the death penalty in the United States based on
the approach to capital punishment in Jewish law, because, "[a]lthough the processes
of repentance and atonement are inherent parts of the Jewish legal system, that is
clearly not the case in American penal law." See Levine, Capital Punishment, supra
note 16, at 1043 & nn.22-24. See also discussion supra note 16.
86. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1804.
87. Id. at 1829-30.
88. David Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1719, 1726
(1999).
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RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF MEDIATION
F. Matthews-Giba, ofm
INTRODUCTION
In thirteenth century Italy, St. Francis of Assisi mediated' a dis-
pute between the Mayor and Bishop of Assisi with a spiritual
song.' This use of spirituality3 as a mediation technique is worth
studying, particularly as it provides motivation for parties to settle.4
The song that Francis and his followers sang was not primarily
about God, or about being a good Christian, which might have had
the effect of making the disputing parties feel guilty. Rather, the
song was about the order of creation. The song opened with,
"Praise to you God almighty for having given us the Sun. It is
beautiful and radiant with great splendor." Then St. Francis con-
tinued to sing the praises of all of creation. This song reframed 5
the context of the parties' dispute from a contentious battle, which
caused disorder in the community and to the ordered creation that
* J.D. 1999, Fordham University; certificate 1995, Conflict Resolution, Syracuse
University; M.A. 1988, Theology, Washington Theological Union; minor in the Order
of Friars Minor (Catholic priest); clerk, 1999-2000 Judge Dickenson Debevoise,
U.S.S.D.J., Third District; mediator, 1997-1999, Manhattan Small Claims Court and
Bronx Family Court.
1. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 12
(1994) (defining mediation as a "process where the third party neutral, whether one
person or more, acts as a facilitator to assist in resolving a dispute between two or
more parties").
2. See FRANCIS & CLARE, THE COMPLETE WORKS 37-39 (Regis J. Armstrong,
ofm & Ignatius C. Brady, ofm, trans., 1982). It states, in part:
Praise by You, my Lord with all your creatures, especially Brother Sun,
[w]ho is the day and through whom You give us light. And he is beautiful
and radiant with great splendor; and bears a likeness of You; Most High
One. Praise be You, my Lord, through sister Moon and the stars, in heaven
You formed them clear and precious and beautiful.
3. The author defines spirituality as any transcendent system of beliefs to which a
people refer to on a regular basis to order their lives.
4. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV 7 (1996) (cita-
tions omitted).
5. See KOVACH, supra note 1, at 108 (defining refraining as technique in media-
tion to "cause the author of the statement to look at the problem or concern in a
different light").
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surrounded the disputants.6 This reframing provided an alternative
model to contextualize the mediation.
By pointing to characteristics found in nature, such as gentleness,
simplicity and endurance, St. Francis presented to the Bishop and
Mayor of Assisi a model of generosity, virtue and peace that the
disputants relied upon to settle their dispute. With the value of
peace properly identified, reconciliation7 is accomplished. St.
Francis' song reframed the Bishop's and Mayor's dispute from indi-
vidual gain to the ordered creation of the surrounding Umbrian8
hillside. Reframing the dispute created an atmosphere where the
parties could settle thereby allowing the town of Assisi to return to
its ordered daily life.
Part I of this Essay will outline the religious roots of mediation,
with a particular emphasis on the influence of the Franciscan
movement.9 Part II will explore the religious roots of mediation in
the United States and its application in present day mediation.
Part III will discuss the various styles, strategies and goals of medi-
ation and their corresponding results. Part IV will analyze the reli-
gious motivation underlying settlement agreements. Finally, this
Essay concludes that the proto-religious, creation-centered tech-
nique employed by St. Francis is a useful method for a multi-cul-
tured mediation, when one or both of the parties raises religious
objections to settlement.
I. RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF MEDIATION
The Popes of the Middle Ages mediated among Catholic sover-
eigns.10 In 1226, Pope Gregory IX was one of the most effective
6. See FRANCIS & CLARE, supra note 2, at 29 (admonishing the followers of St.
Francis to be conscious that only humans create disorder whereas the rest of creation
follows the will of God naturally).
7. The author defines reconciliation as the state of a person's soul (interior life)
characterized by peace, insight into self and friendship with God. This definition is
derived from Catholic Sacramental Theology, specifically the Sacrament of
Reconciliation.
8. St. Francis lived and ministered in the Italian province Umbria.
9. See LAZARO IRIARTE, FRANCISCAN HISTORY 9 (1983) (tracing Franciscan
movement as established by Saints Francis and Clare of Assisi to integrate themselves
into society so that they would contrast with "the new arbiters of society through total
detachment").
10. See Henry T. King, Jr. & Marc A. Le Forestier, Papal Arbitration: How the
Early Roman Catholic Church Influenced Modern Dispute Resolution, Disp. RESOL.
J., Summer 1997, at 74-75 (discussing Pope Gregory IX in 1226, to Pope John Paul II
in 1984, mediating disputes, to such extent that Rome was established as the confer-
ence ground for Europe).
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Papal mediators." Gregory IX mediated between the Holy Ro-
man Emperor and the Lombard League. The Lombard League
feared the encroaching power of the Roman Emperor who needed
the support of the league to pursue the Crusades and to advance
higher studies in the league's academies. 12 When the Roman Em-
peror, Frederick, sent a delegate to negotiate, the league killed the
delegate. In retaliation, Frederick placed Lombardy under a ban
and ordered their schools to be destroyed. With the dispute wors-
ening, both parties appealed to the Pope for mediation. Gregory
IX's predecessor, Honorarious III, resolved the dispute, though the
Lombard League refused to acknowledge the decision. As such,
Gregory IX was left with the task of obtaining the Lombard
League's approval solely though the prestige of his office and the
persuasiveness of his moral authority.
Nevertheless, the Pope's title proved to be insufficient.
Honorarious III had the same Papal title, but could not bind the
parties to an agreement. What Gregory IX offered to the Lombard
League was trust, built by his moral authority. 3 Gregory IX thus
opted to reframe the dispute between the Lombard League and
the Roman Emperor by referring to principles of Christian char-
ity.' 4 Gregory IX maximized the trust given to the papal office by
decreeing a peace pact for all of Europe that banned a Catholic
sovereign from breaching the peace with another Catholic sover-
eign. When the political and religious unity of Europe dis-
integrated, the Papal office replaced the principle of Christian
charity with the principle of rationality to provide a basis for
mediation.' 5
Papal mediation had its problems, the most obvious being that
popes mediated among Christian sovereigns exclusively.' 6 For ex-
ample, a dispute did not rise to the heightened importance of Papal
mediation if it existed between a Christian sovereign and a non-
Christian sovereign, 7 nor if a dispute existed between two Chris-
tian commoners.
11. See id. at 76.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 77.
15. See Paul A. Freund, The Philosophy of Equality, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 14
(recognizing overarching principles of rationality in United States jurisprudence).
16. See King & Le Forestier, supra note 10, at 75.
17. The Crusades are an example of this before the Pope became a party in the
dispute.
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Another difficulty was that papal mediation was costly; for in
order for parties to avail themselves of papal mediation, they had
to expend a significant amount of capital to simply secure a hear-
ing.18 In addition, papal mediation offered no opportunity to ap-
peal, and the Pope held both the legislative and the executive
powers. Accordingly, papal mediation lacked neutrality. 9
The Friars Minor, a Catholic religious order of men that began in
the Thirteenth century, remedied some of the foregoing difficul-
ties.2" One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Friars Minor
was that they mixed freely with the people of their day and were
well aware of the people's needs.2' The Friars Minor popularized
piety, as they worked primarily with common folk.
Thus, when the Church identified mediation as a proper focus
through papal action and the creation of mediating ambassadors,
the friars followed the lead. The Friars mediated between Catholic
22sovereigns, among the sovereigns and commoners, as well as any
other city rivalries.23 In addition to mediating between common
Christian folk, the Friars also mediated between non-Christian sov-
ereigns and Christian Europe.24
The Use Of Religion As A Bridge Towards Understanding
As an alternative to the Crusades, St. Francis went directly to the
Sultan Yusseff el Mostansir in Morocco to discuss the religious val-
ues of their dispute.25 St. Francis and his companion Bernard sug-
gested that the Crusades could end if the Sultan converted.
Though the Sultan was not willing to compromise his religious be-
18. See King & Le Forestier, supra note 10, at 76 (stating "[t]he Court of Rome is
very desirous: it has many needs and one must give many gifts").
19. See id. at 75. Though this lack of neutrality could be seen as a difficulty, some
scholars argue that neutrality is not an essential aspect of mediation. See John D.
Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 455,
463 (1997) (discussing the value of neutrality and disclosing the importance of non-
neutral interests); Riskin, supra note 4, at 17 (describing two ranges of mediation
styles, those who facilitate and those who evaluate); John Bickerman, Evaluative Me-
diator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 70 (1996) (arguing
that evaluative mediation presses the participants to reevaluate their positions).
20. The term Friars Minor is Latin for "lesser brother," signifying the founder's
(St. Francis of Assisi's) desire that his followers identify with the lesser members of
society.
21. See IRIARTE, supra note 9, at 129.
22. See id. at 130 (providing many examples of Friar Minor.mediation between the
years of 1231 and 1410).
23. See id. at 130; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24. See IRIARTE, supra note 9, at 133-34.
25. See id. at 139-41 (recounting Francis' attempted mediation of Crusades with
Sultan).
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liefs, he was impressed with Francis' openness and courage. None-
theless, the mediation did not result in a settlement, and the
Crusades continued. However, the Friars Minor and the Moslems
ultimately reached a mutual understanding and acceptance. Based
on early lessons such as this, scholars have identified understanding
and acceptance as appropriate goals for mediation. 6
Notably, the agreement forged between the Sultan and St. Fran-
cis extends to this day as the Friars Minor still retain the right to
reside in Moslem countries. Another groundbreaking result of this
mediation was that St. Francis inserted an injunction into the Rule
of Life for all Friars Minor that when they are with non-Christians,
Friars Minor "must not create disputes or arguments, but rather
they must submit themselves to all for God's sake, and confess that
you are Christians."27
St. Francis' mediation with the Sultan offers many insights for
present day mediators. For instance, where no common ground ex-
ists among the parties, creating a win-lose situation, exploring reli-
gious values may reveal unforeseen commonality. As previously
stated, because the Sultan was impressed with Francis' simplicity
and sacrifice for the love of God, St. Francis and the Sultan were
able to achieve common ground by virtue of their mutual
Abrahamic tradition.28
Also, in a typical win-lose position, a mutually respected channel
of dialogue may be established with third parties representing both
sides of the dispute through exploring the parties' religious beliefs.
For St. Francis and the Sultan, this was accomplished by discussing
the love of God and the authority of a transcendent power. As a
result of this conversation, some Friars Minor remained in Mo-
rocco, leaving a channel of communications between the warring
parties: Christian Europe and the Islamic countries.
A. The Growth of Papal Mediation
Papal mediation continued to have a positive influence through-
out history. In 1917, for example, Pope Benedict XV wrote an ar-
mistice proposal to the warring powers suggesting a basis for an
26. See ROBERT A.B. BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994);
Zena D. Zumeta, Spirituality and Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 25 (1993) (discussing
understanding and connectedness as goals of mediation).
27. Rule of Friars Minor ch. 7, cited in FRANCIS & CLARE, supra note 2, at 141.
28. Islam, Christianity and Judaism trace their origins to the biblical patriarch
Abraham.
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end to World War I, and a lasting peace.29 The proposal consisted
of reduction and limitation of arms, establishment of international
arbitration, and restriction of the use of military force for the de-
fense of the international order. When Pope Paul VI received U
Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, he stated that
"[t]he Holy See has the highest esteem for this international organ-
ization. It considered it as the fruit of a civilization to which the
Catholic religion ... has given its essential principles. 30
Pope John Paul II also mediated a dispute between Argentina
and Chile in 1984.31 The dispute concerned which country had sov-
ereignty over oil-rich islands in a channel between the two coun-
tries. A panel of judges, composed of members of the
International Court of Justice, held hearings in Geneva over the
course of six years and rendered the decision in favor of Argen-
tina.32 However, Chile refused to accept the decision, a situation
that was reminiscent of the Lombard League's rejection of the de-
cision of Honorious III. With troop movement reported in border
towns,33 John Paul II ultimately mediated the dispute by dividing
the islands between the two countries.34 In a visit to the area, he
noted that the generosity of spirit of the two leaders was what pre-
vented wary.3  Again, an appeal to religious and transcendent val-
ues provided the motivation to settle a dispute.
Papal mediation works on the international level much like adju-
dication works on the national level. As a matter of faith in the
institution,36 the disputing parties must submit their authority to
settle to a larger institution. Both parties in the Argentine-Chile
dispute had recourse to this level of decision-making because nego-
tiations failed or were blocked.
29. See STANLEY CHODOROW, CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THEORY AND CHURCH
POLITICS IN THE MID-TWELFTH CENTURY 152-58 (1972).
30. EMILE M. GUERRY, THE POPES AND WORLD GOVERNMENT at vi (1963).
31. See King & Le Forestier, supra note 10, at 79.
32. See Argentina and Chile, LATIN AMERICA, LAX, 38, Oct. 1, 1976, at 304 (list-
ing the five judges as Fitzmaurice from Great Britain, Gros from France, Dillard from
United States, Onyama from Nigeria, and Petren from Sweden) (on file with author).
33. See Argentina in LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL REPORT, LAPR XI, 48, Dec. 9,
1977 (on file with author).
34. See Associated Press, Argentina Approves Treaty to Settle Dispute with Chile,
Dec. 29, 1984 (on file with author).
35. See John Reichertz, Pope Commemorates Major Diplomatic Victory in South
America, Apr. 1, 1987 (on file with author).
36. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,172 (1951) (J.
Frankfurter, concurring) (observing that "so important to a popular government" is
sentiment "that justice has been done").
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Both the Papal office and the United States judiciary claim to
have the moral and legal authority to settle disputes. They both
call for people to build links of mediation that will consciously re-
assert values to reinforce peace.37 The values that religion asserts
to reinforce peace are a reframing of the dispute from individual
loss or gain to reparation of a disorder and teachings on compas-
sion and forgiveness of one's opponent. Tapping into the religious
motivation to create these links provides a possibility for lay per-
son 38 led expansion of mediation. 39 However, both institutions
share three similar problems: (1) the requirement of a significant
expenditure of money to gain access to the highest court; (2) an
assumption that parties share faith in the larger institution (United
States courts and the Pope) in order to accomplish a mutually ac-
ceptable determination of justice;40 and (3) the incapability of set-
tling the worrisome number of increasing disputes.41
B. Historical Analysis of the Religious Roots of Mediation in
the United States
A closer look at the history of mediation in the United States
illustrates that using religious motivations to achieve mediation set-
tlements is not a novelty. Native Americans, for example, were
well-versed in mediation. Traditional Navajo common law fostered
37. See, e.g., NEGOTIATION, infra note 41, at 13; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW 115-37 (1983) (tracing the mediation/arbitration movement in the
United States); THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(R. Abel ed. 1982); Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adminis-
tration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); but see Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Land-
scape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 7 (1983) (dis-
cussing the fact that "we are the most litigious people in the world").
38. I refer to "lay" in both senses of the term, i.e. non-ordained and not legally
trained.
39. See JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 29 (1984) (presenting a me-
diation guide for lay and lawyer mediators).
40. See Robert N. Wilentz, Chief Justice Swearing-In Ceremony For Justice James
H. Coleman, Jr., 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1173 (1997) (lamenting that African-Americans
among other minorities do not have confidence in the U.S. judicial system. Justice
Coleman says he looks forward to day when this will change); see also King & Le
Forestier, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
41. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982) (not-
ing overcrowded case docket of U.S. judges); JOHN PAUL II, NEGOTIATION: THE
ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION 13 (1982) (observing that, internationally, an increase of
armaments production has been accompanied by a decrease in ethical principles of
goodness, friendship and love, rendering dispute resolution an insurmountable task).
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a system of justice based on a variety of spiritual values, including
clan relations, equality, freedom, responsibility, harmony, main-
taining a good reputation, respect, and an emphasis on making vic-
tims whole.4 z
The early Puritan, Quaker and Dutch settlers employed media-
tion, arbitration and conciliation as a means of ensuring conformity
to community norms, and resorted to the legal system only as a last
resort.43 In the nineteenth century, Mormons, as well as Chinese
and Jewish immigrants, developed their own community dispute-
resolution mechanisms as a reaction to perceived hostility from the
broader society." Indeed, the Chinese who immigrated to the
United States brought an ancient tradition of mediation with
them.45 Up until World War II, the Chinese mediated disputes
through the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association,46 an
organization that appealed to the traditional Chinese values of har-
mony in family, clan and village during mediation. 47
Immediately after World War I, when secular courts in Europe
were inhospitable, the Jewish community brought a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism from Europe to the United States.48 Today mem-
bers of the Jewish community continue the practice of submitting
commercial disputes to a rabbinical mediator selected by the dis-
42. See Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions and Fairness in the Navajo National
Code of Judicial Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15 (June-July 1992) (embodying Navajo
Nation's Code of Judicial Conduct adopted on November 1, 1992 based on a system
which has been in use for 100 years and which in turn is based on traditions observed
by the tribe for centuries before).
43. See Corinne Cooper, Justice Without Law? A Search Through History for
Contemporary Solutions, 48 ALBANY L. REV. 741 (1984) (tracing the use of religious
fora for dispute resolution).
44. See id.
45. See Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1966) (describing how Chinese immigrants to the United
States brought ancient Confucian principles of mediation).
46. See AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 73-76 (describing Chinese use of mediation
from their arrival to United States until World War II when the traditional controls
began to crumble and state courts were more popular to break from Chinese
strongmen).
47. See id. at 73.
48. See id.; see also AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 76-94 (tracing the use of Jewish
Administrative Courts as a means of dispute resolution).
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puting parties,49 provided that all parties to the dispute are willing
to accept rabbinic authority as binding.50
]H. THE APPLICATION OF RELIGION IN MEDIATION TODAY
The religious and spiritual pedigree of mediation is quite exten-
sive, and the practice of using spiritual aspects of mediation still
continues. Recently, the Christian Conciliation Service ("C.C.S.")
established offices to train and provide church mediators for per-
sonal disputes. 51 According to the C.C.S., the purpose of media-
tion is to glorify God through love of one's neighbor and to help
disputing parties learn how to change attitudes and behavior so as
to avoid similar conflicts in the future.52 In addition, the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of New York is in the process of establishing
a mediation center for Catholics to settle their disputes outside of
court.5 3
The Mennonite Conciliation Service avoids denominational ap-
proaches to mediations. Rather, the goal for Mennonites is to es-
tablish proper relationships "that honor mutual human worth, that
redress past wrong as far as injuries are able to be redressed, and in
which steps have been taken so that neither fear nor resentment
play dominant roles."54
There is a troublesome history of using religious and spiritual
traditions to oppress.55 However, if the oppressive nature which
created problems can be avoided, employing religious values to en-
courage settlement can be beneficial. Mediators may increase pos-
itive results in conflict resolution if they re-frame the differences of
the disputing parties in terms of shared values. These shared val-
ues have two sources: (1) the commonly shared values found in
49. See Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, 314 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1970) (resolving a dis-
pute among stockholders of a closed corporation, the parties signed an agreement to
submit themselves to a decision of a named rabbi who was entitled to constitute a
tribunal with two other rabbis and to consult with an attorney).
50. See AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 89 (noting that Jewish mediation committees
are gaining new popularity).
51. O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MARITAL MEDIATIONS (1978).
52. See INSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, CHRISTIAN COALITION HAND-
BOOK 15 (rev. 3.2 1994).
53. See ARCHDIOCESE OF NEw YORK, MEDIATION RULES AND GUIDELINES § 103
(1993).
54. See John P. Lederach & Ron Kraybill, The Paradox of Popular Justice: A
Practitioner's View, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF
COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 357, 361 (Sally E. Merry & Neal
Milner eds., 1993).
55. See supra note 46.
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society as a whole, including, fair play, restrictions on unjust en-
richment and equity; and (2) religious values (our concern here),
including love of neighbor, a belief in an ultimate reckoning, and
personal sacrifice.56 It is important to note that religious values
and other commonly shared values are not mutually exclusive. 7 A
mediator can strategically present values as either commonly
shared or religious, depending on how the parties identify their
value orientation. 8
HI. RELIGION AS PART OF A BROAD STRATEGY To
PROMOTE SETTLEMENT
When using spiritual traditions as a motivation to settle disputes,
the mediator must use broad goals and strategies.5 9 A narrow goal
of mediation is to arrive at a settlement based on the claim as
brought by the claimant, usually a dollar sum.6' This approach uses
the likely court decision as a criteria.61 A broader goal, however,
addresses more personal issues, such as the animosity the parties
may feel towards each other, or the possible loss of self esteem if
one of the parties settles.62 More explicitly spiritual, the personal
issues to be addressed as goals of mediation include moral growth,
the ability to forgive,6 3 love of one's neighbor,64 empathy65 and in-
creasing the inter-connectedness of all of humanity.66
For court-based mediation, the parties should receive notice of
the mediator's option of employing a religious-based mediation.
This can be accomplished in several ways. One is to present the
option of using a religious context as a re-framing device to the
parties at some point during the mediation. This may be done
56. See Cynthia A. Savage, Culture and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 269 (1996).
57. See, e.g., Bernard Haring, Ten Commandments, in 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 7 (1967) (illustrating that the Ten Commandments were largely based upon
commonly held values in the Ancient Near East); see also Kenneth Pennington, The
Spirit of Legal History, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1997) (discussing how develop-
ment of codified law in Europe relied upon Code of Canon Law).
58. See Savage, supra note 56, at 292.
59. See Riskin, supra note 4, at 17 (providing a grid for a mediator to access her
mediation).
60. See id.
61. See id. at 19.
62. See id. at 20.
63. See Kenneth Cloke, Revenge, Forgiveness, and the Magic of Mediation, 11 ME-
DIATION Q. 67, 67 (1993).
64. See INSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, supra note 52, at 7.
65. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 26, at 81-112.
66. See Zumeta, supra note 26, at 25-26.
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within various re-framing options: an on-going relationship be-
tween the parties; a reputation that the parties maintain within the
community; or the time required to receive a hearing by the judge.
Another way is through self disclosure on the part of the mediator.
Mediators may share personal religious beliefs with the parties and
then reflect with them on the impact of religious beliefs on this
mediation. This religious reflection, however, should go to the reli-
gious beliefs of the parties rather than those of the mediator.
These options would need to be discussed beforehand with the of-
ficers of the court.
Both the narrow and broad mediation strategies influence the
outcome of the settlement.67 A narrow strategy ascertains and
evaluates the facts of the case, and applies the mediator's knowl-
edge of how courts resolve this type of case. 68 A broader strategy,
on the other hand, invites the parties to explore their own beliefs
and behaviors that facilitate settlement.69 This strategy would as-
sist the parties in determining the underlying issues in their dispute,
as well as provide opportunities to change themselves, their institu-
tions, and their communities.7 °
When St. Francis of Assisi mediated between the Mayor and
Bishop of Assisi he used a broad goal and broad strategy of media-
tion.7' His goal was to bring peace to Assisi and not simply to
reach monetary agreement.72 St. Francis' strategy was broad in
that it led the parties to consider a larger context within which to
frame their dispute: the ordered creation surrounding the dispu-
tants.73 As such, the parties were inspired to locate a different mo-
tivation to settle other than a higher monetary sum.
74
IV. RELIGIOUS MOTIVATIONS TO SETTLE
In early American history, harmony and the protection of group
identity provided the motivation for parties to settle a dispute.75
Today, if the dispute is inter-cultural, the mediator's challenge is to
find common ground between the disputing parties in order to ar-
67. See Riskin, supra note 4, at 24-34 (evaluating four categories of mediation
techniques and strategies and their potential influence and goals on case settlement).
68. See id. at 27-28, 33.
69. See id. at 24.
70. See id. at 32.
71. See FRANCIS & CLARE, supra note 2, at 37-39 and accompanying text.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 745-746 and accompanying text.
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rive at a settlement. A court does not provide a common ground.
It simply applies a supposedly neutral criteria for settling disputes,
where one party loses and the other wins. Spiritual values, how-
ever, create the possibility of providing a common ground upon
which disputing parties may be motivated to settle their dispute
through mediation.
The following are three scenarios where spiritually-based moti-
vation for settlement would be appropriate: (1) a dispute within a
culture; (2) a dispute between institutional bodies whose spiritual
values are either non-existent or unspoken; and (3) a dispute be-
tween two cultures.76 Each case will employ a broad strategy
paradigm.
1. Jewish Booth Renter v. Jewish Convention Corp.
The claimant brings this suit to recover rental fee from the de-
fendant claiming that the defendant prohibited the claimant
from distributing the claimant's propaganda in violation of pre-
vious agreements where claimant had rented the booth space
and was allowed to disperse propaganda. The claimant alleges
that this censorship was specific to the claimant's political beliefs
in that other booth renters were allowed to disperse their propa-
ganda. The Defendant alleges that the contract neither states
nor implies that booth renters may distribute propaganda. Fur-
thermore, the defendant alleges that if other organizations did
distribute propaganda, they did so out of area where the defend-
ant had control. Both parties agree that it is the content of the
claimant's propaganda that makes this dispute so insoluble
outside of court.
At first, reading this hypothetical could indicate that religious
values only serve to complicate objective mediation processes, and
show that entering the quagmire of religious dispute is entering a
futile, no-win mediation. A narrow goal, fee resolution, and a nar-
row strategy, a close look at the contract and the possibility of im-
plied obligations, seems to be in order. And yet it is possible that
religious values could help resolution by offering a broader goal, a
sharing of Jewish values of community and justice, and a broader
strategy, asking the parties to empathize with each other's shared
belief system.
76. These hypotheticals are based on actual cases mediated by the author in Man-
hattan Small Claims Court, which are on file with the author.
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The first possibility is to ask the parties if they know of function-
ing Jewish mediation committees.77 Assuming that the religious
differences of the parties would prevent them from having recourse
to a Jewish mediation court, a mediator could explore the parties'
understanding of how their own deeply held religious beliefs could
help settle disputes.
Before exploring the intricacies of how a Jewish mediation court
may solve the dispute, it would be helpful to explore the communal
experience of being Jewish to elicit a measure of empathy between
the parties.78 This empathy could be further explored by the medi-
ator directing questions to tap into the Jewish understanding of
community. 79 If the mediator is not Jewish, this might be explored
by having both parties describe commonly accepted Jewish beliefs
on peace and justice. The common Jewish tradition holds the pos-
sibility of re-framing the parties' dispute from the religious/political
dispute to religious teachings on making peace with one's sister or
brother.80
2. Hospital v. Insurance Company
A hospital claims that an insurance company implicitly gave per-
mission for the hospital to authorize medical examination by ap-
proving a primary physician who only uses this type of medical
examination. The hospital alleges that the insurance company
knew of the primary physician's exclusive use of this examina-
tion. The insurance company claims that the policy with the
hospital clearly prohibits the use of non-explicitly approved
medical tests.
This hypothetical appears to offer a case that is void of any spiri-
tual or religious tradition. The only viable option is identifying a
narrow goal-whether the defendant/Insurance Company should
pay the plaintiff/Hospital for services provided, and pursue a nar-
row strategy- to explore the insurance policy and past behavior of
the hospital with the insurance company. However, larger values
may be operative. Perhaps both parties may be angry by the
other's behavior in addressing the matter.
Assuming that the two parties must work together closely for
years, broader goals of mending the relationship would be helpful.
77. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
78. See AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 86.
79. See id. at 79 (describing the Jewish value of community as kehillah derived
from European institutions).
80. Id. at 89.
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The ideals of community and creating order, effective in non-cor-
porate disputes, may be translated into establishing a broader goal
that both parties maintain a good public reputation. The broad
strategy to achieve this goal would be to direct questions for the
parties to explore their mission statements. More value-based
statements are often found in a corporation's mission statement.
Such statements have the potential to re-frame the dispute from
maximum profits to promote healing, for the Hospital, and to help
people feel secure for the Insurance Company. In either case,
broadening the goals and strategies of the mediation allows for
more transcendent values to enter the process and increases the
possibility of the parties finding common ground. This hypotheti-
cal provides an illustration of how commonly held values, derived
from religion or secular society, may be employed to help resolve a
dispute.
3. Presbyterian Client v. Catholic Owned Moving Company
The defendant owns a moving van company which offers serv-
ices to clients on a one-to-one basis at set rates. The plaintiff
claims that the defendant scratched the plaintiff's furniture and
stained the plaintiff's couch after agreeing to an insurance policy
which guarantees full replacement on any injured materials.
The plaintiff is suing for full re-purchase value of the couch. The
defendant concedes that an insurance policy was agreed upon
with plaintiff but the full replacement value was only guaranteed
for such incidents as the destruction of the truck during the
move, not incidental damages. After extended negotiations, the
defendant makes what both parties seem to agree is a reason-
able offer. However, the plaintiff refuses to settle, because he
claims it is "God's law" that damages should be repaid.
This case presents a clash of cultural and class values. The de-
fendant is a Dominican Catholic who lives in the Bronx, and the
plaintiff is a White Presbyterian who lives in Westchester. The
Plaintiff, relying on God's law not to settle, presents a strong case
for the argument that religious values impede settlement. Follow-
ing a narrow goal in the form of a settlement sum, a narrow strat-
egy and explaining the agreement once again appears to be the
most prudent option in pursuing the meditation.
However, the plaintiff's beliefs will not dissipate merely because
the mediation process claims religious neutrality. The mediator
could help the parties identify broader goals, such as learning how
to change attitudes and behavior in order to avoid similar conflicts
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in the future.8' Perhaps the mediator could suggest a broader strat-
egy of mediation by directing both parties to explore 'God's law' as
love of neighbor.82 Through discussing shared religious beliefs,
they might build consensus and lower the "God's law" barrier to
settlement.
With either of these alternatives, raising a religious factor would
not be the death blow to mediation. In fact, an honestly stated
religious belief may provide an opportunity for the parties to
achieve greater mutual understanding. The plaintiff could explain
that "God's Law" for him meant that those who damage other peo-
ple's goods should make full restitution of damaged goods.83 After
a similar discussion of who wronged who, the religious discussion
might incorporate their shared Christian values, in which they may
discover that their greatest commandment is to love one another.
84
Though this religious discussion does not guarantee a negotiated
settlement, it would foster mutual understanding which is a goal of
mediation.
CONCLUSION
Religious authority has a long history of promoting mediation.
Since the Middle Ages, Papal mediation, relying upon shared reli-
gious values, has advanced settlements among intransigent parties.
However, Papal mediation was only accessible to the highest eche-
lons of society. The Friars Minor popularized and broadened the
use of mediation. Presently, United States courts are facing over-
crowded dockets, time and expense of litigation, and the reality
that the justice system is most easily accessible to the privileged in
society.
Value-based mediation presents a vehicle to popularize and
broaden the use of mediation. Mediation in the United States has
roots in religious identity emphasizing values such as stepping into
the shoes of your adversary,85 and assuring peace in the commu-
81. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Numbers 5:7, REVISED STANDARD VERSION OF THE BIBLE ("[t]he
person shall make full restitution for the wrong, adding one fifth to it, and giving it to
the one who was wronged.").
84. See John 13:24 (Jesus decreeing that "I give you a new commandment, that
you love one another. Just as I have loved you, you also should love one another.").
85. See Tso, supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing Native American
use of mediation in legal codes).
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nity.86 Since World War II, religious groups have proceeded to set
up mediation centers in order to mediate disputes from an explic-
itly religious context. 87 Mediation provides an opportunity to em-
ploy religious values as a positive force toward reconciliation, thus
continuing an unbroken tradition of using shared transcendent val-
ues to motivate settlement. This reconciliation is characterized by
inner peace of the parties. 8 Thus, it is only natural that we return
to these roots in the ongoing development of mediation in the
United States legal culture.
86. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing various communities
in the new world preferring mediation rather then resorting to legal system in order to
preserve unity).
87. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing various religious
groups offering mediation).
88. See supra note 7 (defining reconciliation).
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INTERNATIONAL DEBT FORGIVENESS AND
GLOBAL POVERTY REDUCTION
Chantal Thomas*
The crushing debt burden of the world's poorest countries
threatens not just basic dignity but life itself. According to the
United Nations Hunger Project, thousands of people die each day
from hunger, on average one person every 3.6 seconds.' According
to the Institute for Food and Development Policy, ten percent of
those hunger-related deaths are from war; ninety percent are from
simple malnutrition.2
World poverty is a crisis of global dimensions that must be laid
alongside peacekeeping and human rights as a challenge that the
international community has an obligation to address. The interna-
tional debt crisis has played a critical role in entrenching and pro-
longing global poverty. This Essay argues for an expansion of
coordinated international effort, bolstered by fundamental princi-
ples of public international law, to address global poverty by sub-
stantially reducing the foreign-denominated debt owed by
developing-country governments to industrialized-country govern-
ments, private banks and international financial institutions. This
Essay will first describe the international debt crisis, and then con-
sider the moral, economic, political and legal bases for interna-
tional debt forgiveness. Finally, this Essay will discuss what is
being done, and propose what needs to be done in the future.
I. THE DIMENSIONS OF DEBT
The debt burden borne by developing countries totals over $2
trillion.3 Among indebted developing countries, the debt burden is
particularly severe, not surprisingly, for the least developed coun-
tries. The World Bank and IMF have identified forty "heavily in-
debted poor countries" ("HIPCs") - countries at the bottom end
of the world's wealth spectrum, with per capita incomes of just a
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See Peter Uvin, The State of World Hunger, in THE HUNGER REPORT: 1998 3
(Ellen Messer & Peter Uvin eds.).
2. See id. at 5.
3. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 196 (1999) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
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few hundred dollars a year.4 The debt burden of these forty coun-
tries is just ten percent of the total for the developing world -
about $200 billion - but for these countries in particular, the bur-
den is unsustainable one.5
To explain the dimensions of the debt crisis in more concrete
terms: Two trillion dollars is a little over one-fifth of annual U.S.
economic output, which is about $9 trillion.6 HIPC debt is 2.2% of
annual U.S. economic output. It is about one-eighth or 12.5% of
the U.S. federal budget; about 80% of the annual Department of
Defense budget,7 and about half of annual expenditure on Social
Security.8
The debt burden is directly related to world hunger and poverty
because debtor governments must divert precious and scarce re-
sources to paying down external debt instead of meeting the press-
ing needs of their population. For the poorest countries, the debt
burden is about $5 billion each. This amounts to about 0.3% of
U.S. federal budget, and .05%, or one-half of one-thousandth of
U.S. annual economic output. The same $5 billion in debt, how-
ever, constitutes an average 125% of annual GDP of each of these
countries. 9
Thus, external debt for these countries is an overwhelming bur-
den that takes resources away from populations already in very
dire straits. According to recent reports by Oxfam, the United Na-
tions Children's Fund ("UNICEF") and the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme ("UNDP"), about half of all households in
these countries lack access to safe water and sanitation.10 Average
life expectancy is fifty-one years, or twenty-six years less than in
industrialized countries. Life expectancy in many countries is actu-
ally declining, due in part to epidemic levels of the HIV virus.
There is one doctor for every 7700 people on average, about
4. See World Bank, Global Development Finance 1999 (External Debt Summary
Indicators) (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/debt-table/
debt-table.html>.
5. See id.
6. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 132
(1999).
7. The U.S. federal budget was $1.65 trillion in 1998. See Executive Office of the
President of the United States, Budget of the U.S. Government: Fiscal Year 2000, at
365. The Department of Defense spent $260 billion in 1998. See id.
8. See id. at 253.
9. See World Bank, Global Development Finance 1999, supra note 4.
10. See UNICEF & OXFAM, DEBT RELIEF AND POVERTY REDUCTION: MEETING
THE CHALLENGE 2.1 (1999).
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twenty times worse than industrialized country average." The av-
erage literacy rate for the poorest countries is thirty-five percent,
with over one-third of the population not reaching grade five.12
Despite the dire health needs and educational plight of the pop-
ulation, debtor governments spend more on debt payments than on
health and education. In most of the HIPCs, more than one-fifth
of the limited public revenue is being diverted to debt repay-
ments.13 Yet expenditure on health and education is under ten per-
cent on average. 4 A recent joint report by UNICEF and Oxfam
conveyed the dire consequences of this dilemma:
Countries such as Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Niger and
Tanzania are spending $3-$6 per capita a year on their health
systems, which is insufficient to finance a package of basic
health interventions. Yet each of these countries spends more
than double on debt servicing what is spent on primary health
care. In Zambia - where infant mortality rates are increasing,
over half a million children are out of school, and illiteracy is
rising - debt servicing claims more of the national budget than
health and education combined.' 5
In Zambia, per capita income is $250. The debt burden is $750 per
person - three times per capita income. 16
Of the amount repaid, less than half goes to paying principal -
most goes to paying interest, so that the debt burden decreases
only very slowly over time. In sum, debtor governments are caught
in a cycle that they cannot break without debt reduction. There are
moral, economic, political and even legal reasons for an interna-
tional effort to relieve this burden.
H. THE ARGUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEBT FORGIVENESS
A. Moral Arguments
This Symposium on forgiveness in the law has extensively ad-
dressed the moral grounds for forgiveness .1 7 Forgiveness recog-
nizes the kinship of the human spirit - that there is a bond
between us that overrides material differences and inequalities.
11. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 173-75.
12. See id.
13. See UNICEF & OXFAM, supra note 10, 3.1.
14. See id.
15. Id. 3.2.
16. See id.
17. See Panel on Forgiveness and Justice, in Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in
the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347, 1367 (2000).
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This is one reason why religious groups have become strong ad-
vocates for international debt forgiveness. The Roman Catholic
Church has declared the year 2000 a Jubilee Year, invoking an an-
cient Hebrew tradition discussed in the Old Testament. According
to this tradition, "the Jubilee was a time to start over, to right old
wrongs, to reestablish justice and equity.' 18
However, the moral strength of this issue does not depend on
religious belief or denomination. A more secular basis is provided
by fundamental tenets of international human rights law: the prin-
ciple of universal human dignity, and the belief that human solidar-
ity requires action by all to ensure that the dignity of all is
recognized and protected.
One might protest that debt forgiveness is not morally preferable
because debtors should be held accountable for the debts they
have accrued. Yet the causes of the debt crisis are complex and
cannot be attributed solely to the debtors. Certainly, the crisis
arose in part from excessive borrowing, inefficient and ill-thought-
out economic policies and even corruption by debtor governments.
The most notorious example may be that of Mobutu Sese Seko of
the former Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo - Mobutu's
theft reportedly equaled all health and education expenditures of
that country.19
The behavior of debtor governments, however, was only one of
many causes of the debt crisis. Part of the problem was excessive
lending. Private banks, flush with petrodollars, were eager to re-
cycle them to debtor governments. Industrialized governments,
locked in a Cold War, were willing to lend money to corrupt and
totalitarian regimes to secure their political alliance. Mobutu ini-
tially helped to wrest power away from the democratically elected
prime minister Patrice Lumumba, with the support of the U.S. gov-
ernment, and secured his kleptocratic dictatorship with the support
of the West.
Part of the problem also lay with the vicissitudes of the interna-
tional economy, particularly the early 1980s. The bottom fell out of
the international market for the export crops many of these coun-
tries depended on, such as copper and coffee. This recession in
18. Address of Bishop John Glynn, US Catholic Conference, to Congress, Novem-
ber 4, 1999.
19. See Chantal Thomas, Does the "Good Governance Policy" of the International
Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of Democracy?, 14 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 551, 555 & n.21 (1999). Ferdinand Marcos became similarly infamous for his
colossal theft from the government of the Philippines.
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revenue-earning exports coincided with tight monetary policy of
the U.S. government that drove up loan interest rates and made
debt burdens particularly acute.
Thus, many dynamics interacted to produce the debt crisis. Even
if one could say debtor governments were entirely to blame, this
conclusion would not produce a morally valid reason to withhold
forgiveness. Forgiveness is the act of putting away and canceling
claims on one who has done wrong. It is invoked precisely when
the wrong done cannot be justified or excused. Moreover, insisting
that governments must be held accountable for all past debts is
meeting the wrong of excessive borrowing with another wrong,
that of making the people in these countries pay the price.
B. Economic Arguments
Debt repayment by very poor countries is an inefficient use of
global resources, for a very simple economic reason with a fancy
name, called the diminishing marginal utility of money.
The general principle of diminishing marginal utility says the
more you have of a particular thing, the less value you're going to
attach to each additional increment of that thing.20 The diminish-
ing marginal utility of money is an extension of that principle: be-
yond a certain level of income, one experiences decreasing (though
positive) increments of well-being from successive incremental in-
creases in income. This is one of the principles on which progres-
sive income tax systems are based - it's a simple economic
argument for redistribution.
In the international debt forgiveness scenario, if the U.S. econ-
omy grows by one-half of one-thousandth of a percent, it won't
change things in the U.S. much. By contrast, in the world's poorest
countries, the same amount could wipe out the debt and build a
basis on which to begin making essential steps toward meeting ba-
sic human needs.
This redistributive argument seems particularly apropos at a
time when the industrialized world is in the throes of unprece-
dented expansion. The United States is experiencing the longest
peacetime economic expansion on record. Private lenders are ben-
efiting from the bull market. Citibank, for example, earned eighty-
six percent more than it did last year, and the annual profits (i.e.
20. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS 98-100 (1998).
To take a somewhat frivolous example, even if you happen to be a maniac for choco-
late chip cookies, you would not appreciate the hundredth cookie as much as the first.
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net, not gross, revenues) of Citigroup alone would pay off over
one-quarter of the debt of the heavily indebted poor countries.21
Debt reduction, then, is crucial to the development of poor
countries. Without the basic conditions necessary for the people of
these countries to survive, let alone thrive, the crucial human capi-
tal that they bring to development process will remain largely
untapped.
Many have also argued that debt reduction is in the economic
interests of the Western world. Debt repayment is critical to en-
abling economic development, and economic development opens
up places for Western actors to do business with. The Clinton Ad-
ministration recognized this in its initiative related to debt relief,
particularly in its trade and aid with Africa initiative. From this
perspective, the debt burden is a dead weight on the global
economy.
C. Political Arguments
Debt forgiveness is also in the political interests of the world. In
fact, it is critical to ensuring political security and international
peace. The United Nations Security Council made headlines re-
cently when it declared that the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the devel-
oping world constituted a threat to international security. United
States Vice President Al Gore stated in his opening address to the
Security Council that "the number of people who will die of AIDS
in the first decade of the 21st century will rival the number that
died in all of the wars in all of the decades of the 20th century. 22
And yet, as noted above, many heavily indebted governments have
had to cut back on health services in order to service external debt.
A population decimated and destabilized by disease is vulnerable
to strife and unrest. Severe poverty does create political risk.
The political legitimacy of the current order is undermined when
the world's powers stand by and allow the world's poor to suffer
and even to die. Conversely, the political legitimacy of the current
order is reinforced when the world's powers join the world's poor
in partnership. The United States government realized this with
the Marshall Plan and its other generous initiatives to rebuild Eu-
rope and Japan after World War II.
21. Heidi Miller, Citigroup Fourth Quarter 1999 Review 3, 11 (Jan. 18, 2000).
22. Address by United States Vice President Albert Gore to the United Nations
Security Council, January 10, 2000.
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D. Legal Arguments
Debt forgiveness is a crucial component in securing international
prosperity and international peace - it is a challenge for the inter-
national order. As such, it is a challenge for international law. The
current principles of international law represent the beginnings for
progressive development of an international legal system to ad-
dress state insolvency.
For example, numerous international human rights documents
affirm the principle of human dignity. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the founding declaration of principles for the
modern international human rights law framework, recognizes in
its first sentence that the "inherent dignity ... of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world."23 Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights grants all people the "right of self-determina-
tion" which includes the right to "freely pursue their economic, so-
cial and cultural development, ' 24 and states that "[in] no case may
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. '25
These general principles of human dignity and self-determina-
tion are complemented by principles that have emerged with do-
mestic legal systems specific to bankruptcy. According to
international law doctrine, general principles of domestic legal sys-
tems offer a basis on which to derive norms of international law.26
The principle of forgiveness in bankruptcy law seems to be well-
established in this regard.
Indeed, domestic legal systems cause one to wonder about the
possibility of establishing an international insolvency regime. In-
ternational adjudicative bodies are growing and becoming stronger
all the time: the International Court of Justice; the WTO; the In-
ternational Criminal Court; and European Union courts. A multi-
lateral forum for the management of state insolvency deserves
consideration.
HI. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE
Among the poorest countries, the main creditors are industrial-
ized-country governments and international financial institutions
("IFIs").
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly
Res. 217A(111), Dec. 10, 1948.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, cl.1 (1966).
25. See id. at cl. 2.
26. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (1924).
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The HIPC Initiative was established in 1996 as a joint program
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is
conditional on agreement by debtor countries to a series of deep-
reaching economic reforms, often called "structural adjustment."
The HIPC initiative is intended to provide some relief for heavily
indebted poor countries that followed IMF and World Bank policy
advice but have not reached "debt sustainability," defined by the
IMF and the Bank as 200 to 250% of annual export earnings.27 A
heavily indebted country can qualify if it has been unable to relieve
its debt burden through existing debt relief mechanisms, and if it
has a track record of implementing the economic and social re-
forms suggested by the IMF and World Bank. The program is di-
vided into two stages of three years. In the first three years, a
country establishes a record of implementing reforms. In the next
three years, the IFIs work together with the country's creditors to
allow the country to exit from unsustainable debt at the end of that
period, or the "completion point." Multilateral creditors reduce
their debt burden by up to eighty percent. To date, four countries
(Uganda, Bolivia, Guyana and Mozambique) have completed this
debt reduction and are receiving funds totaling 2.8 net-present-
value ("NPV") billion ($5 billion as dispersed). Seven countries
have agreed on debt reduction packages (Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Cote d'Ivoire, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique and Uganda), totaling
3.4 billion NPV (6.8).
In June 1999, the G-8 group (US, Canada, German, UK, France,
Japan, Italy, plus Russia) of industrialized countries meeting in Co-
logne proposed a "Cologne Debt Initiative" accelerating the HIPC
initiative. Under this initiative, total debt relief available would
rise from $55 billion to $100 billion. Creditor governments would
agree to reduce their debt by up to 100%, up from eighty percent.
The Cologne Initiative shortens the time frame for relief from six
years to three years.
There has also been some bilateral debt reduction by creditor
governments. In November of 1999, for example, President Clin-
ton signed into law a debt relief directive 28 that cancels almost one
hundred percent owed to the U.S. by the poorest countries and
appropriates $110 million in debt relief in 2000.
27. See Axel van Trotsenburg & Alan MacArthur, The HIPC Initiative Delivery
Debt Relief to Poor Countries 1-2 (joint paper of the IMF and World Bank, Feb.
1999).
28. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501, 1501A-311 - 1501A-318 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 262, 286 (2000)).
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IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The IMF and World Bank HIPC addresses only a fraction of all
developed countries. Moreover, the Cologne Initiative to improve
it has not been clearly operationalized. Oxfam and UNICEF be-
lieve the debt sustainability definition used under the HIPC initia-
tive allows debt burden still too high to allow a country to meet the
basic needs of its population. Traditional critique of IMF and
World Bank measures, which is that they often require fiscal disci-
pline by the government that hurts the population and proves
counterproductive, remains relevant. As a result of instructions to
cut back on budgetary expenditures, for example, health clinics are
cut in countries where health problems are already dire. This ar-
guably is a backwards way of going about the issue, simply ensur-
ing that the problems the government has to meet will be much
worse by the time money is freed up to address them.
The IMF and World Bank have not been as sensitive to pressing
debt need in other circumstances: e.g., Hurricane Mitch, a devas-
tating hurricane in Central America that left thousands dead and
homeless. IMF and World Bank did not participate in a morato-
rium on debt payments agreed by lender governments, so that in
the midst of their attempts to deal with Hurricane Mitch, these two
governments had to pay the IMF and World Bank $1 million a day.
IMF is considering re-evaluating its gold reserves, which would
free up to $1 billion dollars, and is considering using some portion
of that for debt relief. Governments must also increase bilateral
debt relief. The Hope for Africa Act of 199929 currently in the
Senate Finance Committee, provides trade, aid and debt relief for
Sub-Saharan African countries, nearly all of whom are HIPCs. Fi-
nally, debt reduction by private creditors is a critical part of the
puzzle. Ultimately, both a coordinated international response to
the debt emergency and a longer-term solution are necessary.
29. S. 1636, 106th Cong. (introduced Sept. 24, 1999); see also H.R. 772, 106th
Cong. (introduced Feb. 23, 1999). The Hope for Africa bill was originally introduced
by Rep. Jesse Jackson, D-Ill., as an alternative to H.R. 434, the "African Growth and
Opportunity Act." The "Hope for Africa" bill offers expanded trade provisions and
incorporating labor and environmental concerns. See 145 Cong. Rec. S11,877 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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INTERNATIONAL DEBT FORGIVENESS
ORGANIZATIONS AND CONTACTS
Oxfam
http://www.oxfam.org
http://www.oxfam.org/advocacy/papers.htm
The Jubilee 2000 Coalition
http://www.jubilee2000uk.org
National Conference of Catholic Bishops/United States Catholic
Conference
http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/international/debtindex.htm
World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/
The Hunger Site
http://www.thehungersite.com
Your Congressperson(s):
Get contact info at:
http://www.house.gov/writerep and http://www.senate.gov
For local residents:
Representative Jerrold Nadler,
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510-3201
(202) 225-5635
jerrold.nadler@mail.house.gov
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-3201
(202) 224-4451
Senator@dpm.senate.gov
Pending U.S. Legislation: H.R. 772; S. 1636 ("Hope for Africa Act")
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IS THERE A PLACE FOR FORGIVENESS IN
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM?
Everett L. Worthington, Jr.*
Transgressions unbalance the scales of justice, socially, emotion-
ally, and sometimes politically. Unforgiveness can be seen as a set
of "cold" emotions involving resentment, bitterness, hostility, an-
ger, etc. that occur after ruminating about the transgression. Peo-
ple reduce unforgiveness in many ways. Justice reduces
unforgivingness by balancing the social - and to some extent emo-
tional - books. Forgiveness involves super-imposing emotions of
empathy, compassion and other-oriented altruistic love (or even
romantic love) on top of "hot" anger at the transgression or "cold"
unforgiveness emotions. Justice involves social processes, while
forgiveness occurs within individuals, even though social processes
may hinder or facilitate forgiveness. Yet, there is a place for for-
giveness in the justice system, but it is in the background rather
than foreground.
There is something deep within almost every person that desires
justice. Our spirits rail against unfairness and inequity. Unfortu-
nately for most people, this deep-seated desire for justice is virtu-
ally a one-way street. The outrage of injustice happens almost
exclusively when we are on the light end of the scales of justice -
when we see ourselves as the victim, the one transgressed against.
In those cases, we cry out for a balancing of the scales. We demand
justice.
There is something deep within almost every person that desires
love, mercy, and grace. Love, mercy and grace are closer to being
two-way streets than is justice. In a kind of "justice of love," we
are able to reciprocate love when we receive it, balancing the scales
of love. The marvel of humanity, however, is that we sometimes
are able to give love to those we do not think deserve love. To
make that miracle of love, grace, and mercy happen requires empa-
* Virginia Commonwealth University, Psychology Department Chair; Executive
Director, A Campaign for Forgiveness Research, 1998 to present; Private Practice of
Psychology (Counseling/Clinical), 1982 to present. Much of the research on which
this Essay is based was funded by a generous grant from the John Templeton Founda-
tion (the "Foundation"). Portions of this Essay were presented in an earlier form at a
conference sponsored by the Foundation and Harvard Kennedy School for Govern-
ment in October 1999.
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thy. We cannot meet the needs of others if we cannot empatheti-
cally experience what they experience.
A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
I must admit to you that this struggle between justice and love,
mercy and grace is not just of academic interest to me. Four years
ago, in a botched home burglary, some youths murdered my
mother, bludgeoning her with a crowbar.
At the beginning, I felt the rage and hatred for the youths, which
you might expect. As I walked the floor late at night, fantasizing
about beating the offenders' brains out with a baseball bat, the
irony of having investigated forgiveness as a scientist, professed
forgiveness as a Christian, counseled forgiveness as a therapist, and
written of forgiveness as an author struck me. In fact, I had just
finished a book co-authored with two of my graduate students, To
Forgive Is Human,1 based on seven years of psychological research.
We described a five-step method of forgiving that centered on em-
pathy for the transgressor.2
As I began to apply the method we had found successful in
clinical research,3 I imagined the way a youth might feel who
planned a perfect robbery on New Year's eve. Suddenly, his careful
plans would have been destroyed when an old woman walked in
and caught him. He saw the certainty of jail flash before his eyes
and reached out in anger to beat back the threat to his future and
his happiness with a crowbar.
I could understand his motives and his feelings. Then I realized
that I had said aloud that I could beat this youth's brains out with a
baseball bat - to do to him what he had done to my mother. We
were the same at heart. Yet as a Christian, I knew I was forgiven
by God for my evil heart. Who, then, was I, to deny forgiveness to
the youth? I forgave.
1. MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH ET AL., To FORGIVE IS HUMAN: How TO PUT
YOUR PAST IN THE PAST (1997).
2. See Michael E. McCullough, et al., Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relation-
ships: II. Theoretical Elaboration and Measurement, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1586 (1998); see generally MCCULLOUGH ET AL., To FORGIVE IS HUMAN,
supra note 1.
3. See Michael E. McCullough & Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Promoting Forgive-
ness: The Comparison of Two Brief Psychoeducational Interventions with a Waiting-
List Control. 40 COUNSELING & VALUES 55 (1995); see also Everett L. Worthington,
Jr. et al., Forgiving Usually Takes Time: A Lesson Learned by Studying Group Inter-
ventions to Promote Forgiveness, 28 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 3-20 (2000).
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DEALING WITH CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND PERSONAL
TRANSGRESSIONS
Civil, criminal and personal transgressions occur within the jus-
tice system. Besides the societal issues involved in transgressions,
many parties experience unforgiveness. Below I define unforgive-
ness, forgiveness and reconciliation, and analyze the role of for-
giveness, if any, in the justice system.
Unforgiveness
Unforgiveness is defined as a complex of "cold" emotions in-
volving hatred, anger, resentment, bitterness, hostility and perhaps
fear. Those emotions arise from ruminating about the transgres-
sion and motivate a rapid reduction of unforgiveness.
A model of unforgiveness is embedded within this definition.4
Unforgiveness begins with a transgression.5 A person reacts with
"hot" emotions of anger and fear.6 Anger is experienced to the
extent that a person's sense of justice is perceived to be violated.7
Fear is experienced to the extent that the person is perceived to
have been hurt and is concerned about future harm.8 That anger
and fear are not unforgiveness. Unforgiveness occurs as a person
ruminates about the transgression and its consequences. 9 Over
time a sense of resentment, bitterness, hostility, hatred, anger and
fear, coalesce into a cold complex of emotions that we call un-
forgiveness. 10 Unforgiveness is an unpleasant state of affairs and
motivates people to reduce their unforgiveness. There are many
ways to reduce unforgiveness. Forgiveness is only one of those
ways.
I have summarized many of those ways elsewhere." Many ways
to reduce unforgiveness center around promoting different ways to
feel that justice has been served. These involve achieving success-
ful retaliation or revenge, which can reduce a person's desire for
retribution because the person believes that justice has occurred.
4. See fig. 1 infra p. 1734.
5. See id. box 1.
6. See id. box 3.
7. See id. box 2.
8. See id. box 2.
9. See id. box 4.
10. See id. box 5.
11. See Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Unforgiveness, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation
and Their Implications for Societal Interventions, in FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIA-
TION: RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Rodney Peterson &
Ray Helnick eds., in press).
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Other ways of recognizing that justice has been done, and reducing
unforgiveness, involve traditional punitive justice as well as restor-
ative justice.'2 If an offender makes fair restitution, the victim can
feel that justice has prevailed. Yet another way to believe that jus-
tice has or will be done is to hand the judgment over to God. This
can be done with a desire for seeing God's justice and punishment
poured out on the offender or it can be done as an act of faith,
trusting that God knows more about people's hearts than does the
person who is relinquishing judgment to God.
Forgiveness
As described in the lower part of Figure 1, forgiveness is an emo-
tional super-position or juxtaposition of different emotions onto
the emotional complex of unforgiveness. 13 Emotional attachments
to memories of transgressions prevent a person from ever exper-
iencing unforgiveness to the same intensity or in the same way
again 14 because unforgiveness is reduced 15 and forgiveness is
experienced.' 6
Forgiveness is an individual phenomenon in which emotions are
changed. Emotions involve not just feelings but also the person's
body, brain chemistry, hormones, behavior, and mental
processes. 7 It obviously matters what emotion is juxtaposed over
the cold emotions of unforgiveness. Forgiveness involves emotions
associated with love, empathy and compassion for the person who
has offended or transgressed against a victim. (Recall the empathy
I experienced for the murderer of my mother.) Forgiveness is fur-
thered by a sense of humility, which sees oneself as capable of per-
petrating great evils and harm to others, regardless of whether one
has ever actually perpetrated such harm. Forgiveness also involves
a sense of gratitude at having experienced forgiveness oneself for
having hurt others in the past. That sense of having been forgiven
can involve: (1) forgiveness by another person or, as in the case of
the murder of my mother; or (2) forgiveness by the Divine. So for-
giveness involves a complex of positive other-oriented emotions,
which contaminate the hot emotions springing from the transgres-
12. See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUS-
TICE (1995).
13. See fig. 1, infra p. 1734, box 6.
14. See id. box 7.
15. See id. box 8.
16. See id. box 9.
17. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND
EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 35-81 (1999).
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sion or the cold emotions of unforgiveness that arise out of rumi-
nating about hurts or offenses.
Reconciliation
Reconciliation restores trust in a relationship where such trust
has been violated by a transgression. Transgressions might be one-
sided or might have occurred on both sides. Reconciliation de-
pends on the trustworthy behaviors of both parties, not just the
granting of forgiveness. Reconciliation often, though not always,
involves a sincere and honest conversation about forgiveness. 18
This is because forgiveness is something within a person while rec-
onciliation is something between people. Forgiveness is something
granted to another person, reconciliation is something that people
work together to earn, 19 seeking forgiveness from a victim, expres-
sing forgiveness to an offender and accepting forgiveness that has
been offered are all part of reconciliation.2 °
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION
Humans see things through their own eyes. It takes a lot of ef-
fort and a certain amount of grace to be able to see things through
someone else's eyes.
So when we perceive that an injustice has been done to us, we
seek what is natural - repayment for that cost that we incurred,
whether we had lost a loved one, property, peace of mind, physical
well-being or emotional well-being.
In a two-party justice system consisting of offender and victim,
the problem of differing perspectives makes it virtually impossible
for both people to believe that justice has been done, that the
scales have been balanced. Vigilante justice is a desire to balance
the scales of justice on our own as an individual or group. But vigi-
lante justice is seldom perceived as just by both victim and of-
fender. We perceive wounds to ourselves as being more painful
than wounds we inflict to repay the transgression. In revenge, we
18. See Everett L. Worthington, Jr. & Dewitt T. Drinkard, Promoting Reconcilia-
tion through Psychoeducational and Therapeutic Interventions, 1 J. MARITAL & FAM.
THERAPY 93-101 (2000).
19. See Everett L. Worthington, Jr., The Pyramid Model of Forgiveness: Some
Interdisciplinary Speculations About Unforgiveness and the Promotion of Forgiveness,
in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND THEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 107-37 (Everett L. Worthington, Jr. ed., 1998).
20. See Robert D. Enright & the Human Development Study Group, Counseling
within the Forgiveness Triad: On Forgiving, Receiving Forgiveness, and Self-forgive-
ness, 40 COUNSELING & VALUES 107-26 (1996).
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typically repay more than we incurred. Vigilante justice leads to
escalation of hostilities.
Even civil or legal justice is often perceived inequitable. For ex-
ample, if an intruder breaks into my home and steals $1000 and
that intruder is apprehended, goes to court and is told to repay the
money, I still do not feel that justice has been served. True, I have
my $1000 back, but I have lost my sense of security, my trust in
human nature and even my belief in justice. To feel that the books
of justice have been balanced, I will want to be paid punitive dam-
ages - say one million dollars - which will ease the emotional
suffering that I have undergone).
On the other hand, when the perpetrator is apprehended and
forced to pay $1000, he might believe that justice has not been
served. After all, a lot of effort and energy went into planning the
burglary. The suffering and humiliation that the perpetrator has
experienced at the hands of the police and in the justice system is
certainly something that has put him or her at a social disadvantage
for the rest of his life. Being asked to repay the money adds insult
to injury and perpetuates a desire to commit additional crimes to
get the scales back into balance. If punitive damages are added on
top of the restoration of property, or if a jail sentence is added,
then the sense of injustice and unfairness felt by the burglar is fu-
eled even more deeply. The person becomes even more volatile
once restored to society.
The justice system understands that individual senses of justice
reveal individual perceptions. Therefore, the justice system estab-
lishes a third party who can arbitrate using a process that can be
accepted as fair.
THREE PARTIES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
When a crime or civil dispute occurs, three parties are involved:
(a) a victim and supporters of the victim; (b) an offender and sup-
porters of the offender; and (c) society, or two plaintiffs and soci-
ety. Each of those has different interests and all are involved in
resolving crimes and civil disputes justly. The justice system seeks
to balance the social scales. The concern has traditionally weighed
toward helping victims feel that the social scales are more balanced
by punishing offenders. However, mostly, in the traditional litiga-
tive justice system, the victim's emotional scales are ignored. At
best, it is assumed that rendering a fair verdict or judgment will
balance the emotional scales. As I have argued above, though, un-
forgiveness might persist.
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Unforgiveness might continue to torture the victim and create
costs to the victim that go beyond the crime itself. For example,
unforgiveness can result in decreases in health, troubled mental
health, and interpersonal costs due to chronic anger and
bitterness.2 '
There appear to be two ways that a victim can reduce her sense
of injustice and give up unforgiveness. The first is in some way to
see that the scales of justice become more balanced. The other is
to forgive. Pursuing justice seeks a reestablishment of a power.
The crime reduces the power and status of the victim. A victim's
sense of power can be reestablished through balancing the social
books (e.g., by restitution or incarceration of the offender) and bal-
ancing the emotional books (e.g., by seeing esteem lowering acts by
the offender or through publicly humiliating the offender). In
each, raising the esteem of the victim increases the victim's relative
power - either by seeking revenge or seeing the criminal
punished.
With forgiveness, the victim seems to be more motivated by love
for a needy offender than by asserting power relative to a formerly
powerful offender. Forgiveness is an altruistic gift to someone who
needs forgiveness to restore him or her to a position of moral par-
ity, whereas reducing unforgiveness through justice or vengeance is
aimed at either pulling down the offender from a pedestal or ele-
vating oneself above (or at lease equal to) the offender. In forgive-
ness there is a recognition, as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn remarked,
that every person is a mixture of good and evil and people cannot
destroy the evil with our hearts without also destroying the good.2
Offender
The offender has an important stake in the justice system. The
offender suffers a loss of esteem as well as potential penalties in-
cluding financial costs and incarceration. The offender will also
bear the stigma of having been convicted of a crime for the balance
of his or her life. The offender might or might not want to restore
what was taken from the victim in the course and aftermath of the
crime (e.g., property, psychological well-being and physical well-
being). The offender might or might not feel deserving of a verdict
21. See Carl E. Thoresen, et al, Forgiveness and Health: An Unanswered Question,
in FORGIVENESS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACrICE 254-280 (Michael E. McCul-
lough et al. eds., 2000).
22. See ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO: 1918-1956
(1985).
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that attempts to equalize suffering through incarceration of the of-
fender and punitive fines. As I illustrated earlier, victim and of-
fender will necessarily have different perceptions of what is needed
to fairly balance the scales, but both will be highly emotionally
involved.
Society
The third player in this triumvirate is society as represented by
the trier of fact, the jury, and the observing public. Society's main
interest traditionally has been in protecting the public, deterring
future crimes, and providing for a fair and equitable balancing of
the interests of victim and perpetrator to the extent possible. This
balances the social books. Generally, the role of society has been
more involved with conflict-resolution between offender and victim
than in restitution, healing, and reconciliation after the conflict has
been resolved. This balances the emotional books.
Yet, once society is involved, there is a third set of books to bal-
ance - the political books. Issues about forgiveness can work their
way into society's consciousness, particularly if some members of
society believe a verdict to be unjust. Notable examples of this are
the 0. J. Simpson and Rodney King verdicts, which displeased
some (perhaps most) members of society. In the Simpson case, the
legal system's differing verdicts in criminal and civil systems pro-
vided a way of resolving a conflict and rebalancing the political
books. The riots following the King verdict were vigilante attempts
to balance the political books.
BALANCING THREE SETS OF BOOKS
We have arrived at the need to balance three sets of books: so-
cial, emotional, and political. Our traditional justice system has
done a decent job (with some notable exceptions) of balancing the
social and political books. It has given little attention to the emo-
tional books. If anything, it is typically assumed that emotions are
private and should be dealt with privately. Traditional justice has
been conceived as impartial, and has been equated with being emo-
tion-free, or at least emotion-neutral.
Recall my mother's murder. I forgave the murder in my heart.
No one knew that. Yet I have now communicated my forgiveness
publicly (which is different from forgiving). Forgiveness is an in-
trapersonal act, but its communication is an interpersonal and per-
haps communal act. Those two ideas must be separated
conceptually even though they are obviously related to each other.
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Focusing on forgiveness simply as an intrapersonal event that has
no interpersonal or societal consequences is an inadequate total
picture.
Most people would probably concur that we want people to re-
duce their feelings of unforgiveness to the extent possible. In some
cases, this will be aided if we can talk openly about forgiving under
controllable circumstances. We have to consider also the conversa-
tion that occurs around forgiveness and provide a structured con-
versation around forgiveness.
Previously, the justice system has not had a conversation about
forgiveness. The rise of a victim's rights movement has brought the
victim into the societal picture. The restorative justice movement is
bringing society into the picture. Restorative justice is aimed not
just in punishing the offender but also in restoring the offender to
his or her community, and the victim to his or her community, by
providing a conversation within the community about crime and its
resolution.
A (RELATIVELY) NEW SYSTEM IN MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
A restorative justice movement is now being practiced in several
states.13 In that process, a person who has committed a crime is
brought in for face-to-face contact with the victim or the victim's
family. Third parties (i.e., representatives of society) are typically
present to ensure fairness. The perpetrator is allowed to confess
his or her guilt, express his or her regret, apologize and offer to
make restitution to restore the sense of fairness and justice within
the victim's social and personal world. While these expressions of
remorse and offers of restitution might trigger an experience of for-
giveness in the victim, the essence of this restorative justice move-
ment is to provide a kinder and gentler system of justice that will
meet people's desire for justice deep within, and will help promote
a restoration of the perpetrator to the community. Restorative jus-
tice, then, is not primarily about forgiveness. Rather, it is about a
form of justice that values reconciliation over retribution.
In restorative justice, victims and community representatives
want to see the offender feel and show remorse. They want to hear
a humble apology. Further, offenders (and community representa-
tives) want to know that a victim is willing to grant mercy. This is
justice, not forgiveness. It is aimed more at balancing emotional
and social books than at replacing unforgiveness with the empathy,
23. See ZEHR, supra note 12.
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love, and compassion of forgiveness. At best it is a severe mercy.
It is grudging forgiveness, which satisfies the grudge by helping the
victim feel free of hate and righteously magnanimous for granting
mercy.
Unrestrained forgiveness is something else. It is giving a gift of
grace not purchased by apology, repentance, and restitution -
though such actions might occur.
The justice system is not able to truly employ forgiveness to deal
with crimes. At best, it can attempt the severe mercy of restorative
justice. Forgiveness happens in the hearts of the victims, apart
from the ceremonies of restorative justice. Perhaps some people
forgive before the meetings. Perhaps restorative justice takes a per-
son one-mile down the hundred miles toward the eradication of
unforgiveness, perhaps ninety-nine miles. Then forgiveness com-
pletes the journey.
THE ROLES OF FORGIVENESS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Based on this analysis, you can probably see that I believe that
the justice system can be configured to help reduce unforgiveness
through the application of fair procedures and processes in which
members can feel some trust. In the justice system, the reduction of
unforgiveness and the balancing of social, political and emotional
books are more important than the promotion of forgiveness.
Hearing Testimony Can Produce Empathy
Nonetheless, there are some aspects of the justice system that
might help people forgive. For example, a victim can listen to the
testimony of a perpetrator and might develop a sense of compas-
sion, empathy, or even love for that perpetrator while justice is be-
ing acted out in court. Thus, at the personal level, forgiveness must
be built within the heart of the victim.
Building in Restorative Justice Procedures
In the traditional justice system, though, there are few opportu-
nities for reconciliation between victim and perpetrator. It is only
as we move more toward restorative justice that reconciliation be-
gins to be more of a probability. Forgiveness is more likely with
restorative justice than traditional justice.
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Introducing Forgiveness around the Edges through
Compassionate Practice
Because the justice system is concerned primarily with justice, its
major emphasis will be always to establish fair outcomes that can
reduce unforgiveness. But there is little room for actually produc-
ing forgiveness within the justice system. Forgiveness occurs as
people are stimulated to empathy, compassion, love, humility, and
gratitude. Those qualities are not commonly experienced within
the justice system, thought they may indeed occur as a conse-
quence of (1) rulings by a merciful judge; (2) agreements by com-
passionate attorneys who, in conjunction with each other, work out
arrangements that plaintiffs can be satisfied with; (3) interventions
that accomplish restorative justice; or (4) pardons granted by an
executive.
Involving the Wider Community
It seems to me that the involvement of the wider community into
the justice system offers another promise for bringing forgiveness
into that system. As healing communities, such as churches, neigh-
borhood organizations or civic groups can be invited into the pro-
cess of resolving harms, forgiveness within the heart of both victim
and perpetrator can occur. Therefore, there is no formula that says
that the mere participation of a community will promote forgive-
ness. However, communities have a stake in promoting reintegra-
tion of victim and offender. Furthermore, personal relationships
can be powerful motivators of restoration.
Communities can be divisive as well as oriented toward healing.
In many ways, hatred, prejudice and the economic and psychologi-
cal roots of crime are like an airborne virus that can be passed
easily within a community. But forgiveness is an individual dose of
medicine to fight against the disease. The system of justice cannot
fully bring forgiveness into people's lives, though it can provide op-
portunities that make forgiveness and reconciliation more or less
likely. Forgiveness needs to occur person by person - in the
hearts of attorneys and judges, in the hearts of victims and perpe-
trators, in the hearts of community members. Each person desires
justice and is starved to give and receive love. Both forgiveness
and justice are operating together in human hearts, and one should
not try to remove either from the heart, for that cannot be done
without destroying the heart.
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Promoting Reconciliation
Reconciliation between perpetrators and victims, between per-
petrators and society, and between victims and society is like build-
ing a bridge over a deep chasm. 4 One does not build a bridge by
demanding that a meeting occur in thin air over the middle of the
chasm, for that would lead to both sides falling. Rather, building
the bridge of reconciliation starts at each side and the seeking and
granting of forgiveness is the motive that helps people move away
from their own entrenched self-interest, out toward the middle
where they can meet. Reconciliation does not presume that each
party is equally culpable. It does presume that each party has
wounds and probably has self-justification for pursuing centrifugal
acts rather than centripetal acts. The motive of forgiveness helps
people begin to walk the bridge toward a meeting place. The expe-
rience of forgiveness can occur at any point along the bridge to
reconciliation.
FORGIVENESS OF SELF
I have been primarily concerned to this point with relationships
among offender, victim, and society. One other important venue
must be considered. I am friends with a successful defense attor-
ney, and in talking to him over the course of years, I was struck at
how much he wrestles with his own conscience in his private time.
On one hand, he is completely committed to providing the best
defense that can be provided for any defendant. He has been ex-
tremely successful at the outcomes of his cases. On the other hand,
he wrestles with moral issues. In one case a defendant told him
that the defendant had indeed committed the murder with which
he was charged. Yet the attorney knew that the police had little
evidence and a conviction was extremely unlikely. The case even-
tually did go to trial, and the self-confessed (to his attorney) mur-
derer was acquitted. While this attorney had behaved within legal
and ethical guidelines, the attorney's sense of morality had been
offended, and he had a difficult time forgiving himself in retrospect.
During the case, he had convinced himself that he was doing the
right thing. Later, his doubts haunted him.
Therefore, forgiveness of self is yet another venue for forgive-
ness around the edges of the justice system. Judges make errors.
24. See Worthington & Drinkard, supra note 18, at 95.
25. See Jeanne M. Woods, Reconciling reconciliation, 3 UCLA J. INr'L L. & FOR-
EIGN AiF. 81-127 (1998).
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Juries make errors or are stampeded into awarding inequitable
damages. Attorneys face irreconcilable choices, or they look back
and admit to themselves that they did not give their best to a de-
fense or prosecution. Attending to self-forgiveness within law
school and providing continuing education to deal with forgiveness
of self seem important, not as the major focus of law, but as an
enduring subtext.
Is THERE A PLACE FOR FORGIVENESS?
I see the main role of forgiveness within the justice system as
being less involved in the justice system per se than potentially
within each individual participant in the justice system. Can each
participant empathize with the other participants? Can each indi-
vidual feel compassion for the others? Can each individual love
the others? Can each individual experience a putting aside of pride
and an active sense of humility? Can each individual experience
and recall with gratitude his or her own receipt of forgiveness from
others? If there is hope for forgiveness within the justice system,
this is the hope of forgiveness.
Forgiveness is more a by-product of sensitivity of individuals and
of establishing structures that permit and encourage sensitivity
within the justice system than it is a goal of the justice system. The
goals of justice are (1) provide fair (to society, to victim and perpe-
trator, to plaintiffs) post-injustice settlements; and (2) protect soci-
ety from future injustices. Such goals can be pursued with a hard
heart aimed mostly at retribution and motivated by unforgiveness.
Or such goals can be pursued with a soft heart aimed at restitution,
restoration, and reconciliation, which are motivated by and moti-
vate forgiveness. Note that in both instances, justice is pursued. I
believe that the justice system operates best when reconciliation is
the motivation, not retribution. There is a place for forgiveness in
the justice system, but it is background, not foreground.
1733
1734 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
0
0
0
EPC oo
_1 0
CEP
'040
00
0
'o $-4
0
0 .
10 .0 f
0uC
00
7 0
'.44R
C4 0 0
.000
